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The Record and its Meaning 



Copyright 1954 by Henry Regnery Company , Chicago , Illinois. Copyright 
under International Copyright Union. Manufactured in the United States 
of America. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 54-6342. 


P.B.B. and P.T.B. 


T he two authors of this book have chosen to study and take 
sides in the most scandalous fracas of the century. For the 
intellectual brawl that has evolved around McCarthy is, in 
fact, just about the most offensive kind of scandal the human intel- 
lect can be dragged into: a scandal of the mind gone manifestly 
irresponsible. And the authors contend that this ultimate felony of 
reason has been committed, not by McCarthy, but by McCarthy’s 

It is the bold assumption of this book that the incredible Senator 
Joe McCarthy, who has replaced the weather and even existen- 
tialism as the main topic of civilized dinner conversation, actually 
exists. The two authors, that is to say, chose not to accept the 
judgment of the day (which, in politics, tends towards fiction); 
rather, they decided to investigate the mythical Grand Investiga- 
tor’s three-dimensional record. 

Right here, of course, we have a violation of current intellectual 
etiquette. For nobody is deemed so uncouth by certified gentle- 
men as a writer who dares take their favored figures of speech 
literally. The sweeping and unsupported generalization is nowa- 
days absolutely de rigueur — so long as it aims at the allegedly su- 
preme dispenser of the sweeping and unsupported generalization, 
that man from Wisconsin. The gentlest President this Republic has 
ever known gets up and delivers a downright inflammatory speech 
against the burning of books; yet, when asked by mortified report- 
ers a few days later which books have in fact been burned by his 
government, he reassures them that he had been speaking meta- 
phorically of purely metaphoric perils in an altogether metaphoric 
world. The stage, in short, is set for a Jonathan Swift (who, how- 
ever, would have to be awfully careful with such ironical stunts 
as those about abolishing Christianity and eating babies: for, in 
this somewhat psychopathic era, the highest political authority 
would greet Swiftian satire with solemn appeals to the citizenry 
not to abolish Christianity and not to eat babies ) . 

Consequently, the authors would seem to be in for some unusual 
and cruel punishment from the American Academe which will 



stand for no such nonsense as a material probe of metaphoric po- 
litical contentions. As it happens, I know the two authors well, and 
I have no doubt that they can take it. Still, I gratefully avail myself 
of the publisher’s invitation to explain my considered solidarity 
with them and their book. I do so, not because of any delusion that 
my endorsement could add one whit of luster or validity to their 
argument, but because I appreciate every opportunity to clarify 
an unorthodox position; and what could be more unorthodox in 
this era than intellectuals engaged in hot pursuit of Artfi-McCar- 

When McCarthy proceeded to uncover the immense Commu- 
nist infiltration of democratic government and free society, his 
conduct was sometimes objectionable (as this book demonstrates), 
but his activating premise was not: At the heart of what is deri- 
sively called McCarthyism lives, in paradoxical fact, the very 
principle of Western civilization— tKe axiomatic tenet that man 
is entirely responsible for the intellectual choices he has made in 
an exercise of his free will. The essence of what we have learned 
in five thousand years about the nature of man is that the inviolable 
sovereignty of the person presupposes his inseparable responsibil- 
ity for the positions he takes, including wrong ones. A man can 
stumble into grave error for the noblest of reasons, God knows; 
and only Satanism denies man’s inalienable capacity to recover 
from error. But man can neither grow, nor err, nor reform, nor 
even exist, unless he is taken seriously, and so takes himself. The 
true difference between McCarthy and his allegedly sophisticated 
opponents is not that they propose a charitable and civilized 
course, while McCarthy is Caliban; the difference is, in truth, that 
he, often crudely instructed, takes man seriously, while they insist 
that man is morally a vegetable and intellectually an eternal child. 
The intellectual scandal around McCarthy is primarily the fright- 
ening frivolousness of his opposition which holds that mans choices 
signify nothing; that on his walks through the valley of decisions 
man picks and discards commitments with the abandon of Peter 
Pan picking daisies. 

And the scandal becomes wholly insufferable when the private 
commitments for which pardon is asked— on the peculiar grounds 
of moral idiocy— involve no less than the fate of man. Conceivably, 
an artist can justly demand that no importance be attached to his 
early endorsement of, say, stark atonality: for this, surely, may 
have been the commitment of a playful hour of nihilism involving, 



after all, nothing but his own creative self; and so it must not be 
held against whatever preference he later chooses. But what is one 
to say of an intellectual who, having advocated in the past a tragic 
interference with innumerable lives, now thinks himself entitled 
to claim for his immense act the irrelevancy of a meaningless in- 
fatuation? To a man who leaves an indefensible position, society 
owes understanding and confidence, provided his motives in tak- 
ing the indefensible position had been in themselves defensible, 
and provided he himself tries to understand the impact of his error 
and to atone for it. But to a college professor who, on leaving 
organizations which are demonstrably engaged in a total upheaval 
of human existence, says “Ooops, so sorry, and let’s not ever men- 
tion it again!”— to such a man society owes nothing but contempt. 

Yet this is precisely the measure of the scandal: that the most 
audible intellectuals of our era invoke for themselves a special 
dispensation from intellectual responsibility, a kind of license to 
philander through the moral order, a fool’s franchise never to be 
taken at their word. This, I submit, is the ironical essence of what 
America’s and Europe’s intelligentsia consider their battle royal 
with McCarthy: that he ascribes to the intellectual a serious im- 
pact on society. 

I do not know Mr. McCarthy’s innermost thoughts on the sub- 
ject. But judging by what he has done and said in public, I am 
compelled to conclude that he is one of the few contemporary poli- 
ticians who earnestly believe in the efficacy of ideas. He respects 
reason so much, in fact, that he clearly overemphasizes its part in 
the shaping of national policies. For his rationale is invariably the 
same: certain people have certain ideas— ergo, whatever they do 
in positions they have obtained must have been determined by, 
and serve, these ideas. The shameful joke of the era is that this 
compliment to the supremacy of the mind is being taken by the 
Liberal intelligentsia as the supreme affront against the intellect, 
as a sordid assault of Know-Nothingism on reason. 

Honesty and worldly experience compel me to warn Mr. Mc- 
Carthy that he may overrate the mind’s supremacy over character. 
In sad truth, a great many intellectuals put income above convic- 
tions and, consequently, have no scruples in acting contrary to 
their beliefs. There must be, for example, quite a few Marxians in 
government and in the professions who, in exchange for a regular 
salary, do their utmost to promote capitalism. The Senator from 
Wisconsin, in short, underestimates the frequency and the compe- 



tence of prostitution. But unless we renounce rationality alto- 
gether, we are forced to assume that, once an intellectual disagrees 
with his society, only two consequences are logically permissible: 
either he infuses his considered bias into every phase of his pro- 
fessional work-in which case society is surely entitled to retaliate; 
or he suppresses his innermost beliefs for a fee— in which case he 
proves himself so depraved that his services ought to be discon- 
tinued on grounds of moral hygiene. For on two points have revo- 
1 lutionaries and conservatives agreed, from the dawn of time up to 
the appearance of Anti-McCarthyism: both always acknowledged 
mans privileged duty to live by his convictions, and both always 
d espise djthgjurchasable libertine. Of all changes that have oc- 
j curred in my lifetime, none is more catastrophic than this: that the 
j Liberals^ in their brawl with McCarthy, no longer defend man’s 
1 glorious burden of living his beliefs, but now stipulate a brand-new 
| inalienable right of man— the right to sell his soul. 

No, the disclaimer that the concentric and unprecedentedly 
savage Liberal attack on McCarthy is motivated by nothing but 
the celebrated crudity of his rhetoric and his investigative methods 
will just not wash. Crudeness is of course deplorable, even in a 
politician, and must be censured by the sensitive; consequently, 
this book censures McCarthy whenever its authors found him 
guilty of recklessness or just plain exaggeration. But no honest 
book has ever been written about any American politician, alive or 
dead, that has not censured him on these very grounds. Mass 
democracy apparently invites shouting, and this country, at any 
rate, is used to a pretty high pitch. In fact, I for one can still remem- 
ber the learned American Liberal’s sheepish pleasure with the 
demagogic cleverness of F.D.R. and the murderous invectives of 
Ickes; mind you, not that the learned American Liberal ‘philo- 
sophically” approved of demagoguery and venom— he just wanted 
you to know that he was “realist” enough to “understand” how 
indispensable such gimmicks were in mobilizing the lazy “masses” 
for the righteous cause. Now, unlike that American Liberal, the 
authors of this book apply one standard to both camps: objection- 
able techniques they find objectionable even when employed on 
their side of the issue, and they say so quite unequivocally. But— 
and for such astuteness I want to congratulate them particularly— 
not for a second did they believe that the hectic growth of Anti- 
McCarthyism has been really provoked by “McCarthy’s methods.” 
Some day, when there has developed a new science of political 



ethnology, a patient scholar will undoubtedly produce the Golden 
Bough of Anti-McCarthyism— a definitive critical catalogue of its 
mythology, its lore and its obsessions. And though the area of that 
fascinating inquiry has as yet hardly been mapped, I would hazard 
the guess that its future Sir James Frazer will define the great 
affliction of the 20th-Century intelligentsia as a collective mental 
inversion. Not for the first time in history, but more fiercely and 
more uninhibitedly than ever before, a closed group was exorcising 
the devils of its collective mind by projecting all its own vices onto 
a personalized demon: what McCarthy’s opposition calls “McCar- 
thyism” will no doubt be found the observable stun total of their 
own Techniques, aggressions and attitudes. 

McCarthyisii?, indicts the opposition, is a technique of the fan- 
tastic and reckless exagge^fuH. Yet, typically, when a lady in a 
small Indiana town ventures to warn that the Communists are ex- 
ploiting the delightful tale of Robin Hood ( which, to be sure, they 
indubitably are), the ubiquitous anti-McCatthy press blankets 
the several continents with editorial chants that this worrisome 
lady from Indiana represents America gone mad over suppressive 

McCarthyism, accuses the opposition, is the technique of estab- 
lishing a lie simply by referring to it as a well known fact. Yet 
Mr. Walter Lippmann, a senior saint of certified liberalism, did not 
hesitate to misinform the world in his globally syndicated column 
that “an American who dared to suggest the relinquishment of 
American sovereignty to a supernational, to a super- American fed- 
eration would be hauled up before the McCarthy committee.” 
(Whereupon Mr. Clarence Streit, President of the manifestly su- 
pernational “Federal Union,” reminded Lippmann that, on the 
contrary, the Senator from Wisconsin had co-sponsored the Kefau- 
ver Resolution “calling for a Federal convention of delegates to 
explore the possibility of the U.S. and Canada forming an Atlantic 
Union with Britain, France and other European members of 

McCarthyism, claims the opposition, is the technique of the 
gratuitous smear. Yet, for one of innumerable examples, the liberal 
Saturday Review , reviewing an innocuous book on Formosa, sug- 
gests without the slightest provocation that “it may be denounced 
by the China Lobby’s kept journalists and legislators.” 

McCarthyism, protests the opposition, subverts the very essence 
of free society by charging a person’s private associations against 



his fitness for positions of public trust. Yet no American Liberal 
has ever objected to this finding of the U.S. Supreme Court: “One's 
associates, past and present, as well as one's conduct, may prop- 
erly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty ” 

McCarthyism, thunders the opposition, slaughters civic rights 
by dragging private citizens through the mud of congressional in- 
vestigations. Yet when the U.S. Senate was investigating some 
wretched capitalists, and foolhardy conservatives objected to pos- 
sible congressional violations of privacy, Professor (later Justice) 
Felix Frankfurter, another senior saint of certified liberalism, thus 
! found in The New Republic (of May 21, 1924): “The question is 
not whether people's feelings here and there may be hurt, or mines 
‘dragged through the mud,' as it is called. . . « GriYics, who have 
nothing to say for the astonishing toituption and corrupting soil 
which have been brought Vo light, seek to divert attention and 
shackle the future by suggesting restrictions in the procedure of 
future congressional investigations.” 

Anti-McGarthyism, one can see, throws the liberal mind into 
distressing inconsistency: contortions of such severity have not 
been observed since the St. Vitus Dance epidemics of the Middle 
Ages. That the McCarthy-obsessed intelligentsia enjoy their 
sprained logic is inconceivable; to make them endure that self- 
imposed pain, their fixation must be profound. What is it? 

Is it a dread that McCarthy may be America's Hitler? To my 
knowledge, not even McCarthy's worst-balanced opponents have 
ever publicized such a dread. True, some conscientious objectors 
to “guilt by association” have, somewhat inconsistently again, tried 
to hold against the Senator that several denizens of America's 
lunatic fringe have accosted him. But McCarthy's rebuke of such 
advances was each time so unequivocal and spiteful that the whis- 
per died on the rotten vine. 

Indeed, nothing perhaps embitters McCarthy’s opposition so 
much as the, to them, confusing fact that he has never indicated 
the slightest sympathy for Fascism. For, surely, one is allowed to 
presume a general consensus that these are the two irreducible 
tenets of any Fascist ideology : the transfer of undivided social and 
political power into the hands of an executive which reigns su- 
preme; and the abolition of all political parties, save a “people's” 
militarized rally around a deified leader and his appointed “elite.” 
Different color schemes of Fascism ( black, brown, or red ) may, as 
it suits, drape this skeleton of the Fascist doctrine with different 



sets of racial or social or philosophical canons; but, so long as we 
propose to make semantic sense, we confine the term Fascist to 
revolutionary movements only when they embrace the two ge- 
neric creeds of totalitarian social organizations— an all-powerful 
executive and a one-party system. 

By no stretch of the imagination, or logic, could anything Mc- 
Carthy has ever done, or said, or written, be interpreted as a mal- 
content revolutionary's critique of America’s traditional system. 
He is, come to think of it, the exceptional politician who advocates 
no social reform, recommends no surgery, and sells no medicine. 
Here indeed, if anywhere, McCarthy would appear seriously vul- 
nerable: authentic American liberals could reasonably admonish 
him that a politician of his stature and eloquence owed to himself, 
and to the nation, a far more sharply profiled approach to the au- 
thentic dilemmas of our social, economic, financial and foreign 
policies. To this McCarthy might reply that the hectic circum- 
stances of his crusade against the Communist infiltration of gov- 
ernment force upon him a singlemindedness which precludes ex- 
pert concern for much else. 

And this would be a persuasive reply because McCarthy believes 
(backed up by excellent evidence and excellent compatriots— the 
authors of this book among them ) that his country is at war with 
Communism, war pure and simple; and that therefore, as there is 
in war “no substitute for victory,” all other policy concerns must 
recede for the time of fighting. “This war will not end except by 
either victory or death for this civilization/’ McCarthy asserted in 
a recent speech; and it is this hot sense of urgency which distin- 
guishes him from the more conventional practitioners of the po- 
litical trade— and also explains, altogether satisfactorily, his non- 
conformance with pastoral etiquette. 

Still, an authentic American liberalism could, perhaps con- 
vincingly, insist that a Senator of McCarthy’s fame ought to work 
harder on his political rationale. But it is a measure of the stupe- 
faction which has befallen American liberalism that, instead of 
demanding that McCarthy talk more, and about more things, its 
only intent is to shut him up about everything. For, inasmuch as a 
modicum of coherence can be interpolated into their frantic utter- 
ances, the program of American Liberals seems to have atrophied 
to just this one plank: Shut him up— in the name of free speech I 

What is it they want? That it be made illegal for the citizens of 
Wisconsin to vote for McCarthy? That he be forbidden to speak 


his mind when, nonetheless, elected? That at a time when some 
liberals proclaim the de luxe “right to be wrong,” one man (that 
man) be forbidden to be right? In bizarre fact, Anti-McCarthyism 
seems to be campaigning for a veritable Rube Goldberg of a Con- 
stitutional Bill of Attainder— a repeal of the Constitution for just 
one Joseph R. McCarthy, Jr. 

For the same Constitution that evidently grants a Communist 
the privilege not to answer a Senator s questions, surely grants a 
Senator the concomitant privilege to ask them. And that privilege 
of a Senator happens to coincide with his sworn duty to ask any 
question he deems relevant to pending or contemplated legisla- 
tion. Yes, here stands the American Liberal, stuck with a Constitu- 
tion which guarantees freedom of speech even to Senators; with a 
political system whose effectiveness depends on unfettered con- 
gressional hearings; and with the Senates indisputable right to 
elect its own inquiring officers. But the American Liberal is also 
stuck with that Senator whom, one gathers, he dislikes. And so the 
American Liberal, cutting his nose rather than the Gordian knot, 
suggests that Constitution, political system, and Senatorial stat- 
ute-just this once, please!— be damned. Such are the fevers of 

Now the origin of this novel disease is still unknown. It can not, 
as we have seen, have been caused by a sincere apprehension of 
incipient Fascism; for to suspect McCarthy of Fascist intent would 
be just another symptom of McCarthophobia— not its causation. 
Nor can the affliction stem from an irritated concern for civil liber- 
ties; for we have seen that the afflicted have always considered 
what they now call “McCarthy’s methods” to constitute a most 
legitimate exercise of those very same civil liberties. Nor could it 
be a case of plain allergy; for while anybody is of course entitled 
to dislike an incumbent Senator, nobody can be such an ass as to 
make his private hate-affair the very center of his Weltanschauung 
—nobody, that is, who is not stricken by a serious malady. So we 
will have to be patient for a while; it may take years before the 
elusive virus of McCarthophobia is finally separated. 

Until then, I venture to predict, this book will remain a unique 
source of illumination for anybody who wants to move through our 
darkened political neighborhood. I venture to predict that the 
reader of this heavily documented volume will discover how excit- 
ing documentation can be— incomparably more exciting, in pleas- 
urable fact, than the banal irrationalism which nowadays simulates 
political debate. 



This book refutes the insolent contention that those millions of 
Americans who share McCarthy’s sense of urgency, though not 
necessarily all his judgments, are sons of Neanderthal. And it re- 
duces the peddlers of this falsehood to their size: if the entrenched 
and the conformists, the Babbitts and the snobs, have ever agreed 
on a common enemy, and made utter fools of themselves, they 
have done so in the case of McCarthy. 

There came from the heartland of America a tenacious and quite 
traditional politician who had much to learn about the nature of 
evidence and the manners of public debate. He occasionally mis- 
judged the motives of men, but not worse than two generations 
of American liberals have misjudged men and motives. Yes, he 
called Mr. Owen Lattimore the top Soviet agent in this country, 
and he has not produced conclusive evidence. But two genera- 
tions of American liberalism have called honorable men “merchants 
of death” and Stalin a protagonist of human liberation; and for 
either misjudgment they had far less evidence than McCarthy had 
for his. 

And consider what happened! On the one side, there were the 
pundits and opinion-makers, the professional thinkers, the teachers 
and artists and critics— and they have been proved fatally wrong in 
a stubborn misjudgment that may involve the end of everything 
they were educated to uphold. On the other side, there was a 
young, not at all subtle, entirely self-made Midwestern politician— 
and he was wrong in several judgments that involve some members 
of the club. Whereupon the Liberal supreme court of columnists, 
editors, commentators and critics, of thinkers and comedians, of 
statesmen and account executives, of publishers and piccolo play- 
ers, convened in permanent mob session and found: the atrocious 
misjudgment of the certified gentlemen, who have dropped 
(“Oops, sorry!”) half of the world into irrevocable perdition, are 
not merely forgivable but downright honorable; while the erring 
young man from Wisconsin is the hound of hell. 

With this book, William F. Buckley, Jr. and L. Brent Bozell have 
liberated a territory which for four years was terrorized by the 
nervous shriek; liberated and restored it to orderly argument. Now 
anybody who wants to remain an Anti-McCarthyite in good stand- 
ing, and at the same time intellectually respectable, will first have 
to read and disprove this book. 

William S. Schlamm 



Prologue by William Schlamm vii 


I The Problem 3 

II The Background 5 

III The State Department, 1945-1947: An Earnest 

Effort 9 

IV The State Department, 1947-1950: Three Years 

of Inertia 18 

The State Department and the United 

Nations 31 


V The First Charges 41 

VI The Typings Saga: Introduction 62 

Public Hearings: Whose Responsibility? . 69 

VII The Nine Public Cases: An Invitation to Investigate 74 

The Case of Dorothy Kenyon 76 

The Case of Haldore Hanson 86 

The Case of Philip Jessup 97 

The Case of Esther Brunauer 125 

The Cases of Frederick Schuman and 

Harlow Shapley 136 

The Case of Gustavo Duran 140 

The Case of John Stewart Service .... 147 

The Case of Owen Lattimore 153 

VIII "Warmed-Over Charges” 161 


IX Some Unanswered Questions 167 

X A Vindication 192 

XI Confrontation 212 

XII Closing Ranks: Some Proposals for the Civil Service 245 


XIII Senator McCarthy’s Method 267 

Introduction 267 

The Smearing of Innocent People .... 270 

The Publicizing of His Charges .... 282 

The Use of Congressional Immunity . . . 286 

Impugning the Loyalty of His Critics . . 294 

McCarthy As Against His Contemporaries . 302 

XIV The New Conformity 308 

Our “Reign of Terror” 308 

The Question of Conformity ..... 316 
McCarthyism’s Call to Conformity . . . 331 

XV Afterword 336 

Appendix 341 

A. Communist Front Connections of 

McCarthy’s “Public Cases” 343 

B. The Controversy Over the Loyalty Files . . 351 

C. Statistical Breakdown of Lee List and 

McCarthy List 360 

D. List of Persons Accused by McCarthy . . . 364 

E. Press Coverage Given to McCarthy’s Nine 

Public Cases 383 

F. The George Marshall Episode 388 

Notes 393 

Index 401 



The Problem 

O N the 31st of March, in 1949, Mr. Winston Churchill (he was 
then ungartered) was to address the Mid-Century Convo- 
cation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and he 
had advertised his forthcoming remarks as “not unimportant.” 
After it was delivered, the press services had a hard time decid- 
ing what aspect of Churchill’s address was most newsworthy. They 
settled, finally, on this: “It is certain that Europe would have been 
communized like Czechoslovakia, and London under bombard- 
ment some time ago, but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in 
the hands of the U. S ” 

Sir Winston, of course, normally speaks with a robust certitude 
about everything. It is perhaps not “certain” that our monopoly on 
the atom bomb served during those years as the controlling deter- 
rent to Soviet expansion. But whatever Churchill’s extravagances, 
he cannot be taken lightly. This time, no doubt, he put his finger on 
the dominant feature of mid-twentieth century international rela- 
tions: conceivably a single individual could shift the balance of 
power by delivering to the Soviet Union technological secrets 
through the use of which they could overcome their strategic dis- 
advantage and proceed to communize Europe. 

This is something new in the world. Traitors have played critical 
parts in the past. But many factors— primarily the indecisiveness of 
any single weapon— have mitigated the consequences of treason. 
The great traitors of the past have swung battles, but not wars. The 
situation is different today. An Alger Hiss, critically situated, can, 
conceivably, determine the destiny of the West. A Klaus Fuchs can 
deliver to “the thirteen scheming men” what may well be the key 
to world conquest. 

It is largely because of this new face of treason that we in the free 
world are writing, preaching and discussing ways to adapt our tra- 
ditional concepts into serviceable weapons with which to protect 


ourselves from hazards the architects of our society never contem- 
plated. The job will be hard. The new consequences of treason 
will not allow us to settle for a security program based on the idea 
—in itself venerable— that ten suspected traitors working in the 
State Department should not be molested lest one of them should 
prove to be loyal. It is one thing for Lizzie Borden to benefit from 
the charity of the doubt; it is something else again to protect 
Klaus Fuchs until after he has committed the “overt” act. 

By 1950, we were more or less agreed that the overt act a Fuchs 
might commit was something we dared not risk. The majority of us 
now knew that, for all the twists and turns of the Party Line, the 
Communists have never swerved and, barring a philosophical or 
political revolution, never would swerve from their ambition to oc- 
cupy the world. And we knew, moreover, that they had hit upon 
an uncommonly successful formula for achieving their goal. The 
era was past when Americans needed to be educated about the 
threat of Communism. 

But a new era arrived, the dominant characteristic of which was— 
and remains— indecision. Undecided how to cope with the new 
menace, we lacked even the will to find a solution. Our confusion 
and our purposelessness were crippling. A symbol of it, perhaps, 
was our society’s relentless persecution of what John Chamberlain 
has shrewdly labelled “premature anti-Communists.” The evolution 
from pro-Communism in the direction of anti-Communism seemed 
to have ground to a halt in an intermediary stage, aptly described 
as anti- anti-Communism. 

This, then, was the overriding problem when Senator McCarthy 
made his entrance on the national stage: having acknowledged the 
nature and the immediacy of our peril, how might we get by our 
disintegrated ruling elite, which had no stomach for battle, and 
get down to the business of fighting the enemy in our midst? 


The Background 

C ertainly one of the most effective arms of Soviet imperialism 
has been the strategically placed native of the free world 
who, for whatever perverse reason, has determined to serve 
the Communist cause. 

As far back as the twenties, many Americans were aware that 
Communism was more than a proposal for political change which 
would take its chances "in the marketplace of ideas.” Communism, 
it was recognized, was a relentless political-military conspiracy. A 
Committee of the House of Representatives was soon instructed to 
investigate the Communist conspiracy in the United States. The 
Committee operated in the increasingly difficult climate of the 
Popular Front, when great numbers of Western intellectuals had 
entered into an enthusiastic concordat with Stalin. Slowly and hap- 
hazardly our lawmakers sought to adjust our statute books to the 
realities of the Communist menace. 

In 1938, the McCormack Act ordered all agents of foreign gov- 
ernments to register with the Department of Justice. The Hatch 
Act of 1939 excluded from Federal employment members of any 
organization that advocates the forcible overthrow of our consti- 
tutional form of government. The Smith Act of 1940 forbade Ameri- 
cans to conspire to teach or advocate the overthrow of the U. S. 
government by force or violence. 

In 1942, surprisingly, an alert Civil Service Commission enunci- 
ated loyalty criteria which were to govern federal agencies in deter- 
mining whom to hire. It was stipulated that, in case of "reasonable 
doubt” as to his loyalty, an applicant must be regarded as un- 

These, of course, were primitive and inadequate tools for dealing 
with the kind of penetration against which our best students of 
Communism were warning us. It is best to think of them as the first 
efforts of the American people, acting through their representa- 



fives, to master by fiat a problem that, in the long run, would re- 
quire much more, perhaps even a Constitutional Amendment. * 

Moreover, the laws were not enforced; or, insofar as they were 
enforced, they were enforced tardily and halfheartedly. The Hatch 
Act bothered nobody. Even after it was passed, no less than 537 
members of the American League for Peace and Democracy alone 
(as palpable a Communist front as ever existed) remained in fed- 
eral service. 

However, the Civil Service Commissions “reasonable doubt” cri- 
terion for applicants moved toward the heart of the matter. The 
Commission made a start toward committing us to the principle 
that the federal government has the right to draw up its own re- 
quirements for government service— that employment by the Gov- 
ernment is a privilege, not a right. 

The Commission’s effort did not, however, prevent further Com- 
munist penetration of the government, much less undo that which 
had already occurred. For the Commission did not rule on person- 
nel already hired. Moreover, the Commission, under existing stat- 
utes and budget limitations, could not use the FBI in its investiga- 
tions. Consequently, most of the Commission s information was ob- 
tained from the files of the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities. The rest came from a handful of its own investigators. 

Meanwhile, the Attorney General had entered the field. In 1941, 
he directed the FBI to probe complaints of alleged disloyalty 
among Federal personnel. The FBI reported its findings to the ap- 
propriate agencies, and these agencies made their own decisions. It 
soon became clear that standards varied widely from agency to 
agency. In 1942, therefore, the Attorney General created an Inter- 
departmental Committee on Investigation to assist in standardiz- 
ing procedures and evaluative criteria. This Committee, like the 
Civil Service Commission, confined itself to regulating applications 
for employment; and even then it recommended a manifestly inade- 
quate standard: rejection on loyalty grounds was to be based on 
proof that the applicant personally advocates the overthrow of the 
government; or else that he is a conscious and willing member of 
an organization advocating such overthrow. 

0 The Smith Act, in our opinion, in effect did amend the Constitution, 
the circumlocutions of the slim majority of the Supreme Court that upheld 
it notwithstanding. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” It does not go on to say that 
certain social exigencies, as for example war, or a foreign conspiracy, invali- 
date this explicit limitation of congressional competence. 



But the Civil Service Commission was making enough headway 
to inconvenience some Communists on the government payroll. 
Consequently, a sustained cry went up from the Communist-influ- 
enced Federal Workers Union which demanded, among other 
things, that the Commission cease to affront the dignity of the indi- 
vidual by interesting itself in his allegiance. The Bureau of the 
Budget heeded the Union's protests and cut the funds required to 
implement the loyalty program. And Communist after Communist 
worked his way into the assorted wartime agencies. 

Thus, during the war, there was no effective program to keep 
Communist agents out of sensitive government areas. In some cases, 
the most incriminating evidence against an applicant or, worse 
still, against a highly situated incumbent, failed not only to produce 
action but even to get attention. The case of Alger Hiss, the Amer- 
asia case, and the Doxey Wilkerson case, are monuments to Amer- 
ica’s early incapacity to defend herself against her enemies. 

Responsible officials, both in the State Department and in the 
White House, were twice informed about Alger Hiss. Mr. Adolph 
A. Berle relayed Mr. Whittaker Chambers’ report on Hiss to his 
superiors in 1939. In 1943, Chambers spoke with the FBI, who 
presumably submitted the information to the State Department. 
There was either a conspiracy of silence among those officers who 
knew the information about Hiss, or else they were so persuaded by 
pro-Communist propaganda, much of it of their own making, that 
they simply did not think it made much difference whether or not 
Hiss was a Communist. The last is less astounding if one recalls 
the celebrated statement of the influential Mr. Paul Appleby, of 
the Bureau of the Budget: “A man in the employ of the govern- 
ment has just as much right to be a member of the Communist 
Party as he has to be a member of the Democratic or Republican 
Party.” 1 

Chambers also revealed to the FBI his personal knowledge of 
the fact that Lee Pressman, Nathan Witt, John Abt, Charles Kramer 
and others— all of them government employees at one time— were 
members of the Communist Party. Yet no action was taken even on 
those who were still employed in the government. 

The Amerasia case is the second-most publicized dereliction of 
the State and Justice Departments in loyalty matters. Six persons 
were apprehended and charged with delivering at least 1700 clas- 
sified government documents to the magazine Amerasia , a dimly 
veiled Communist publication run by a named Communist, Philip 



Jaffe. Many of the documents were top secret, and some of them 
contained information still affecting American security. But so re- 
luctant was the Justice Department to press the case that charges 
against four of the individuals involved were dropped altogether, 
Jaffe was let off with a fine of $2,500, and Emmanuel Larsen, an 
employee of the State Department, with one of $500. 

Throughout the war, to the extent that limited funds and over- 
worked personnel made it possible, the FBI kept up a steady flow 
of reports to government agencies on the results of its inquiry into 
the affiliations of various employees. But no matter how conclusive 
its evidence, the FBI could never count on prompt action. One 
example: Before the Committee on Un-American Activities, Mr. J. 
Edgar Hoover testified on March 26, 1947, that on March 7, 1942, 
the Bureau had transmitted to the Federal Security Agency a 57- 
page report indicating that one of its employees, Doxey Wilkerson, 
had been, and in all probability still was, a Communist. The FSA 
nevertheless retained Wilkerson (who later left it for another gov- 
ernment agency, the Office of Price Administration ) . On the 19th 
of June, 1943, Mr. Hoover continued, Wilkerson left the govern- 
ment altogether— to become a “Communist Party Organizer” and 
a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party. 
Mr. Hoover was able to cite a regulation of the Communist Party 
which stipulates that, to be eligible for its National Committee, an 
individual must have been a Party member in good standing for 
at least four years. 

The government’s wartime record on security was so bad that 
inadequate laws and sloppy administrative procedures cannot fully 
account for it. There must have been a total absence of the will to 
do the job. Understandably, after all. For this was the era when our 
government was using its propaganda machine to trumpet the vir- 
tues of our noble and democratic Soviet ally. Into this propaganda 
effort our leaders put their hearts. It could hardly be expected 
that, at the same time, they should consider as unfit for govern- 
ment service Americans who had merely shown themselves to be 
deeply attached to that ally. 


The State Department, 1945-1947: 
An Earnest Effort 

M r. J. Anthony Panuch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Administration between September, 1945, and January, 
1947, asserted recently that, the scandal of Alger Hiss not- 
withstanding, “the hard core of the State Department remained 
[under Cordell Hull] impenetrable— a stockade of conservatism 
and traditionalism.” It is, of course, now a matter of record that 
Hiss was not the sole representative of proletarian democracy in 
Hull’s State Department. Still, Mr. Panuch may be almost right; 
for it was not until the fall of 1945 that the State Department be- 
came the haven for every jobless ideologue in Washington. Then, 
at the behest of the all-powerful Bureau of the Budget, roughly 
13,000 employees of wartime agencies were transferred to the State 
Department, en masse, in the interest of “economy.” As we shall 
see, the “Merger of 1945” presented almost insuperable problems 
for the Department’s security officers. 

Yet before examining this critical turn of affairs, we must take 
note of concurrent events at the policy-making level of the Depart- 
ment. By the summer of 1945, the State Department had a New 
Look, even though James Byrnes was its head. Assistant Secretary 
Adolph Berle had been eased out by those who, as he put it, were 
opposed to “a pretty clean-cut showdown” with Soviet Russia— 
“Mr. Acheson s group, of course, with Mr. Hiss as principal assist- 
ant in the matter.” 1 Next to go was anti-Communist Under Secre- 
tary Joseph Grew, who, in August of 1945, was replaced by Dean 
Acheson. Similar shifts followed on lower levels. 

The now powerful left-wing faction within the Department set 
itself a whole series of administrative and policy objectives, most 

1) transfer of the policy-making function from Foreign Service 
career officers to new State Department personnel; 


2 ) centralized control of sources of foreign intelligence; 

3) adoption of a global (as opposed to a nationalist, alliance- 
type) approach to foreign policy, centered on the United Nations. 

Already, Alger Hiss, as Director of the State Department’s Office 
of Special Political Affairs, exercised broad powers. The charter of 
Hiss’ office— drafted by himself— delegated to it “charge of interna- 
tional organization [UN] and security affairs, for the formulation 
and coordination of policy and action relating to such affairs, with 
special emphasis on the maintenance of international peace and 
security through organized action/’ 

After organizing the United Nations Secretariat in London, in 
March, 1946, Hiss proposed a reorganization of the State Depart- 
ment. Had this plan been approved, and had Hiss attained the per- 
sonal power which, under the plan, he staked out for himself, the 
State Department would have taken a long step forward in the 
direction of becoming an adjunct to the Soviet Foreign Office. 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration, Mr. J. An- 
thony Panuch, transmitted an analysis* of Hiss’ plan to his superi- 
ors which said in part: 

I have read with mingled feelings of admiration and horror the out- 
line of the above as revealed in . . . memorandum to the Secretary of 
State, March 5, 1946. The plans simplicity of design is admirable; its 
conception is grandiose. . . . 

In examining the plan and assessing its implications in terms of con- 
trol, it should be remembered that Dr. Hiss exercises Svengali-like in- 
fluence over the mental process of ( Blank ) . Through ( Blank ) , his desig- 
nee for the post of Secretary General of the U.S. Delegation to the 
UNO, Dr. Hiss will enjoy “working contror over the flow of papers in 
and out of the Secretariat of the U.S. group. The proposed plan would 
establish a similar control set-up within the State Department, where 
Dr. Hiss already wields considerable influence with (Blank). . . . Un- 
der the plan, the Director of this new office ( Dr. Hiss ) would be the 
under Secretary’s Deputy for United Nations Affairs. 

If this ambitious project should be approved , it is obvious that the 
operations of the new Office , as the “initiating and coordinating center 
with the Department” for UNO affairs will , for all practical purposes , 
supplant and supersede the functions of the geographic and economic 
offices of the Department . ... If Dr. Hiss should succeed in causing 

* This memorandum was treated as confidential until it was read on the 
floor of the Senate, on July 24, 1950, by Senator Homer Ferguson. Senator 
Ferguson, even then, suppressed many of the names mentioned, substituting, 
in each case, “Blank/’ The names were revealed by Panuch before a sub- 
committee of the Senate Judiciary on June 25, 1953; for various reasons, 
however, they are excluded here. 



(Blank) to be designated as the UNO Assistant Secretary General for 
Administration, the Hiss group will have achieved infiltration in, or 
control of, four critically strategic points, i.e., a) UNO itself (Blank), b) 
The U. S. Delegation (Blank), c) State Department (Blank) and 
d) Bureau of the Budget (Blank) [Italics added.] 

God was surely in His heaven on that particular day: Secretary 
Byrnes rejected the proposed reorganization plan. Had Byrnes ac- 
cepted it, and had Whittaker Chambers remained silent, Alger Hiss 
would have emerged as our virtual Secretary of State. As it hap- 
pened, Hiss was defeated— on this point, at any rate. A few months 
later, he resigned, to labor in the vineyards of International Peace 
as President of the Carnegie Foundation. 

Though he cannot be credited with being a pioneer in the fight 
against Soviet infiltration of government, Secretary Byrnes frus- 
trated the aspirations of the Hiss group and maintained a deter- 
mined, if sometimes shortsighted, team in the security division. He 
brought with him, as Assistant Secretary, his long-time friend and 
former law partner, Mr. Donald Russell. And at the suggestion of 
General Clay and others, Russell persuaded J. Anthony Panuch, a 
successful New York attorney with ten years’ experience in various 
government jobs, to take the post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Panuch was assigned the task of integrating the new “merger” 
personnel into the State Department. He insisted that this responsi- 
bility called for complete authority over the Department’s security 
program. Byrnes agreed and named Panuch “Coordinator” in Octo- 
ber, 1945. Panuch retained from Cordell Hull’s regime Mr. Tom 
Fitch, head of the Bureau of Special Investigation, and Mr. Fred 
Lyon, Chief of Counter Intelligence, both of whom had made con- 
scientious and sometimes telling security efforts during the war. 
Mr. Robert L. Bannerman came in as Special Assistant and Secur- 
ity Officer. 

Panuch’s responsibilities were legion. He had, on the one hand, 
to concern himself with internecine struggles raging between vari- 
ous agencies in the Department. Many of these were over com- 
peting proposals for reorganization of the Department; and some, 
as we have noticed, were but thinly disguised attempts to center 
power in the hands of ideologues congenial to the schemer. Not- 
withstanding, Panuch and his associates waded into the security 
quagmire. They faced a number of grave problems. 

There was, first, the sheer volume of work involved in screening 



the personnel entering the Department under the "merger” pro- 
gram. Another problem was the reorganization of security proce- 
dures with an eye to separating the investigative and evaluative 
functions. A third was the adoption of a loyalty standard exacting 
enough to protect the Department in case of doubt about an em- 
ployee’s reliability. And a fourth concerned the legal problems 
involved in firing "status” employees. 

Top priority was given to the "merger” program. The task was 
difficult. There had been a total of 12,797 “transferees,” as the State 
Department called them. Although most of them left the Depart- 
ment almost immediately, as a result of the post-war retrenchment, 
approximately 4,000 stayed on. The personnel records for many of 
these, however, were far from complete. The State Department 
listed some of its difficulties in a memorandum to the Tydings Com- 
mittee, 2 emphasizing both the administrative confusion of the day 
and the sloppiness of the wartime security program: 

Thus, as to one of these agencies [the OWI], it was determined that of 
the entire staff of 7,482 transferred to the Department, only 2,687 had 
been cleared by the Civil Service Commission. Investigations were dis- 
continued before completion in 1,113 cases and were pending in 262 
cases when the transfers were made. Thus, there were thousands of 
cases of employees in this and other agencies transferred to the Depart- 
ment who had apparently never been fully investigated. . . . 

During the first hectic months of the new security program, in- 
vestigators were often called upon to evaluate their own findings, 
and even to make final disposition of the cases, though a strict 
separation of fact-finding and evaluation has for centuries been 
basic to justice. This deficiency was, however, spotted before much 
damage had been done, and Mr. Panuch eliminated it. Thenceforth 
individuals were investigated at one level, the findings evaluated at 
another. Moreover, employees could appeal to the Secretary of 
State, who was empowered to reject the recommendations of the 
final screening board. 

But what loyalty and security standards were to be established? 
Here Panuch aligned himself with the realists. He ordered his 
security personnel to observe the standards set up by the Civil Serv- 
ice Commission in 1942: if there was "reasonable doubt” as to an 
individual’s loyalty to the U.S. government or if there was "reason- 
able doubt” about his reliability, the panel should recommend his 


dismissal. On this point— that the government, not the individual 
jobholder, should benefit from any doubt— Panuch and his assist- 
ants remained emphatic. On July 29, 1946, the State Department 
security office was able to advise Mr. Bartel Jonkman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives that the "rea- 
sonable doubt” standard had been in effect for months. "The De- 
partment,” it stated, 

is thoroughly cognizant of the security problem and its implications, 
and any reasonable doubt of an employee’s loyalty to this Government 
or its institutions will be resolved in favor of the Government. However, 
the doubt must be based on substantial evidence. 

This view of the State Department coincided with that of the 
Civil Service Committee of the House, which, after a long investi- 
gation into the problem of subversives in government, had recently 

Adequate protective measures must be adopted to see that persons of 
questioned loyalty are not permitted to enter into federal service. These 
protective measures should of course be absolutely fair and impartial, but 
doubts must, in the nature of things, be resolved in favor of the 

Note that the State Department did not restrict the application 
of the standard to individuals seeking employment; but in dealing 
with persons already employed, the Department clashed with Civil 
Service regulations protecting certain classes of government per- 
sonnel from "arbitrary dismissal.” In short, rules fashioned for one 
purpose— to protect non-policy-making public servants from the 
ravages of incoming, patronage-starved administrations— had be- 
come a major obstacle to the realization of another legitimate objec- 
tive— a strong internal security program. 

At its inception in 1884, the Civil Service Code prohibited in- 
quiry into the political beliefs of civil servants: "No question in any 
form or application or in any examination shall be so framed as to 
elicit information concerning the political or religious opinions or 
affiliations of any applicant, nor shall any inquiry be made concern- 
ing such opinions, or affiliations, and all disclosures thereof shall be 

The Hatch Act of 1939, however, and subsequent legislative and 


administrative orders, set aside parts of this prohibition. They 
authorized inquiries meant to determine whether or not an individ- 
ual s employment jeopardized the nations security. But when exer- 
cising the "reasonable doubt” standard, security officers— in the 
State Department— were treading on loose ground, especially when 
there was no conclusive evidence that the investigated individual 
was still a member of a party advocating the violent overthrow of 
the government. The Hatch Act merely forbade employment to 
members of the Communist Party or of subversive organizations; 
and an employee, even if detected as having been a member of such 
a group, had only to resign from it to avoid the sanctions of the 
Hatch Act. If his job had tenure rights, he was thereafter virtually 
immune against dismissal on loyalty grounds. 

The old Lloyd-LaFollette Act in effect permitted the dismissal 
of any federal employee in the interest of efficiency. It stipulated, 
however, that proposed dismissals be submitted for approval to a 
board of the Civil Service Commission. Here the procedural re- 
quirements were so angled in favor of the employee, and the sheer 
time and manpower needed to press the government’s case were 
so exorbitant, that it was entirely impractical to rely on this author- 
ity to dismiss overt Communists, let alone suspected Communists. 

In short, no one really knew how to get rid of persons whose 
continued presence in the State Department jeopardized national 
security without violating their rights as civil servants. While Fed- 
eral agencies now had the authority to question employees about 
their political opinions and their affiliations, "status” employees 
could not be discharged on a "reasonable doubt” judgment. Noth- 
ing less than provable present membership in the Communist 
Party, or in an organization cited as subversive by the Attorney 
General, would do.* 

Secretary Byrnes, Assistant Secretary Russell, and Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretary Panuch discussed this conundrum with Senators 
Bridges and McCarran. McCarran suggested a way out, and the 
conference led to the attachment of the so-called McCarran Rider 
to the State Department Appropriations Bill, passed on the 6th of 
July, 1946, and renewed yearly until 1953. The Rider authorizes the 
Secretary of State "in his absolute discretion” to discharge any em- 

* And even this was made risky when the Supreme Court declared in 
1943 on the Schneiderman case that mere membership in the Communist 
Party is insufficient proof that a given individual advocates the violent over- 
throw of the government. 


ployee “whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or ad- 
visable in the interests of the United States.”* 

But during the six months following the passage of the McCar- 
ran Rider, it was used only once.** A few weeks after the enact- 
ment of the Rider, Secretary Byrnes wrote a much-discussed letter 
to Congressman Adolph Sabath reporting that of 284! “adverse rec- 
ommendations” thus far made against Department personnel, 
79 had been acted upon. Of the 79, 40 were loyalty and security 
cases, Byrnes added. Yet these 40 were not fired under the authority 
of the McCarran Rider.J 

How account for this apparent dereliction? In Mr. Panuch’s 
opinion, the McCarran Rider did not definitely settle the question 
whether or not a discharged employee could successfully appeal to 
the courts on the grounds that, when all was said and done, he had 
been discriminated against because of his political opinions— in vio- 
lation of the First Amendment. In the absence of a firm legal prece- 
dent to sustain him, Panuch believed the issue of thought control 
would inevitably arise. Might not the point be made that a govem- 

* Similar powers had been conferred upon the Secretaries of War and 
Navy during the war. Subsequently, the Director of the Atomic Energy 
Commission was also empowered to discharge summarily. On August 26, 
1950, this privilege was incorporated into an independent bill which also ex- 
tended the privilege to the Departments of Justice and Commerce, the Coast 
Guard, the National Security Resources Board, and the National Advisory 
Commission for Aeronautics. The Bill passed the House of Representatives 
by a vote of 327-14. 

** Perhaps twice, for there is conflicting evidence as to whether Mary Jane 
Keeney was got out under the Rider. It is established, however, that the Rider 
was used for the first time in dismissing Carl Marzani on December 20, 1946. 
(See below.) 

f This letter has been widely misrepresented. Various commentators have 
suggested that the figure 284 represented all the final adverse determina- 
tions. But the security board’s work had then only begun, and at least a 
thousand "transferees” were yet to be processed. And the twenty-odd thou- 
sand standing personnel of the Department had not yet been re-examined. 

X The authority under which the 40 individuals were fired as security 
risks remains a mystery. The McCarran Rider was not used, and the Presi- 
dent’s loyalty order had not been issued. It was by no means proved that all 
the individuals in question were members of the Communist Party, and 
hence violators of the Hatch Act. Mr. Panuch does not "remember how they 
were gotten rid of.” The man most directly concerned, Mr. Robert Banner- 
man, is now working with the Central Intelligence Agency, and refuses to 
comment. Only two explanations spring to mind: (1) the individuals in 
question were not dismissed, but were persuaded to resign, or were trans- 
ferred to a unit destined for liquidation at the war’s end; or (2) Byrnes’ letter 
was inaccurate. 



ment which extends job protection privileges only to employees 
holding a particular set of beliefs is abridging freedom of speech? 
In Panuch’s opinion, in other words, the legal issue had by no 
means been definitely settled, notwithstanding congressional au- 
thorization of the McCarran Rider. What was more, relative apathy 
to the menace of Communism, the action of the Supreme Court in 
the Schneiderman case, and an academic groundswell (to which 
the Supreme Court would be predictably sensitive) against f witch- 
hunting, were all storm signals which Panuch decided to take 
seriously. The stakes were too high. The danger of the moment, as 
he saw it, did not lie in postponing the day of reckoning for pro- 
Communists in the Department. It lay, rather, in judicial torpedo- 
ing of the entire federal loyalty program. 

He decided, therefore, to take a calculated risk. He retained in 
office all security and loyalty cases who had committed no overt 
illegal act. And carefully preparing his case, he trained his guns on 
one individual.* On the 20th of December, 1946, Carl Aldo Mar- 
zani was fired by the Secretary of State, under the authority of the 
McCarran Rider. 

Marzani had lied to Panuch when he denied having been actively 
associated with the Communist Party in the late 30’s and early 40’s. 
He was convicted on May 22, 1947, on eleven counts, the crucial 
one being his misrepresentation of his political affiliations to secur- 
ity officers of the State Department. Exactly two years after he was 
fired by the State Department, Marzani’s conviction was upheld by 
the Supreme Court. The Court’s decision affirmed the right of secur- 
ity officers to ask political questions relevant to a security investiga- 
tion, and the duty of employees to answer them truthfully. 

Two months before Marzani’s conviction, the Supreme Court 
had refused to review the complaint of Morton Friedman, who had 
been fired from his post with the War Manpower Commission in 
1944 on the grounds that he was pro-Communist. On March 22, 

* Panuch’s wisdom in postponing a purge of pro-Communists in the De- 
partment is, unlike his good faith in doing so, open to question. There are 
convincing grounds for believing that, had he eliminated them as soon as he 
had amassed evidence supporting “reasonable doubt,” the Court would have 
sustained him — especially since it was faced with an aroused Congress which 
had already recorded its solidarity on this issue by its overwhelming approval 
of the McCarran Rider. Panuch’s timidity in this respect reflects the legal 
fastidiousness of his boss. Secretary Byrnes, who on this and other occasions 
(see, for example, the section on the United Nations) hesitated to risk judi- 
cial rebuke, even in matters affecting the national security. 


1947, President Truman had issued Executive Order 9835, estab- 
lishing a federal loyalty program that forbade the employment of 
loyalty risks. The “trusteeship” view of federal employment— the 
doctrine that public service is a privilege rather than a right-had 
thus won legislative, executive, and judicial recognition. 

But neither Panuch nor his principal assistants were to be given 
the opportunity to carry out their long-range, earnest program to 
rid the State Department of security risks. On the 22nd of January, 
1947, James Byrnes resigned, and George Marshall assumed office. 
The following day, after a protracted interview with Dean Acheson, 
Under Secretary of State and long-time foe of Panuch, Marshall 
consented to the firing of Panuch. Acheson ordered Panuch out of 
the Department, at the close of business the same day. 

Within a few weeks, every vital member of Panuch’s security 
staff was retired, demoted, transferred to another branch of the 
Department, or fired. John Peurifoy succeeded Panuch. President 
Truman’s loyalty directive established the inadequate “reasonable 
grounds” standard in loyalty cases. The State Department security 
program was now dead in its tracks. 


The State Department, 1947-1950: 
Three Years of Inertia 

T he premise of virtually all non-Communist attacks on Mc- 
Carthy is that for three years before Senator McCarthy made 
his sensational charges in February, 1950, the State Depart- 
ment had maintained an effective security division. The sun 
never sets without some editorial writer, some professor, or some 
radio commentator having asserted that the pre-McCarthy State 
Department was doing a magnificent job of weeding out security 
risks, and that therefore McCarthy’s charges were sheer dema- 

Here are a few examples, taken at random: 

From the New York Times , breathless with indignation after Mc- 
Carthy was renominated in Wisconsin on September 9, 1952: 

The plain fact of the matter is that the Government’s own loyalty pro- 
gram was initiated almost three years before McCarthy made his first 
national impact with [a] ... discredited allegation. . . . 

From Life Magazine, October 1, 1951: 

If Houdini were a suspected Communist,* he couldn’t get near a sensi- 
tive government payroll today. In short, Communist infiltration of Gov- 
ernment is no longer a legitimate worry. 

From McCarthy : The Man , The Senator , The “Ism”; 1 

... of all the government departments probably the most security-con- 
scious has been [i.e., before McCarthy] the State Department. 

State Department officials have energetically attempted, with 
remarkable skill, to foster national confidence on this score. General 

* Which of course begs the question of what Houdini has to do to get him- 
self “suspected/' 


Conrad Snow, Chairman of the State Department Loyalty Security 
Board, for example, met any doubts about his efficiency and judg- 
ment head-on in a nationally circularized speech delivered on the 
21st of October, 1951: 

What, then, is all the shouting about? The best and shortest answer I 
can give you is to ask you to read the article “Demagog McCarthy” . . . 
in Time magazine, October 22, 1951. . . . What about the loyalty pro- 
gram, designed to prevent infiltration of Government by Communism, 
and, in fact, ante-dating McCarthyism for two full years? ... it is ef- 
fectively protecting not only the Government of the United States, but 
also the loyal employees of that Government. 

General Snow might, of course, be suspected of speaking ex 
parte ; for an indictment of State Department security is in large 
measure an indictment of General Snow. The defenders of the De- 
partment’s program, therefore, have relied heavily on other docu- 
ments to sustain their point of view. One source to which they turn 
is the report of the Tydings Committee. Tydings did more than 
brand McCarthy a liar, and the persons McCarthy had denounced, 
patriots. He handed down a studied endorsement of the entire 
State Department security program: 

Our investigation reveals . . . B) That the State Department's Security 
Division is efficiently operated by highly qualified personnel. C ) That 
the loyalty and security Board of the State Department is made up of 
high-type individuals of unquestioned loyalty and integrity, and sound 
judgment. [Italics added.] 

Some of the pleaders for the Department reach back to the 2nd 
of August, 1948, and quote a self-effacing Republican Congressman 
from Michigan, Mr. Bartel Jonkman, who announced on the floor 
of the House that after conducting a one-man investigation in be- 
half of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, he had something 
he wanted to say: 

. . . before the 80th Congress adjourns, I want the members to know 
that there is one department in which the known or reasonably sus- 
pected subversives, Communists, fellow-travelers, sympathizers, and 
persons whose services are not for the best interests of the United States, 
have been swept out. That is the Department of State. For this job the 
people of the United States can thank to a great extent in the order in 
which the work was done: First, Congressman Bartel J. Jonkman of the 
Fifth District of Michigan, who on July 10, 1946, was appointed a Com- 


mittee of one — from the Committee on Foreign Affairs — to investigate 
Communism in the State Department; second, the people themselves . . . 
and third, Mr. John E. Peurifoy . . • Assistant Secretary of State for 
Administration. . . . 

Defenders of State Department security action during this period 
neglect, almost conspiratorially, to point out that, after March of 
1948, the data necessary to the making of an informed evaluation 
of the security program were inaccessible . For on March 13, 1948, 
President Truman issued an order instructing all federal officials to 
withhold personnel loyalty and security information from mem- 
bers of Congress; and from everybody else, of course. This order 
was of critical importance, for several reasons. 

For one thing, it served notice on Congress that it had better not 
concern itself with loyalty and security; the Executive would shoul- 
der the job itself without any outside help. But further, since the 
concern of Congress over security in sensitive government agencies 
cannot be foreclosed by presidential flat, the Executive Order was 
to invite uneasiness on Capitol Hill— and consummate arrogance 
on the part of federal security personnel. The Order created the 
combustible frustration which McCarthy detonated two years 

President Truman’s directive read, in part, as follows: 

... all reports, records, and files relative to the loyalty of employees or 
prospective employees . . . shall be maintained in confidence, and shall 
not be transmitted or disclosed except as required in the efficient con- 
duct of business. 

Any subpoena or demand or request for information, reports or files 
of the nature described, received from sources other than those persons 
in the executive branch of the Government who are entitled thereto by 
reason of their official duties, shall be respectfully declined. . . . There 
shall be no relaxation of the provisions of this directive except with my 
express authority. 

Members of Congress were thenceforth left without information 
on which to base a vote either of confidence or of no confidence in 
the Administration’s handling of security matters. For it obviously 
does not follow that, because the proclaimed security standards are 
acceptable, the personnel of, say, the State Department Loyalty 
Security Board will apply the standards in such a way as to merit 
Congressional confidence. 

The important fact is that vital security data were withheld from 



Congress. This alone would invalidate such claims as that “the Sen- 
ate Committee on Appropriations gave the State Department a 
clean bill of health in 1948.” Yet much has been made of such al- 
leged clean bills of health. The Tydings Report stated, for example, 
that the Appropriations Committee had cleared the State Depart- 
ment— for it had not even published a report on concluding its 
investigation into Department security. 

Senator Homer Ferguson, a member of the Appropriations Com- 
mittee, coped with this claim on July 24, 1950. He stated that, 
despite concerted pressure from some sources, the Committee had 
been making gradual progress up to the moment of the President’s 
directive of 1948. 

As I have stated [Senator Ferguson told the Senate] our Committee 
did not consider the situation [security in the State Department] as one 
which did not merit a report because we did report to the Secretary of 
State and we cited names [of security risks] . We gave no clearances, as 
the subcommittee [Tydings] report and the Senator from Maryland in- 
ferred we did. As I have said before, we were confronted in March 1948 
with the closing of all the files , and therefore it was impossible for us 
to look into the files any further, or continue the examination of them. 
[Italics added.] 

Thus, not only was it impossible for a responsible Senate Com- 
mittee to clear the State Department after the promulgation of 
Truman’s censorship order; there also is evidence that a specific 
committee of Congress was preparing to do just the opposite when 
the Order made it impossible to pursue the matter. 

The preliminary report to the Secretary of State, cited by Senator 
Ferguson, was a confidential memorandum which the Committee 
transmitted to General Marshall on the 10th of June, 1947: 

It becomes necessary, due to the gravity of the situation, to call your 
attention to a condition that developed and still flourishes in the State 
Department under the administration of [Under Secretary] Dean 

It is evident that there is a deliberate , calculated program being car- 
ried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places, but to 
reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity. 

Regarding the much-publicized M ARZANI case, the evidence brought 
out at his trial was well known to State Department officers, who ig- 
nored it and refused to act for a full year. 



MARZANI and several other Department officials, with full knowl- 
edge of the State Department, and with Government time and money, 
promoted a scheme called PRESENTATIONS, INC., which contracted 
with a Communist dominated organization to disseminate propaganda. 

Security objections to these and other even more dangerous develop- 
ments were rebuffed by high administrative officials; and there followed 
the substitution of unqualified men for these competent, highly respect- 
ed personnel who theretofore held the intelligence and security assign- 
ments in the Department. The new chief of controls is a man utterly 
devoid of background and experience for the job, who is and at the 
time of his appointment was known to those who appointed him to be, 
a cousin and close associate of a suspected Soviet agent. The next devel- 
opment was the refusal of the FBI, ONI and other federal investigative 
agencies to continue the whole hearted cooperation they had for years 
extended to the State Department. 

On file in the Department is a copy of a preliminary report of the FBI 
on Soviet espionage activities in the United States , which involves a 
large number of State Department employees, some in high official posi- 
tions. This report has been challenged and ignored by those charged 
with the responsibility of administering the Department with the appar- 
ent tacit approval of Mr. Acheson. Should this case break before the 
State Department acts , it will be a national disgrace. 

Voluminous files are on hand in the Department proving the con- 
nection of the State Department employees and officials with this Soviet 
espionage ring. Despite this, only two persons, one of whom is MAR- 
ZANI, were released under the McCarran rider because of their sub- 
versive activity. 

1. [names omitted] 6. 

2. 7- 

3- 8. 

4 - 9 - 

5 - 

are only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who 
are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence 
is an obvious hazard to national security. There is also the extensive 
employment in highly classified positions of admitted homosexuals, who 
are historically known to be security risks. 

The War and Navy Departments have been thwarted for a year in 
their efforts to carry out the German Scientist program. They are blocked 
by one man in the State Department, a protege of Acheson, named 
[name omitted], who is also the chief instrument in the subverting of 
the over-all security program. 

This deplorable condition runs all the way up and down the line. 
Assistant Secretary Braden also surrounded himself with men like [name 
omitted] and with [name omitted] who has a notorious international 


reputation. The network also extends into the office of Assistant Secre- 
tary Benton.* [Italics added.] 

The nature and intent of Truman’s Executive Order are disclosed 
by the following colloquy between Senator Ferguson and a State 
Department official, in which Ferguson virtually threw up his hands 
in despair: 

Senator Ferguson. The way I find myself here in this committee as 
a representative of the people is that we can review the procedure but 
we cannot review any substantive evidence. 

Mr. Humelsine. That is right, and that is not my regulation but the 
directive of the President. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand. But he tells the people, “You are 
not entitled to know anything except the machinery.” That is true, is 
it not? 

Mr. Humelsine. Yes, sir; that is true. 2 

The fact that legislative committees could not possibly go on 
record as approving State Department security practices sheds 
light on the performance of the press and other special pleaders for 
the Department. For it follows from Congressional inability that 
laymen— and we dare include here the editors of the New York 
Times — were alike unqualified to talk authoritatively on the sub- 
ject, though in their efforts to discredit McCarthy they have not 
hesitated to do so. 

Every Executive effort has been made to maintain a full blackout 
of security information. But an occasional failure of these efforts 
has brought to light sufficient data to justify a preliminary answer 
to the one question at issue: whether the State Department’s loy- 
alty-security program had adequately protected a most sensitive 
government agency from Communist penetration. 

Before going into that, however, it is necessary to define the 
authorities under which the Department’s program operated after 
1947, the different standards under which its personnel were 

* In his book, McCarthyism , the Fight for America (New York; Devin- 
Adair, 1952), Senator McCarthy states, “This warning was disregarded by 
Marshall” (p. 23). This is only partly true. On the 24th of June, 1947, Assist- 
ant Secretary John Peurifoy notified Senator Ball, chairman of the subcom- 
mittee of the Committee on Appropriations handling State Department mat- 
ters, that ten persons had been dismissed. Five of them were listed in the 
above memorandum. Their separation was, let us assume, urged by General 


tried, and, of course, the difference between the loyalty and the 
security risk. 

Until the 17th of December, 1947, the State Department oper- 
ated under the “reasonable doubt” standard with respect to both 
loyalty and security cases; and it had the power, under the McCar- 
ran Rider, to discharge at will. From December, 1947, on, federal 
agencies were under a directive ( the President’s Executive Order 
No. 9835) which required the dismissal of “loyalty risks,” but set up 
the “reasonable grounds” rather than the “reasonable doubt” stand- 
ard for determining whether a person was a loyalty risk. In doing 
so, the President went contrary to the recommendations of the 
House Civil Service Commission, and moved away from the stand- 
ards the State Department itself had adopted— on paper at least. 

The President’s Order also directed the Civil Service Commission 
to establish a Loyalty Review Board which was empowered to re- 
view, at its discretion, the findings of agency loyalty boards; to 
reverse them if it saw fit; and to adjudicate appeals from adverse 
findings of subordinate boards. The Loyalty Review Board could 
not, however, entertain an appeal by the government against the 
clearance of an employee by an agency board.* Moreover, it had 
no jurisdiction at all over security cases. 

The language of the President’s Order (“on all the evidence 
reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is dis- 
loyal to the Government of the United States”) set up a standard 
that is far more lenient than that included in the words, “on all 
the evidence there is reasonable doubt as to the loyalty, etc. . . 

The difference in standards can be shown with the following 
illustration: An employee is identified, let us say, as a former mem- 
ber of the Communist Party. If he specifically pleads change of 
heart, it is difficult to find “reasonable grounds” for concluding that 
the alleged change has not in fact taken place. Under the “ reason- 
able doubt ” standard, by contrast, only clear-cut, substantial evi- 
dence of reform would prevent dismissal. In fact, State Depart- 
ment regulations based on “reasonable doubt ” stipulate that “A 
former course of conduct or holding of beliefs will be presumed to 
continue in the absence of positive evidence indicating a change , 
both in course of action and conviction , by clear , overt , and un- 
equivocal acts” 3 

° The Government has never formally recognized the “prosecutor” (i.e., 
those members of a security division who recommend dismissal of an em- 
ployee) as its representative. Appeals in the loyalty field, consequently, 
should always be understood to mean appeals from adverse findings. 


In all justice, then, the fact that the State Department suddenly 
found itself saddled with what appeared to be a stringent pro- 
employee standard made dismissals on loyalty grounds more diffi- 
cult than they had been formerly.* 

Actually, however, the change in standards was meaningless. 
For what the apologists for the State Department studiously neglect 
to mention is that the President's Loyalty Order did not rescind the 
McCarran Rider; that the State Department's security standard 
continued to be based on “reasonable doubt"; that every loyalty 
risk is ipso facto a security risk ; and that therefore the promulga- 
tion of the Loyalty Order in no way affected the Department's 
authority to discharge suspect personnel in the security category 
under the “reasonable doubt" standard . 

The State Department, in short, was not actually handicapped- 
provided it was willing to proceed against employees in the security 
rather than the loyalty category. And responsible State Department 
officials were demonstrably aware of the decisive difference be- 
tween the two standards. The indispensability of the “reasonable 
doubt” standard to an effective security program was stressed by 
Mr. John Peurifoy on June 13, 1947 —after the promulgation of the 
President’s Loyalty Order (but before it began to operate). Mr. 
Peurifoy, who as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administra- 
tion was directly in charge of the State Department’s security 
division, appeared before the Appropriations Subcommittee of the 
Senate. Former Senator Joseph Ball asked him: 

Would you say that in our present situation, internationally, particu- 
larly in a Department like the State Department, dealing with foreign 
questions, it is essential that there be absolutely no question as to the 
loyalty of its employees? 

Mr. Peurifoy. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator Ball. . . . any doubt as to an individuaFs loyalty should be 
resolved in favor of the Government? 

Mr. Peurifoy. Any reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of 
the Government. I believe it is a privilege to work for this Government, 
and not a right. 4 [Italics added.] 

Now: How to distinguish between the two classes of “risks?” 
Here is one explanation: 

* Though having said this, we must hasten to add that the Department 
never exercised even the power the Loyalty Order left to it. Other agencies 
subject to the Order managed to dismiss their more flagrant loyalty risks. 
But the State Department did not. 



Suppose the District Attorney in your county called together police 
officials to plan a series of raids against gambling spots. 

If an official at that meeting carelessly told a newspaper reporter 
about the plans, then he would be a security risk. 

If this official, however, immediately telephoned a gambler and 
warned him of the coming raid, then the official would be disloyal to 
his government — the county in this case. 

Thus, a "security risk” might be an employee who talks too much, or 
who drinks, or who is careless in the kind of people with whom he 
associates . 5 

Another explanation: 

Senator Ferguson. How can there be security when there is disloy- 
alty? Will you please tell me. 

Mr. Humelsine (Assistant Secretary of State — Administration). 
Well , a person that is a loyalty risk is also a security risk . 

Senator McCarran. Certainly. 

Mr. Humelsine. But a person can be a security risk without neces- 
sarily being a loyalty risk. The reverse of that would not be true. 

Senator Hill. You mean by that that a person might be a drunkard, 
say, a habitual drunkard. 

Mr. Humelsine. Yes, he might be a habitual drunkard who went into 
a bar and talked too much and allowed some of our very vital informa- 
tion to fall into the hands of our enemies. . . . 

Senator McCarran. He would be termed a security risk, would he 

Mr. Humelsine. Yes, sir. Now a person who takes a confidential doc- 
ument from the Department of State and sees to it that it gets into the 
hands of an alien power — if that sort of thing were to take place — that 
person would be a loyalty risk. 

Senator McCarran. He would be both, would he not? 

Mr. Humelsine. And also a security risk; yes sir. When I use the term 
loijalty risk , that includes security. 

Senator McCarran. That is what I wanted to know. How can there 
be a loyalty risk and not a security risk? 

Mr. Humelsine. There cannot he. Senator . 6 [Italics added.] 

However, neither of these explanations is adequate. While it is 
true that an individual may be a security risk and yet a patriot— he 
may be alcoholic, homosexual, forgetful, or artless— the term, as 
used by the State Department when referring to political suspects, 
very simply denotes disloyalty. For the loyalty and security criteria 
of the State Department are virtually identical, except for one 
thing: guilt by association is more heavily stressed in the security 
category, which, for example, cites as pertinent evidence against 


an employee, “voluntary association with persons known or be- 
lieved to be” Communist sympathizers. 

The fact that a “security risk” may also be a conscious threat to 
the United States is clearly indicated in Paragraph 3 (Section VA) 
of the State Department s security regulations. A security risk is, 
among other things, 

A person who has knowingly divulged classified information without 
authority and with the knowledge or belief or with reasonable grounds 
for the knowledge or belief that it will be transmitted to agencies of a 
foreign government, or who is so consistently irresponsible in the han- 
dling of classified information as to compel the conclusion of extreme 
lack of care or judgment. 7 [Italics added.] 

Clearly, there was nothing to prevent Department officials from 
putting every ‘loyalty” suspect into security channels, and thence 
examining him under the “reasonable doubt” standard. What is 
more, the Department had no choice in the matter; as security offi- 
cials themselves never tire of repeating, “Whoever is a loyalty risk 
is also a security risk.” As it happens, the preponderant majority of 
employees discharged under the security category during the years 
1948 through 1952 had been previously cleared in the loyalty cate- 
gory. What is more, Under Secretary of State for Administration, 
Carlisle Humelsine, unambiguously admitted that there is no such 
thing as examining a man on loyalty and neglecting to look at him 
on security: 

Senator McCarthy. Am I correct in saying that you have had over 
800 cases that went through the loyalty-security channels [since 1947]? 

Mr. Humelsine. That is right. 

Senator McCarthy. And all 800, you say, were considered as secur- 
ity risks as well as loyalty risks? 

Mr. Humelsine. Yes. 8 

In short, the President's 1947 Loyalty Order notwithstanding, the 
State Department' s mandate after 1946 was to apply the reason- 
able doubt standard on all its suspect employees * 

How did the State Department use, after 1947, the broad powers 
it had to purge the Department of dubious personnel? 

* The same does not hold true for all other government agencies, some of 
which were not granted the authority of the McCarran Rider to discharge 
at will, and were hence without the effective power to set up their own 



Security information on specific persons is still inaccessible- 
even to Congressmen. But general figures are available and may be 
assembled from testimony squeezed out of Department officials by 
Congressional Committees. While the Executive Order forbids dis- 
closures which involve names and which reveal the current security 
status of a given employee, it does permit Department officials to 
reveal the number of cases that are being handled or that have 
been disposed of in some way or other. 

During the period here in question, the State Department had 
roughly 20,000 employees, all of whom it was required to process 
on loyalty (under the Presidential directive) and on security (un- 
der its own regulations ) . 

On June 10, 1947, Assistant Secretary John Peurifoy testified be- 
fore the Senate Committee on Appropriations that, until that time, 
the authority of the (then eleven months old) McCarran Rider 
had been used to discharge exactly two persons from the State De- 
partment.* One of these, as we have seen, was Carl Marzani, dis- 
charged under the Rider in December, 1946. 

In March of 1950, Peurifoy appeared again before the Appropria- 
tions Committee, and in the presence of Mr. Acheson testified again 
about the use of the Rider: 

Senator Bridges. How many employees, Mr. Secretary, have been 
dismissed under the McCarran rider in the years since its inception? 
Secretary Acheson. I will have to get the statistics. 

Mr. Peurifoy. May I answer that? 

Senator Bridges. Yes. 

Mr. Peurifoy. Since January 1, 1947, there has been one. 9 

This testimony, in conjunction with the Marzani facts, estab- 
lishes that the Rider was exercised for the second time between 
January 1, 1947, and June 10, 1947. It establishes also that the Rider 

* [ Hearings , Committee on Appropriations , U. S. Senate , for 1948, p. 646.] 
In June of 1947, ten persons were discharged under the McCarran Rider. 
One of them appealed to Washington lawyers Thurman Arnold and Abe 
Fortas, old hands at defending loyalty suspects. Mr. Bert Andrews of the 
New York Herald Tribune took up the cause of this same man, Mr. X (his 
name was not publicly discussed ) , and wrote a series of articles which won 
him a Pulitzer Prize, and which later appeared in book form with the title 
Washington Witchhunt, no less. Secretary of State Marshall succumbed to 
mounting pressure and rescinded the dismissals, allowing the ten to “resign 
without prejudice/' Thus, the McCarran Rider is not theoretically on record 
as having been used on the ten. 


was not used from June of 1947 until McCarthy made his charges 
in the spring of 1950. 

But this does not mean that no security risk was removed during 
this period, not by any means. The Loyalty Security Board of the 
Department made one adverse security finding in 1948 and one 
more in 1949.* ** Both employees were allowed to resign. 

As regards loyalty, not only did the Department fail to discharge 
anyone on these grounds, the Department 7 s Board made not a 
single adverse determination— not, in fact, until early 1952! 

In short, throughout a period of two and one half years preced- 
ing McCarthy's entry into the picture ( during which time 16,000 
investigations had been conducted ) , the State Department's record 
was as follows: fired as loyalty risks— none; fired as security risks— 
none; adverse loyalty determinations— none; adverse security de- 
terminations— two. * * 

“But this is surely not a fair picture,” Department defenders will 
say. “What about those persons who resigned before their cases 
were finally adjudicated? Did not the Department get most of its 
risks out by scaring them out?” 

The Department put at 182 the number of persons who had re- 
signed and about whom “security or loyalty questions have been 
raised and not cleared up.” 10 We have Mr. Peurifoy’s own word for 
it that this statistic does not shed much light on the problem at 
hand: it should not be inferred, he told the press in February, 
1940, “that these employees were security risks. . . .” There may, 
of course, have been some Communists among them; but if so, 
there is little reason to suppose they left the Department because 
they feared exposure. The record of the Loyalty Security Board, 
which was spotting security risks at the rate of one a year and had 
never found a loyalty risk, was not such as to have caused wide- 
spread panic among them. A Mother Bloor, hawking membership 
in the Party during the lunch hour, might have chosen the discreet 
occasion to make for the door; but certainly not an Alger Hiss. 

But most State Department defenders take the position that, if 
no adverse loyalty determinations were made, the presumption is 

* These statistics were given to the authors by the office of the Chief 
Counsel of the Loyalty Security Board. They are confirmed by the testimony 
of Mr. Sam Boykin of the Department before the Senate Appropriations Com- 
mittee for 1951, pp. 603, 610, 611. 

** During the same period, from 1947 to 1951, a total of well over 300 
persons were discharged for loyalty alone in other branches of government. 



not that the State Department’s program was inadequate, but that, 
very simply, there were no loyalty risks around. 

Now of course an evaluation of a security program must not be 
based on the number of scalps offered up to the public every fiscal 
year. If the State Department harbored only two security risks 
from 1947 to 1950, then obviously only two should have been dis- 
charged. If the Department employed no loyalty risks until 1952, 
then we must commend the courage of its officers in refusing to sac- 
rifice innocent people to the appetites of lustful witch-hunters. The 
important question is, Were there any security or loyalty risks in 
the State Department during this vital period? 

This question we will attempt to answer in analyzing the Tydings 
investigation. But let us first look at the security record of the State 
Department as regards the protection of American interests in the 
United Nations. 

The State Department and the United Nations 

On December 29, 1952, foreman Joseph P. Kelly of a New York 
Grand Jury appeared before a House Investigating Committee and 
reiterated, under oath, an astonishing charge he and fellow jurors 
had made earlier in the month. The State and Justice Departments, 
Mr. Kelly declared, had put pressure upon him and his colleagues 
to “postpone” or “tone down” a finding to the effect that an “over- 
whelmingly large group of disloyal” Americans had successfully 
penetrated the United Nations. He, and fellow jurymen, further 
stated that the refusal of Secretary Acheson to divulge the names 
of State Department officers responsible for passing judgment on 
the loyalty of American personnel in the UN Secretariat had made 
it impossible for them to conduct a definitive inquiry into the em- 
ployment of American Communists by the UN. 

The State Department promptly denied virtually everything: at 
no time had it obstructed the work of the grand jury; and, in any 
case, the UN Charter does not permit the Department to “inter- 
fere” with the Secretary General in the hiring of personnel for 
positions in the UN Secretariat. 

An explosive issue was touched off. Its repercussions would 
have received more notice had they not occurred in the headline- 
filling weeks of the Republican return to power. However, a sub- 
committee of the House Committee on the Judiciary summoned 
Secretary Acheson on the last day of December, 1952. Mr. Acheson 
persisted in refusing to divulge the names of responsible State De- 
partment officials. And anyway, Acheson maintained, while sub- 
versive Americans in the United Nations might damage American 
“interests,” certainly they could not damage American “security”— 
a distinction not entirely clear to some members of the Committee. 

The new Administration promised to press the investigation, and 
subsequent hearings before the House Committee led to significant 

The architects of the United Nations had stipulated in Article 
101 of the Charter that 

Each member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusive- 
ly international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary Gen- 
eral, and the staff, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of 



their responsibilities. . . . The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary 
General under regulations established by the General Assembly. 

The Soviet Union (through Yugoslavia) had objected to the 
principle that the personnel of the Secretariat should not be respon- 
sible to their own governments. The Western world, the United 
States in particular, had expressly sought the internationalization 
of the Secretariat, and had won the day. The Russians finally ap- 
proved Article 101, in return for Western support of an administra- 
tive provision which bars from UN employment any person who 
has a background of sympathy for Fascism or Nazism. 

Thus, on the basis of Article 101, Secretary of State Byrnes took 
the position in 1946 that the State Department ought not to intrude 
in any way in the affairs of the UN Secretariat. “It was my opinion,” 
Byrnes wrote to the chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee in 
January, 1953, "that the Department of State should not assume 
responsibility when it had neither the power to hire nor the power 

to dismiss employees Under these circumstances, I did not wish 

to offer any recommendations of persons seeking employment at 
the United Nations nor did I want subordinate officials to offer rec- 
ommendations without my knowledge or authority. I made known 
my views to the Assistant Secretary for Administration, Mr. Donald 
Russell, in March, 1946.” 

But in the early days of the UN, its Secretary General was short- 
handed. To help him out, the State Department’s office of Special 
Political Affairs ( in charge of relations with the UN ) submitted in 
the early spring of 1946 about 300 names of “qualified individuals.” 
One set of names was sent to Mr. Lie on March 25. On March 29, 
Byrnes laid down his directive. On April 4, a second list was sent 
to Mr. Lie completing the roster. (Secretary Byrnes was not aware 
that such lists had been drawn up, or submitted, until six years 
later. ) But Lie wanted more. The State Department— again, mostly 
through SPA— obliged by detailing 193 government employees to 
work, on a contractual basis, for the UN.* Of this group 43 became 
permanent UN employees. 

The head of the office of Special Political Affairs was Alger Hiss. 

A few years and many disillusions later, the prevailing American 
philosophy about the United Nations moved a little way towards 

0 President Truman authorized this procedure on May 10, 1946, in Execu- 
tive Order 9721. 


realism. The change was reflected in an incident described to the 
Judiciary Committee on March 23, 1953, by Mr. William Franklin, 
a State Department security officer: 

At a luncheon in 1949, [Mr. Franklin testified] — in the summer of 
1949 — it developed here that Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secre- 
tary of State, of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, met with one of 
the principal assistants of the Secretary General’s staff, who asked Mr. 
Hickerson if there was not some help that we could give to help him get 
rid of undesirable Americans on his staff. [Italics added.] 

The initiative, then, in formulating a program to protect Ameri- 
can security interests was taken, not by the U.S. government, but 
by the UN! Mr. Franklin continued: 

Then following that meeting, there was scheduled within the areas 
of the Department other meetings to determine what could be done, 
and out of that developed this secret arrangement. 

The secret arrangement was designed this way, on this basis: the 
Secretary General would send to the Department of State lists of names 
of United States nationals employed on his staff. It was agreed that the 
Department of State, through the Division of Security, would conduct 
what we call a namecheck operation. . . . When this information was 
assembled it was reviewed by an official in the Office of Security, the 
Chief of a branch, who looked at and kept it secret; and if it were de- 
rogatory, the Bureau of United Nations Affairs was informed of that 
and that they were to review the information, and if it was of such na- 
ture, to put them on notice that the person was a Communist or under 
Communist discipline. 11 

In other words, the security division of the State Department 
was to act as a security office for the Secretary General of the UN; 
and it was to do so unbeknownst to the Secretary of State: 

Mr. Franklin: The record as far as we can determine is clear on that 
point, that Mr. Acheson did not know about this arrangement until 
October 8, 1952, at which time Mr. McGranery, the Attorney General, 
told him that the Grand Jury for the Southern District of New York 
was about to hand up an interim presentment critical of [Communist 
infiltration in] the United Nations. 12 

The rationale of concealing the Secret Agreement from Mr. Ache- 
son appears to have been as follows : Had he known of the Agree- 
ment his subordinates entered into, and had he subsequently faced 
a charge from a representative of a member nation that the United 



States was violating Article 101 of the United Nations Charter, he 
would have been placed in an intolerable position; i.e., he would 
have had to choose between confessing all and lying— with the pos- 
sibility of future exposure. 

To protect the confidential nature of the Agreement, investiga- 
tion of Americans in the United Nations was to be confined to a 
“namecheck operation.” ( That is, no field investigations aimed at 
corroborating or dispelling charges were to be conducted, since this 
might alert others to what was going on.) The resulting appraisals 
would accordingly be based, exclusively, on information already 
on file in some government agency. Upon arriving at an adverse 
decision about the loyalty of an individual, a State Department 
official would confidentially inform the UN of its finding. And, Mr. 
Franklin told the Committee, the UN had pledged itself to act upon 
adverse Department recommendations. 13 

The Committee set out to assess the administration of the Secret 
Agreement by studying the negotiations between the State Depart- 
ment and the UN over each of the 47 UN employees whom the 
New York Grand Jury had examined.* Secretary Dulles directed 
Mr. John W. Ford, the Director of Security of the State Department 
to assist it in every way. Mr. Ford, among other things, prepared 
charts illustrating the operation of the program as far as the 47 
individuals were concerned. 

And they were unquestionably a rum lot. Department evalu- 
ators, after studying information, had transmitted to the UN “ad- 
verse judgments” on no less than 35 of the 47. And Committee 
members were soon expressing surprise that the UN had not been 
warned against five of the remaining twelve. 

The high percentage of adverse judgments was by no means the 
most arresting information the Committee turned up. Mr. Hicker- 
son, Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs, testified to the 
Committee that the average interval between the Department's 
receipt of an individual's name from the UN and a reply, based on 
nothing more than an examination of the individual's file kept in 
the various Washington departments, was “three to four months ” 
Later, correcting himself, he put it at six months. The real state of 
affairs turned out to be even worse than that. “We find, however,” 

0 Five of the 47 witnesses were individuals included in the Hiss list re- 
ferred to above: Cases 12, 26, 36, 43, and 46. It is an interesting and relevant 
sidelight on State Department security attitudes that, as late as 1951, Alger 
Hiss was referred to in State Department security reports as a “suspected 
Communist”! 14 


said Robert A. Collier, Chief Counsel of the Committee, “that in 
analyzing these 47 cases, in the adverse comment cases, there was 
a total of 15.6 months average . . . to process those cases. . . 
(Italics added.) 

In short, the State Department took an average of 12-15 months 
to check existing data in personnel files, evaluate these data, and 
report back to the UN. 

“In case after case,” the Committee reported, “it was revealed 
that the FBI had transmitted highly derogatory information from 
sources of known reliability, and that the State Department had 
either refrained from making any adverse comment to Lie or had 
delayed for periods up to more than 3 years.” 15 

The delays of the State Department in passing judgments to the 
UN were matched by the delays of the Secretary General in acting 
on the Department’s recommendations. Some notorious U.S. Com- 
munists remained with the UN more than two years after the State 
Department reports had been submitted.** 

Of the 35 UN employees on whom the State Department re- 
ported adversely, only 15 had left the UN when the McCarran 
Committee and the New York Grand Jury investigating Commu- 
nism in the United Nations blew the lid off the Secret Agreement 
in October, 1952. Lie forthwith suspended, and subsequently dis- 
missed, 19 more employees who had refused to answer questions 
before the McCarran Committee. 

The inertia, the apparent lack of interest, and the total absence 
of effective statecraft exhibited by the State Department in dealing 
with loyalty in the UN, can only be understood when one recalls 
the whole security picture in the Department during the Acheson 
period. The fact that neither Secretary Byrnes nor Secretary Mar- 
shall took a stand on the matter of disloyal Americans in the UN 
does them, of course, no credit. But they must not be judged too 
severely; anyone tempted to do so must bear in mind the intellec- 
tual climate of the day. Any effort the Department might have 

* The discrepancy between this and Hickerson’s average figure is pre- 
sumably accounted for by the fact that Hickerson was referring to all cases, 
and Collier to the 47 mostly adverse judgments. 

** Trygvie Lie has stated that he proceeded cautiously because he was 
never sure the General Assembly would sustain him if he fired individuals 
against their protests. He therefore adopted the practice of putting pressure 
on suspect employees to resign, assigning them to less important posts, and 
otherwise harrassing them; but he did not feel he could terminate their em- 
ployment until their contracts ran out. 



made at that time to prescribe standards of employment for Ameri- 
cans at the UN would have been generally denounced as a sacri- 
legious maneuver to destroy the integrity of the international body; 
though this is not to say, of course, that the effort should not have 
been made anyway. But by 1949, America’s back had stiffened. The 
Communist technique of policy sabotage had been exposed so 
completely that the legitimacy of the United States government’s 
interest in its nationals working in the UN became widely accepted. 
( The public debates of the time seldom centered on the question 
whether the United States had the right to screen American em- 
ployees in the UN for Communist sympathies but on whether there 
were in fact American Communists in the UN. ) 

There are, then, two counts on which to base a severe judgment. 
One, of course, is that State Department underlings failed to attend 
with even minimum dispatch to a highly important matter dealing 
with American security. The other is that Dean Acheson failed to 
seek an agreement with the UN on what to do about American 
Communists in the UN Secretariat. 

The rather desperate “explanation ’—that Mr. Acheson did not 
attempt to take such steps because as a lawyer he knew that, in 
view of Article 101 of the Charter, they would be fruitless— will not 
hold up. On November 30, 1953, a UN Special Commission of Jur- 
ists, to whom Trygvie Lie had submitted the question of the legal- 
ity of firing American Communists from the UN staff, ruled unani- 
mously that nothing in the Charter could be construed to protect 
American Communists in their jobs. On the contrary, the Com- 
mission recommended immediate dismissal of (a) American Com- 
munists, (b) members of organizations officially listed as subver- 
sive, (c) employees with respect to whom the Attorney General 
might find “reasonable grounds” for regarding them as “likely to 
be engaged in any activities regarded as disloyal by the host coun- 
try.” Belatedly, the President issued an Executive Order (10244) 
directing that Americans in the UN be screened for loyalty. 

The presumption is that the UN’s ruling would have been iden- 
tical had it been sought three years before. And it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that the interests of the United States would 
have been better served had Mr. Acheson requested a ruling on 
the matter. 

On August 21, 1953, in adjudicating a number of individual com- 
plaints from dismissed UN personnel, the Administrative Tribunal 
of the United Nations handed down a series of judgments, the 


moment of which reversed the advisory finding of the Special Com- 
mission of Jurists: that the Secretary General is entitled to dismiss 
persons whose employment constitutes a risk to the security of the 
United States. The new ruling was greeted in this country by a bi- 
partisan uproar. Dag Hammarskjold immediately refused to reem- 
ploy the persons involved and thus, for the moment at least, molli- 
fied the American people. 

The ruling of the UN Tribunal* indicates not only the dogged 
ignorance of its members about the realities of the Communist 
conspiracy, but also, we suspect, a profound miscalculation of the 
temper of the American people. The United States has been tem- 
porarily assuaged by Hammer skj old’s decision not to reemploy the 
ousted persons; but it will probably insist in due time on an unam- 
biguous legalization of the Secretary General’s right, and duty, to 
dismiss security risks. 

Be that as it may, the effect of the State Department’s inertia, 
and of its incorrigible insensitivity to the demands of national se- 
curity, was the retention in positions of varying importance in the 
UN of dozens of American Communists and pro-Communists. To 
this price we must also add the embarrassment to the United States 
involved in the revelation that State Department officials were car- 
rying on secret business with the United Nations, behind the back 
of the Secretary of State and in possible violation of the UN Char- 
ter; and that these officials were prepared not only to lie about the 
existence of the Secret Agreement, but also to allow Secretary 
Acheson to deceive the United Nations and his own countrymen 
by blandly asserting that no such agreement existed. And finally, 
one must add to the price the humiliation in learning that the 
only measures taken to guard against disloyalty in the UN were 
suggested not by our own representatives but by officials of the UN 
who had apparently pre-empted American concern for American 

* It is difficult, incidentally, to pinpoint the ruling because it uses different 
terms in the various judgments handed down. It appears most baldly, per- 
haps, in Judgment No. 18, upholding the complaint of Ruth E. Crawford: 
“. . . membership of [sic] any particular party would not, of itself, be a jus- 
tification, in the absence of other cause, for dismissal.” ( Administrative Tri- 
bunal , Judgment No. 18, 21 August 1953, p. 6) 



The First Charges 

O n the gth of February, 1950, Senator Joe McCarthy struck 
his first important blow at the criminal nonchalance of State 
Department security practices. He knew, he told the Ohio 
County Women s Republican Club of Wheeling, West Virginia, 
the names of a number of Communists working in the State De- 
partment. Just how many Communists McCarthy claimed to have 
knowledge of is still being hotly argued. In fact, his enemies have 
made so much of the alleged disparity between what McCarthy 
actually said in Wheeling and what he subsequently claimed he 
had said, that one of them— Senator William Benton— seriously pro- 
posed he be expelled from the Senate as a perjurer. 

For this reason we will examine in some detail the two versions 
of McCarthy’s Wheeling speech. We will do this by canvassing the 
evidence dug up by the Senate Committee that explored Benton’s 
allegations. (The authors have had access to the confidential re- 
port of the Committee’s staff. ) 1 

Senator McCarthy, Benton told the Senate subcommittee on 
Privileges and Elections (the Gillette-Monroney Committee) on 
September 28, 1951, “shows himself a calculating dispenser of false 
and perverted information.” For, said Benton, McCarthy lied to the 
Senate on February 20, 1950, and to the Tydings Committee on 
April 24, 1950, when he denied that he had said at Wheeling on 
February 9, 1950, “I have here in my hand a list of 205— a list of 
names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being 
members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still 
working and shaping policy in the State Department” Rather, Mc- 
Carthy claimed to have said at Wheeling, “I have in my hand 57 
cases of individuals who would appear to be either card-carrying 


members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party , but who never- 
theless are still helping to shape our foreign policy ”* 

The speech was recorded, and broadcast the same day over radio 
station WWVA in Wheeling, but the recording was erased on the 
following day (a routine practice of that radio station). And per- 
sons who had heard McCarthy deliver his speech were vague as to 
just exactly what figures he had used and in what context he had 
used them. 

On July 20, Senator Millard Tydings presented the report of his 
committee to the Senate, and startled the press and the Senate by 
telling them that, at last, he had the goods on McCarthy: he had the 
recording of the Wheeling speech and proposed to play it on the 
Senate floor. But as we shall see in a later chapter, Tydings did not 
in fact have the recording and only an adroit bit of maneuver- 
ing on the floor kept the Senate from baring his hoax. Thus, the Gil- 
lette-Monroney Committee had to proceed with its inquiry without 
direct evidence. 

Benton insisted, however, that the circumstantial evidence was 
conclusive, and that even in the absence of a recording of McCar- 
thy's own voice, he must be found guilty of lying. Benton set forth 
his evidence. He gave the committee: 

A. An affidavit signed by Mr. James E. Whitaker, News Editor 
of Radio Station WWVA. The affidavit was attached to a copy of 
the speech Benton insisted McCarthy gave, i.e. the version which 
contained the statement that McCarthy knew the names of 205 
members of the Communist Party known to the Secretary of State 
and nevertheless still working in the State Department. The affida- 
vit read; 

As News Editor of Radio Station WWVA I was in charge of the tape 
recording of Senator Joseph McCarthy's speech at the Hotel McLure, 
Wheeling, West Virginia, on February 9, 1950. At the hotel I followed 
the prepared script as I listened to the speech. I certify that the deliv- 
ered speech, as recorded by me, and on that evening broadcast by the 
Station WWVA, was in the same form as the attached photostat of the 
prepared script — with the exception of the usual added connective 

* The most striking difference between the two versions, it would cer- 
tainly seem, is that in the one McCarthy in just about as many words ac- 
cused Acheson of treason — for not having got rid of 205 “members of the 
Communist Party” although their identity had been “made known” to him. 
But curiously, this was not the difference which elicited most comment. 
Rather it was the sheer discrepancy in the number of Communists McCarthy 
claimed to have personal knowledge of. 



phrases and the addition or deletion of such words as ‘Vs”; “and’s”, and 
“the’s” which to my thinking did not materially change the meaning of 
the text. I have initialed each page of the attached photostatic copy of 
Senator McCarthy’s speech. 

B. An affidavit identical in all material respects with that of 
Whitaker, attached to the same version of McCarthy’s speech, 
signed by Paul A. Myers, program director of WWVA. 

C. A reproduction of a news story that appeared in the Wheel- 
ing Intelligencer the day after the speech, written by Mr. Frank 
Desmond of the Intelligencer staff. A part of that story reads: 

Referring directly to the State Department, he [McCarthy] declared: 
“While I cannot take the time to name all of the men in the State De- 
partment who have been named as members of the Communist Party 
and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 that 
were known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Com- 
munist Party and who, nevertheless, are still working and shaping the 
policy in the State Department.” 

Benton also told the Committee that Mr. Austin V. Wood, vice- 
president and general manager of the Intelligencer , had written to 
Senator Ty dings on March 25, 1950, as follows: 

I have today talked with Mr. Frank Desmond, the reporter who wrote 
the story in question. He tells me there can be no doubt that Senator 
McCarthy did use the figure “205” in referring to his list of men in the 
State Department who have been named as members of the Communist 
Party, and members of a spy ring. 

D. A copy of Senator McCarthy’s speech to the Senate on Feb- 
ruary 20. In this speech, McCarthy in effect denied having used the 
“205” version at Wheeling. He told his colleagues that he would 
read to them a copy of the speech he had actually delivered in 
Wheeling. The figure mentioned in this version was “57.” McCar- 
thy furthermore stated that the speech he was then reading to the 
Senate “was taken from a recording of the speech. I did not use a 
written speech that night.” 

Since McCarthy at no time had access to a recording of the 
Wheeling speech, Benton claimed that his Senate denial of the 
“205” version was without foundation.* 

* It will be seen below, that McCarthy must have been referring to a 
recording of a speech delivered in Reno on February 11. The two speeches, 
McCarthy claimed, were identical. 



E. A copy of U.S. News and World Report , September 7, 1951, 
including an interview with McCarthy, who had been asked, 

Senator, there was, weve heard, a great deal of talk about your 
changing your numbers. What is your explanation for that — 205 charges 
in one speech up in West Virginia, and then 81 — 

[McCarthy.] Up in West Virginia we read to the audience a letter 
written by Jimmy Byrnes, the then Secretary of State, to Congressman 
Sabath, in which he said that out of the 3000 employees screened — 
employees who were being transferred from other departments into the 
State Department — they found 284 unfit for government service. He 
said of the 284 we discharged 79, leaving a total of 205. That night I 
called upon Acheson and the President to tell us where those 205 were, 
why they kept them in if the President’s own board says they were un- 
fit for service. . . . 

This statement, Benton told the committee, directly contradicts 
even McCarthy’s own claims; for in the speech he read to the Sen- 
ate which he represented as the speech he gave at Wheeling, no 
mention whatever was made of the figure 205. 

“To me,” Benton concluded his statement on the first charge, 
“Senator McCarthy shows himself a calculating dispenser of false 
and perverted information. If your Committee, upon investiga- 
tion, decides that Senator McCarthy has committed perjury, I as- 
sume it will bring the facts to the attention of the proper author- 
ities for prosecution in the courts. I concede cheerfully that if this 
is done my resolution asking for his expulsion from this body be- 
comes somewhat academic. After all, a Senator in jail, for all prac- 
tical purposes, has been expelled.” 

Here is what the Committee’s staff, after a thorough investiga- 
tion, were able to report: 

McCarthy flew from Washington to Wheeling and arrived “some- 
where between three and five o’clock” on the day he was scheduled 
to speak. He was met at the airplane by Mr. Tom Sweeney, his host 
at Wheeling, Mr. Francis J. Love, a Republican member of the 80th 
Congress, and Mr. Frank Desmond, the reporter from the Intelli- 
gencer . McCarthy was told that WWVA was planning to broad- 
cast his speech later in the evening and so required an advance 
copy of the script. 

McCarthy told Sweeney, Love, and Desmond that he had with 
him only a rough draft of the speech he intended to deliver; that it 
would take him several hours to put it in shape. He consented to 



turn over the draft, as it stood, to the radio station, but only on the 
understanding that the WWVA executives should consider it a 
rough draft. 

Sweeney took the script to the radio station. Desmond was given 
another copy. McCarthy took a third copy to his rooms to work 
over it. 

This rough draft contained the “20^ version. And it was this 
rough draft that WWVA employees Whitaker and Myers were sub- 
sequently to swear was delivered by McCarthy, "word-for-word,” 
at the night’s meeting. 

The Committee’s investigators questioned Whitaker.* Who had 
asked him to sign the affidavit? A representative of the State De- 
partment— he did not know his name. How was Whitaker able to 
certify that McCarthy had followed the rough script word for 
word? Because he was checking the script (the rough draft that 
had been given to WWVA) while McCarthy spoke: his role had 
been to watch for "libel, profanity, or slander,” and to see to it that 
the recording being made by a WWVA engineer was broken off at 
a logical point, not more than 29% minutes after McCarthy had 
begun to speak. 

Could he positively remember that McCarthy had used the figure 
205? He could not remember any longer, but he had remembered 
at the time he signed the affidavit. 

Did Whitaker realize that, if McCarthy had read word-for-word 
from the rough draft, he would have been saying some rather extra- 
ordinary things? For example, did Whitaker remember McCarthy’s 
saying, “Today less than 100 years have come under Communist 
domination ?” Whitaker did not remember. Did he remember Mc- 
Carthy’s saying, “Today, only 6 years later , there are 80 billion peo- 
ple under the absolute domination of Soviet Russia— an increase of 
over 400 percent . On our side the figure has shrunk to around goo 
thousand. In other words in less than six years , the odds have 
changed from 9 to 1 in our favor to 8 to 1 against us”? Did Whitaker 
remember McCarthy saying that? Whitaker could not be sure. 

“It should ... be mentioned,” the Committee’s staff reported af- 
ter reviewing the evidence, “as a factor to be considered in evalu- 

* The reader should recall that the Gillette-Monroney Committee revealed 
itself from the outset of its investigation as predisposed to find against Senator 
McCarthy, So much so that one of its assistant counsels, Mr. Dan Buckley, 
resigned in protest against the partisanship of the inquiry in December, 1951. 
Later, two senators on the Committee, and another member of the staff re- 
signed, giving similar reasons. 


ating the credibility and scrupulosity of Whitaker, that he was very 
evasive— i.e., was unwilling to give a definite affirmative or negative 
answer— when he was asked whether or not Senator McCarthy in 
fact orally uttered the grossly erroneous population statistics con- 
tained in the script attached to his, Whitaker s, affidavit, notwith- 
standing that the only possible answer was * yes if the affidavit was 
accurate and truthful” ( Italics added. ) 

Mr. Bill Callahan, chairman of the meeting at which McCarthy 
spoke, was asked to comment on Whitaker’s competence to make 
such an affidavit; he said: 

If Whitaker says that, he is right. I did not have that impression. ... I 
was to give a signal to McCarthy when he got to 3-2-1 or 5-3-1 minutes 
and I was to stand up and show him by fingers how long he had to go. 
When Whitaker was “following” the script, he was watching his watch 
because he was looking up to me and I was looking down to him. 
[Whitaker claims to have looked at his watch only two or three times.] 
I would be amazed if he could follow the written speech, give me sig- 
nals and make sure I gave them to McCarthy and nodded back to him. 
If he could do that, he was a miracle man. ... I would say Whitaker 
would be absolutely honest in his opinion, but, again, I do not think that 
Whitaker, in watching his watch, tape, engineer and me . . . would be 
able to follow accurately a written prepared speech . . . with all that on 
his mind and know it was going word-for-word. I would say — having 
seen McCarthy with a big sheaf jumping from page to page and turn- 
ing many pages and skipping — that Whitaker could not possibly have 
followed a script. 

This last sentence of Callahan’s statement introduced a highly 
relevant factor. Every person interviewed— Desmond, Callahan, 
Sweeney, Love, Mr. Herman Gieske ( editor of the Intelligencer) 
and a Mrs. Eberhard (President of the Wheeling Women’s Repub- 
lican Club)— testified that McCarthy had spoken in part extem- 
poraneously, in part from “a sheaf of notes.” Samples: 

Sweeney. McCarthy was not reading the speech. It was a combina- 
tion of both [reading and extemporizing]. He was walking around the 
platform. He left the center part two or three times. But he did have 
some type of manuscript. . . . He referred to the manuscript from time 
to time. He did not read the speech. 

Love. It seems to me that McCarthy talked extemporaneously but that 
he had papers in front of him and might have read a paragraph now 
and then. My impression was that McCarthy did not read the speech 
but now and then looked at papers before him. 



Callahan. I have a distinct impression that McCarthy cut, elimi- 
nated, passed over, jumped through parts of his speech. He did have a 
thick sheaf of papers on the desk. . . . Sometimes he appeared to be 
looking at the papers and just glanced over the script and read some 
part . . . and then did not read for a minute and then read for a minute 

It is not easy to understand, in short, how McCarthy could have 
clung literally to the text of the rough draft— even assuming he was 
using this draft— if he had danced all over the platform, and spoken 
largely extempore. 

Unlike his colleague in WWVA, Myers, under examination, in 
effect repudiated his affidavit. “Admissions made to our investiga- 
tors by Myers,” the Committee's staff reported, “proved that his 
certification of virtual identity between the tape-recording of Sena- 
tor McCarthy’s speech and the text of the script attached to his 
affidavit was not based on personal knowledge.” 

Myers had not attended McCarthy’s speech. His affidavit was 
based on a technical check of the recording prior to its broadcast 
over the radio. The Committee’s staff reported: 

Myers later admitted ( x ) that his first “review” of the tape-recording — 
the one which occurred between delivery of the speech and the broad- 
cast — consisted merely of a “spot-checking” of the recording to make 
sure that it was “of broadcast character,” i.e., free of mechanical defects, 
and involved no textual comparison whatever of the recording against 
the script; and (2) that in his second review of the tape-recording, 
“against the script,” on the following day, only “certain portions” of the 
recording were textually compared with the script. 

Myers did insist, however, that Senator McCarthy had used the 
figure “205” somewhere in his speech. But note the exact extent of 
Myers’ recollection: 

Q. [by a Committee investigator] Did you play back the portion 
concerning 205? Can you religiously state that the figure 205 was used? 

A. Yes, that was what I have been concerned about. He used the 
term 205. ... I can recall the figure 205. . . . 

Q. To make the matter entirely clear, Mr. Myers, will you now read 
page 7, paragraph 3, of the script which you had in your hands that day 
when you checked, as you say, portions of the script against the record- 
ing, and tell us whether you can now recall not merely that the figure 
205, which appears in that paragraph, was in the recording, but also 
that the entire paragraph was in the recording, word-for-word? 


A. I cannot state that the entire paragraph was in the recording word- 
for-word. I did not compare that closely. 

Q. Can you say what the substance of the paragraph was in the re- 
cording, including the idea expressed by the words [205 Communists] 
made known to the Secretary of State? 

A. No, sir. I did not check that closely. [Italics added.] 

In short, Myers could only remember that McCarthy had used 
the figure ‘205” in some connection. McCarthy himself has repeat- 
edly acknowledged having used that figure: he had drawn atten- 
tion to the fact that in 1946 Secretary of State Byrnes had written 
that 205 persons recommended for dismissal by a security screening 
committee had not yet left the Department. 

The third of Benton's exhibits was the news story of Frank Des- 
mond citing the “205” figure exactly as it appeared in the rough 
draft. Desmond had attended McCarthy's speech. Had he written 
his story on the basis of the speech itself, or on the basis of the rough 
draft that McCarthy had given him (with due warning as to its 
crudity) during the automobile trip from the airport? Austin Wood, 
general manager of the Intelligencer told the Tydings Committee 
that Desmond had said to him that there could “be no doubt'' that 
his news story had correctly quoted McCarthy. Asked to amplify 
on his meeting with Desmond, Wood told Committee investigators 
that on Tydings' request he had asked Desmond whether “the fig- 
ure he quoted McCarthy as using was accurate”; that Desmond 
had “stated that it was”; and that he had therefore so reported to 
Tydings in his letter of March 25. However, Wood told the investi- 
gators he would nevertheless “bet 10 to 1 [that] Desmond got the 
story from the script.” 

Herman Gieske, the paper's editor and a member of the audience 
that heard McCarthy, also told investigators that he had ques- 
tioned Desmond's figure “205” when he saw it in the paper the next 
day; and that Desmond, although he at first defended it, later “qual- 
ified” his answer. The end of the road came when Desmond himself 
was questioned. He frankly admitted to the investigators that he 
had “got the figure from the script.” 

At this point, little was left of the case on the basis of which Sena- 
tor Benton proposed McCarthy be sent to jail. But the Committee's 
investigation was to yield more than a point-by-point discreation 
of Benton's charges: it yielded positive evidence supporting Mc- 
Carthy's Senate version of what he had said at Wheeling. On the 
other hand, none of the witnesses interviewed by the investigators, 


aside from Whitaker, said anything that tended to confirm the Ben- 
ton-Tydings version of the Wheeling speech. 

(1) Two persons, Love and Callahan, distinctly remembered 
that McCarthy had used two numbers. Love: "There was certainly 
another figure mentioned other than 205 and I think it was stressed 
more than 205 . 1 am not sure if 205 was mentioned. It seems to me 
that he talked about another number. . . .” Callahan: "McCarthy 
definitely talked about two different figures. . . .” which represented 
(a) State Department employees identified as Communists about 
whom McCarthy ‘had gotten information which he considered au- 
thentic” and (b) Department employees who were "fellow travel- 
ers or suspected [as such] who ought to be investigated.” (Presum- 
ably Callahan was referring to the 5 7 and 205 figures, respectively. ) 

(2) Herman Gieske, the editor of the Intelligencer , wrote an 
editorial the day after the speech presumably based on his own 
recollection of what McCarthy had said. "Senator McCarthy 
shocked his audience,” the editorial said, "when he charged there 
are over fifty persons of known Communistic affiliation still shel- 
tered in the U.S. Department of State.” (Italics added. ) 

(3) On June 28, McCarthy wrote to Herman Gieske of the In- 

The thought occurs to me that there is a sizeable number of people 
who make a hobby of recording almost any and every program on the 
air. There must be someone someplace who has a recording of my 
speech in Wheeling. 

It would be tremendously valuable to me to obtain a recording. 
Normally it would be of very little importance but the State Depart- 
ment and the Tydings group have spent so much time building up the 
importance of the [charge] . . . that I said 205, a recording would effect 
tively discredit. . . . the false claim. 

McCarthy asked Gieske to use the facilities of his paper to locate 
a recording. "If you could do this, Herman, I would not want it to 
appear to have been initiated by me because if it were I would have 
the press service on my neck looking for a statement.” 

Though nothing came of Gieske’s attempt to unearth a record- 
ing, the Committee’s staff interpreted McCarthy’s spontaneous ef- 
fort to get hold of an authentic transcript as evidence of his own 
confidence that such a transcript would vindicate him. If McCar- 
thy’s effort had been sheer bravado, it is unlikely that his approach 
to Gieske would have been confidential. 



(4) A final and highly relevant consideration. Within a period 
of 48 hours after he spoke in Wheeling, McCarthy made the charge, 
on three separate occasions, that there were 57 Communists in the 
State Department; and during this period all mentions of the fig- 
ure 205 were confined to remarks on the old Byrnes list. 

On the night of February 10, in Salt Lake City, McCarthy said 
over the air: 

Last night I discussed the “Communists in the State Department.” I 
stated I had the names of 57 card-carrying members of the Communist 
party. . . . [Italics added.] 

On February 11, McCarthy wired President Truman: 

In the Lincoln Day speech at Wheeling Thursday night I . . . further 
stated that I have in my possession the names of 57 Communists who 
are in the State Department at present. . . . 

While the records are not available to me, I know absolutely of one 
group of approximately 300 certified to the Secretary for discharge, be- 
cause of communism. He actually only discharged approximately 80. 
[Herein, obviously, the reference to the 205.] 

On February 11, McCarthy spoke in Reno and said: 

I have in my hand 5 7 cases of individuals who would appear to be 
either card-carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, 
but who nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy. 

If McCarthy had told a large audience on Thursday night that 
he had in hand a list of 205 State Department Communists, known 
to the Secretary of State as such, why did he say something so very 
different on Friday, and again on Saturday? An explanation has on 
occasion been advanced: McCarthy was so alarmed Friday morn- 
ing by the reaction to his explosive Thursday-night statement in 
Wheeling that he immediately took counsel with himself and, after 
looking over his meager data, decided that discretion was the 
better part of valor. Whereupon he took the square root of his 
original figure, and for good measure multiplied it by four, and 
started talking about 57 Communists. 

This might be a cogent argument except for the fact that there 
was no uproar Friday morning! McCarthy was too little known, 
and Wheeling was too remote. Only the Wheeling paper, and the 
Chicago Tribune, as far as we have been able to discover, reported 



McCarthy’s speech of Thursday night on the following day. It was 
another two or three days before his Wheeling statements reached 
a national audience. That audience was aroused by the charge that 
there were 57, not 205, Communists in the State Department. 

To sum up: there is no conclusive evidence (i.e., evidence pro- 
vided by a tape recording or by numerous and unambiguous affi- 
davits from a cross-section of McCarthy’s audience ) that McCar- 
thy said “57” or that he said “205”. The available evidence, how- 
ever, clearly indicates that McCarthy used “57”; and that there- 
fore Senator Benton and others are unjustified in accusing McCar- 
thy of having lied to the Senate. There is, on the other hand, no 
accounting for McCarthy’s having represented to the Senate, as a 
verbatim transcript of his Wheeling speech, a version in which the 
figure 205 never appeared— since, on repeated occasions, he has 
acknowledged having used both figures in the speech. Benton was 
correct in pointing out this contradiction; though it is not one that 
buttresses Benton’s main argument. 

Let us turn now to the impact of the Wheeling speech and the 
two or three public appearances McCarthy made in the ensuing 
few days. McCarthy accomplished two things. He served notice that 
nothing short of an exhaustive investigation into State Department 
security practices would satisfy him. And he committed an egre- 
gious blunder which continues to furnish grist for the mills of those 
many whose first goal in national affairs remains the political assas- 
sination of McCarthy. 

In Wheeling, as we have seen, McCarthy said, "I have in my 
hand 57 cases of individuals who would appear to be either card- 
carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but 
who nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy.” The 
following evening, in Salt Lake City, he went even further. He was 
on the air with Senator Malone. The interrogator, Mr. Dan Valen- 
tine, asked him to elaborate on his speech the night before: 

McCarthy. Last night I discussed the Communists in the State De- 
partment. I stated that I had the names of 57 card-carrying members of 
the Communist Party. 

Valentine. ... In other words. Senator, if Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson would call you at the Hotel Utah tonight in Salt Lake City, 
you would tell him 57 names of actual card-carrying Communists in the 
State Department, actual card-carrying Communists? 

McCarthy. Not only can I, Dan, but I will, as I say, on condition. . . . 


“Not Members of the Communist Party/ not people who were 
alleged to be Communists/ but ‘the names of 57 card-carrying mem- 
bers of the Communist Party/ ” Senator Tydings was to taunt Mc- 
Carthy on the Senate floor upon submitting the Tydings Report on 
July 20, 1953; and the refrain has never died down: “57 card-carry- 
ing Communists ?” it goes; “where are their cards?”* 

The following day, McCarthy wired President Truman the flat 
statement: “I have in my possession the names of 57 Communists 
who are in the State Department at present.” Six paragraphs further 
on, in the same telegram, McCarthy repeated his unambiguous 
charge: “Despite this State Department blackout, we have been 
able to compile a list of 57 Communists in the State Department.” 

McCarthy, of course, could never hope to prove that specific 
charge, and hence should not have phrased it in the way he did. 
This does not mean that there were not at the time, or that there 
are not today, 57 Communists in the Department of State; nor does 
it mean that McCarthy did not actually name 57 Communists to 
the Tydings Committee. It means simply that McCarthy never of- 
fered proof that he had in hand the names of 57 State Department 
employees loyal to the Communist Party, much less “card-carrying” 

These are difficult things to prove at best; and, as experience 
shows, all but impossible to prove to the satisfaction of the Liberals. 
At this writing, a book has appeared contending that even Alger 
Hiss was not a Communist— that he was framed. Reputable folk 
continue to insist that Harry Dexter White, that Lauchlin Currie, 
that Nathan Gregory Silvermaster were not Communists. “Insuf- 
ficient proof,” we are told; and indeed, at least one court has ruled 
that anyone who calls somebody a Communist had better be pre- 

* We asked Senator McCarthy why he described the 57 as “card-carrying” 
Communists, and he answered that he had in mind the discipline under 
which the persons in question worked, and the regularity with which they 
served Communism: he had meant it as a figure of speech to emphasize the 
seriousness of the evidence against them. “Card-carrying” could , in certain 
circumstances, mean simply that; but it should be so used only in pretty 
sophisticated company, and even then subject to proper inflection and em- 
phasis. And even a poet would not press a figure of speech if he were chal- 
lenged as Mr. Valentine challenged McCarthy in asking “. . . actual card- 
carrying Communists?” McCarthy should have answered, of course, “Prob- 
ably not actually ‘card-carrying*; but what difference does carrying a card 
make anyhow?** 

As a matter of fact, in 1950 there were no card-carrying Communists in 
the State Department — or anywhere else. The Party had recalled all mem- 
bership cards several years before. 



pared to furnish either a certified photostat of that person’s Com- 
munist Party card or sworn affidavits from at least two people to 
the effect that they have with their own eyes seen him at meetings 
of the Party open to members only. 

Probatory evidence of Party membership is ipso facto hard to 
come by. If we have learned anything about the scope and the tech- 
niques of the Communist conspiracy it is that only a small percent- 
age of the Communist faithful take out membership cards; and 
that, what is more, many Communists are not identifiable on the 
basis of their overt political activities. Whittaker Chambers has a 
great deal to say on the subject, as do a dozen equally authentic 
witnesses to the conspiracy. Moreover, the Party’s increased em- 
phasis on underground activity and its current discouragement of 
overt support of Russian policies are well known, thanks in part to 
the published findings of FBI undercover agents. It can be imag- 
ined, indeed, that disciplined Communists in strategic posts in the 
federal government are now enjoined to frequent in far greater 
force meetings of the National Association of Manufacturers than 
the functions of the National Council for American-Soviet Friend- 

Perhaps McCarthy deliberately sensationalized the evidence he 
possessed in order to draw attention to the gravity of the situation. 
Perhaps, again, the complexities of the Communist problem were 
lost on Joe McCarthy in the early days of his venture. After all, he 
had seen alarming reports of various investigating agencies on cer- 
tain employees of the State Department. And who, McCarthy may 
have asked himself, who but Communists would do and say such 
things? That only Communists would so act is perhaps a logical 
answer to the question; but logic in our age, must be strained 
through the woof of irrationality and the warp of ignorance. Many 
non-Communists behave in a baffling manner, and McCarthy 
should have taken this into account— all the more since he was pre- 
pared to challenge the President of the United States, the political 
party in control of Congress, and the vigilantes of Liberalism in the 
press and the classroom. 

McCarthy could have said: “I hold in my hand investigative re- 
ports on 57 members of the State Department. The evidence of 
pro-Communism on the part of these 57 is so substantial that, in 
my opinion, no loyalty-security board composed of conscientious 
men who know the score about Communism would, after weigh- 
ing it, clear them for sensitive positions. The Communists don’t 



often give us a break and expose themselves. But here we have 57 
people whose activities and associations are ominous. Perhaps some 
of them, perhaps many of them, are not Communists. But none of 
them should be working in the State Department.” 

But McCarthy did not put it that way; and it quickly became 
evident that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for him to pull 
himself out of the hole he had dug himself into. And to those who 
were above all concerned with getting the dupes and the fellow 
travellers out of the State Department, McCarthy’s blunder would 
prove costly. His specific charges, just to the extent that they were 
incautious, would make a cleanup more difficult because attention 
would be drawn away from loyalty risks (the real problem) to 
Communist Party card-carriers ( a marginal aspect of the real prob- 

If, however, McCarthy at first disappointed his potential allies, 
he was soon to surprise them by the speed with which he got edu- 
cated to the kind of warfare in which he found himself engaged. 
By the 20th of February, when McCarthy faced a hostile Senate, 
and a press aroused to a fever pitch of excitement, he had changed 
his tack notably. 

When he got up to speak in the late afternoon, the Senate em- 
barked upon a rowdy six-hour session. The Democrats had been 
clamoring for McCarthy to state his case against the State Depart- 
ment. When he tried to do so, they made it all but impossible. 
Senator Lucas interrupted no less than 61 times. Senator McMahon 
no less than 27 times, while the more restrained Senators Withers 
and Lehman satisfied themselves with 22 and 13 insertions re- 

McCarthy presented material, most of it developed several years 
earlier by the State Department Security office, on “81”* cases. He 
has since stated, “This list included the 57, plus additional cases of 
less importance against whom the evidence was less conclusive.” 0 0 

0 Actually, he omitted a few. See below. 

00 [Joe McCarthy, McCarthyism , (New York; Devin- Adair, 1952), p. 10.] 
McCarthy did not segregate the 57 from the others. And since in the course of 
his harried six-hour presentation, he spoke several times of numbers 1, 2, and 
81 as the most dangerous on his list, he left his listeners no grounds for con- 
cluding that numbers 1-57 were the ones he had in mind at Wheeling and Salt 
Lake City, and in his wire to President Truman. (No. 1 was finally suspended 
by the Department, pending the adjudication of loyalty-security charges 
against him. No. 2 was ultimately found to be a loyalty risk by the Loyalty- 
Review Board. No. 81 had been “separated” from government service four 
months before McCarthy spoke.) 



In his Senate speech, McCarthy did not contend that his material 
conclusively proved membership in the Communist Party . He 
spoke of loyalty risks. These we propose to classify, roughly, in 
five groups. One category includes persons suspected of being dis- 
ciplined Communists and/ or espionage agents; that is, persons who 
may fairly be described as “first-degree security risks/’ A second 
group includes persons with provably suspicious associations and 
activities, whom we may call “second-degree security risks.” A 
third category includes persons who have associated with suspected 
Communists and shown themselves to be in sympathy with as- 
sorted Communist objectives, or “third-degree risks.” A fourth in- 
cludes sexual deviates, persons with mental or character weak- 
nesses— let us say, “moral risks.” A fifth group includes persons who 
are both “third-degree” and “moral risks,” or “combination risks.” 

McCarthy went into 76 of his 81 cases. * They break down as 
follows: 25 first-degree risks, 13 second-degree risks, 30 third-de- 
gree risks, 2 morals risks, and 5 combination risks.** 

There was here a perceptible change in the nature of McCarthy’s 
charges— a change to which his critics have paid scant attention. 
They have preferred to call him to an accounting on the basis of 
his early scattered references to “57 members of the Communist 
Party presently in the State Department” rather than on the basis 
of his detailed Senate speech. They keep insisting that he stand or 
fall on a political peroration rather than on his more or less formal 

Several misapprehensions are, consequently, current about 
what McCarthy set out to do in his Senate speech. We are told, for 
example, that he was attempting to prove, case by case, that 81 
members of the Communist Party were employed in the State De- 
partment— although quite early in the speech, and again and again 
later, he discouraged such expectations. “I shall not attempt to pre- 
sent a detailed case on each one, a case which would convince a 
jury. All I am doing is to develop sufficient evidence so that anyone 
who reads the record will have a good idea of the number of Com- 

0 One of the 76 persons (No. 72) McCarthy highly approved — his quar- 
rel with the State Department was that it had refused to hire him! He read 
one duplication (he confused No. 77 with No. 9) and omitted, without 
explanation, four cases — Nos. 15, 27, 35, and 59. 

°* First-degree risks: 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 12, 16, 17, 19, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 

36, 38, 39> 47. 53. 58, 68, 74, 75, 81. Second-degree risks: 3, 8, 9, 13, 34, 

37, 46, 54, 55, 5 7, 64, 67, 73. Third-degree risks: 6, 10, 11, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 56, 60, 61, 63, 65, 69, 70, 71, 78, 
79, 80. Morals risks: 62, 76, Combination risks: 14, 18, 20, 44, 66. 


munists in the State Department.” ( Congressional Record , Feb. 20, 
1950, p. 1959. ) “It is possible that some of these persons will get a 
clean bill of health. I know that some of them will not.” (P. 1967.) 
“I have said to the Senator that I am not indicting the 81. I have 
said there is sufficient in the files to show that there is something 
radically wrong ” (P. 1968. Italics, here and throughout the bal- 
ance of this chapter, are added.) 

McCarthy is frequently accused of having said that all his targets 
worked in the State Department whereas it later developed that 
many of them did not. Yet McCarthy was quite clear about this 

I may say that I know that some of these individuals whose cases I am 
giving the Senate are no longer in the State Department. A sizeable 
number of them are not . Some of them have transferred to other Gov- 
ernment work, work allied with the State Department. Others have 
been transferred to the United Nations. (P. 1961.) 

About several of the persons on his list McCarthy stated frankly 
that he did not know their whereabouts. 

I . . . told the Senate earlier that I have no way of knowing definitely 
which of these persons are still in the employ of the State Department. 
I know they have all been there at some time.* A sizeable number is 
still there. (P. 1964.)** 

McCarthy made it clear why his interest in a case did not lapse 
the moment the person involved left the State Department. And the 
Senate went along: its Resolution 231 authorized the Tydings Com- 
mittee to investigate present and former employees of the State De- 
partment whose loyalty was in question. 

I do not claim that all the cases I am reporting to the Senate refer to 
persons working in the State Department, but in view of the fact that 
most of them were in the State Department and had top secret clear- 
ance, I think the Senate could call them before a committee and find out 
in what Government work they are now engaged, or, if they are not en- 
gaged in Government work, what they have been doing in private em- 
ployment, and whether they are members of espionage rings. (P. 1971.) 

0 All but six were or had been. Five of the six had applied for work in the 
State Department, but had never been hired. 

00 McCarthy commented similarly in discussing Cases 29, 33, 34, 39, 42, 

45, 57,78,8 i. 



In the light of these facts, which are available in the Congres- 
sional Record, it is surprising that McCarthy is so universally 
judged by an irrelevant yardstick. McCarthy’s excesses in Wheel- 
ing, Salt Lake and Reno were not repeated in the Senate and are 
unrelated to his later performances— for example, before the Tyd- 
ings Committee. In the Senate speech which occasioned the crea- 
tion of that Committee, McCarthy did not commit himself to reveal 
the names of 57 card-carrying Communists presently working in 
the State Department, but, rather, to present evidence against indi- 
viduals whose survival of the State Department’s security program 
was a prima facie indictment of that program. 

The further charge is made that McCarthy “introduced no new 
evidence”— that, insofar as he said anything that was correct, it was 
old stuff. This is a curious accusation, if only because McCarthy’s 
claims about what he was doing before the Senate were extremely 
modest. “This information is nothing new,” he said. “It has been 
there a long time. If the Senator or anyone else who is interested 
had expended sufficient effort, he could have brought this to the 
attention of the Senate.” (P. 1968.) Indeed, this was the crux of 
McCarthy’s argument. It is, McCarthy was saying, precisely be- 
cause the cases are “old” ones that the situation is so serious. For if 
the employees he had in mind had been under fire several years be- 
fore (as they had been), and if the State Department had kept 
them on anyway (as it had with respect to the majority), then the 
Department security picture was all the more alarming. 

At this juncture, however, McCarthy should have given his col- 
leagues some information highly relevant to what he was doing. 
Yet he chose not to; and so he gave the Tydings Committee an 
opening for the sweeping charge in its Report, that “in seeming [an 
investigation] ... a fraud was perpetrated upon the Senate.” 2 

Having told his colleagues that his information was “nothing 
new,” and having, in fact, gone so far as to chide them for not hav- 
ing “expended sufficient effort” to bring this information “to the 
attention of the Senate” at an earlier date, McCarthy should have 
told them just exactly where they could have got hold of the infor- 
mation. Virtually all the data McCarthy was giving them were to be 
found in the files of the House Committee on Appropriations which 
two years before, prior to the imposition of the ban on the release 
of security data, had conducted its own investigation of State De- 
partment security. McCarthy kept this highly relevant fact from 
the Senate. And at the same time he was telling the Senate that the 


information “has been there a long time,” he was also telling it 
that “all the records are completely secret except what I could get 
from loyal State Department employees”! And again, “I know the 
State Department is very eager to know how I have secured all 
this information. I know that the jobs of the men who helped me 
secure this material would be worth nothing if the names were 
given.* If it were not for some good, loyal Americans in the State 
Department— and there are many of them— I should not have been 
able to present this picture to the Senate tonight. . . .” 

Now this amounts to misleading the Senate as to the source of 
his information— but only, be it noted, because McCarthy intimated 
that the data he was presenting to the Senate that night had been 
gotten together for him by Department informants. As we shall see 
in subsequent chapters, a great deal of the information McCarthy 
gave to the Tydings Committee was indeed fresh information; and 
some must have come through leaks from the Department. More- 
over, it is likely that confidential information from the Department 
had already begun to reach him before he delivered his Senate 
speech. But the point is, of course, that McCarthy was not using 
that material on the night of February 20th ; or, if he was, it consti- 
tuted only a very small portion of his presentation. * * McCarthy had 
put himself in an embarrassing position because the assorted 
factors could be so arranged, by adept partisans, as to add up as 
follows: (1) By referring to Department informants McCarthy 
gave the Senate the impression that he was presenting it with fresh 
information; (2) the Senate, taking McCarthy’s word for it that his 
charges had not previously been reviewed and discredited, voted 
an investigation; (3) the investigation would not have been voted 
had McCarthy advised the Senate that his data had previously 
been gone over by a committee of Congress. Therefore , McCarthy 
got his investigation by perpetrating “a fraud upon the Senate.” 

Actually, no such olfense could be proved against Senator Mc- 
Carthy by the Tydings Committee— nor was the Tydings Commit- 
tee entitled to reprimand McCarthy in the language it did. As we 
have said, McCarthy may have misled the Senate as to the source 

* This was no exaggeration. See Humelsine's warning to State Depart- 
ment employees, in Chapter XI, “Confrontation.” 

The exceptions: McCarthy referred sketchily to seven employees with 
bad security backgrounds who were working in the State Department’s Office 
of Information and Education in New York (Cases 21-27). There are no 
identifiable counterparts for these persons on the old House list. Hence it is 
likely that their names were indeed given to McCarthy by what he termed 
“good loyal people in the [OIE] 



of his information; but steps 2 and 3 in the Committee’s reasoning 
involve a couple of false premises. For one, the House committee 
that had gone over the data that McCarthy presented on the 
Senate floor had not cleared the suspect employees*— in fact, it had 
done everything in its power to urge the State Department to dis- 
miss them. That was in the early months of 1948. In the early 
months of 1950, McCarthy found that a number of these people 
were still working in the Department. Such a situation clearly 
called for an investigation. But most important, Tydings’ premises 
are that, if McCarthy had enlightened the Senate about the history 
of his 81 cases, an investigation would not have been voted; and 
that Senator McCarthy, therefore, defrauded the Senate. This is 

Since 1948, no Congressional probe into State Department secur- 
ity had taken place, for the simple reason that security data on 
federal employees had been withheld from the legislature. In the 
meantime, President Truman had called the Hiss investigation a 
“red herring”; Hiss had been convicted; the ideological coloration 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations was becoming increasingly evi- 
dent; Judith Coplon and Klaus Fuchs had been caught; and we 
had lost China. The public’s reaction to McCarthy’s charges in 
Wheeling and elsewhere was unmistakable: the country wanted 
an investigation. The Senate would in no circumstances have de- 
nied it one . It would have made no difference whatever if McCar- 
thy had told the Senate that his material had been developed by 
the 80th Congress. 

To get on: McCarthy not only told the Senate that his informa- 
tion was not new, he went further and said that even the evalua- 
tion of the information was not, by and large, his own: 

I am not giving my evaluation of the evidence. I want it understood. If 
the Senators will listen, they will note that what I am doing is to recite 
the facts, which the State Department’s own security agency dug up, 
and which information acted as the basis for their recommendation that 
the individuals in question, because of being security risks, be dis- 
charged and not retained in the service. 

And finally, McCarthy admitted that the information he was 
presenting was not necessarily complete; though he assumed that, 
in arriving at the conclusion that the individuals in question were 
security risks, the original evaluators had taken stock of mitigating 

0 See Chapter VIII. 



I think the Senator [McMahon] flatters me when he says it is my duty 
to present the entire file to the Senate and to give all the information. 
The President has said we shall not get that file, and, as of the present 
moment, since we are not on a “Dear Joe, Dear Harry” basis, I cannot 
go to the White House and say “Harry, give me this file because Sena- 
tor McMahon insists that you give me the information.” All I can do is 
to give Senators what I can dig up. I have given Senators the fullest, 
most complete, fairest resume of the files that I possibly could. ( P. 1969. ) 

On this point, McCarthy deserves to be censured. For his resume 
of the information that had been developed by State Department 
security investigators, and synthesized by Congressional investiga- 
tors two years before,* was neither full nor fair. A comparison of 
the dossier from which McCarthy got his material with McCar- 
thy’s own version of this material reveals that in 38 cases he was 
guilty of exaggeration. On some occasions “fellow-traveller” had 
turned into “Communist”; on others, “alleged pro-Communist” had 
developed into “pro-Communist.” In most cases, however, Mc- 
Carthy’s exaggerations were neither detailed nor emphatic enough 
to shove a given case into a higher security category. However, af- 
ter McCarthy got through improvising on them, fifteen cases 
seemed indeed to move up a notch in the security ladder.** 

In the course of the debate, McCarthy was asked several times 
why he had not presented his evidence in an “orderly fashion” to 
the President, or to the Secretary of State, or to the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations. McCarthy’s answer, precise and on 
occasion eloquent, was as follows: 

Mr. President, I have before me information from the State Depart- 
ment files, information which the President says the Senate did not 
have. Having this information, it is a serious question as to what should 
be done with it. I originally thought possibly we could hope for some 
cooperation from the State Department and the President. However, in 
going over the material and finding that all of it, of course, has been 
available to the State Department, for it is all from their files, it seemed 
that nothing would be gained by calling it to their attention again. The 
President, I felt, had demonstrated his lack of interest quite thoroughly, 
during the Hiss investigation. Then, when I sent him a telegram and 
said, “Mr. President, I have the 57 names; they are yours if you want 
them”; and when he answered by calling me a liar, I felt I could get no 
cooperation from the President. ( P. 1958. ) 

0 See Chapter VIII. 

00 They are Cases 1, 4, 14, 17, 18, 20, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 58, and 68. 



To those who say, “Why do you not tell the State Department; why 
do you not give the names to the State Department?” I say that every- 
thing I have here is from the State Department’s own files. ( P. 1959. ) 

[Re McMahon s suggestion that he should have reported his findings 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:] the Senator suggested a 
course of action which he thinks I should have followed. As I explained 
earlier this evening, I thought of that. I thought there was some possibil- 
ity of accomplishing the desired results in that fashion. However, keep- 
ing in mind that the members of the Foreign Relations Committee and 
all the Senators have had substantially the same knowledge and oppor- 
tunity that I have had, I questioned whether anything would be gained 
unless the President changed his mind and said “I will give you the 
information.” ... I thought the only thing to do was what 1 have done , 
namely , to let the people of the country know what is going on, and 
then hope that the pressure of public opinion would be great enough 
to force the President to clean house. Frankly, I think he will not clean 
house until he determines it is politically inexpedient for him to do 
otherwise. I think the President is one of the cleverest politicians this 
Nation has ever had. I think when he discovers that the people of the 
country do not want a continuation of what is going on, there will be a 
housecleaning. (P. 1970.) 

Here is a precis of McCarthy's position in his speech to the 

1. In 1946 and 1947, security investigators in the State Depart- 
ment developed convincing evidence that a substantial number of 
Department employees are disloyal to the United States or that 
they are, at least, security risks. 

2. Three years have gone by, and yet, I have reason to believe 
that a number of the individuals in question remain on duty in the 
State Department. 

3. If there are mitigating circumstances in these cases, if there 
exists new evidence that exonerates them, I do not know what it is, 
and the Presidential ban on releasing material in the files precludes 
my finding out what it is. 

I am not prepared to take the word of the Secretary of State that 
his security program is serving the national interests. I find it dif- 
ficult to believe that the retention in office of a number of these 
individuals is justified. I want an independent judgment— the judg- 
ment of a Senate investigating committee. 

This may not fit in very well with the press picture of McCar- 
thy the loud-of-mouth, McCarthy the irresponsible. But it is the 
position McCarthy actually took and said he was taking. 


The Ty dings Saga: 


T he Tydings Committee investigation "made” McCarthy. 
This is true in two senses. The investigation established Mc- 
Carthy in the eyes of a few articulate, and millions of inar- 
ticulate, anti-Communists as the standard-bearer in the fight to 
expose Communist infiltration of the Federal Government. In the 
eyes of many other Americans, especially of almost all members of 
our intelligentsia, it established McCarthy as the arch-villain of 
mid-twentieth-century American politics. 

It was in the course of the Tydings investigation that McCarthy 
earned his stripes as a “wholesale character assassin .” There he got 
his reputation for “publicly smearing innocent people.” There 
“McCarthy” became (or soon was to become) synonymous with 
the irresponsible, reckless accusation. There he became known as 
the unconscionable and insatiable publicity-seeker, the crude and 
ambitious political adventurer. There the “Big Lie,” “misrepresen- 
tation” and “innuendo” became known as McCarthy’s “methods.” 
There he was “ismized”: “McCarthyism,” the derisive epithet 
coined by Owen Lattimore, became, with a boost from the Tyd- 
ings Committee, a household word. And there, most important of 
all, McCarthy’s fundamental charge that the State Department 
had been guilty of lax security practices was consigned to history 
as a “fraud and a hoax.” 

All this is not to say, of course, that McCarthy stopped offending 
people when the Tydings hearings closed. But it was in the course 
of that investigation that he got branded— indelibly, so it seems— as 
someone nice people are, as a matter of course, against. 

The Tydings investigation occupied less than four months of 
McCarthy’s tumultuous career— something less, surely, than the 
span of time normally allotted to a man for defining himself, his 
life work, and his methods. It might, therefore, seem sensible for 
us to treat the Tydings episode as an isolated item in McCarthy’s 


record and speedily move on from there to consider the present- 
day McCarthy whom even his critics acknowledge to be wiser, 
more cautious, and more sophisticated. But such treatment of the 
episode would keep us from coming to grips with the over-arching 
issue of the whole McCarthy controversy: Is the view of Mc- 
Carthy cultivated by the Liberal intelligentsia something for 
which McCarthy himself is responsible, or something for which 
persons other than McCarthy are responsible? Is it traceable to 
things McCarthy has really done and really said, or to things he 
is merely alleged to have done and said? If the responsibility does 
lie with persons other than McCarthy (or even if only part of it 
does), intelligent discussion of McCarthy requires that we know 
who has so misled large numbers of Americans, and what, in so 
misleading them, they have been up to. 

The answer emerges, in full, from the Report of the Tydings 
Committee, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, which in the spring of 1950 investigated charges that 
disloyal persons were employed or had been employed by the De- 
partment of State. This Committee returned the verdict that the 
man who had made most of the charges had perpetrated a “fraud 
and a hoax” upon the American people. Since the Liberals seem to 
want it that way, we shall let it be that way: we shall take the Tyd- 
ings episode as the testing ground for judging both McCarthy and 
McCarthy’s enemies. 

For such purposes, however, a hasty precis of the hearings will 
not do. We shall, rather, survey in some detail the data McCarthy 
presented to the Committee; note the precise charges McCarthy 
levelled— both those that do him credit in retrospect and those that 
do not; examine the defense offered by each of the persons accused; 
and give close attention to what the Tydings Investigating Com- 
mittee did, and failed to do, with the evidence put at its disposal 
by McCarthy and other witnesses. This will involve our devoting a 
sizeable portion of our book to the Tydings proceedings. 

In three particulars, however, we shall move faster than in all 
others. The Amerasia case will be dealt with only to the extent that 
it sheds light on the Committee’s performance and attitude, and 
thus, briefly: the Amerasia story is well known, and McCarthy’s 
role in it was a minor one. Similarly, we shall take a short-cut in 
dealing with the cases of Owen Lattimore and John Stewart Serv- 
ice. The Lattimore and Service cases were highly publicized at the 
time of the investigation, and most Americans are now more or 



less conversant with their details. And these two cases are beyond 
any question McCarthy’s strongest cases; so that in abbreviating 
them rather than, for example, the Hanson and Kenyon cases, we 
do not open ourselves to the charge of stacking the cards. (Mc- 
Carthy has been dramatically vindicated in the Service case, by 
the finding of the Loyalty Review Board that “reasonable doubt” 
existed as to his loyalty; and in the Lattimore case by the findings 
of the McCarran Committee and by Lattimore’s subsequent indict- 
ment for perjury. ) 

The following review by no means purports to be an exhaustive 
account of the Tydings proceedings. (There are 1498 pages of tes- 
timony in the Committee’s record, plus 1024 pages of documentary 
evidence.) But it does purport to be a fair one. We propose to pre- 
sent the reader with sufficient data on both sides to enable him to 
make informed judgments about McCarthy and the forces which 
were arrayed against him. These data are die raw materials out of 
which the political pundits, the press, and most of our intellectuals, 
have constructed the most publicized if not necessarily the popular 
notion of what McCarthyism is. Upon them was based the judg- 
ment, handed down many months ago, that the State Depart- 
ment’s security record has been as pure as the driven snow, and 
that Senator McCarthy is Lucifer looking for headlines. We are 
urging that they be freshly considered. Is the picture of McCarthy 
painted four years ago a good likeness? Was the indictment, then 
handed down, in accord with the facts and was it brought against 
the right people? 

Finally: the requirements of impartiality, which we have strived 
to observe in the ensuing pages, apply only to the presentation of 
the facts — they do not commit us to reticence in stating our own 
conclusions. We do not, in other words, intend to repress the con- 
tempt that familiarity with the Tydings record breeds. 

Two days after McCarthy first aired his charges on the floor of 
the Senate, Democratic Majority Leader Scott Lucas— McCarthy’s 
principal heckler— introduced Senate Resolution 231, which au- 
thorized an investigation of the State Department. 

The wording of the resolution needs careful attention since there 
is a striking discrepancy between what the Senate unanimously 
instructed its Committee to do and what the Committee later did. 
“Resolved,” the Resolution reads, 1 



That the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, or any duly author- 
ized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed to conduct a full 
and complete study and investigation as to whether persons who are dis- 
loyal to the United States are, or have been, employed by the Depart- 
ment of State. The committee shall report to the Senate at the earliest 
practicable date the result of its investigation, together with such rec- 
ommendations as it may deem desirable, and if said recommendations 
are to include formal charges of disloyalty against any individual, then 
the committee, before making such recommendation, shall give said in- 
dividual open hearing for the purpose of taking evidence or testimony 
on said charges. 

In the conduct of this study and investigation, the committee is di- 
rected to procure by subpoena and examine the complete loyalty and 
employment files and records of all the Government employees in the 
Department of State, and such other agencies against whom charges 
have been heard.* 

The reader will note at once that some of the language here is 
ambiguous; that, for example, the Resolution leaves in question the 
exact scope of the Committee s inquiry. Thus, a dispute over tech- 
nicalities plagued the Committee from the beginning, particularly 
the question whether it should investigate only State Department 
employees ( past and present) or, additionally, employees of “other 
agencies against whom charges have been heard.” For example: 
was William Remington (a Commerce Department employee, yet 
one of Senator McCarthy's cases) a proper subject of the investi- 

McCarthy has attacked Tydings for not having investigated 
Remington, maintaining that the “other agencies” phrase in the 
Resolution's second paragraph brought within the Committee’s 
purview all government employees “against whom charges have 
been heard .'' 2 Yet the Committee's refusal to take up the Reming- 
ton case was, from a strictly technical point of view, justified. ( The 
first paragraph of the Resolution fixes the limits of the inquiry, 

* There is no evidence that McCarthy objected to the phrasing of the Reso- 
lution — which he should have done. For it is virtually impossible to prove 
that persons "are disloyal’ to the United States. In February, 1950, the 
question was whether the President’s Loyalty Program was being adequately 
administered . The committee should have been asked to ascertain whether 
"reasonable grounds” existed for questioning the loyalty of persons who are 
or have been employed by the Department of State; or, foreshadowing the 
momentous change in loyalty standards of a year later, better still, "whether 
persons about whose loyalty or reliability there is reasonable doubt are or 
have been employed by the Department of State.” 



and includes only past and present employees of the State Depart- 
ment. The second paragraph is clearly procedural, authorizing the 
Committee to procure the files of suspect State Department per- 
sonnel from other agencies where such individuals may also have 
been employed. ) But it is another question entirely whether the 
Committee ought to have stuck to a strict interpretation of its man- 
date when it was confronted with a man like Remington who, 
while never on the State Department payroll, nevertheless engaged 
in interdepartmental work that included the State Department. 

Traditionally, the Senate gives its investigating committees a 
measure of discretion. Thus it is unlikely that the Senate intended 
this Committee to call back the hounds whenever a disloyalty trail 
led to individuals who did not present themselves fortnightly to a 
State Department cashier. Moreover, the Committee did adopt the 
“broader” view in the case of Owen Lattimore.* “We find,” the 
Committee said in its final report to the Senate, “that Owen Latti- 
more is not now and never has been in any proper sense an em- 
ployee of our State Department.” 3 Yet this did not deter it from 
hearing 191 pages of testimony from Lattimore, or from devoting 
26 pages of its final Report to his exculpation. The Committee’s 
comments on the charges against Lattimore were advanced “as a 
matter of elementary fairness to Mr. Lattimore . . . [and] to schol- 
ars and writers throughout the country and to the American public 
generally.” 4 But no such tender concern was shown for an inquir- 
ing public, or a harassed Senator, when the Committee refused to 
look into the record of William Remington who has since been 
convicted of perjury for having testified under oath that he had 
never been a member of the Communist Party. But we are getting 
ahead of the story. 

Whatever lingering doubts there may have been in the minds of 
Committee members as to the propriety of investigating personnel 
on the State Department periphery, Senate Resolution 231 spelled 
out one unequivocal directive: it ordered the Committee to find 
out whether disloyal persons were being, or had been, employed 
by the State Department. Yet a majority of the Committee either 
misunderstood the assignment or deliberately perverted its mean- 
ing. For the majority’s operating assumption was, from the very 
first, that the Senate had ordered an inquiry concerning McCar- 

* Nor is this the only instance in which the Committee displayed its will- 
ingness to stretch and contract its mandate as it saw fit. 


thy’s reliability— or, concretely, the validity of his contention that 
such and such a number of loyalty risks were working in the De- 
partment of State. And this untenable notion of the Committee’s 
task was so promoted by the press that the public remains ill- 
informed even today as to what the Tydings Committee was sup- 
posed to do. 

The difference between investigating “McCarthy’s charges” and 
investigating the loyalty of State Department personnel is obvious 
and important. A committee conducting a “full and complete 
study ... as to whether persons who are disloyal to the United 
States are, or have been, employed by the Department of State” 
will itself assume the burden of investigation. It will seek out in- 
formation from every available source; it will follow up leads; it 
will pore over personnel files; it will subpoena key figures to testify; 
and it will draw the conclusions to which its evidence points. A 
committee investigating “McCarthy’s charges” will— as the Tyd- 
ings Committee did— turn to McCarthy and demand conclusive 
proof from him. It will content itself with evaluating McCarthy’s 
cases on the basis of such evidence as McCarthy is able to produce. 

McCarthy’s approach to the Committee was consistent with the 
Senate Resolution. “I intend,” he told the Committee when he first 
appeared before it, “to submit to the Committee information bear- 
ing upon the disloyalty, the bad security risks in the State Depart- 
ment. Then it is up to the Committee to investigate those particu- 
lar cases. The Committee has been allowed, I believe, $25,000 or 
$50,000 to do that. I do not have the investigative staff. I do not 
have access to the files, to make any complete investigation and 
make any formal charges. All I intend to do, Mr. Chairman, is to 
submit the evidence I have gathered.” 5 What is more, in his major 
Senate speech, McCarthy specifically disowned exhaustive knowl- 
edge of all his cases. And, of course, he repeatedly called for the 
establishment of an investigating committee; which would hardly 
have been necessary if, in his view, there had been nothing left to 

Senator Tydings lost no time in setting the course we have attrib- 
uted to him. Pointing his finger at McCarthy on the opening day 
of the hearings, he said: 6 “You are in the position of being the man 
who occasioned this hearing, and so far as I am concerned in this 
Committee you are going to get one of the most complete investi- 
gations ever given in the history of the Republic, so far as my abil- 



ities permit The Tydings group faithfully steered this course 
through the succeeding four months. Yet the notion is abroad in 
the land that a Senate Committee, four years ago, conscientiously 
and impartially canvassed McCarthy's charges, found them base- 
less, went on to explore security in the State Department, and gave 
the Department a clean bill of health. 

Our contentions are that the Tydings Committee did not go into 
the Department security at all; that it did not adequately canvass 
even the charges themselves ; and that in failing to do the one, and 
in only half-doing the other, it violated the express mandate of its 
parent body. 

* Perhaps Tydings misspoke; perhaps he meant McCarthy’s charges were 
going to get a complete investigation, rather than McCarthy personally. 
But then it becomes hard to explain why the Committee sent investigators 
to Wheeling, West Virginia, to seek proof that McCarthy, in insisting he had 
used the figure “57” rather than “205,” had lied (which certainly had noth- 
ing to do with investigating the State Department). Or why the Committee 
made a compilation of the State Department publicity releases dissecting 
McCarthy’s public speeches, and included it in the Appendix to its Report. 

Public Hearings: Whose Responsibility? 

On March 8, 1950, the Tydings investigation opened, with Sen- 
ator McCarthy on the dock. It was time for the showdown, and 
McCarthy started in. But no sooner was the name Dorothy Ken- 
yon , the first case McCarthy presented to the Committee, out of 
his mouth than the Tydings claque went into action with a charge 
that has figured incessantly in the subsequent history of anti-Mc- 
Carthyism. Namely, that McCarthy "accuses in public persons who 
have no opportunity to answer.” The second part of this charge, 
that the persons he accuses have no opportunity to answer the ac- 
cusation, is, as we shall see, without basis in fact. 

But let us at the start place where it belongs the responsibility 
for the public identification of McCarthy’s cases. And the question 
here is not Ought the names to have been divulged? ( That ques- 
tion we shall consider in the chapter "Senator McCarthy’s Meth- 
od.”) But: What parties are responsible for these names having 
been divulged? 

That McCarthy would give the Tydings Committee the names 
of the persons whose loyalty or reliability he had questioned on 
the Senate floor (plus those of other persons who might subse- 
quently have come to his attention) was a foregone conclusion 
when the Committee was set up. Indeed, McCarthy had been un- 
der great pressure to reveal the names in a public Senate session; 
and the pressure had come precisely from Democratic senators— 
among them, Senator Lucas, the Majority Leader, who rose four 
times to demand that McCarthy name, right there and then, the 
individuals described in the 81 cases. 7 

Even before McCarthy began his formal Senate presentation, 
Lucas had asked for the names. "I want to remain here,” he said, 
"until he names them. That is what I am interested in.” 8 McCarthy 
refused. But he had only half completed what he referred to as 
"Case Number One” when Senator Lucas interrupted him again to 
ask, "Will the Senator tell us the name of the man for the record? 
We are entitled to know who he is. I say this in all seriousness.” 9 
Senator Withers (D. Ky.) was even more insistent: "I should like 
to ask the Senator what reason he has for not calling names. Does 
not the Senator think it would be a fine thing to let the public know 
who the guilty are? Is not the Senator privileged?” 10 

McCarthy did not acquiesce in these demands. He took the posi- 


tion, from the very beginning of the debate, that the names should 
be submitted only to a Senate committee authorized to investigate 
the cases ; and that they should be withheld from the public till the 
committee itself saw fit to disclose them . Later in the session he 
stated this position as follows: 

The Senator from Illinois [Lucas] demanded, loudly, that I furnish all 
the names. I told him at that time that so far as I was concerned , I 
thought that would be improper; that I did not have all the information 
about these individuals. ... I have enough to convince me that either 
they are members of the Communist Party or they have given great aid 
to the Communists: I may be wrong . That is why 1 said that unless the 
Senate demanded that I do so, I would not submit this publicly, but I 
would submit it to any committee — and would let the committee go over 
these in executive session . It is possible that some of these persons will 
get a clean bill of health. . . . 11 [Italics added.] 

Senator Lucas finally shifted his emphasis and said, “The Senator 
should name the names before the [proposed] committee.” 12 

Thus the only question left open was whether the committee 
hearings should or should not be held in executive session.* And 
on this point, too, the record disproves what most Americans have 
been led to believe. For McCarthy expressed his desire to name 
the names in executive session, in order to protect individuals who, 
in his words, might “get a clean bill of health.” It was left to the 
Democratic Majority Leader to urge maximum publicity. “So 
far as I am concerned, ” said Senator Lucas, “it will be in the open, 
where every individual in America, every newspaperman can at- 
tend, so that they will know definitely, as soon as possible, just who 
is being charged, and who is not being charged with being Com- 
munists. This is only fair . . . . every individual in the State Depart- 
ment tonight is under a cloud. . . .” 13 

But McCarthy stuck to his guns. A few days later, after Senator 
Tydings* appointment as chairman of the inquiry, McCarthy made 
a personal request that the forthcoming hearings be held in secret. 
Here is the story— plus its sequel— as McCarthy told it to the Senate 
some five weeks later, after the dispute had exploded into a major 
Party issue. 

° Senate Resolution 231 was silent on this issue. Indeed, its sole procedur- 
al directive was to the effect that persons against whom the committee 
determined to bring formal charges of disloyalty must be allowed to testify 
in open hearings. 


At the time [February 22?] I urged that the hearings be in executive 
session, and reminded him [Tydings] of the statements which I had 
made on the Senate floor. He informed me that the first hearings would 
be in public, and that later we would go into executive session. Later I 
was informed by the press that the Senator from Maryland had made 
the statement that I could present my cases as I saw fit. I again con- 
tacted him and told him that if that were the case I thought the names 
should be given in executive session, but was again informed that the 
hearings would be in public . 14 

But the actual power of decision rested, of course, not with Mc- 
Carthy, nor even with Tydings, but with the Committee itself; 
and the matter was decided at the first executive session to con- 
sider procedure. Senator Hickenlooper later told the Senate what 
transpired at that meeting: 

It is a matter of fact . . . that the junior Senator from Massachusetts and 
I, ... at the first executive meeting of the subcommittee, suggested and 
proposed the procedure, that the subcommittee meet in executive ses- 
sion, call the Senator from Wisconsin before it, and ask him to disclose 
names in private, together with whatever information he had in connec- 
tion with the names; but the majority of the subcommittee said no, this 
must be brought out in public. . . . the Senator from Wisconsin was re- 
quired, or requested, to come before the committee in public hearing, 
with klieg lights, television, and all the rest of the fanfare of such an 
emotional occasion, there to bring out his cases, name names, and pro- 
duce facts . 15 

Any attempt to make McCarthy, in the teeth of such evidence, 
responsible for "the public naming of names” would have to rest 
on his role in the jockeying for position after the public hearings 
were under way. The sparring began when Senator McMahon in- 
terrupted McCarthy’s introductory remarks with a question: 
"Senator, is it your intention to name individuals against whom 
you are making charges ?” 16 McMahon, in other words, now delib- 
erately dumped in McCarthy’s lap the issue that he, as a member 
of the Committee majority, had already resolved against McCar- 
thy in executive session. If names were named, McMahon con- 
tinued, and the charge turned out to be incorrect, would it not 
result in "great injustice to decent American citizens ?” 17 McCarthy 
reminded McMahon that he had expressed misgivings precisely on 
that point on the Senate floor; and for that very reason had re- 
quested that his charges be heard in executive session . 18 

The ensuing brush between Tydings and McCarthy is of great 


Senator McCarthy. Let me make my position clear. I personally do 
not favor presenting names, no matter how conclusive the evidence is. 
The committee has called me this morning and in order to intelligently 
present this information I must give names. I think this should be in 
executive session. I think it would be better. However, I am here. The 
committee has voted to hold open sessions, so I shall proceed. Let me 
take the case of Dor — 

Senator Typings. I told you when I invited you to testify that you 
could testify in any manner you saw fit. If it is your preference to give 
these names in executive session we will be very glad to have your 
wishes acceded to. If it is your desire to give them in open session, that 
is your responsibility. Now, if you will indicate how you want to pro- 
ceed, the committee will take it under advisement and give you an an- 
swer in 2 minutes. 

Senator McCarthy. Let me say this first case has been handed to the 
press already. I think we will have to proceed with this one in open 
session. When we get to the next case, let us consider it. Let us take the 
case of Dorothy Kenyon . 19 

Wrapped up in this passage is the “proof’ offered by McCarthy’s 
enemies for the contention that the responsibility for naming names 
in public was his. For, they ask, did not Tydings call McCarthy’s 
palpable bluff by giving him the opportunity to go into executive 
session, thus forcing him to admit that he had already handed to 
the press his proposed testimony? Here the disturbing fact is not 
so much Tydings’ attempt to make McCarthy appear responsible 
for the holding of public hearings. The shameful fact is that Tyd- 
ings was allowed by subsequent commentators to get away with 
his incredible ruse. 

Let us put the above colloquy in its proper setting. When Mc- 
Carthy entered the conference room, it was his understanding 
(a) that names were to be given out, and (b) that the hearings 
were to be open to the public. It was therefore perfectly natural 
that he should have handed the press advance copies of what he 
was going to say: as every congressman and Washington reporter 
knows, advance press releases of public statements are unchal- 
lenged routine. Thus, that Tydings’ last-minute maneuver should 
have succeeded in impressing the public that McCarthy was re- 
sponsible for naming the names in public incriminates others be- 
sides the Committee members. For it is quite clear that this 
misinformation could not have been palmed off to the American 
people solely through the artful play-acting of the Tydings Com- 
pany; cooperation was required from members of the press who. 



although they could see plainly what was going on in the Com- 
mittee room, popularized and perpetuated a malicious myth. 

And why did not McCarthy move to have the subsequent cases 
heard in executive session? In view of the reception accorded the 
Kenyon case by press and radio, a later request by McCarthy to 
ring down the curtain on publicity at that point would have been 
interpreted as his effort to run for cover. Moreover, McCarthy, as 
a mere witness, had every right (having raised the issue, and made 
his own position clear) to deem the procedure, from the Kenyon 
case on, a proper matter for determination by the Committee— and 
no one else . As a polemicist, he had everything to gain by doing so. 
Thus, he acquiesced in the decision the Committee had taken be- 
fore the hearings began— the decision to hold, over McCarthy’s 
protest, open sessions at which the public would learn the names 
of suspected State Department personnel. 


The Nine Public Cases: 
An Invitation to Investigate 

I ord Acton advised us never to rest content with a point of 
view “until we have made out for our opponents a stronger 
and more impressive case than they present themselves.” 
Objectivity and charity demand that we search out a propositional 
justification for the Tydings Committee's amazing refusal to inves- 
tigate— the more so since its friends and admirers have never at- 
tempted one themselves. 

The “stronger and more impressive case” for the Committee’s 
performance would run something like this: Granted, the Senate 
ordered an investigation. But it was implicit in the mandate that 
the Committee should not expend time and money on an exhaus- 
tive probe that might jeopardize Department morale and, perhaps, 
even our foreign relations, unless the chief accuser presented a 
prima facie case against the Department's loyalty and security 
program. And this— so the case would run— McCarthy did not do. 

Let us, in other words, give the Tydings Committee the benefit 
of the doubt here and agree that, unless McCarthy produced a 
persuasive prima facie case against the State Department’s loyalty 
program, the Tydings Committee was entitled not to investigate, 
not to subpoena witnesses, not to follow up leads, not to take more 
than a furtive peek at the loyalty files of suspect personnel. Let 
us even concede that the Committee should have adjourned its 
inquiry into the problem, should have silenced McCarthy at crucial 
points in the proceedings, and should have used State Department 
press releases to disprove charges against the State Department— 
if McCarthy failed to bring a persuasive prima facie case in sup- 
port of his contentions. Thus, we shall fix our attention on one 
simple question: Did McCarthy present enough evidence to raise 
reasonable doubt as to whether all loyalty and security risks had 
been removed from the State Department? 



To answer this question we propose close scrutiny of the Nine 
Public Cases. The nine individuals whose cases McCarthy dis- 
cussed in public are not necessarily the most important in terms 
either of their influence on the State Department or of incrimi- 
nating evidence McCarthy brought to light. But they were the 
first group of cases about which an amount of useful information 
was made available to Congress and to the nation, both thirsty for 
facts on which to base an opinion on State Department security. 
None of these nine cases, let us agree at once, was backed up by 
definitive or even particularly impressive research. They were the 
product of more or less sustained homework by a single Senator 
to uncover hard-to-come-by loyalty and security data on employ- 
ees, or consultants, or associates, of the United States Government. 
The evidence was obtained from multifarious sources— from the 
files of private researchers, from informants working in the govern- 
ment, from old newspaper clippings, from forgotten speeches of a 
few congressmen who had sensed the danger long before McCar- 
thy, but had for the most part failed to find a listening audience. 

Such evidence is unlikely to provide unassailable and unam- 
biguous proof that a government employee is disloyal. The ques- 
tion is whether McCarthy’s evidence added up to a prima facie 
case against State Department security practices. 

The story of the Nine Public Cases was not adequately told at 
the time. It was adumbrated here and there, in lurid news stories, 
and between the lines and words of excited columnists and com- 
mentators. But most of the factual data never did get out; and 
those that did were quickly forgotten in the backwash of angry 
partisanship. We have, therefore, attempted to run the story down. 
We will tell it here, hoping to slight neither McCarthy’s evidence, 
the counter-testimony of the accused, nor the Committee’s investi- 
gative efforts. 

The Case of Dorothy Kenyon 

Senator McCarthy's choice of the Kenyon case to lead off his pres- 
entation came as a surprise. The name of Dorothy Kenyon was 
little known to the public— much less in association with Commu- 
nist activities. Judge Kenyon was a reputable New York City law- 
yer, had once served as a municipal court judge, and had attracted 
some attention as a political activist, especially in the advancement 
of women's causes. She had been hired by the State Department in 
1947 to serve as American delegate to the United Nations Com- 
mission on the Status of Women. 

“This lady,” Senator McCarthy explained, “has been affiliated 
with at least 28 Communist front organizations, all of which have 
been declared subversive by an official government agency.” 1 

McCarthy thereupon handed the Committee a series of docu- 
ments, mostly photostats, allegedly establishing Judge Kenyon s 
connection with various front organizations. He cited the govern- 
ment groups (including state legislative committees) that had 
designated these organizations as “subversive” or as “Communist 
fronts.” Nine of them, McCarthy said, had been cited as subver- 
sive by the Attorney General of the United States. 2 The documents 
themselves were of several types. Most were official organization 
letterheads that listed Miss Kenyon either as a sponsor or as a 
member. Some were official programs of organization-sponsored 
dinners. A few were newspaper reports of open letters that Miss 
Kenyon had allegedly signed in such fashion as to connect her 
with this or that organization.* All in all, it looked as though Mc- 
Carthy had a pretty good prima facie case. 

McCarthy, to be sure, was not permitted to lay out his evidence 
in neat, orderly fashion. The presentation summarized in the pre- 
ceding paragraph took the better part of two days, during which 
McCarthy was plagued by constant interruptions— a kind of sus- 
tained heckling that finally prompted Senator Lodge to intercede 
on McCarthy’s behalf: “I think to interrupt the witness [McCar- 
thy] every time and break up his continuity and destroy the flow 
of his argument, the way we are doing, is not the right procedure. 

* A summary of McCarthy’s evidence on Miss Kenyons front affiliations, 
along with official citations, is set forth in the Appendix. 



. . . For some reason that has not been made clear to me, whether 
it is to rattle or whether it is to confuse, I don’t know, we have an 
entirely different procedure today. ... I am objecting to the con- 
stant interruption of the witness so that he never gets a fair shake.” 3 

McCarthy’s opposition was rallying— and not only within the 
Committee. That night, the State Department issued the first of 
its almost daily communiques on the investigation: Dorothy Ken- 
yon, the Department said, was not one of its employees, since her 
appointment to the UN had terminated some two months earlier. 
McCarthy shot back that the implications of the case were not in 
the slightest affected by the fact that Miss Kenyon’s term of em- 
ployment happened to have lapsed: "Even though this individual 
may no longer be with the Department, the case in my opinion, is 
still extremely important in that it will shed considerable light on 
the workings of our loyalty program.” 4 

This, then, was the issue as McCarthy drew it: Is it not a per- 
suasive indictment of the State Department loyalty program, he 
asked, that an important Department employee had successfully 
weathered loyalty and security screening processes in spite of her 
sometime affiliation with "at least 28” Communist fronts? 

Now let us get before us the salient points of Judge Kenyon’s 
defense. But first we must put to rest one of the most vicious of 
the anti-McCarthy canards. Long-standing evidence to the con- 
trary, one hears again and again that the people McCarthy accuses 
in public are not given a chance to answer. The fact of the matter 
is that every person McCarthy publicly accused before the Tyd - 
ings Committee was invited to appear before the Committee to 
reply to the charges . Six of the nine persons accused availed them- 
selves of the opportunity. The others submitted statements to the 
Committee. All were permitted counsel. Affidavits on behalf of the 
accused, and all other exhibits offered, were entered in the Com- 
mittee’s records. The accused could bring in witnesses to testify 
for him, and the Committee offered to subpoena any reluctant wit- 
ness the accused wished to call. 

Judge Kenyon’s reply to McCarthy’s charges was flat and un- 
equivocal. "I am not,” she declared, "and never have been disloyal. 
I am not, and never have been a Communist. I am not, and never 
have been a fellow-traveler. I am not, and never have been, a sup- 
porter of, a member of, or a sympathizer with any organization 
known to me to be, or suspected by me of being, controlled or 
dominated by Communists. As emphatically and unreservedly as 



possible, I deny any connection of any kind or character with com- 
munism or its adherents.” 5 

On the specific question of her affiliation with Communist fronts, 
which Senator McCarthy professed to have documented a week 
earlier, this was Miss Kenyon’s testimony: She had been affiliated 
in the past with 12 of the front organizations mentioned. She had 
withdrawn from 4 of the 12 upon discovering their communist 
"complexion.” She denied affiliation with two of the fronts men- 
tioned (the Consumers Union and the Veterans of the Abraham 
Lincoln Brigade ) . She had "no recollection” of having been affili- 
ated with the remainder. In no instance, she emphasized, had she 
continued her affiliation with an organization that she knew to be 
Communist. Finally, she was not at present connected with any of 
the groups Senator McCarthy mentioned. 0 

Judge Kenyon went further and offered evidence that she was, 
on the record, an active and determined opponent of Communism. 
In the fall of 1939, the American Labor Party, for many years a 
prime target for and later the captive of Communist infiltrators, 
had split wide open on the subject of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Miss 
Kenyon, an ALP candidate for re-election as municipal court 
judge, had been asked by ALP state secretary, Alex Rose, to state 
her views on the pact; and she did so, she told the Committee, 
as follows: "I regard with horror and loathing the Hitler-Stalin 
pact. ... I agree with you that any fusing of the brown and red 
dictatorships is a treacherous blow to world civilization.” 6 More- 
over, the following spring she had been vice-chairman of the "Lib- 
eral and Labor Committee to Safeguard the American Labor 
Party,” a group formed to “fight the Communist attempt to capture 
the Labor Party.” 7 And by way of clinching the argument as to her 
views during the German-Russian honeymoon, she showed the 
Committee her signature on an open letter, dated May, 1941, of the 
interventionist (William Allen White) Committee to Defend 
America by Aiding the Allies. 8 

Miss Kenyon also called attention to her clashes with the Rus- 
sians during her stint on the UN’s Commission on the Status of 
Women. She had told a woman’s club audience back in 1948, 
"Women in Russia undoubtedly have more equality in a greater 
variety of jobs than do American women, but it is the equality of 
slavery.” 9 Several weeks later, the Soviet short wave radio had ac- 

0 Judge Kenyon's description of her connection with each of the fronts 
is summarized in Appendix A. 


cused her of “slandering the Soviet people” with her “irresponsible 
drivel.” 10 

Her summary was plaintive but eloquent: 

With all the mistakes and errors of judgment which the best of us 
can and do commit only too frequently, I submit that the record proves 
without a question that I am a lover of democracy, of individual free- 
dom, and of human rights for everybody, a battler, perhaps a little too 
much of a battler sometimes, for the rights of the little fellow who gets 
forgotten or frightened or shunned because of unpopular views. . . . The 
converse of these things: dictatorship, cruelty, oppression and slavery, 
are to me intolerable. I cannot live in their air, I must fight back. This 
is not perhaps a very wise or prudent way to live, but it is my way. . . . 
There is not a Communist bone in my body. 11 

One further point in Miss Kenyon’s testimony deserves special 
notice. When Senator Hickenlooper asked her whether any State 
Department official had ever questioned her about her affiliations 
with subversive organizations, her answer was: “Never.” 12 

Let us return now to the evidence presented by Senator Mc- 
Carthy and evaluate it in the light of both Judge Kenyon’s reply 
and other data the Committee could easily have laid its hands on, 
and let us attempt to answer three questions: (1) To what extent 
did McCarthy show himself to be an accurate and reliable witness? 
(2) How well did the Committee perform its job? (3) What did 
the evidence disclose about the adequacy of the State Depart- 
ment’s loyalty and security precautions? 

The first of these questions must be answered, in part at least, 
adversely to McCarthy. He had said things about Judge Kenyon 
that he clearly had no business saying— especially since he had in- 
sisted early in his testimony that characterizing the accused was 
not his task. “I am not making charges,” McCarthy had said, “I am 
giving the Committee information on individuals who appear to all 
the rules of common sense as being very bad security risks.” 13 On 
his own showing, that is to say, McCarthy should have confined 
himself to the evidence and should have made observations con- 
cerning only Miss Kenyon’s fitness for government employment. 
But he said: “. . . the Communist activities of Miss Kenyon are not 
only deep-rooted but extend back through the years. Her sponsor- 
ship of the doctrines and philosophy of this ruthless and godless 
organization is not new.” 14 And again: “Here again we have this 



prominent State Department official, Judge Kenyon, crying aloud 
in anguish for a fellow red.” 15 

These, however, are the only instances in which he referred to 
Miss Kenyon otherwise than as a security risk. But the words are 
McCarthy's, and their use was, in our opinion, unjustified, for the 
case against Miss Kenyon was not strong enough to warrant such 

The main thrust of McCarthy's argument, however, was that 
Judge Kenyon had belonged to a flock of Communist fronts and, by 
that token, was a poor security risk. Here he was on firm ground. 

Insistence on the relevance of Communist front affiliations in 
determining the security status of a government employee is not 
a McCarthy innovation ( as his enemies often imply) . Ten days be- 
fore the Tydings Committee convened, Secretary Acheson had 
told the Senate Appropriations Committee about the criteria he 
used to determine who was a security risk. Quoting from the De- 
partment's security regulations, Acheson said: "Participation . . . 
in organizations which are fronts for, or controlled by, [the Com- 
munist] party . . . whether by membership therein, taking part in 
its executive direction or control, contribution of funds thereto, 
attendance at meetings ... or by written evidences or oral expres- 
sions by speeches or otherwise, of political, economic or social 
views will be taken into account, together with such mitigating 
circumstances as may exist.” 16 McCarthy, then, was simply ask- 
ing, Does the State Department adhere to its own standards in 
evaluating security risks? His answer: it had clearly not been doing 
so, as witness the fact that the Department had cleared someone 
with a record of 28 front affiliations. And the Department could 
not very well plead "mitigating circumstances” in this instance 
since it had not even bothered to question Miss Kenyon about her 
affiliations . 

Close examination of the Committee's published record reveals 
that McCarthy showed evidence of only 24 Communist front af- 
filiations for Miss Kenyon (rather than 28) and that two of her 
affiliations ( that with the Consumers Union and that with the Vet- 
erans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade) were backed up only by 
a news story and an advertisement, respectively, in the Daily 
Worker . Curiously, however, the Tydings Committee did not itself 
take notice of the discrepancy between the 28 alleged affiliations 
and the 24 actually suggested by the documentation. The likely 
explanation, in the light of the Committee's yen for pointing out 



each and every McCarthy misstatement, is that someone on the 
Committee had consulted Appendix IX of the House Committee 
on Un-American Activities which lists 28 Communist fronts after 
Dorothy Kenyon’s name. 

Only four of the 24 groups had been cited as subversive by the 
Attorney General; not, as McCarthy had stated, nine.* Except, 
however, for purposes of nailing down a McCarthy inaccuracy, this 
fact is of little significance. For absurd emphasis is normally put 
on the Attorney Generals list—as though it were the only authentic 
compilation of Communist fronts. The Justice Department usually 
does not get around to citing an organization as subversive until 
many months ( and sometimes many years ) after it is so recognized 
by most other people conversant with the subject. Sometimes the 
Attorney General waits until an organization has disbanded, and 
then passes a post-mortem. The House Committee on Un-American 
Activities lists almost five times as many organizations as the Attor- 
ney General, and has yet to be embarrassed by having to retract 
one of its listings. 

It is interesting that the Tydings Committee exploited none of 
these inaccuracies. It did not, indeed, so much as mention them in 
its report. Thus, for all its eagerness to nail McCarthy whenever 
the opportunity arose, the Committee neglected to comb McCar- 
thy’s data with sufficient thoroughness to discover his mistakes I 
Instead, as far as the Kenyon case was concerned, it contented it- 
self with urging two themes : ( a ) some 'pretty prominent people” 
had joined with Miss Kenyon in several of the fronts mentioned, 
and (b) the dates of Miss Kenyon’s affiliations (in every instance 
but one) preceded the dates on which the groups were officially 
cited as "Communist-fronts.” 

Time and again during McCarthy’s testimony it was remarked 
that Miss Kenyon had "distinguished company” in her connection 
with this or that front organization. A United States Senator was 
noted here, a prominent diplomat there. 17 Now such observations 
might be expected from a high school senior but, coming from 

0 The four: American-Russian Institute of New York, National Council of 
Soviet-American Friendship, Conference on Pan American Democracy, and 
the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. A fifth, the Political Prisoners 
Bail Fund Committee, might be included since the House Committee on Un- 
American Activities had indicated that during the period of Miss Kenyon’s 
affiliation, the “Bail Fund” was an adjunct of the notorious International Labor 
Defense, which Attorney General Biddle, in 1942, had labelled the “legal 
arm of the Communist Party.” 



United States Senators presumed qualified to investigate subver- 
sion, they are rather baffling. For a Communist front is, by defini- 
tion , an organization that uses innocent people (the more prom- 
inent the better) to conceal its real nature. The California Com- 
mittee on Un-American Activities, for example, cautioned the 
readers of its report “to hold in mind that a Communist front or- 
ganization is characterized by the fact that a majority of its mem- 
bers are non-Communists. If this were not true , it should be quite 
obvious that the organization would be actually a Communist 
organization , and not a front in any sense .” 18 (Italics added.) 

Whether or not an individual has been “duped,” McCarthy sug- 
gested to the Committee, can be quite reliably established by 
looking at the number of fronts he has joined. For experience with 
Communist groups presumably educates even “innocents” to rec- 
ognize a front. “I think that it is possible that you yourself may be 
duped into joining, or having your name used on some Communist- 
front organization,” McCarthy told Senator Tydings. “The reason 
I submit the vast number [of Miss Kenyon's affiliations] is that it 
is impossible for any normal individual, of normal intelligence, to 
be so deceived that they can act as sponsors for 28 different Com- 
munist front organizations.” 19 

The Committee made the further point that only in one case 
(re the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship) did Mc- 
Carthy's evidence show that Miss Kenyon's affiliation post-dated 
the official citation of the group as subversive. McCarthy's answer: 
This is not significant “where we are dealing with a person who be- 
longs to 25 or 30 of them.'' 20 A seasoned joiner, he reasoned, should 
not depend on the invariably belated judgment of the Attorney 
General for information as to the nature of an organization he has 
joined. And McCarthy might well have gone on to point out— 
though he did not— that there was no reason to assume Miss Ken- 
yon's affiliation had lapsed on the date mentioned by the single 
document McCarthy gave the Committee. His documents merely 
showed Miss Kenyon's connection with each organization as of a 
given day; only by further investigation could the Committee have 
learned the dates on which she had severed the connection. The 
Committee could easily have learned, for example, that Miss Ken- 
yon was still signing petitions of the Veterans of the Abraham Lin- 
coln Brigade in March, 1945— a year after the organization had 
been officially cited as Communist by the House Un-American Ac- 
tivities Committee and five years after the date mentioned in 



McCarthy’s document. The Committee’s bald statement in its 
final report, that Miss Kenyon “was found to be connected on but 
one occasion with an organization after it was cited as subver- 
sive,” 21 reveals both the Committee’s indolence and its intellectual 

In “investigating” Miss Kenyons alleged addiction to front- 
joining, the only documents the Committee examined were Mc- 
Carthy’s photostats and clippings. How could meaningful conclu- 
sions be reached on the nature and extent of an individual’s con- 
nection with an organization on the basis of one solitary document 
countered by the individual’s self-serving explanations and deni- 
als? The unavoidable result of the Committee’s decision not to 
press the investigation was that the validity of McCarthy s docu- 
mentation was not disproved . Thus it had no grounds on which to 
challenge the presumption that Miss Kenyon was affiliated, as 
charged, with 24 (or 28) Communist fronts. That presumption- 
arising from the fact that greater credence is normally given to 
written documentation than to simple denials— accordingly stands. 

As for Judge Kenyon’s own evidence relating to her attitude 
during the Hitler-Stalin pact, the situation is more complicated. 
Her documents indicate that she was opposed to the pact— that 
she was, in fact, an “interventionist” at the time. They therefore 
weigh strongly in her favor; for seasoned students of party-lining 
are unanimous in attaching great significance to an individual’s 
attitude during that period. So it is understandable that the Tyd- 
ings Committee should have been “especially impressed” with 
Miss Kenyon’s record on this point. “Of great significance,” the 
Committee reported, is “the undisputed evidence of her pro-Allied 
feelings in 1940 and 1941. . . .” 22 

The complications arise because the evidence was not “undis- 
puted.” For the Committee also had before it evidence that Miss 
Kenyon had signed a party-lining Open Letter on February 21, 
1940, which supported the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln 
Brigade* and deplored the “mounting war fever,” the “hysteria,” 
and the “terror” encouraged by the Roosevelt Administration. 23 To 
be sure, the validity of this evidence is questionable: it appeared 
as a paid advertisement in the Daily Worker , and Miss Kenyon 
denied having authorized the use of her name on the letter. But 

0 What is more, there was the evidence, mentioned earlier, which lends 
credibility to the 1940 “Brigade” allegation; namely, the Brigade’s own press 
release which in 1945 listed Judge Kenyon as one of its sponsors. 



there it stood: a photostat of an advertisement in the Daily Worker 
bearing Miss Kenyon’s name— versus Miss Kenyon’s insistence that 
her name had been used without her authority. And there is not 
the slightest indication, on the record, that the Committee ever 
attempted to secure the original of the letter or even a reliable 
copy of it. The “investigators” preferred to treat this disruptive bit 
of evidence as though it had never existed. But if it were true that 
Miss Kenyon did, in fact, join with the Abraham Lincoln Brigade 
to protest against American “war hysteria” in 1940, then her real 
sentiments during the Hitler-Stalin Pact are in doubt. We then 
would have to conclude that she was working both sides of the 
street— as the strenuous demands of a political career in New York’s 
American Labor Party have obliged many a man and woman to do. 

On balance, we believe that Dorothy Kenyon is and has been 
a loyal American. By that we mean that a person is innocent until 
proven guilty— a presumption Americans traditionally indulge in 
when deciding whether a fellow citizen is guilty of a crime. But 
Miss Kenyon indiscriminately joined numerous Communist fronts 
and this clearly disqualified her from government service. It makes 
her, as McCarthy claimed, a security risk . For where government 
employment is involved, the benefit of the doubt must ( and does, 
by recent tradition) go to the government. 

The Tydings Committee made no such observations about Miss 
Kenyon. Rather, in handing down its categorical clearance of her, 
the Committee indulged in several remarks which throw light on 
the attitudes— and incapacities— of its members. Their job was to 
assess the Kenyon case in the context of prevailing security stand- 
ards in the Department of State; instead of doing that job, the 
Committee launched into a rollicking cliche about jurisprudence, 
sportsmanship, and other matters. “While the number of admitted 
affiliations by Miss Kenyon,” the report stated, 24 “are sufficient to 
suggest a high degree of naivete and perhaps gullibility” ( we dis- 
agree: with McCarthy, we believe that, in general, naivete and 
gullibility are indicated in inverse ratio to the number of Commu- 
nist affiliations ) , “American standards of justice and fair play have 
not deteriorated to the point that our citizens become disloyal on 
the basis alone of their affiliations with organizations found to be 
subversive several years after the affiliations, particularly in the 


case of Communist fronts which are deliberately designed to de- 
ceive and hoodwink the unsuspecting ”* 

However, let us for a moment assume that Judge Kenyon was 
not even a security risk. What then, were the lessons of the Kenyon 
case as regards the adequacy of the State Department’s loyalty- 
security apparatus? The outstanding fact of the Kenyon case is 
that neither her loyalty nor her reliability was ever explored by 
the State Department . When Senator McCarthy expressed surprise 
at her having been “cleared by the State Department Loyalty 
Board” 25 he was, for once, guilty of an understatement. The Loyal- 
ty-Security Board had never held a hearing on the Kenyon case- 
had never even sent her a routine “ interrogatory 7 We have Miss 
Kenyon’s own word for it that no Department official ever ques- 
tioned her on the subject of her Communist associations. And her 
version of this matter was never contradicted by the State Depart- 
ment. In a word, not only did the State Department fail to find 
Miss Kenyon a security risk; her record of 28 (or, if you like, 24) 
Communist front affiliations did not even prompt Department se- 
curity officers to look into that possibility! 

It can therefore hardly be disputed that, with respect to Dorothy 
Kenyon, McCarthy presented a prima facie case for doubting the 
adequacy of the State Department’s loyalty-security program. 

0 Note how the Committee, in reaching its conclusions, loads its premises. 
It speaks of the affiliations “admitted” by Miss Kenyon although it had no 
evidence other than Miss Kenyon’s word that the affiliations which were not 
admitted by her were erroneously charged to her. And it speaks of affilia- 
tions after the organizations were found to be subversive although, as we 
have seen, the Committee did not know the dates of Miss Kenyon’s affilia- 
tions, except as indicated by the documents provided by McCarthy. It speaks 
of “loyalty” as though finding a person a security risk required an affirmative 
finding of disloyalty . And so on. 

The Case of Haldore Hanson 

At the time McCarthy named him before the Tydings Committee, 
Haldore Hanson was employed by the State Department as Chief 
of the Technical Cooperation Projects Staff, one of the three staffs 
responsible for the administration of the Point 4 program.* He had 
come a long way since 1934 when, fresh out of college, he had 
sailed for China as a stowaway. 

For three years Hanson had taught school and had written as a 
free lancer, mostly while living in Peiping. The turning point in his 
career had come in 1937, when Japanese and Chinese troops 
clashed at the Marco Polo Bridge: he then took a job as war corre- 
spondent with the Associated Press. Two years later, at the age of 
twenty-seven, he published a book called Humane Endeavor. The 
book, though it got good reviews, sold poorly and was all but for- 
gotten until Senator McCarthy told the Tydings Committee that 
Humane Endeavor “sets forth . . . [Hanson’s] pro-Communist an- 
swer to the problems of Asia as clearly as Hitler’s Mein Kampf set 
forth his solution to the problems of Europe.” 26 

McCarthy was bent on proving that Hanson had knowingly re- 
layed Communist propaganda; that he had written favorably about 
the Communists because of his “pro-Communist proclivities.” 27 
“This,” said McCarthy, “is not a dupe. Here is one of the cleverest, 
one of the smoothest men we have in the State Department.” 28 And 
later on: “Here is a man with a mission— a mission to communize 
the world.” 29 

In deciding to spear Hanson as a Communist, or pro-Communist, 
rather than a mere security risk, McCarthy took for himself an un- 
necessarily hard row to hoe. He was out to make a case against the 
State Department; and so he had only to prove that the Depart- 
ment was employing persons about whose reliability there was a 
“reasonable doubt.” McCarthy would have been well-advised to 
confine himself to that single job. But since we seek to throw light 
not only on government security practices, but also on McCarthy, 
we must keep in mind the specific accusations he brought against 

As we say, McCarthy painted an alarming picture of Hanson. 
“This young man,” he said, “was running a Communist magazine 

* McCarthy claimed, erroneously, that Hanson’s job put him “in charge 
of Truman’s Point 4 program.” 



in Peiping when the Japanese-Chinese war broke out.” 30 He later 
“spent several years with the Communist armies in China, writing 
stories and taking pictures which the Chinese Communists helped 
smuggle out of the country.” 31 And, McCarthy told the Committee, 
“Hanson himself said— they [the Chinese Communists] do not tol- 
erate anyone who is not completely on their side.” 32 

Humane Endeavor , McCarthy charged, was a pro-Communist 
polemic. It exalted the Chinese Communists at the expense of the 
Nationalists. It awarded to the guerillas the now familiar kudos 
for having done the only serious fighting against the Japanese, and 
for having redistributed the land “as fairly as possible.” 33 Directly 
and indirectly, McCarthy went on, it extolled the Communist 
leaders— indirectly, for example, by quoting from Red apologists 
of the stripe of Major Evans Carlson.* On Carlson, it hung the fol- 
lowing tendentious characterizations: Mao Tse-Tung— “the most 
selfless man I ever met, a social dreamer, a genius living 50 years 
ahead of his time”; and Chu Teh, Commander of the Eighth Route 
Army— the “prince of generals,” “a man with the humility of Lin- 
coln, the tenacity of Grant, and the kindliness of Robert E. Lee.” 34 
McCarthy also cited tributes to Chinese Communist leaders that 
were Hanson’s very own: “I left Yenan with the feeling that Mao 
was the least pretentious man in Yenan and the most admired. He 
is a completely selfless man.” 35 And ( though here he had not done 
his homework, as we shall see below) McCarthy cited a reference 
to the Communist leaders as “a group of hard-headed, straight- 
shooting realists.” 36 

On the other hand, McCarthy charged that Hanson had dis- 
paraged the Chinese Nationalists, whom he had described as 
“rightists” who were “fighting the Democratic Revolution as pro- 
posed by Mao Tse-Tung and the Communists.” 37 Lastly, McCar- 
thy fixed attention on the following excerpt from Humane En- 
deavor : “Leaders of the Communist Youth Corps were arrested by 
military officers at Hankow. I myself,” Hanson went on, “was the 
victim of one of these incidents and found that local officials were 
the instigators.” 38 On the basis of this, McCarthy told the Commit- 
tee: “this young man has a criminal record in China where he was 
arrested, not by the Communists, but by the anti-Communists.” 39 

McCarthy cited, in all, only eight or nine passages from Humane 
Endeavor . Even so, and even though they had been written twelve 

* Of “Carlson Raiders” fame. In 1950, Louis Budenz named Carlson, 
now dead, as a member of the Communist Party. 



years earlier, they added up to a prima facie case against Hanson. 
On the strength of them, the Committee should have given the 
book a careful reading and subjected Hanson to a thoroughgoing 
investigation. It did neither. 

Hanson appeared before the Committee fifteen days after Mc- 
Carthy had testified about him. He was an indignant and persuasive 
witness, and he made the most of McCarthy’s overzealous charac- 
terizations of him. “I deeply resent this attack upon my loyalty. 
I wish to state now, under oath, that I am not a Communist. I have 
never been a Communist. . . . Senator McCarthy produced no new 
facts before this Committee which were not available to those 
[FBI] investigators. In fact, he produced nothing that I hadn’t put 
in a public library. After the FBI investigation I was given a com- 
plete clearance by the Department of State.” 40 

In speaking of Humane Endeavor , Hanson 41 pulled all the stops 
—from modesty ( "It was not a great book. It was published when 

I was 27 years old. . . .”) to patient factual description, to special 
and didactic pleading ("now it is grossly misleading to take objec- 
tive journalistic reports about the Chinese Communists in 1938, at 
the time of a united front with Chiang Kai-shek against Japan, and 
to deduce from them my attitude toward the Chinese Communists, 

II years later, in the midst of a cold war between the democracies 
and world communism” ) . * 

Senator McCarthy, Hanson went on to say, had not mentioned 
that, at the time of his contact with the Chinese Reds, he was work- 
ing for the Associated Press. Moreover, he had been with the Com- 
munist armies not for two years, as McCarthy had said, but for only 
four months; and what he had subsequently written in Humane 
Endeavor , he insisted, he had written as a mere reporter chron- 
icling the facts as they came to his attention. The Chicago Tribune , 
one of the many papers that had carried favorable reviews, treated 
his book as an objective account of the Sino-Japanese conflict. 42 

Some of the excerpts McCarthy had quoted from Humane En- 
deavor, Hanson claimed, were inaccurate and misleading. Here he 

* Note that Hanson is saying two things here, each tending to contradict 
the other. He asserts (a) that his observations in Humane Endeavor were 
objective reporting, and (b) that they were somehow conditioned by the 
existence of the United Front, Even if we concede the second of these state- 
ments, the question remains whether Hanson wrote favorably of the Com- 
munists because they were fighting side by side with the Nationalists, or 
took it somewhat easy on the Nationalists because they were then fighting 
side by side with the Communists. 



thoroughly convinced the Committee, which in its report took 
great pains to bring to the public’s attention McCarthy’s “factual 
inaccuracies.” Since so much was made of McCarthy’s alleged “mis- 
representations” and distortions, we shall pause here to examine 
the McCarthy quotations which the Committee took exception to. 

( 1 ) McCarthy stated that Hanson called the Communist lead- 
ers a “group of hard-headed, straight-shooting realists.” This was 
indeed a misquotation since what Hanson had written was that the 
Reds were “hard-headed, hard-shooting realists.” 43 ( McCarthy 
continues to misquote this passage, for example in his own book. ) * 

(2) McCarthy stated that Humane Endeavor showed Hanson 
had a “criminal record” in China since it revealed that he had been 
arrested in connection with a crack-down on the Communist Youth 
Corps. Actually, in the paragraph following Hanson’s assertion, 
“I myself was the victim of one of these incidents,” he tells of the 
seizure of his passport by Nationalist officials when they found him 
en route from Communist territory. 44 The presumption, then, is 
that it is this incident, not that of the Youth Corps leaders, in which 
Hanson was involved as a “victim.” It is, therefore, not easy to quar- 
rel with the Committee’s conclusion that McCarthy here quoted 
Hanson out of context. On the other hand, Hanson himself de- 
scribes the use McCarthy made of the quotation as merely “care- 
less,” and as we read the chapter in Humane Endeavor , it can in- 
deed be construed as saying that he was involved in both events. 

(3) McCarthy told the Committee, as we have seen, that Hu- 
mane Endeavor quoted Major Carlson’s eulogies of Mao Tse-Tung 
and Chu Teh. There was never any question from what McCarthy 
said but that Hanson was setting forth Carlsons, not his own evalu- 
ation of the Chinese Red leaders. ( Hanson himself did not criticize 
McCarthy’s presentation of this datum.) Yet Senators Tydings and 
McMahon, for no other conceivable reason than to heckle McCar- 
thy, spent fifteen or twenty minutes on two occasions to “make it 
clear” that the words were not Hanson’s own, implying, in the proc- 
ess, that McCarthy had taken liberties with the text. McCarthy 
had done no such thing, as anyone can see by looking at the tran- 
script. Nevertheless, the Committee reported the incident as an ex- 
ample of McCarthy’s mendacity. 45 

( 4 ) McCarthy attributed to Hanson the statement that the Chi- 
nese Communists “do not tolerate anyone who is not completely 
on their side,” implying that since Hanson had been permitted to 

* McCarthyism , the Fight for America, p. 76. 


report on guerilla activities in Yenan, he must have been persona 
grata with the Communists. (McCarthy did not give a source for 
file quotation.) When Hanson took the stand, he acknowledged 
that in an article written for Pacific Affairs in 1938, he had said 
“The guerillas do not tolerate neutrality; a man’s either for or 
against them” However, he pointed out that the article referred 
to the Communists’ attitude toward Chinese traders who were not 
cooperating in the war against Japan, not to their attitude toward 
American news reporters. 46 If, therefore, McCarthy had the above 
passage in mind, it does not document the inference he drew. An- 
other possibility, however, is that McCarthy was not dealing with 
the quotation from Pacific Affairs , but was merely giving the drift 
of certain passages in Humane Endeavor in which Hanson (a) in- 
timated that only a very few reporters were granted admission to 
Yenan, and (b) described his own enthusiastic welcome there by 
the Communists. Whether he intended to or not, Hanson certainly 
conveyed the impression in his book that only sympathetic report- 
ers were allowed to visit Yenan. Thus, as regards the issue whether 
McCarthy misrepresented Hanson, the quotation from Pacific Af- 
fairs is neither here nor there. 

It is indeed characteristic of McCarthy to put into direct quotes 
what amounts to his own paraphrase of someone’s position*— as, 
for example, his assertions that Hanson had “said” such and such, 
while actually Hanson had said it in some other way, or had clearly 
implied it. Such interpolations, to be sure, pay scant heed to the 
rules of scholarship. But to condemn McCarthy on the strength of 
these rules is to judge him by unusual standards; it is to demand 
of McCarthy a norm of behavior not subscribed to by other politi- 
cians and, for better or for worse, not expected of them. The canons 
of politics, at their severest, proscribe misrepresentation. McCar- 
thy in the instance we have just mentioned, did not misrepresent 

The Tydings Committee, in cross-examining Hanson, took a 
Cook’s Tour through the salient points of interest in Senator Mc- 
Carthy’s testimony; Hanson was brought in and simply asked to 
comment, item by item, on what McCarthy had said. An example 
of the superficiality of the cross-examination; the matter on hand 
was completely dropped when, in answer to Senator Hickenloop- 

0 In February, 1953, for example, by way of contrasting Abraham Lin- 
coln's philosophy with Communist doctrine, McCarthy stated: “Lenin said 
The world cannot exist half slave and half free: it must be all slave/ ” 



er’s question why Humane Endeavor had referred to the Commu- 
nists’ “Democratic Revolution,” Hanson answered that “democ- 
racy” means something in China entirely different from what it 
means in America. “Mao Tse-Tung was using the term ‘democracy’ 
—I did not put it in quotation marks; perhaps I should have.” 47 The 
Committee showed no curiosity about any passage of Humane En- 
deavor other than those McCarthy had mentioned, and asked no 
questions about Hanson’s other writings, or about his activities 
through the years. There is, indeed, no indication from the record 
that any member of the Committee ever read Humane Endeavor! 
Just so, by the time Hanson left the stand, it was clear, from the 
attitude of the Democratic majority at least, that the Committee 
was ready with a verdict. 

It was, therefore, thrown for a complete loss when four weeks 
later a witness, testifying in secret session, named Haldore Hanson 
as a member of the Communist Party . 

The witness, Louis Budenz, was presenting to the Committee a 
list of persons whom he had known to be Party members and who 
contributed to Pacific Affairs at the time it was being edited by 
Owen Lattimore. He came to No. 6 on his list, Haldore Hanson. 
“I know him,” Budenz said, “only from official reports, to be a 
member of the Communist Party.” 

Senator McMahon. Somebody told you that he was? 

Mr. Budenz. Not gossip around headquarters; official information. I 
carried his name with me. 

Senator McMahon. Who gave it to you? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, as I recall at the moment, Jack Stachel. 48 

( Budenz went on to say that he had given Hanson’s name to the 
FBI only a week before. Thus, the State Department’s security 
division had had, as yet, no opportunity to reprocess Hanson on 
the basis of this new development. ) 

These, then, were the data the Tydings Committee had before 
it when it made its report flatly stating that McCarthy’s evidence 
against Hanson “fails in credibility, relevancy and competency.” 4 

* By way of substantiating its conclusion about Hanson, the Committee 
said, inter alia, “there was no evidence at all to uphold the charge that the 
magazine with which Hanson was so briefly associated in Peiping many 
years ago was a Communist magazine” (italics supplied). This astounding 
statement is itself strong evidence that the Committee never read Hansons 
book. For Hanson himself tells us in Humane Endeavor that the magazine 
was started by Edgar Snow and Nym Wales, both of whom have been named, 
under oath, as members of the Communist Party. 



“The quotations from Hanson’s book,” it continued, “had been un- 
fairly presented and grossly misinterpreted in the first instance,” 
and had upon examination “failed miserably as proof of any pro- 
Communist leanings on his part.” Even Budenz’ testimony had left 
the Committee unimpressed. The revelation of a tested witness to 
the Communist conspiracy provoked nothing more than one com- 
ment. It ‘leaves us,” said the Committee, “to a degree in wonder- 

The Committee summed up: “On the basis of our record and the 
results of the FBI investigation as indicated by the Loyalty Board’s 
action,* we do not find Haldore Hanson to be disloyal, or a man 
with pro-Communist proclivities or a mission to communize the 
world .” 49 

Before making our own evaluation of Hanson, we shall examine 
certain evidence about him which, for reasons unknown, appears 
never to have been weighed— or even reviewed— by the Tydings 
Committee. In particular, certain observations about the full text 
of Humane Endeavor will, we believe, prove relevant. 

First, Hanson left the readers of his book with the firm impres- 
sion that he sympathized with the Communist movement in China. 
He expressed admiration for the political communities the Com- 
munists had established at Yenan and Mt. Wu Tai. He pointed to 
the “cooperation” between Communist and “liberal” groups in the 
Communist-held areas as a model for the political organization of 
China as a whole . 30 He thought the Communists had been unfairly 
persecuted . 51 Where apologetics seemed in order, he supplied 
them : “the chopping off of landlords’ heads” by the Communists, 
he reminded his readers, followed upon generation after genera- 
tion of “man-made famine .” 52 In contrast, Chiang’s persecution of 
students, teachers, union organizations, and others accused of Red 
sympathies, was “a heinous crime .” 53 

Often, the favorable references to the Communists were en- 
closed in quotation marks; for example, when he decided to tack 
down the “old bogy that Soviet Russia is directing the activity of 
the Chinese Communists,” he came up with the following com- 
ment from “an editor”: “Why should we need the Russians to tell 
us what to do ?” 54 Again, he dispelled doubts about the “reform” 
nature of the Chinese Communist movement by quoting from a 

8 Why the Committee thought the Loyalty Board’s action was reason for 
confirming the correctness of the Loyalty Board’s action, leaves us to a degree 
in wonderment. 



guerilla general: “Our new task was to give the villagers something 
to fight for. . . . That is why we decided ... to give each village a 
democratic council and complete political freedom. . . .” 55 When 
he considered the future course of the Communist movement, he 
called in Mao Tse-Tung himself— the “red philosopher.” Mao ex- 
plained that, whereas it had been necessary in the early days of 
the Revolution to adopt violent methods such as expropriating pri- 
vate property and killing landlords, the forces of reaction had now 
( 1938 ) become so weak that the Communists were in a position to 
join with other groups in a democratic coalition, on behalf of social 
reform. 56 

In short, Hanson's claim to having written an objective book 
wears thin. His book is an impressive example of a well-known and 
effective propaganda technique: an author avoids personal respon- 
sibility for the opinions he communicates, yet relies on their cumu- 
lative effect to advance his own position; and the more objective 
the presentation appears , of course, the more it invests the author's 
opinion with an aura of authenticity. 

In some passages of Hanson's book the veil of objectivity disap- 
peared altogether and Hanson the advocate was clearly visible: 
“I am convinced,” he wrote, “that there are no . . . Russian arms 
[being used by the Chinese Reds] . . . except a small amount of 
ammunition Chiang Kai-shek turned over to them.” 57 And at an- 
other point: “The Chinese Communist leaders are not anti-Chris- 
tian.” 58 On the other hand, Hanson had occasional kind words for 
Chiang Kai-shek. He cited the Generalissimo's personal courage 
and spoke of his efforts to wipe out the opium trade and to elimi- 
nate corruption from the Kuomintang. 59 Elsewhere, he commended 
Chiang’s military chieftains; for example, his reference to Chang 
Chun who had a “reputation for integrity, diplomacy and absolute 
loyalty.” 60 But when the cards were down, and comparisons had to 
be made, the Communists invariably came out on top and the Na- 
tionalists on the bottom. 

In sum, we believe that Humane Endeavor falls short of reveal- 
ing, definitively, Haldore Hanson's political allegiance.* One per- 
son might read Humane Endeavor and reasonably conclude that 

* Of course, Humane Endeavor could, at most, reveal Hanson's political 
orientation as of 1938, when the book was written. But we must remember 
that he did not later repudiate the book. Quite the contrary. What is more, 
the Department's own security regulations insisted that "A former course of 
conduct or holding of beliefs will be presumed to continue in the absence of 
positive evidence indicating a change, both in course of action and con- 
viction, by clear, overt, and unequivocal acts.” 61 



its author was knowingly peddling Communist propaganda to the 
American people; another might read it as a book by a man who, 
not being an experienced student of Chinese or of world affairs, 
was taken in by the Communists. 

What, then, were the obligations of the State Department Loy- 
alty Security Board which, in 1950, was under instructions to dis- 
miss employees about whose reliability there was a “reasonable 
doub'c ’?* Can we say that the Hanson case was— as McCarthy 
claimed— a black mark against the Department? 

An evaluation of the Board’s performance requires a brief digres- 
sion. We must consider an aspect of loyalty board decisions which, 
though of critical importance, has received insufficient attention 
from students of the loyalty program. 

What we have in mind is the presumption-of-innocence aspect of 
loyalty-security proceedings; and our contention is that the loyalty- 
security program, to date, has operated in terms of such a presump- 
tion. Even though loyalty and security boards are instructed to 
rule against a man about whose reliability there is a “reasonable 
doubt,” the presumption of “innocence”— a carry-over from our 
criminal law— affects that ruling. To be sure, no such presumption 
is articulated in any loyalty board opinion we have read; and it is 
not likely that board members consciously apply it as they go about 
their work. It is nonetheless there — an inescapable consequence 
of the moral climate in which the loyalty program operates. It has 
its deep roots in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. It is grounded in the 
basic attitudes about “innocence” and “guilt” which an American 
absorbs as he grows up, and which an American carries with him 
into all phases of political and governmental life. 

The notion that a man is innocent till proved guilty cannot be 
set aside by a mere Executive Order assigning to the government 
the “benefit of the doubt.” The presumption of innocence is bound 
to seep into decisions about the fitness of government employees 
as long as they are made through quasi-judicial proceedings and 
as long as an adverse judgment carries with it overtones of moral 
censure. The very fact that we have loyalty or even security tests— 
as opposed for example to a “fitness” test— invites analogies with 

* The nature of the evidence in the Hanson case — i.e., information bear- 
ing on his political allegiance — would have put Hanson, initially, in “loyalty” 
rather than in “security” channels. But, as we have seen. Department offi- 
cials have insisted that whoever is a loyalty suspect is also a security suspect. 
Thus, even in 1950, an evaluation of Hanson’s case had to be made, at the 
margin, with reference to the security — i.e., the reasonable doubt — standard. 



the sentences handed down by courts. Thus, even if we instruct the 
boards to fire everyone about whose loyalty or reliability there is 
“a reasonable doubt,” we can expect the decision as to whether 
there is a doubt to be influenced by the unconscious presumption 
in favor of the “accused’s” “innocence.” 

Just how the members of a loyalty board apply the presump- 
tion-how much weight it is given, and at what stage of the eval- 
uation it is interjected— all this, of course, is pure conjecture; the 
board members themselves would be hard pressed to give a precise 
answer. But what goes on must be something like this: An em- 
ployee has written that Mao Tse Tung is promoting a “Democratic 
Revolution” in China. The Board members thereupon indulge 
what lawyers call a “rebuttable presumption” that the analysis was 
made in good faith. That is to say, they take it for granted that the 
employee was not knowingly parroting Communist propaganda. 
This presumption can be overcome by other evidence that gener- 
ates reasonable doubt as to the employee’s pureness of motive. But 
it stands if such other evidence is not forthcoming. And, of course, 
the presumption attaches to each piece of evidence that comes up 
for consideration. 

In any case, the mechanics of the presumption are not so impor- 
tant as the fact that it is present; and it must remain present and 
effective until we get rid of the type of security program we now 
have. We may feel that it ought not to enter into the calculation at 
all; that “innocence” and “guilt” have no business figuring in the 
adjudication of an employee’s fitness. But in evaluating the past 
performance of the State Department Board, of the Tydings Com- 
mittee, and even of Senator McCarthy, we must take that over- 
riding presumption into account. 

Keeping all this in mind, what was to be concluded from Haldore 
Hanson’s authorship of Humane Endeavor? Certainly, in the ab- 
sence of a presumption of innocence, the Board was obliged to 
find there was “a reasonable doubt” about Hanson’s reliability; for 
reasonable men could, certainly, conclude that he was knowingly 
advancing the Communist Party line. The innocence presump- 
tion, however, alters the picture. If Hanson had been an experi- 
enced observer of Chinese politics— as were John Service and Owen 
Lattimore— the thesis that he was “taken in” by the Communists 
would have been implausible, and the original presumption of in- 
nocence would thus have been rebutted. We feel therefore that the 
State Department was justified in clearing Hanson, security-wise, 


as of the time McCarthy levelled his charges ; and, consequently, 
that the Hanson case was not, when the Tydings Committee heard 
it, prima facie evidence of derelict security practices in the Depart- 

It does not follow, of course, that McCarthy was unjustified in 
questioning Hanson’s loyalty, or that the Tydings Committee 
should have cleared Hanson— or that the Department should have 
kept him on after the hearings. At the time he made his charges, 
McCarthy was aware of what Budenz would testify to. And once 
Budenz’ information was on the record, both the Committee and 
the Department were obliged to find against Hanson; for the scales 
were now tipped against him, the “presumption of innocence” not- 

Conceivably, Budenz might have fabricated his story. But it is 
a matter of elementary logic that, if we find ( in spite of Budenz’ 
testimony) no reasonable doubt of Hanson’s reliability, we are 
simply saying that Louis Budenz is a liar, beyond reasonable 
doubt. Yet the FBI, out of long experience, has given him the high- 
est rating for reliability and accuracy. Now we may concede that 
the presumption of the accused’s innocence in some cases would 
justify such a conclusion about Budenz— if the “accused’s” previous 
record were particularly impressive in support of the “innocence” 
presumption. For example, if Budenz asserted that he had known 
Senator Taft as a member of the Party, Budenz might be written 
off as a liar, his own previous record of witness veracity notwith- 
standing. Haldore Hanson, however, bordered on being a security 
risk even before Budenz’ testimony; consequently, doubt about his 
security reliability was now reasonable. 

Yet the Tydings Committee cleared him, and the State Depart- 
ment kept on doing so through the succeeding months— sufficient 
justification, in our opinion, for McCarthy’s claim that the one 
“white-washed” and the other went on its way, unregenerate. 

Finally, in 1953, the Technical Cooperation Administration, of 
which Hanson was now an assistant administrator, was moved 
from the State Department to Harold Stassen’s Foreign Operations 
Administration. On August 16, the Washington Times-Herald car- 
ried a report that Stassen had demanded Hanson’s resignation— as 
the alternative to summary dismissal. Stassen’s explanation for the 
separation: “Reduction in force.” 

The Case of Philip Jessup 

The celebrated “Jessup case,” second only to McCarthy’s attack 
on George Marshall, has become for the Liberals the symbol and 
the definitive proof of the evils of McCarthy ism. Before McCarthy 
went after him, Philip Jessup— like Marshall— was in the front 
ranks of those “great Americans” whose patriotism and integrity 
were simply not open to question. Unlike Marshall, however, Jes- 
sup achieved martyrdom. A year and a half after McCarthy brought 
his name before the Tydings Committee— at a time when he had 
risen to be United States Ambassador-at-Large— Jessup was for all 
intents and purposes forced out of public life; a tragic victim, we 
are frequently told, of the Great Witchhunt. 

What finished Jessup was, of course, the Senate’s refusal in the 
fall of 1951, to confirm his appointment as U.S. Ambassador to the 
UN. But, according to the Liberal view, McCarthy, not the Senate, 
is to be blamed for the loss to the nation of Jessup’s invaluable 
services. The fact is generally ignored that prominent members 
of both Senate parties vigorously opposed the appointment, and 
that a majority of a Senate Committee declared Jessup’s past per- 
formance to be such as to disqualify him as our national spokesman 
at the UN. But McCarthy it is who captained the attack; and it is 
McCarthy who planted doubts about Jessup’s loyalty in the minds 
of his Senate colleagues. So Jessup remains McCarthy’s victim. 

Our concern here, however, is not with the alleged consequences 
of McCarthy’s campaign but with the Jessup case , and the light it 
throws on McCarthy’s battle with the Tydings Committee. 

The Jessup case, in view of its subsequent notoriety, made a para- 
doxically unpretentious entrance onto the Committee stage. A 
quarter of the way through his statement about Dorothy Kenyon, 
McCarthy paused for an aside— so casual that a number of the re- 
porters present assumed they probably hadn’t heard right: 

Although I shall discuss the unusual affinity of Mr. Philip C. Jessup, 
of the State Department, for Communist causes later in this inquiry, I 
think it pertinent to note that this gentleman, now formulating top-flight 
policy in the Far East affecting half the civilized world, was also a spon- 
sor of the American Russian Institute. . . . 62 


This reference to Jessup’s affiliation with the American-Russian 
Institute is all McCarthy told the Committee about Jessup.* Before 
evidence could be heard in support of the charge that he had an 
‘unusual affinity for Communist causes,” Jessup had flown in from 
Pakistan to make his reply. Once the “accused” had entered on the 
stage, the case became Philip Jessup’s own show, and the Commit- 
tee, as impresario, was content to listen to a soliloquy. After hear- 
ing it, the Committee never asked McCarthy to state his case. 

As he stood before the Committee, Jessup was a model of confi- 
dence, dignity and restraint. “I am not a Communist and never 
have been a Communist sympathizer. I have never knowingly sup- 
ported or promoted any movement or organization which I knew 
had as its objective the furtherance of Communist objectives. Al- 
though I cannot claim to have any detailed knowledge of the proc- 
ess, I wholeheartedly support the efforts of those whose official 
responsibility it is to see that Communist sympathizers are kept out 
of our Government .” 64 

Since McCarthy had not yet presented the evidence against him, 
Jessup had no occasion to answer specific charges. Instead, he of- 
fered the Committee a detailed account of his public career, espe- 
cially his anti-Communist speeches and public statements as dele- 
gate to the UN and, later, as roving Ambassador. On no less than 
nine occasions, he pointed out, the Communist press in Russia and 
elsewhere had attacked him as the “responsible executor” of Ameri- 
can aggression and imperialism. And if his own word was not 
enough. Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, no less, had sent him 
warm letters of support. “It does not read,” he said in concluding 
the recital of his anti-Communist activities, “like the record of a 
Communist, a pro-Communist or a fellow traveler .” 65 

Meaningful cross-examination of Jessup was, of course, out of 
the question. For one thing, since the “prosecution” had never pre- 
sented its case, there was nothing to cross-examine him about. For 
another, the “prosecutor,” though permitted to be present as the 
witness spoke, was forbidden to ask questions. And the Committee 
members’ own curiosity was atone of its frequent rock-bottom lows. 

The following abstract from the hearings is as good a commen- 
tary as any on the attitude of the Tydings “investigators.” Senator 

* On only one other occasion did McCarthy mention Jessup’s name. 
While discussing Owen Lattimore s connection with the Institute of Pacific 
Relations, McCarthy said, “The familiar pattern starts again with Messrs. Lat- 
timore, Hanson, Bisson and Jessup .” 63 


Hickenlooper had just been turned down once more on his recur- 
rent demand that the personnel files be made available to the 

Senator Hickenlooper. One other thing, Mr. Chairman. I think it is 
very important, in the interests of complete examination of this matter 
at this moment — and ineffective as I think any examination of this kind 
can be without full access to the files — that a decision be made on 
whether or not Senator McCarthy, who is the moving force in connec- 
tion with Mr. Jessup, be permitted to interrogate Mr. Jessup at this time, 
when they can confront each other. . . . Senator McCarthy is here. . . . 
I don’t know Mr. Jessup. I have never seen any information on him of 
any kind. I think it is very important that Senator McCarthy, who has 
generated this matter, be permitted to bring up whatever matters he 
has with Mr. Jessup. . . . 

Senator Tydings. We will lay this question before the Committee 
and decide on procedure. I do not want to be precluded from passing 
on it in the committee. However, I think this is a fair observation that 
Mr. Jessup . . . might be entitled to interrogate Senator McCarthy. . . . 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to let Mr. Jessup 
ask me any questions he cares to. 

Senator Tydings. Just a minute. We haven’t asked you as yet, Senator 
McCarthy. . . . 

Senator Hickenlooper. I take it that the Committee at this time 
says that Senator McCarthy cannot confront Mr. Jessup. 

Senator Tydings. Not until we pass on it as a committee. . . .* 60 

Armed only with some notes and documents he had received 
from McCarthy, Hickenlooper then tried, on his own, to go into 
Jessup's alleged Communist front affiliations. But he was like a 
child in Jessup's hands. He had only to mention the name of a 
front organization, and Jessup would suddenly be off again, ex- 
plaining that his association with that organization had been pe- 
ripheral and had, in any case, occurred at a time when he had had 
no knowledge of its Communist complexion. * * 

The Committee's majority members, clearly unhappy about 
what Hickenlooper was up to, sat impatiently, each, no doubt, 
studying the arrangement of the furniture with an eye to being the 
first to wring the Ambassador's hand when his ordeal was over. 
Hickenlooper did not presume upon their good nature. He soon 
gave up, and Senator Green won the race to the Ambassador's 

"Hi 6 matter was never put to the Committee. Subsequent requests by 
McCarthy that he be allowed to question witnesses were ignored. 

00 See Appendix A for an account of Jessup’s comments on his front affili- 



hand. “Dr. Jessup,” he said, “ . . let me congratulate you on the 
way you have so thoroughly cleared whatever charges, so-called, 
have been made against you” 67 — although only one charge had 
been made, and the evidence with which it might have been sup- 
ported had not been heard. Senator McMahon, when his turn 
came, effused an encomium, even warmer, for his was a special 
privilege: “Dr. Jessup, I am proud to have you as a constituent of 
mine. I am delighted that you are a fellow-citizen of the State of 

Nothing remained for the “investigators” to do except to work 
out appropriately handsome words for inclusion in the report. 
This was finally accomplished by the suggestion that the prestige 
of Philip Jessup and the prestige of the United States are one and 
the same thing: “This subcommittee feels that the accusations 
made against Philip C. Jessup are completely unfounded and un- 
justified and have done irreparable harm to the prestige of the 
United States.” 68 

McCarthy had in the meantime determined to specify his case 
against Jessup before a forum where he could not be so easily 
silenced. In two speeches made on the Senate floor, on March 30 
and June 2, 1950, he catalogued his evidence against Jessup; and 
although the speeches are not, strictly speaking, a part of the Tyd- 
ings Record, the Committee report did advert to them in discussing 
Jessup. Partly for this reason, and partly because they are docu- 
ments to which the student must turn in his attempt to test the 
Committee’s conclusion, we will summarize them here. 

To support his charge that Jessup had an “unusual affinity for 
Communist causes,” McCarthy reported: 

That Jessup had been affiliated with five Communist fronts ;* 69 

That Jessup had been a leading light in the Institute of Pacific 
Relations at a time that organization was reflecting the Communist 
Party line ; and that he had “pioneered the smear campaign against 
Nationalist China and Chiang Kai Shek” and propagated the 
“myth of the ‘democratic Chinese Communists' ” through the IPR 
magazine , Far Eastern Survey, over which he had “absolute con- 

That Jessup had associated with known Communists in the 
IPR ; 11 

That the IPR’s American Council under Jessup's guidance had 

* The fronts are listed in Appendix A, along with an indication of the 
nature of Jessup's affiliation with them. 


received more than $ 7,000 of Communist funds from Frederick 

Vanderbilt Field; 12 . . » . .. . 

That Jessup had “expressed vigorous opposition to attempts to 

investigate Communist penetration of the IPR , 

That Jessup had urged that United States atom bomb production 
be brought to a halt in 1946, and that essential atomic ingredients 
be “dumped into the ocean”; 1 * 

That Jessup had appeared as a character witness for Alger Hiss , 
and that later , after Hiss’s conviction , Jessup had found (as Mc- 
Carthy put it) “no reason whatever to change his opinion about 
Hiss’s veracity, loyalty and integrity.” 15 

A Committee seeking a sober and impartial judgment on State 
Department security practices might at least have had to think 
twice before dismissing McCarthy’s case. The Tydings Committee 
did not in fact think once. 

In the matter of Jessup’s alleged front affiliations, this is what the 
Committee said in its report: “Only a casual review of the record 
is required to demonstrate the erroneous and misleading character 
of the charge that Dr. Jessup had been affiliated with five Com- 
munist front organizations. . . . The true facts . . . are that Dr. Jessup 
is shown to have been associated with only two organizations, in 
both cases prior to the date they were cited as Communist fronts.” 16 
With just which two fronts the Committee was prepared to con- 
cede Jessup’s affiliation it is impossible to discern from its jumbled 
recapitulation of Jessup’s testimony. But the inaccuracy of the 
statement is, in any case, easy to demonstrate. Uncontroverted 
evidence showed Jessup to have been affiliated with four groups, 
all of which have since been officially cited or designated as fronts: 
the American Russian Institute; the National Emergency Confer- 
ence (and its successor, the National Emergency Conference for 
Democratic Rights ) ; the American Law Students Association; and 
the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.* 

The fifth affiliation charged by McCarthy, he did not establish. 
The Coordinating Committee to Lift the Spanish Embargo (a 
Communist front, to be sure ) , did publish a statement by Jessup on 
the embargo in one of its pamphlets. But the statement appeared 
along with statements from some thirty other persons, and there 
is no evidence that Jessup had given the Coordinating Committee 

* It should be noted that the citation against the IPR’s American Council 
was withdrawn in 1951. But at the time of the Tydings Report, the citation 
was in effect. 



permission to use it. Moreover, the pamphlet in question seems, on 
the face of it, to have been a catchall for public statements from 
pretty much any and everyone in favor of ending the embargo, 
which the organization turned to its own uses. It is difficult to see 
how McCarthy could have mistaken it for anything else. 

To the extent the Committee was willing to concede that Jessup 
in fact had front affiliations, it rationalized them in familiar terms: 
the organizations were cited as fronts after the date of Jessup’s 
association. Yet let us repeat that one cannot make any general in- 
ference from the date on which a subversive organization is cited 
as to when intelligent people should have been able to spot it 
as Communist- dominated. Official proscription occurs only after 
lengthy and painstaking investigation and it is evidence of Com- 
munist activity in the past * 

If the Committee had bothered to investigate the public files of 
the House Committee on Un-American Activities, it would have 
found that each organization with which Jessup had been con- 
nected was engaging in pro-Communist activities at the time of 
Jessup's association. And if it had bothered to question some of 
Jessup’s prominent colleagues in the various fronts he had belonged 
to, it would have discovered that the Communist complexion of 
the organizations was not very difficult to spot. It would have 
found, for example, that Senator Paul Douglas, a co-sponsor with 
Jessup of the National Emergency Council for Democratic Rights, 
had resigned from the group in September, 1940, precisely on the 
grounds that the Council was “a Communist front/’ 77 Jessup, 
though a member at that time, took no such action. 

A word is in order about the one Jessup affiliation McCarthy 
charged and did not establish— i.e., that with the Coordinating 
Committee to Lift the Spanish Embargo. The facts are, as it hap- 
pens, vastly more damaging to Jessup than a substantiation of his 
alleged affiliation could possibly have been. For they add up to 
this: Jessup, having advocated lifting the embargo, later opposed 
lifting it, and chose as the time for his about-face the month of 

* The attitude of some observers on this matter, we may note in passing, 
reflects the normal Liberal tendency to have it both ways. On the one hand, 
they challenge the right of the Attorney General to cite an organization as 
“subversive” at all; and on the other, when it suits their purpose, they imply 
that the Attorney General feels a peculiar afflatus on the subject and is 
hence the first individual to become aware that an organization is subver- 
sive — from which it readily follows that all organizations are all right until 
the Attorney General says they aren’t. 



September, 1939— after the Hitler-Stalin Pact had been signed. 
So much McCarthy proved, beyond the shadow of a doubt, at the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings in the fall of 1951 
by citing ( 1) a letter Jessup had written to the New York Times 
on September 21, 1939, opposing repeal of the embargo and (2) a 
letter he had written to the Times eight months earlier when he 
had contended that lifting the embargo would 

mark a return to our historic policy of avoiding intervention in Euro- 
pean civil wars, following a strict hands-off policy instead of taking af- 
firmative action which, as events have demonstrated, inevitably affects 
the outcome of a struggle in which we profess not to be concerned . 78 

The September letter, by contrast, insisted that repeal of the em- 
bargo would be “unneutral” and would be 

contemptuous of the legal duty which the law of nations imposes upon 
every neutral sovereign. Such conduct is ... a specious form of inter- 
position sought to be disguised under a cloak of professed equality of 
the opposing contenders . 79 

Jessup’s interest in the matter, one may legitimately suspect, was 
political rather than professional.* Jessup, of course, knew that 
maintaining the embargo in January meant unofficial American in- 
tervention on the side of the Spanish Loyalists (by that time Com- 
munist-dominated), and that lifting the embargo in September 

* To both of his arguments Jessup lent the force of his expertise in Inter- 
national Law. And like any resourceful lawyer, he was full of arguments with 
which to justify drawing a distinction between two apparently similar situa- 
tions. He argued on the one occasion that General Franco’s status as a 
“belligerent” during the Spanish Civil War had not been officially recognized 
by the United States; and that therefore legal precedent would be against an 
embargo on shipments to Spain. On the other occasion he started out from 
the existence of the general European war and argued that repealing the em- 
bargo after the conflict had begun would be unneutral conduct; thus, illegal 
under the law of nations. Most learned persons would dismiss such talk as 
sophistry, and recognize that, practically speaking, Jessup had, in the name 
of neutrality, urged diametrically opposed policies in essentially similar situa- 
tions. But even within the strict confines of legal reasoning, Jessup proved 
too much. For, if precedents were to be his guide, he should have started 
out by noting that America has traditionally opposed embargoes against 
belligerents as well as against rebels; which would have ended him up oppos- 
ing the embargo in September as well as in January. Or, if he was saying 
that no alteration of the status quo after the commencement of hostilities is 
to be the controlling consideration, how could he justify a repeal of the 
Spanish embargo at a time when the Spanish Civil War was nearly three 
years old? 



meant unofficial American intervention on the side of England and 
France against Germany and its ally of the moment, Soviet Russia. 
Now there may be other common denominators in the two posi- 
tions Jessup took; but the one that stands out is the interests of the 
Soviet Union. This the Tydings Committee, if it meant business, 
could not ignore. Nor is it any answer here to say that McCarthy 
did not present the two letters in time for Tydings' consideration: 
the letters, printed in the Times , were available to any one pre- 
pared to conduct a probe of Jessup's past. 

In the matter of Jessup's alleged influence in the Institute of 
Pacific Relations at a time it was promoting Communist interests, 
the Committee reported as follows: “His connections with the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations do not in any way reflect unfavorably 
upon him when the true character of the organization is revealed .” 80 

Just what the Committee conceived the IPR’s “true character” 
to be it did not undertake to say beyond noting that only a small 
portion of IPR funds had been contributed by Communists. Ascer- 
taining the real significance of Jessup’s association obviously re- 
quired a conscientious inquiry into IPR activities; and that the 
Committee, characteristically, deemed beyond its call of duty. It 
was left for the McCarran Committee to do the job a year later, 
and to report, “The IPR was a vehicle used by Communists to 
orientate American Far Eastern policy toward Communist ob- 
jectives .” 81 

To be sure, the IPR, as the McCarran Committee Hearings clear- 
ly show, was not a Communist “front” in the sense that experts on 
organizational Communism use the term to describe an organiza- 
tion either “created” or later “taken over” by Communists. But the 
hearings also show that the IPR had a Communist “cell” that suc- 
ceeded in putting the organization's official organs at the service of 
Communist imperialism; and that this was done by “manipulating” 
the IPR's policy-making officials. 

Philip Jessup certainly was among the policy-makers whom the 
Communists “manipulated.” It is quite true that among the IPR’s 
sponsors, members, and contributors, there was an impressive list 
of “irreproachables”— publishers, diplomats and industrialists 
whose anti-Communism is beyond question; but who, be it noted, 
had very little to do with the actual management of the Institute. 
The McCarran investigation makes it abundantly clear that IPR 
policies were controlled by a closely-knit brotherhood. While there 



is nothing sinister about operational autocracy in an organization 
of this character, the small group which does run it must accept 
responsibility for its conduct and policies, and not attempt to de- 
flect criticism by citing the respectability of its uninvolved front 

men. , 

If Jessup had remained merely a member of the Institute s Board 
of Trustees ( on which he sat from 1933 1 94 ® ) be could lay claim 

to having, like the irreproachables, played a relatively unimportant 
role. In 1939 and 1940, however, he was chairman of the Institute’s 
American Council, and from 1939 to 1942 chairman of its Pacific 
Council, both of which are policy-making bodies. Moreover, he 
was a member of the American Council s Executive Committee 
during most of the years in which he was not its chairman. And in 
1944, he was chairman of the IPR’s Research Advisory Commit- 
tee— this being, of all the IPR hats he wore, the one to which 
McCarthy attached the greatest significance. 

All this does not prove that the IPR was “Jessup’s organization,” 
as McCarthy had put it at one point. But it does, unmistakably, 
establish his membership in the IPR’s policy-making echelon dur- 
ing the crucial years of its exploitation by the Communists. Judg- 
ing from the McCarran Committee Hearings, it seems probable 
that Jessup’s power during this period exceeded that of any other 
IPR officer. In a word: it is difficult to see how the Communists 
could have “used” the IPR as a propaganda instrument without 
having “used” Philip Jessup in the process. 

Specifically, McCarthy charged that Jessup had “pioneered the 
smear campaign against Chiang Kai-Shek” in the American Coun- 
cil’s official organ. Far Eastern Survey. As to this, the most electric 
of all McCarthy’s charges against Jessup, the Committee reported: 
“We also cannot find any evidence to support the allegation that 
Dr. Jessup was in control of the publication Far Eastern Survey or 
that that magazine took part in a smear campaign against Chiang 
Kai-Shek The evidence in support of the so-called ‘smear cam- 

paign is non-existent .” 82 

A charitable explanation for this astounding statement is that 
the Committee ( a ) failed to inquire into the organizational setup 
of the IPR; (b) did not read Far Eastern Survey; and (c) deemed 
judicial notice of the brazen propaganda war against Chiang to be 
beyond the scope of its inquiry. We need not waste time on the 
Committee’s denial of the existence of the smear campaign against 

106 the nine public cases 

Chiang; this-unquestionably the most successful job of political 
huckstering in our time— has already been so thoroughly docu- 
mented that we may regard it as res adjudicata * The Far Eastern 
Surveys role in that campaign is, however, worth looking into, as is 
the question of Jessup’s precise connection with this influential 

We have studied the issues of the Far Eastern Survey over the 
years 1943-1946 and are satisfied that anyone who does likewise 
will immediately recognize the Survey s pro-Communist bias. The 
skeptic we invite to look for himself. 

The McCarran Committee tried to make the point by examining 
articles in the Survey from 1931 to 1951, on a statistical basis, 
classifying their authors as “pro-Communist,” “anti-Communist,” 
or “neutral,” respectively. ( Into the “pro-Communist” group they 
put only persons who had been named under oath as Communist 
Party members and/or members of officially-cited Communist 
fronts in the Asiatic field; 83 as for the other two groups they trust- 
ingly allowed IPR Secretary-General W. L. Holland to do the 
classifying himself.) 84 The results: 33.73% were contributed by 
“pro-Communists,” 15,18% by “anti-Communists,” and 51.09% by 
“neutrals.” 85 If we confine our attention to the years 1943-1946, the 
McCarran- type breakdown yields approximately the same results. 

Yet such an analysis is inadequate for it fails to reveal how much 
of the material submitted by each group had any political signifi- 
cance. Much of the magazine's space was devoted to highly techni- 
cal discussions of economic and social problems, which had no 
particular bearing on the conflict between the Communists and the 

* The most conclusive proof for this assertion is to be found, of course, 
in the books, articles, and book reviews on China that appeared during that 
incredible decade. The political reporting of Chinese affairs was then vir- 
tually monopolized by a left-wing cadre of writers closely connected with the 
IPR, notably Owen Lattimore, Edgar Snow, Lawrence Rosinger, Agnes 
Smedley, John Fairbank, Theodore White, Israel Epstein. The story was 
subsequently told by Mrs. Irene Kuhn (in the American Legion Magazine , 
1951); by Senator Owen Brewster (in a speech to the Senate, 1951); by 
John T. Flynn (in While You Slept, 1952); by Victor Lasky and Ralph de 
Toledano (in Seeds of Treason , 1950); by de Toledano (in the American 
Mercury , 1951); and, most authoritatively, in the IPR Hearings, 1951 and 
1952 . 

** The influence of the Survey is not to be measured by its circulation, 
which was small, but by its unchallenged domination — in company with 
Pacific Affairs (IPR) and Amerasia (an offshoot of the IPR) — of the field. 
Expert discussion of Far Eastern problems was for many years the exclusive 
domain of these three political “trade journals/' 



free world; and most of the articles by the “anti-Communists” were 
of this character. On the other hand, every article dealing with the 
Chinese Communists painted a favorable, often an ecstatic pic- 
ture of the Reds; and not a single article on the internal policies of 
the Nationalist government, from 1943 on (when the Communist 
Party line turned against Chiang), refrained from severe criticism 
of the Kuomintang. 

The Survey s campaign against Chiang was touched off by 
T. A. Bisson’s now famous “China’s Part in a Coalition War” 
which appeared in the issue of July 14, 1943. The Bisson article, 
which explained the differences between “Democratic China” ( the 
Communists) and “Feudal China” (the Nationalists) was, accord- 
ing to Louis Budenz, planned and planted by the American Com- 
munist hierarchy to keynote the switch in the international Party 
Line on China. The revised party line was clearly visible in the 
subsequent numbers of the Survey . Criticism of Chiang came to be 
a dominant theme in the magazine. Article after article posed the 
question, “Is China [the Nationalist government] really a democ- 
racy?” Of course, not even Chiang’s greatest admirers would have 
contended that his government was democratic in the western 
sense. But the Surveys repeated asking of the question and its 
manner of asking it, carried the suggestion, tacitly or explicitly, 
that everything would be enormously improved once Chiang 
“broadened the base” of his government “to include other 
groups”— meaning, of course, the Communists. Significantly, the 
Survey never once indicated similar misgivings over the internal 
political conditions of the Soviet Union, although such observa- 
tions would have had a place in a magazine that devoted a good 
deal of space to rhapsodical accounts of life in Soviet Asia. 

By the end of 1944, such “constructive” criticism of Chiang was 
giving way to an openly hostile treatment of the Nationalists. In a 
lead piece called “Report on China,” Survey editor (Lawrence 
Salisbury) wrote that “a number of Americans with varying back- 
grounds have obtained first-hand knowledge of the Chinese ‘Com- 
munists,’ enough for us to realize that the term can be used 
correctly only in quotation marks. The ‘Communist’ areas are in 
fact primarily agrarian communities intent on driving the Japanese 
from China. In those areas private property is respected and pri- 
vate enterprise encouraged. Reports which have come out of China 
recently by, for example, American correspondents indicate that 
a comparison of conditions in the ‘Communist’ and Kuomintang 


areas inclines heavily in favor of the former.” 86 And so the cam- 
paign progressed. Not one article during the entire 1943"46 period 
suggested the possibility that China's “Communists” were sure- 
enough Communists. 

In analyzing a magazine that has no editorial page, the most 
indicative index of editorial bias is the book-review section. During 
the years in question, the Far Eastern Surveys pro-Communist 
batting average in that area was a cool Every book critical 
of the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists was reviewed 
unfavorably; and every book praising the Communists, or dressing 
them up to look like non-Communists, was reviewed favorably. As 
everyone in the trade knows, book reviewers are invariably se- 
lected with the editors' foreknowledge that the opinions they will 
express do not differ substantially from those which the editors 
themselves hold. 

This brings us to our other question: How did Philip Jessup fig- 
ure in the “smear campaign” against Chiang's government? Jessup 
was chairman of the American Council's Research Advisory Com- 
mittee in 1944, which , on Jessup’s own showing , was responsible 
for the policies and activities of the “ Far Eastern Survey In 
December, 1944, Jessup and three other members of the IPR hier- 
archy answered Alfred Kohlberg's charge that Communist writers 
dominated the magazine. How could the Survey be accused of 
pro-Communism, they replied, when its contributors, after all, 
were not in control of the magazine's policies? 

The research conducted by the American Council is under the direc- 
tion of its Research Advisory Committee. ... This Committee formu- 
lates and approves the research programs , and it approves the research 
personnel who are engaged for their competence to undertake the special 
assignments required in the research program . Having hired competent 
research workers, it is not the policy of the Committee or of the American 
Council to censor these findings, but to publish them as the research 
results of the authors themselves. 0 [Italics added.] 

Let us not be put off by the statement that it was not the “policy” 
of the American Council to “censor these findings.” The questions 
remain: Why were the results not censored (i.e., rejected on ac- 
count of their patent partisanship ) ? And why— among the research 

* Letter to Alfred Kohlberg, December 19, 1944, signed by the Chair- 
man of the American Council of the IPR, Robert G. Sproul; by Robert D. 
Calkins, G. Ellsworth Huggins, and Philip C. Jessup. See McCarran Com- 
mittee Hearings , Vol. 14, p. 4938. 


personnel that the Advisory Committee by its own admission had 
approved— was the incidence of Communists and fellow travelers, 
unqualified, on the face of it, to carry on objective research, so 
very high? 

Jessup did not become head of the Research Advisory Commit- 
tee until several months after the Survey s anti-Chiang campaign 
was launched. Whether or not he had a hand in casting the maga- 
zine’s policies in 1943 is not clear. Mr. Alfred Kohlberg (whose 
credentials we discuss below) believes he did. He cites, in particu- 
lar, the fact that he (Kohlberg) learned, in the course of preparing 
his analysis of IPR publications in 1944, that the touchy situation 
created by Nationalist objections to Bissons opening shot at 
Chiang was referred to Jessup; and that Jessup arranged to have 
the Nationalists’ protests printed in the form of a letter to the Sur- 
vey and to have the protest answered by a letter from Bisson run- 
ning in an adjoining column of the same issue. If Kohlberg’s infor- 
mation is correct, it appears that Jessup was pretty close to the 
magazine even in 1943. But even if Kohlberg’s information is 
wrong, it would be difficult to exculpate Jessup for the Survey s 
1943 policies. For, as one of the most influential and hence most 
responsible members of the IPR hierarchy, Jessup was certainly 
obliged to speak out against the magazine’s increasingly blatant 
pro-Communism, and decline, in the circumstances, to take over as 
its impresario the following year. 

In summary: while the available evidence does not substantiate 
McCarthy’s statement that Jessup “pioneered the smear cam- 
paign,” McCarthy’s indictment of Jessup was decidedly closer to 
the mark than the uninformed yet categorical denials of the Tyd- 
ings Committee. For the record shows that Jessup, wittingly or 
not, did give the Communists valuable assistance in their propa- 
ganda war against Chiang’s government. And though McCarthy, 
in crediting Jessup with “pioneering” the campaign, over-stated 
his case, his general charge— that Jessup had an “unusual affinity 
for Communist causes”— was, in the light of the evidence, remark- 
ably shrewd and apt. What McCarthy should have said, specifi- 
cally, is that but for the active cooperation of Jessup, the Far 
Eastern Survey could not have developed into a militantly pro- 
Chinese-Communist magazine. Jessup apparently had the power 
to flush out the fellow travellers. And if he did not have this power, 
he could at least, by resigning and publishing the reason for his 
resignation, have frustrated the American Council’s efforts to fur- 



ther the Communist Party line under the cloak of scholarly im- 

In the matter of McCarthy's charge that Jessup had associated 
with known Communists in the IPR, the Tydings Committee said 
nothing in its report, absolutely nothing. Two years later, the Mc- 
Carran Committee reported that 46 persons connected with the 
IPR had been named under oath as members of the Communist 
Party; and that at least eight others had collaborated with the Sovi- 
et Intelligence apparatus. 87 While this does not establish that they 
were all known Communists, and certainly does not show that 
Jessup knew them to be Communists or that he was personally re- 
sponsible for their connection with the IPR, Jessup’s association 
with them is beyond doubt. Either, therefore, he was the victim of 
incredibly elaborate deceit, and thus had the poorest nose for Com- 
munists in all the world; or he knew he was associated with Commu- 
nists. Those who are prepared to accept the first of these possibil- 
ities are conceivably entitled to regard him as a first-rate dupe but 
a sound fellow security-wise. If, however, the second is correct, he 
was a bad security risk as Ambassador-at-large. 

Of course, since Communist infiltration is normally a covert 
operation, it does not follow as a matter of course that Jessup was 
aware of the political allegiance of these persons— any more than 
it follows as a matter of course that Dean Acheson and Felix Frank- 
furter were aware of Alger Hiss' ideological commitments. On the 
other hand, there are certain facts that put the burden of proving 
the “dupe” or “poor nose” thesis on Jessup and his supporters. For 
example, ten of the thirty-three individuals whom Jessup recom- 
mended as delegates to the IPR Hot Springs Conference in Jan- 
uary, 1945, have since been named, under oath, as members of 
the Communist Party; and it would be difficult to argue that the 
bias which most of these ten would carry into the deliberations 
was hard to predict.* Jessup may not have known what he was 
doing when he recommended these men; but this is to contend 
that he was abysmally ignorant in the fields of activity in which 
he was supposed to be, and indeed never pretended not to be, an 

A special word is in order about Jessup's association with Fred- 

* The ten: Benjamin Kizer, Lauchlin Currie, John Carter Vincent, Owen 
Lattimore, Joseph Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter 
White, Len de Caux, and Frank Coe . 88 



erick Vanderbilt Field. Field was secretary of the American Coun- 
cil in 1939 and 1940, when Jessup was its chairman. Field's sym- 
pathies were perfectly evident in those years. 

In the summer of 1940, the Communist Party created a new 
front— the notorious American Peace Mobilization— to oppose U.S. 
aid to the Allies. Field was selected to head it. When Field, antici- 
pating a busy time, requested that he be relieved of some of his 
duties with the IPR, Jessup sent a memorandum to the Board of 
Trustees of the American Council that read in part as follows: 

I cannot acquiesce in his complete separation from the direction of the 
affairs of the American Council. I have therefore appointed him Staff 
Adviser with the understanding that he is to be on leave without salary 
for the next six months. . . . We consider that it is in the best interests of 
the American Council that Mr. Field should remain as closely associ- 
ated with it as possible. We should therefore like to see him continue 
as secretary of the Council, exercising the maximum amount of guid- 
ance in the determination of policy consistent with his desire to be re- 
lieved of the burden of administrative work and financial promotion . 89 
[Italics added.] 

It was left to the Communist Party to tell Field later that he 
would have to drop his work with the IPR altogether (see below) 
and devote full time to his new job. Louis Budenz' testimony be- 
fore the Tydings Committee throws further light on Jessup's atti- 
tude toward Field at the time: 

Mr. Budenz. Well, Dr. Jessup was working very close, on very close 
and friendly terms, with Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and his name came 
into Field’s report [to the Communist Party]. 

Senator McMahon. As a member of the Party? 

Mr. Budenz. No, sir; not to my knowledge. I never heard him men- 
tioned as a member of the party. ... I dare say, however, that Mr. Field 
did declare at the time — and I don’t know whether this ought to be on 
the record or not — 

Senator McMahon. This is an executive record. 

Mr. Budenz. The thing is that, well, I am saying this in justice to Dr. 
Jessup. I do not know him as a Communist. I repeat, Mr. Field reported 
that Dr. Jessup felt that he [Field] could serve better in the Institute 
of Pacific Relations. Now, you must understand, I do not know whether 
Dr. Jessup knew fully what Mr. Field intended to do. . . . The Political 
Bureau decided nevertheless that Mr. Field should become the head 
of the American Peace Mobilization, which he did . 90 



The light becomes more illuminating still if we place beside Bu- 
denz’ statement what Jessup had to say when the time came to 
arrange a public announcement of Field’s resignation from the 
IPR. Writing on October 29, 1940, to IPR head E. C. Carter, Jessup 
spoke of Field as follows: 

Dear Ned: I don’t really think we can use Fred’s statement as is, 
much as I would he glad to help him with his cause. How about a com- 
bination of the two, something like this: 

“Frederick V. Field, who has been on the staff of the American Coun- 
cil since 1928, has resigned in order to become Executive Secretary of 
the American Peace Mobilization. ‘The American Peace Mobilization is 
a mass organization of progressive trade unions , farm, church , youth, 
Negro and fraternal groups, dedicated to preserving the interests of the 
United States through the strengthening of American democracy and 
through non-participation in the war between England and the fascist 
powers * Mr. Field had a deep conviction that he was obligated to ac- 
cept this new responsibility and felt that in view of the acceptance of 
his new position, it was not possible for him to continue his official con- 
nection with the IPR. The Executive Committee . . . expressed the hope 
that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to 
resume active leadership in the work of the ZPR/’ 91 I Italics added.] 

Are we really to believe that Professor Jessup was uninformed as 
to the nature of Fields “cause” which he professed to be “glad” to 
“help”? Are we to believe that Jessup, who was active in the Amer- 
ica First Committee,* thought of Field as merely a fellow-isola- 
tionist? Hardly, since it was public knowledge that the American 
Peace Mobilization was first and foremost a Communist mouth- 
piece. It had been exposed as such at the time of its organizational 
rally in Chicago, late in August, 1940, before Jessup produced the 
encomium quoted above. The Executive Committee of the New 
York Young Democrats, for example, had declared on August 31 
that the APM was “one more Communist-lead 'fifth column’ at- 
tempt to weaken national unity.” 92 And a few days earlier, Jessup’s 
America First colleagues, Senators Gerald Nye and Bennett Clark, 
had refused to address the rally because of its Communist inspira- 
tion. 93 If, in the light of all this, one still wants to conclude that 
Jessup, though an expert student of public affairs, was unaware of 

0 Jessup continued on the America First Committee even after the inva- 
sion of Russia by Hitler s armies, when the Communist Party was clamoring 
for American intervention. 


Field’s "cause/’ it must at least be admitted that the odds are heav- 
ily against this assumption.* 

In response to McCarthy’s charge that the IPR’s American Coun- 
cil had received over $7,000 in Communist funds from Field, the 
Tydings Committee reported as follows: " 0 / the many thousands 
of dollars received by the Institute as contributions only a few 
thousand are shown to have come from Communist contributors .” 95 
Jessup had already driven that point home in a statement incor- 
porated in a State Department press release: 

... in the years when these donations were made, 1942 and 1943, I had 
ceased to be Chairman of the American Council. ... At that time, Dr. 
Robert Gordon Sproul, president of the University of California, was 
chairman. . . . Mr. Francis Harmon was treasurer; and Mr. William R. 
Herod, now president of the International General Electric Company, 
was chairman of the finance committee. During that period, Mr. Juan 
Trippe, president of Pan American Airways, and Mr. Henry Luce of 
Time and Life, were sponsors of a drive for funds on behalf of the 
American Council. Surely, these gentlemen would never have acccepted 
payments from Mr. Field or anyone else for “selling the Communist 
Party Line.” Neither would I if I had been in control. These contribu- 
tions, according to Senator McCarthy’s own figures, total only $3,500** 
as compared with total expenses for the 2-year period of approximately 
$200,000. About half of the amount was met by contributions from the 
Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation. Generous donations 
by large industrial concerns made up a large portion of the remainder. 96 

Resolutely resisting the temptation to reflect upon the enthu- 
siasm with which American capitalists dig their own graves, let us 
simply note the fact that Jessup’s statement here crowds dishon- 
esty— and that the Tydings Committee’s endorsement of it, if not 
dishonest, was at least premature. McCarthy’s evidence consisted 
of a number of cancelled Field checks he had somehow laid hands 

0 E. C. Carter, then the IPR’s Secretary General, and not a man to be 
lightly accused of helping to expose Communism, made no attempt to con- 
ceal from the McCarran Committee how open Field had been about his 
political sympathies: 

Senator Eastland. When did he [Field] take that position with the 
Peace Mobilization? . . . 

Mr. Carter. It was in the autumn of 1940 .... 

Senator Eastland. . . . you knew that Field was a Communist, did you 

Mr. Carter. I know at that time he was behaving like a Communist. 94 

00 This was the figure McCarthy had given in his March speech; by June 
he had uncovered additional checks from Field for $3,500, bringing the total 
to $7,000. 



on, made out to the IPR during 1942 and 1943 on behalf of the 
American Peoples Fund.* Now on what grounds did the Com- 
mittee and Jessup (the latter obviously knowing better) blithely 
assume that McCarthy’s desultory discoveries had told the whole 
story of Communist money going into the IPR? Certainly McCar- 
thy was suggesting that a great deal more of this sort of thing had 
been going on than was proved by the few checks he had been able 
to dig up. Once again, it remained for the McCarran Committee 
to get at the truth. 

Mr. Morris [Counsel for the Committee]. Mr. Carter testified yes- 
terday that the total of your contribution to the Institute through the 
years that you were associated with it approximated $60,000. 

Mr. Field. I am perfectly willing to accept that. . . . 97 

From here it is a short step to an educated guess that a consider- 
able part of the $60,000 (since Field was especially active in the 
IPR at the time ) was contributed during Jessup’s tenure as Chair- 
man of the American Council during 1939 and 1940. But educated 
guesses are, happily, not needed. For on June 3, 1940, Carter, 
writing to his colleague, W. L. Holland, about the need to cut down 
the American Council’s expenditures, let the cat out of the bag: 
“It is impossible for Field to go on paying each years deficit. I 
think he now feels contraction should have been effected years 
ago .” 98 

Now it beggars belief that Jessup, as chairman of the organiza- 
tion, was unaware of Field’s role with respect to its financial situa- 
tion. Why, then, did he see fit to evade the truth by implying that 
the few 1942 and 1943 checks uncovered by McCarthy, told the 
whole story of Field’s donations? 

The reader however may concede the point as to Jessup’s lack 
of candor, yet object to McCarthy’s underlying argument here, 
i.e . 9 that acceptance of Communist funds is indicative of Commu- 
nist sympathies. After all, an organization may take money from 
Red sugar daddies, provided no visible strings are attached, and 
use it for anti-Communist purposes— just as an organization may 
take money from the anti-Communist Rockefellers and use it for 
Communist purposes. This is a cute objection, but not a valid one. 

0 The American People’s Fund was organized and directed by Frederick 
V. Field “as a repository for funds to be distributed to Communist enter- 
prises.” (California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report , 1948, 
p. 168.) 


The Communists, on the record, are much more inclined than the 
Rockefellers to carry into politics the habits formed in meeting the 
payroll: the Communists, notoriously, hold on to their money until 
they know they are going to get for it something they want worse 
than they want it. Any political expert is on notice that, when he 
gets gifts from the Communists, the Communist cause is getting 
something in return. This notice, together with what it implies in 
terms of sympathies, must be imputed to Jessup. For while it is 
possible that the distinguished and preoccupied businessmen who 
served on the IPR’s Board of Trustees were unaware of Field’s po- 
litical leanings, the same cannot be said for one of Field’s closest 

To McCarthy’s charge that Jessup opposed attempts to inves- 
tigate alleged Communist penetration of the IPR, the Tydings 
Committee replied: “It has been shown that this reference is to an 
attempt made by Alfred Kohlberg to wrest control of the Institute . 
The dispute was primarily a private feud between the controlling 
group and the faction supporting Kohlberg which resulted in over- 
whelming defeat for Kohlberg and his faction . While we do not 
pass on the merits of the contest, it is apparent that this is a correct 
explanation of the incident in contradiction of the erroneous inter- 
pretation given by Senator McCarthy 

How the Committee figured it could thus endorse the IPR line 
(that Mr. Kohlberg’s personal ambition and not his anti-Commu- 
nism* was at the heart of the “feud” in question), and not “pass 
on the merits of the contest,” it did not explain. The facts about 
the Kohlberg controversy, as it relates to Jessup, appear to be as 
follows: Kohlberg opened the “feud” in November 1944, when he 
submitted to the trustees of the IPR an 88-page report showing, 
with chapter-and-verse citations from IPR publications, the In- 
stitute’s pro-Communist bias, and demanding a self-administered 
housecleaning. Kohlberg’s allegations, we may note in passing, 
were fully corroborated by the McCarran Committee. 

0 Alfred Kohlberg is to many people the "China Lobby” incarnate. His 
sinister motives for supporting Chiang (i.e., concern over his financial invest- 
ments in China and his personal ambition to run the IPR) are now a cliche — 
thanks to one of the most vicious and successful smear campaigns ever visited 
upon a private citizen of this country. This is not the place to review Mr. 
Kohlberg’s record, except to note that, had his counsels been heeded in 1944, 
the IPR would have been saved; and Chiang’s China might have had a 
fighting chance to survive. 



The IPR s answer came in a letter signed by Jessup and three 
other members of the American Councils Executive Committee: 
“The Executive Committee and the responsible officers of the 
American Council find no reason to consider seriously the charge 
of bias.” 100 

Kohlberg then requested a copy of the organizations member- 
ship roster, so that he might put his brief in the members’ hands. 
The request was refused. Kohlberg brought suit— which some two 
years later resulted in a court order compelling the IPR to provide 
facilities (at the IPR’s expense) for circularizing its members. 
Heartened by this minor triumph, Kohlberg sent out his 1944 
analysis, together with a proposal that an impartial board of in- 
vestigators be appointed to test the validity of his charges; and he 
requested that supporting proxies be sent to him for the next mem- 
bers’ meeting. The IPR administration, not to be outdone, also 
requested proxies with which to fight “any and all proposals made 
by Alfred Kohlberg.” “For over two years,” so read the administra- 
tion’s letter, “Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, a former member of the Amer- 
ican Institute of Pacific Relations, and an importer with substantial 
business interests in China has been carrying on [his] . . . campaign. 
. . . The Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees has investi- 
gated Mr. Kohlberg’ s charges, and found them inaccurate and irre- 
sponsible.” 101 (Italics added.) The letter was signed by Jessup and 
six other members of the Board of Trustees. 

Kohlberg’s request for an investigation was tinned down by a 
vote of 1163 to 66. 

Kohlberg clearly showed good faith in suggesting that an inde- 
pendent group adjudicate the issue. As for the assertion by Jessup 
and the IPR administration that the Executive Committee had al- 
ready conducted an objective investigation (the ostensible reason 
for opposing an inquiry by outsiders), this excuse appears to have 
been far from the truth, as an excerpt from the McCarran Commit- 
tee hearings indicates: 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dennett, were you secretary of the American Coun- 
cil of the IPR when Alfred Kohlberg brought his charges that there 
was Communist influence in the Institute? 

Mr. Dennett. I was. . . . 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dennett, was there ever any thorough investigation 
made of the so-called Kohlberg charges? 

Mr. Dennett. I would say “no.” I would say an answer was prepared, 
which is somewhat different. 


Mr. Morris. Who prepared the answer? 

Mr. Dennett. Marguerite Ann Stewart . 0 

Mr. Morris. Did she make any objective investigation of the so- 
called charges? 

Mr. Dennett. I am not really in a position to judge that, Mr. Morris. 
I would be inclined to think not. 

Tydings investigators could easily have got hold of the facts of 
the Kohlberg controversy and of Jessup’s part in blocking an objec- 
tive investigation of the IPR. Instead, they chose to authenticate 
the version of the incident that nervous IPR apologists were then 
telling to anyone who would listen. The facts, of course, would 
have gotten in the way of exonerating Jessup. 

To McCarthy’s charge that Jessup in 1946 urged the United 
States to stop its atom bomb production, the Tydings Committee 
retorted: “Dr. Jessup admitted signing the letter of February 16, 
1946, which appeared in the New York Times, and stated that 
among the signers were prominent professors who were leading 
physicists working on atomic energy. Dr. Jessup testified that the 
letter was a conscientious effort to make a useful suggestion with 
respect to control of the atom bomb through the United Nations. 
He added that in view of the changed attitude of the Soviet Union 
and its failure to cooperate with free peoples, the proposal is no 
longer applicable, and that his views have changed completely.” 102 

This seems to be a fair treatment of the episode in question. Jes- 
sup’s atom bomb proposal has a probative value of exactly zero as 
regards his political orientation. For, besides Jessup’s affinity for 
Communist causes (of which halting U.S. atom bomb production 
was certainly one), we must also reckon with Jessup’s i nfini te ca- 
pacity for reading the future wrong and arriving at unwise judg- 
ments— a capacity he shares with some of the most impeccable 
American patriots. 

Finally, McCarthy charged that Jessup had supported Alger Hiss 
even after his conviction. The Tydings Committee was right in 
saying that McCarthy’s statement (“Jessup said he can see ‘no 
reason’ ... to change his opinion about Hiss’ veracity, loyalty and 

* Dennett's testimony that Mrs. Stewart prepared the answer to Kohl- 
berg's charges is contested by Messrs. Holland and Carter, who claim she 
merely edited the staff report — that is, a report by the very same staff that 
was the primary object of Mr. Kohlberg's accusation! See McCarran Hear- 
ings, pp. 5345, 5366. 



integrity”) was inaccurate and misleading. 103 The following testi- 
mony appears to have been all that McCarthy had to go on: 

Senator Hickenlooper. Are you of the same opinion about Mr. Hiss 
that you were when you testified as a character witness for him at his 

Ambassador Jessup. The testimony which I gave in his trial, sir, as 
you properly pointed out, was as a character witness, in which I testi- 
fied to the reputation. I see no reason to alter the statements which I 
made under oath as a witness in that case. 104 

Assuming the above was his reference, there is no excuse for 
McCarthy’s having read into Jessup’s words the meaning he attrib- 
uted to them. As a lawyer, McCarthy must know that the function 
of the character witness is not to testify as to his own opinion, but 
to the “opinion of the community”— i.e., to the general reputation 
of the accused. And the fact that Hiss had fooled his associates so 
completely as to win for himself an excellent reputation has been 
confirmed by many persons who had even more opportunities than 
Jessup to penetrate Hiss’ disguise. And Hiss’ conviction has noth- 
ing to do with his reputation at the time Jessup knew him. 

Before we turn to an evaluation of the “Jessup case” as a whole, 
we should examine one more incident in Jessup’s career, namely, 
the notorious State Department Policy Conference of October 1949 
over which Jessup presided.* Jessup’s activities in connection with 
it certainly cannot be taken as proof of disloyalty to the United 
States; but they do have some bearing on the question whether 
he was fit for government service “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

As chief advisor to Acheson, Jessup personally arranged the con- 
ference— ostensibly a gathering of non-government Far-Eastern 
experts held for the purpose of eliciting their advice on Pacific and 
Asiatic policy. Some of the persons present had a sound claim to 
the title of expert on the Far East; but some of them did not; and 
many conspicuous experts were missing. Their absence has yet to 
be explained by Jessup or his defenders. 

Explanations from other quarters, however, have not been want- 
ing; and they all point in one and the same direction. Mr. Harold 

0 The conference was mentioned in McCarthy's case against Lattimore; 
which means that at the time the Tydings Committee was sitting, zealous 
investigators could have uncovered the story, including Jessup's role in it. 


Stassen, who was there, testified 105 how he saw from the first that 
a decisive majority of those present held quite similar views on 
policy, views, moreover, that he ( Stassen) did not share— his impli- 
cation being, of course, that the persons constituting a decisive 
majority had not got there by accident. Stassen noted further that 
the principal spokesmen of the “prevailing group” were Owen Lat- 
timore and Lawrence Rosinger (both of whom have been named 
under oath as members of the Communist Party) .* The Lattimore- 
Rosinger “plan,” as Stassen recorded it in his notes, covered ten 

1. Europe should be given priority over Asia. 

2. Aid to Asia should not be started until after a "long and careful 

3. Russian Communists should be viewed as "not as aggressive as 
Hitler” and as "not apt to take direct military action to expand their 

4. Communist China should be recognized by the U.S. 

5. Britain and India should be urged to follow suit in recognizing 
the Chinese Communists. 

6. The Chinese Communists should be allowed to take over Formosa. 

7. The Communists should be allowed to have Hong Kong "if they 

8. Nehru should not be given aid because of his “reactionary and ar- 
bitrary tendencies.” 

9. The Nationalist "blockade” of China should be broken and eco- 
nomic aid sent to the Communist mainland. 

10. No aid should be sent to Chiang or to the anti-Communist gueril- 
las in South China. 107 

Stassen’s report of Lattimore’s and Rosinger’s views is supported 
by the memoranda the two men drew up in preparation for the 
conference . 108 Moreover, the official transcript of the conference 
proceedings clearly shows that a substantial majority of those pres- 
ent approved their program, more or less as Stassen had set it 
forth . 109 The McCarran Committee, on the basis of the transcript, 
summarized the results of the conference as follows : “. . . the pre- 
vailing [majority] view at the conference advocated ( a ) the recog- 
nition of Communist China; ( b ) normal trade relations between the 
United States and Communist China; (c) encouragement of trade 

* Lattimore by Louis Budenz; Rosinger by Budenz, Karl Wittfogel, and 
William Canning. 106 



between Japan and Communist China; (d) economic assistance to 
Communist China; (e) recognition that Communist conquest in 
Asia was a natural and inevitable consequence of revolutionary 
ferment in Asia with its Communist nature being incidental.” 110 

There are grounds, quite aside from the fact of his having chosen 
the experts, for believing that Jessup shared Lattimore’s and Ros- 
inger’s views. Stassen reports that between sessions he repeatedly 
urged Jessup to reject the advice of the Lattimore-Rosinger group, 
only to be told that the "greater logic was on their side.” 111 And 
General Joseph Fortier, Chief of General MacArthur’s Intelligence 
Staff, has testified that Jessup, while on an official mission to Japan 
in early January, 1950, told him that United States recognition of 
Communist China was due in "about 2 or 3 weeks,” and that he 
(Jessup) personally was in favor of it. 112 (Jessup has denied Stas- 
sen’s and Fortier's statements of his position. ) 

Yet far more informative on the matter of Jessup’s political orien- 
tation than what he may or may not have said is the fact that the 
1949 conference was his personal enterprise; and that the partici- 
pants were, to a man, personal acquaintances of Jessup. Every one 
of the 25 participants was a past member of the IPR , and seventeen 
of them were still active in it. Jessup must therefore have known 
beforehand which faction in the conference would carry the day; 
and thus, which ideas would be pressed upon those responsible for 
American foreign policy. 

Now there is nothing particularly sinister about one IPR old boy 
inviting the gang down to Washington to do in direct fashion what 
it had been doing behind the scenes for many years. But the fact 
that in 1949 Jessup was still turning to the IPR for advice surely 
seals the case against his statecraft, and leaves him on the defen- 
sive as regards more serious charges. For here was a man presiding 
over the wake of Free China and calling upon accomplices to her 
murder for suggestions as to which would be the most suitable 
funeral arrangements. 

Let us now attempt to answer the questions posed at the begin- 
ning of this chapter: Is there evidence here of dereliction on the 
part of State Department security officials? Was McCarthy justi- 
fied in raising the loyalty issue in Jessup’s case? Did the Tydings 
Committee, in this instance, go into McCarthy’s charges compe- 
tently and impartially? 



The Tydings “investigation” of Jessup was, any way you look at 
it, a fraud. Even if it had done the rest of its work well (which it 
did not), this phase of its inquiry should have discredited it in 
everyone’s eyes. 

The Committee’s task was roughly similar to that of a Grand 
Jury. A Grand Jury is asked to make a preliminary determination 
as to whether sufficient grounds exist for indicting an individual. 
The Tydings Committee was asked to weigh all the evidence on 
persons “against whom charges [of disloyalty] have been made” 
and to report its findings to the Senate. This it certainly failed to 
do in the Jessup episode, where its preoccupation with clearing the 
State Department and discrediting Senator McCarthy was par- 
ticularly obsessive and where, therefore, it ignored, with consum- 
mate arrogance and astonishing self-assurance, any evidence that 
tended to get in the way of the realization of these objectives. 

What of Senator McCarthy’s role in the Jessup case? McCarthy 
went no farther than to label Jessup a man with an “unusual affinity 
for Communist causes.” This label, in our opinion, was fully justi- 
fied by the evidence— all readily available. What else can we con- 
clude about a man of proven intellectual stature who belonged to 
Communist fronts; who helped to frustrate an investigation of 
Communism in the IPR; who spoke approvingly of the American 
Peace Mobilization; who relied upon the “guidance” of Frederick 
Vanderbilt Field; who accepted, on behalf of his organization, 
money from Field; who associated closely with a number of Com- 
munists over a period of years; and who allowed an organization 
in which he had great influence to become an instrument of Com- 
munist propaganda? Certainly not that such activity is “usual” or 
that it does not amount to making, wittingly, or unwittingly, com- 
mon cause with Communism. 

But, someone may say, to accuse a man of an affinity for Commu- 
nist causes, in context of the loyalty investigation, is, in effect, to 
call him disloyal or, at least, a loyalty risk. But, surely, we must 
not put words in McCarthy’s mouth. Nor should we read into 
Resolution 231 more than the Senate put there; or if we do, we 
must not hold McCarthy responsible for doing so. Jessup, simply, 
was one of the individuals whose cases, McCarthy thought, should 
be examined in an “ investigation as to whether persons who are 
disloyal to the United States are . . . employed by the Department 
of State.” In other words, McCarthy made it clear he thought Jes- 



sup’s loyalty was worth looking into , but he withheld— and with- 
holds to this day— any personal judgment as to what the results of 
such investigation would be. 

Was McCarthy justified in pointing to Jessup’s case as one that 
wanted looking into? In our opinion, he was, and we reject the 
premise that underlies the objections to this phase of McCarthy’s 
behavior; namely, the premise that certain citizens occupying 
positions of respect in the community are by definition not par- 
ticipants in the Communist conspiracy, and that no one must sug- 
gest they may be unless he has the real goods on them. This is an 
age of surprises, and at our peril we neglect the meaning of the few 
revelations as to the dimensions of the conspiracy that providence 
has granted us. In this age, the beginning of political wisdom is to 
learn the lesson of the Hiss case. And when McCarthy spoke up, 
Jessup’s case was a good deal more suspicious than Alger Hiss’ had 
been when, two years earlier, Whittaker Chambers appeared 
in a dusky chamber of the House Office Building and said softly 
but resolutely that he had known Alger Hiss as a member of the 
Communist underground. 

Jessup’s pronouncements, as a diplomat, had been vigorously 
anti-Communist; yet his record is barren of any conspicuous af- 
front to the Communist cause before he became an official spokes- 
man for the government and had to make such pronouncements 
in the line of duty. Jessup’s admirers frequently remind us that we 
are dealing with a noted scholar, wise in international affairs— 
forgetting that precisely this conversance with the world we live 
in, and the tensions that threaten to pull it apart, taxes the thesis 
that every time Jessup lent himself to a Communist cause he did 
so because he was “duped.” To be sure, Jessup was an America 
Firster and remained one until Pearl Harbor; but he was concur- 
rently involved with pro-Communist organizations, and his re- 
maining with America First after July of 1941 may have been pro- 
tective coloration. 

The essence of Jessup’s record is that he was not unsympathetic 
either to Communists or to their policies from 1939 to 1944 . This 
is not to assert that Jessup’s allegiance was to the Soviet Union dur- 
ing this period. But if today’s security standard had governed 
eligibility for State Department employment in 1944, and if Jessup 
had been screened under it then, the Department’s security office 
would have had to disqualify him as a security risk . 

This brings us to the third question: was the Jessup case evi- 



dence of dereliction on the part of the State Department security 
officials in 1950P Jessup’s past record was sufficient reason for ask- 
ing the Tydings Committee to inquire into his loyalty. But it does 
not follow that he was a loyalty risk as of 1950. In our opinion, the 
evidence turned up as a result of McCarthy’s leads was not suffi- 
ciently incriminating to justify such a finding. It was not incrim- 
inating enough to rebut the “presumption of innocence”;* and this 
presumption was fortified by Jessup’s consistent anti-Communist 
statements after 1946. 

Yet this is not to say the State Department’s security division 
was on the job. 

In 1950, on the basis of the evidence now available, Jessup may 
not have been a loyalty risk. But the only way to find this out was 
to explore the questions raised by McCarthy. If the Department 
had not gone into these questions, it stands indicted under the 
same test it failed to pass in the case of Dorothy Kenyon. And 
whether or not the Department had investigated Jessup at all the 
Tydings Investigating Committee did not even try to find out. 

In fine: it is our judgment that under the prevailing understand- 
ing of the reasonable doubt standard Jessup was not a security risk 
in 1950. It remains to be said that given a security program of the 
sort we did not have in 1950, and do not yet have— that is one that 
does not in effect invite an adjudication as to whether an employee 
is “innocent” or “guilty”— Jessup would have been disqualified for 
duty with a sensitive agency of government, even in 1950. The sort 
of program that is required by the exigencies of the day we discuss 
in a later chapter; let us note here simply that it would eliminate 
the Jessups. It would operate without reference to a “presump- 
tion of innocence”; and thus would permit a comparatively cold- 
hearted evaluation of Jessup’s past contributions to Communist 
causes. Moreover, it would encourage security officers to take a 
skeptical view of Jessup’s anti-Communist pronouncements as a 
diplomat in the late ’forties as long as he persisted in his explicit 
refusal to acknowledge that during the late ’thirties and early for- 
ties he had contributed , actively and passively , to the Communist 
cause . For this would emerge as the crucial consideration in deter- 
mining Jessup’s fitness under such a program. Not because it is im- 

* The presumption of innocence in the particular sense we use it here is dis- 
cussed at some length above, in the section on Haldore Hanson, and again 
below, in Chapter XII. 



portant to extract abject self -denunciations from the dupes of yes- 
teryear, but because the absence of such self-denunciations can, 
and definitely does in Jessup’s case, raise questions of credibility. 
And because it indicates an intransigent spirit and an invincible ig- 
norance about the nature of Communism which the government 
cannot indulge its lieutenants in time of war. Under an effective 
security program Philip Jessup would be quietly but firmly re- 
moved from the combat areas, and sent back to his books. Happily, 
this is where he has gone. 

The Case of Esther Brunauer 

Esther Caukin Brunauer was at the time of the Tydings hearings 
Assistant Director of Policy Liaison of the UNESCO Relations Staff 
of the Department of State. She had served the Department in 
various capacities, including a tour of duty as Division Assistant in 
the Department’s critical Division of Internal Security. 113 

“I think,” McCarthy told the Committee, “this definitely should 
be the very first case [you investigate].” 114 Undoubtedly McCar- 
thy considered the Brunauer case to be explosive (“This is one of 
the most fantastic cases I know of”) ; 115 but we should note at the 
outset that he took as his primary theme— more explicitly than in 
any other case— the need for further investigation. Except for ven- 
turing, on one occasion, the further opinion that Mrs. Brunauer was 
not a “dupe,” 116 he simply relayed the information in his possession, 
invited the Committee to uncover such further facts as it could, 
and to draw its own conclusions. In spite of their anxiety to keep 
the American people informed about his methods, McCarthy’s 
critics have had little or nothing to say about the statement— in our 
opinion a model of senatorial sobriety and restraint— to which his 
testimony in the Brunauer case was geared: “I urgently request 
that this committee give serious consideration to the details of 
this case and act immediately to ascertain the facts .” 117 

Were, however, McCarthy’s data sufficiently unfavorable to Mrs. 
Brunauer to warrant a full-fledged investigation? We propose to 
canvass the implications of each item of evidence, including both 
McCarthy’s statements and Mrs. Brunauer s comments; and, where 
possible, to take note of the Committee’s reaction to each. 

The Brunauer case had been No. 47 in McCarthy’s Senate 
speech of February 20. The information about Mrs. Brunauer 
which he disclosed at the time (and which he repeated for the 
benefit of the Tydings Committee) was taken from the so-called 
“Lee Report” of 1948.* An excerpt from the Brunauer file, as pre- 
pared by the investigators of the House Committee on Appropria- 
tions follows: 

A CSA [State Department Security Agency] report on August 15, 
1947, indicated as a result of contact with seven associates and former 

* The Lee Report is discussed below in the chapter, “Warmed-Over 



supervisors of subject that she reportedly was a Liberal. Her husband, 
according to the informants, has a highly confidential position with the 
Navy Department and was possibly present at the Bikini Atom Bomb 

The House Un-American Activities Committee advised [the Depart- 
ment security division] on August 18, 1947, [that] X-9, an admitted 
former Communist Party member, was formerly associated with the 
subject in Communist Party activities in Washington, D. C. Interview 
with this informant by the CSA Agent indicated that the subject’s hus- 
band had admitted to him in 1929 or 1930 that he was a member of the 
Communist Party in Baltimore, Maryland. The informant also advised 
that the subject had associated with a group of known Communists. 
The informant said he had not seen the subject in over ten years. 

On July 16, 1947 it was ascertained that , in 1941, a Senate Investi- 
gating Committee had stated the subject and her husband were mem- 
bers of the Communist Party . On September 15, 1947, a Government 
Investigative agency advised that early in 1941 a reliable informant re- 
ported the subject as a Communist. Further , that the subject had been 
recently contacting a subject of a Soviet Espionage case. [Italics added.] 

This investigation is in a pending status. 118 

The significance of this file information to a committee investi- 
gating the State Department is self-evident. For the adverse data, 
as long as they were not discredited , certainly added up to a pre- 
sumption that Mrs. Brunauer should have been declared a security 
risk under the “reasonable doubt” standard; and that the agency 
that had failed so to declare her was sleeping on the security 

But the Committee did not see it that way. Its only reference to 
the file summary in its Report is the caustic and totally irrelevant 
observation: “The allegation taken from the Government report of 
July 16, 1947, was obviously lifted verbatim from the case memo- 
randa from among the so-called 108 list of the subcommittee of the 
House Appropriations Committee of the Eightieth Congress which 
list was based on State Department loyalty files.” “We have,” the 
Report says, “of course, reviewed the entire loyalty file of Mrs. 
Brunauer.” 119 Presumably, the Committee intended this enigmatic 
remark to suggest to its readers that the complete files had not 
borne out the House Committee’s summary of them; or, failing this, 
that the derogatory information in the summary had been satis- 
factorily explained away. But precisely the opposite inference is in 
order. For, if the Committee had found that, for example, X-9 and 
the other “reliable informant” referred to in the summary, are de- 



ranged mischief-makers who busy themselves besmirching the 
reputations of Liberals, it most certainly would have brought this 
out. We know enough about the Committee to be sure that it was in 
no mood to pass up any such opportunity to make McCarthy look 
bad. Thus, the presumption is that the Committee simply wished 
this item away. 

In addition to the file information, McCarthy presented new 
evidence purporting to show that Mrs. Brunauer had engaged in 
Communist front activity: 

1. Mrs. Brunauer [McCarthy said] was for many years Executive 
Secretary of the American Association of University Women. . . . Mrs. 
Brunauer was instrumental in committing this organization to the sup- 
port of various front enterprises, particularly in the so-called consumer 
field. One such instance of this activity was reported in the New York 
Times of April 27, 1943. In that case, The American Association of Uni- 
versity Women joined with the Consumers Union, the League of Wom- 
en Shoppers, and other completely communist-controlled fronts. 120 

Actually, however, the Times article in question shows that the 
AAUW merely joined with 15 other organizations, only two of 
them Communist fronts, in urging grade-labelling of canned goods 
in order to implement price control regulations governing such 
foods. 121 Moreover, the AAUW (not itself a Communist front) 
promptly informed the Committee that Mrs. Brunauer had never 
been its “executive secretary” (she had been “international rela- 
tions secretary” and, later, “associate in international education”), 
and that she “at no time . . . [had] any connection with the associa- 
tion s consumer program.” 122 Here, pretty clearly, McCarthy hadn’t 
a leg to stand on: not only was he in no position to prove that the 
combine the AAUW had joined was in any sense a Communist 
front, he also had no evidence that Mrs. Brunauer had in fact 
been “instrumental” in committing it to the combine. 

2. Exhibit 21 indicates that Mrs. Brunauer presided at a Washington 
meeting of the American Friends of the Soviet Union [in 1936]. The 
principal speaker at this meeting was Myra Page, long an avowed lead- 
er of the Communist Party and frequent writer for the Daily Worker 
and other Communist periodicals. 123 

Here McCarthy came off a great deal better. For Mrs. Brunauer 
acknowledged, in her prepared statement to the committee, that 
she had indeed presided at the meeting in question and later, under 



cross-examination by Senator Hickenlooper, she further acknowl- 
edged that she had addressed a similar meeting in 1934. Her ex- 
planation, moreover, was not altogether satisfactory: . . [It] was 

part of my job [as associate in international education with the 
AAUW],” Mrs. Brunauer testified, “to attend and preside on occa- 
sions at meetings of numerous organizations in this field. In 1936, 
the attitude of most Americans toward the Soviet Union was friend- 
ly and hopeful. I had no way of ascertaining then that the organiza- 
tion . . . would at some later time be declared subversive. I was 
never a member of that organization, and it was not considered 
reprehensible or a sign of disloyalty for American citizens to attend 
lectures on conditions in Soviet Russia, even if made by Soviet 
sympathizers.” 124 

The Committee’s report on this aspect of the case was, it will be 
seen, simply a paraphrase of Mrs. Brunauer’s own verbal testimony. 
She had, the Committee reported, “attended” two meetings of the 
Friends of the Soviet Union, but each “for perfectly legitimate 
motives. . . . [No] inference of Communist sympathies can be 
raised therefrom.” 125 What this proves, more than anything else, is 
that the Committee had not studied the extensive literature on the 
Friends of the Soviet Union, prepared by various legislative Com- 
mittees.* These findings make it abundantly clear that the organi- 
zation was, from its founding in 1921, among the most notorious 
as well as the most important Communist groups in the United 
States. (It was succeeded during the Hitler-Stalin pact by the 
National Council for American-Soviet Friendship.) They make 
it virtually impossible not to draw an “inference of Communist 
sympathies” from the facts about Mrs. Brunauer which the Com- 
mittee had before it. 

3. Exhibit 22 shows Esther Brunauer was a signer of the call to the 
annual meeting of the American Youth Congress of 1938.* * 126 

Mrs. Brunauer did not deny having signed the call in question, 
but stated that she had been joined in doing so by a number of “irre- 
proachables,” among them a spate of U.S. Senators, Representa- 
tives, and Governors. “My recollection of this call,” she testified, 

* See Special Committee on Un-American Activities , Report , January 3, 
1.939, P* 78; California Committee on Un-American Activities Report, 1948, 
pp. 65, 244, 321; Massachusetts House Committee on Un-American Activi- 
ties Report, 1938, pp. 77 and 129. 

July 1-5, 1939, is the correct date for this meeting of the AYC. 



“is that it represented an attempt of the liberals to capture the 
leadership of the American youth organizations. The fact that the 
American Youth Congress had been cited by the Attorney General 
as a subversive organization is an indication that we failed, but if 
we are to be criticized it is perhaps because we are not active and 
aggressive enough to succeed, but at least we tried.” 127 Mrs. Bru- 
nauer did not, however, present any evidence that she had fought 
against or denounced the Communist leadership of the AYC at 
that time, or later. 

The Committee reported: “. . . the announced principles of the 
meeting were entirely proper and the list of the signers conclusively 
refutes an implication of Communist sympathy because of this act. 
In addition, there is no evidence before the sub-committee that 
this particular meeting was under the domination of the American 
Youth Congress, as alleged ,” 128 (Italics added.) 

This statement is unwarranted on two counts. The isolated act 
of sponsoring this particular congress is, indeed, not very persua- 
sive evidence of Communist sympathies; for, notwithstanding its 
blatant Communist history, the AYC had at that time managed 
to inveigle persons of every political coloration— most notably po- 
litical bigwigs*— into endorsing its “calls.” But the Committee’s 
talk here about “conclusive refutation” is a thin piece of nonsense. 
The respectability of one’s fellow-signers is, at most, a factor to be 
weighed in appraising a front affiliation, and in some situations 
it weighs less heavily than in others. Here, for example, we must be 
wary of thinking that a Senator with a natural appetite for publicity 
will have the same motives for sponsoring a nationally known or- 
ganization, as, say, an Esther Brunauer, who, we may assume, 
is more interested in helping the organization than in getting 
helped by it. 

With its further statement that it had “no evidence that this 
particular meeting [The Congress of Youth] was under the domi- 
nation of the American Youth Congress,” the Committee only 
proved its incompetence. The Congress of Youth was the American 
Youth Congress— same people, same program, same organization. 
Indeed, the official report issued by the 1939 Congress is a part of 
the Tydings Committee’s record, and therein, under a list of the 
officers elected “at this particular meeting” is the statement: 

# For example. Senators Capper, Logan, Murray and Wagner; Cabinet 
members Ickes and Farley. Mrs. Roosevelt supported the AYC even after it 
endorsed Stalin’s somersault of August, 1939. 


“Elected officers listed above constitute the Cabinet of the Ameri- 
can Youth Congress”! 12 * (Italics ours.) 

4. Esther Caukin Brunauer was very active in launching an organiza- 
tion called the American Union for Concerted Peace Efforts. . . . [The 
AUCPE] was cited as a Communist-front organization, the leader of 
which was the editor of the Daily Worker. 130 

Mrs. Brunauer admitted that she had been active in the Ameri- 
can Union for Concerted Peace Efforts; indeed, she was “proud of 
the fact.” Hotly denying it was a front, she pointed out that the 
Union had favored collective security before and after the Hitler- 
Stalin pact, and was the predecessor of the ( William Allen White) 
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. 131 

Neither the Tydings Committee nor McCarthy handled this 
point creditably. The Committee, surprisingly, found here the only 
evidence of Mrs. Brunauer’s membership in a Communist front. It 
stated, quite rightly, that Mrs. Brunauer had been a member of the 
Committee for Concerted Peace Efforts , which after three months 
became the American Union for Concerted Peace Efforts (the or- 
ganization mentioned by McCarthy) . But it went on to imply that 
the CCPE was a Communist front. The Committee made this mis- 
take because it misinterpreted a reference to the CCPE in the 
files of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. 132 The 
House Committee had not cited the CCPE— or the AUCPE— as a 
Communist front. 

McCarthy had made a different mistake. He had confused the 
AUCPE with (if the reader can stand it) a third organization, the 
Union of Concerted Peace Efforts, which had been cited as a Com- 
munist front, “a leader of which was Clarence Hathaway, then edi- 
tor of the Daily Worker.” 133 There is no evidence that Mrs. Bru- 
nauer was ever affiliated with this group. 

So much for McCarthy’s allegations concerning Mrs. Brunauer’s 
front activity. 

McCarthy also told the Committee, 

[T] his woman, Esther Caukin Brunauer . . . was the first assistant to 
Alger Hiss in the San Francisco Conference. This is set forth in her 
biographical sketch issued by the State Department. 134 

Yet the State Department register does not show that Mrs. Bru- 
nauer was Hiss’ first assistant; and no other documentary evidence 



has come to light to support McCarthy's statement, which must 
accordingly be set down as unfounded. 

One further question came up regarding Mrs. Brunauer's activi- 
ties while representing the State Department at an international 
conference. Senator Hickenlooper asked Mrs. Brunauer whether 
she or her husband had been visited by “the Communist member 
of the Hungarian Delegation to UNESCO” on his way back from 
UNESCO's Mexico City Conference of December, 1947. 135 Yes, 
she said, she and her husband had received such a visit; and, if the 
Committee cared to listen, here was how it all came about: 

While attending the Mexican Conference, she said, she had been 
invited to lunch by a Mr. Ferenczi, who was a member of the dele- 
gation from Communist Hungary. Ferenczi, it turned out, wanted 
to know whether Hungary could expect to receive “education re- 
construction aid” from the United States. “I gave him no encour- 
agement whatever,” Mrs. Brunauer told the Committee. She went 
on to say that Ferenczi then changed his tack. En route back to 
Hungary, he proposed he stop in Washington to see Stephen Bru- 
nauer and discuss with him aid for Hungary's “scientific institu- 
tions” from the Rockefeller Foundation, with which Mrs. Brunauer 
was associated. Ferenczi had claimed to have letters of introduc- 
tion from “two or three people . . . whom my husband knew as anti- 
Communist.” But when he arrived in Washington he had “lost” his 
letters. He nevertheless saw Mr. Brunauer and put to him the ques- 
tion of Rockefeller aid for Hungary. “My husband said that under 
the circumstances [the existence of a Communist regime in Hun- 
gary] he could not do anything about it.” 

Sometime later, Mrs. Brunauer continued, Ferenczi and a Mr. 
Florian, a member of the Hungarian Legation who was subse- 
quently ordered to leave the U.S., “discussed very seriously the 
possibility ... as a matter of something that they could use as re- 
venge on my husband, of revealing to the public my husband’s long 
ago Communist connection.” But they were “dissuaded” from 
harassing Brunauer by another member of the Legation who raised 
“the point that when a man had worked hard and achieved as 
much as my husband had done, there was no reason, and it was 
unfair, to bring up something that existed long ago in his past, and 
that had no influence whatever on his present life— quite the con- 
trary.” 136 

Mrs. Brunauer's account of the Ferenczi incident left several 
questions to be answered. Why had a Communist diplomat sin- 



gled the Brunauers out in the first place? Mrs. Brunauer intimated 
it was because, Hungary being her husband’s native land, they 
were well acquainted with Hungarians in Washington, most par- 
ticularly with the diplomatic representative of the pre-1947, anti- 
Communist regime. 137 But if the Brunauers were well known for 
their sympathies with the ancien regime, why would representa- 
tives of the Communist regime turn to them for help? And again, 
are we to believe that two Communist diplomats were swerved 
from their purpose by being reminded that persecution of a Party 
apostate was “unfair”? 

The Committee did not see fit to pursue any of these lines of 
inquiry. Its Report noted, perfunctorily, the salient points of Mrs. 
Brunauer’s testimony about Ferenczi, and let it go at that. 138 

The Committee also refused to pursue a line of inquiry sug- 
gested by Senator McCarthy in his concluding remarks on the 
Brunauer case: 

I ask that the Committee immediately seek to learn whether or not 
Stephen Brunauer had: 1. Been the subject of a constant investigation 
by government agencies over a period of 10 years. 2. [Been] a close 
friend and collaborator of Noel Field, known Communist who recently 
and mysteriously disappeared behind the iron curtain. 3. . . . recently 
admitted to associates that he was [had been?] a member of the Com- 
munist Party. 139 

To be sure, it was Mrs. Brunauer, not her husband, who was an 
employee of the State Department; and thus it was only she who 
fell within the scope of the investigation authorized by the Senate. 
But McCarthy was invoking the principle of “security risk by asso- 
ciation”— quite legitimately, in our opinion: if persons with whom 
an employee is in “habitual or close association”* are Communists 
or Communist sympathizers, then these facts are pertinent in de- 
termining security reliability. Stephen Brunauer’s sympathies were 
therefore relevant; more so since Mrs. Brunauer had testified that 
“on matters of this sort my husband and I see completely eye to 
eye, and inform each other completely/’ 140 

The Committee, nevertheless, did not subpoena Mr. Brunauer. 
But it did hear Mrs. Brunauer testify about her husband: 

He dropped out of the Young Workers League early in 1927 and has 
not been a member of any Communist group since that time . . . The 
* As the State Department’s own security regulations put it. 



Young Workers League was organized and run by the Communist 
Party. There is no attempt to deny that my husband for a short time 
supported the Communist ideals . 141 

With respect to her own political ideals, Mrs. Brunauer stated: 

I am a loyal American. I am not a Communist and never have been a 
Communist. I have never engaged in Communist activities. I am not a 
Communist sympathizer and have never been a Communist sympa- 
thizer. I do not have, and never have had, any sympathy for any doctrine 
which conflicts with the basic principles of our American democracy. I 
support the President’s loyalty program and have been cleared under 
that program . 142 

Whereupon she handed the Committee a batch of supporting 
letters, headed by tributes from Dr. Milton Eisenhower and former 
Senator Joseph Ball, which the Committee cited as one reason for 
clearing her . 143 

McCarthy’s evidence against Esther Brunauer— aside from the 
data he cited from her loyalty file— must be set down as weak and 
inconclusive. But this is not to say that McCarthy should not have 
raised the question of Mrs. Brunauer’s reliability— or of her “loy- 
alty,” if you will. He was justified in bringing her name to the atten- 
tion of the Committee even if there had been nothing against her 
save that “a reliable informant” had testified in 1941 that he had 
known her to be a member of the Communist Party . This datum 
alone made it not only his right but his duty to do so. For Mc- 
Carthy’s task, we must remember, was to hand over to the investi- 
gating committee information he possessed about persons whose 
loyalty or reliability he thought should be looked into . And as long 
as the adverse information in her loyalty file stood unrebutted, Mrs. 
Brunauer was worth looking into. Her file was prima facie evidence 
that the Department’s security precautions were inadequate : any 
such case required immediate investigation as a matter of course. 

Should the Committee, then, have declared Mrs. Brunauer a se- 
curity risk? No. In the absence of further investigation, the Com- 
mittee was in no position to find either that she was or that she was 
not a security risk. Though the unrebutted loyalty file data were 
sufficiently grave to constitute a prima facie case against her, they 
also required further careful inquiry into their authenticity. Just 

134 the nine public cases 

what conscientious investigators would have uncovered, had they 
undertaken an investigation, no one save possibly the FBI and the 
State Department security officers can say. What can be asserted, 
however, is that the Tydings Committee undertook no investiga- 
tion at all. It accepted at face value Mrs. Brunauer’s own account 
of herself. It shrugged off not only the loyalty file matter, but also 
the Ferenczi affair and Mrs. Brunauer’s involvement with the 
Friends of the Soviet Union. Instead of investigating, the Investi- 
gating Committee handed down an oracular clearance: “The con- 
clusion is inescapable , on the basis of our inquiry, that there is no 
evidence that Mrs. Brunauer is disloyal, a Communist sympathizer 
or a security risk” 1 ** ( Italics added. ) 

There is an epilogue to the Brunauer case. A year after the Tyd- 
ings Committee heard McCarthy’s evidence against Mrs. Bru- 
nauer, the Navy Department announced that Stephen Brunauer 
had been suspended from his post as a chemist in the explosive re- 
search division— for security reasons. Brunauer resigned from the 
Navy before his case was adjudicated by the Navy’s loyalty board. 
And Esther Brunauer was dismissed from the State Department as 
a security risk on June 16, 1952— two years after McCarthy sug- 
gested to the Committee that hers be the first case it investigate. 

We may ask, then, whether the firing of Mrs. Brunauer in 1952 
constitutes an indictment of State Department security practices 
in 1950. Security standards, we must remember, had not changed 
between 1950 and 1952. There is, of course, no way of knowing 
whether the evidence considered by the Loyalty Security Board in 
1952 was identical with the evidence before the Board in 1950. 
If new data had been uncovered in the interim, then the reversal of 
the case in 1952 obviously cannot be cited as evidence that the 
Board was negligent in 1950. On the assumption that no new data 
came to light, two explanations for the Department’s reversal on 
Mrs. Brunauer are commonly advanced. One of them— that the De- 
partment had decided to appease McCarthy— is implausible. For 
even after Mrs. Brunauer ’s suspension, General Conrad Snow, 
chairman of the State Department Loyalty Security Board, was 
making speeches around the country about “Demagog McCarthy,” 
and State Department publicists continued to churn out their con- 
tempt for him— hardly evidence that State Department officials 
were intimidated by McCarthy. And anyway, the Department did 
not set out to fire other McCarthy targets. There must have been a 



reason, it would seem, for firing Mrs. Brunauer and not, say, Hal- 
dore Hanson. The other explanation, and this one seems to fit the 
circumstances, is that the agency which had in the past trumpeted 
its confidence in Mrs. Brunauer had begun, in 1952, to take a some- 
what harder look at the nation’s security requirements, and, on 
more mature reflection, decided that its earlier decision in the Bru- 
nauer case had, after all, not been in the national interest. 

The Cases of Frederick Schuman and 
Harlow Shapley 

Although McCarthy included them among his public cases, 
neither Frederick Schuman nor Harlow Shapley has ever worked 
for the State Department on a regular-employment basis. Both had 
been, at the time McCarthy discussed their fellow-travelling rec- 
ords, and are now, full-time professors at Williams and Harvard, 
respectively— their connection with the Department having been 
strictly extra-curricular. 

Dr. Schuman had been a "consultant” to the Department, in the 
sense that that term is commonly but unofficially used to describe 
a private person asked on occasion to attend or to address policy 
conferences and training classes. The record shows only one in- 
stance when he actually served: in 1946 he lectured to Foreign 
Service officers under a program called “Orientation Conferences 
and Training Programs for Personnel of the Foreign Service and 
the Department of State.” All but three of the fifty-seven instruc- 
tors who participated in this particular orientation program were 
government officials— the interesting exceptions, besides Schuman, 
being Edward Acheson (Deans brother) and Owen Lattimore. 145 

As for Dr. Shapley, he was for three years ( 1947-1950) a mem- 
ber of the United States National Commission for UNESCO (a 
State Department “job” in the sense that members are appointed 
by the Secretary of State, and compensated on a per diem basis by 
the Department). 

Given the peripheral nature of Schuman's and Shapley's rela- 
tions with the Department, it might seem that McCarthy's evi- 
dence against the two men, no matter how devastating it might be, 
could not add up to a serious indictment of the State Department's 
loyalty and security program. Yet this is very definitely not the case. 
The American people can be assumed to want a State Department 
security program that is choosy not merely as to whom the De- 
partment employs, but also whom it lets ride on its coat-tails. The 
investigators might have been entitled to point out, as they did, 
that the two cases did not come within a literal construction of Sen- 
ate Resolution 23 1; but it is another question whether they should 
have omitted entirely a discussion of the cases. The question was 
(and remains): Did these two cases shed enough light on the 



larger issues involved in the Committee’s study to warrant an inves- 
tigation, as thorough as, say, that accorded McCarthy’s activities 
at Wheeling, West Virginia? 

Schuman and Shapley both boasted spectacular records of join- 
ing Communist fronts and supporting Communist causes. Read 
side by side, their cases suggest a personal contest between the two 
to see which of them could help the Soviet Union more while 
hanging on to his academic reputation. 

Schumanns accomplishments were barely hinted at in Mc- 
Carthy’s testimony. McCarthy’s documents showed him to have 
been affiliated with a mere twelve Communist fronts, eight of them 
on the Attorney General’s list. 146 But the files of the House Com- 
mittee on Un-American Activities show over fifty front citations 
after Schuman’s name. Even so, McCarthy had enough to prove 
that Frederick Schuman was a fellow-traveler’s fellow traveler, a 
Grand Master of the lodge. As far back as 1932, Schuman had 
signed up with the League of Professional Groups for Foster and 
Ford, which supported the Communist Party ticket in that year’s 
elections. 147 He played along with the Popular Front movement of 
the 30’s and, just nine days before the Hitler-Stalin Pact, signed one 
of the truly great documents in the anthology of party-lining. On 
August 14, 1939, four hundred “leading Americans” proclaimed 
that “reactionaries are attempting to split the democratic front. . . . 
With the aim of turning anti-Faseist feeling against the Soviet 
Union, they have encouraged the fantastic falsehood that the 
USSR and the totalitarian states are basically alike. . . . ” 148 

Though Schuman seems to have had certain difficulties with the 
party-line after Hitler and Stalin signed their 1939 agreement, 149 
he was a prominent rider on the pro-Soviet bandwagon during the 
war and after it. He joined numerous new Communist fronts, 
urged the presidential candidacy of Henry Wallace, and wrote 
learned apologetics for Stalin’s regime. A typical Schuman value 
judgment, found in his book Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad , 
appeared just about the time the State Department enlisted him to 
help out with the orientation of Foreign Service officers: “The 
Russian adventure,” Schuman wrote, “marks a long forward stride 
toward human mastery of man’s fate. . . . ” 150 

Harlow Shapley took up party-lining in a big way only after the 
outbreak of the European war in 1939— that is, after the Commu- 
nists had ceased to employ the deceptive blandishments of Popular 



Frontism. Once involved, however, Shapley achieved real distinc- 
tion in that field. Unlike other fellow travelers who were sensitive 
to the company the Soviet Union was keeping in 1939-41, Shapley 
joined up with at least six Communist fronts during the German-So- 
viet honeymoon. By the time McCarthy presented his name to the 
Tydings Committee, Shapley had no less than twenty-one front- 
affiliations to his credit, eight of them with organizations proscribed 
by the Attorney General. McCarthy’s documents also showed that 
Shapley had stayed on with at least ten fronts after they had been 
officially cited as subversive by one or more legislative investigat- 
ing committees. Moreover, at least fourteen of the affiliations were 
active even after the cold war had begun in 1946. 

Shapley attained his chief notoriety as chairman of the National 
Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions, the organization that 
in 1949 sponsored the "Waldorf Peace Conference.” In open con- 
tempt of public opinion, now relatively informed and aroused on 
the Communist issue, Shapley insisted that the Stalinist extrava- 
ganza over which he presided was seeking "cultural understand- 
ing” between East and West. Senator McCarthy drew attention in 
his testimony to the irony of the fact that at the very moment the 
State Department was denouncing the Waldorf Conference as a 
"sounding board for Communist propaganda,” it had on its payroll 
the Conference’s chief organizer! 

Both Schuman and Shapley refused to "dignify” McCarthy’s 
charges by appearing before the Committee. Both professors wrote 
to Senator Tydings denying ( 1 ) that they were or had been em- 
ployed by the State Department, and ( 2 ) that they had ever be- 
longed to an organization they had known to be a Communist 
front. The second of these denials seems brash beyond compare in 
the light of the facts. To say that these two men are inaccurately 
labelled if called fellow travelers, one would have to take the posi- 
tion that no one can legitimately be called a fellow traveler. The 
public facts prove beyond dispute that, over the years, Frederick 
Schuman and Harlow Shapley have given expansive support to the 
policies of the Soviet Union. 

Ought the Tydings Committee, then, to have advised the Senate 
and the American people about Schuman and Shapley? 

The Committee was entitled to point out, as it did, that the two 
professors were not technically within the purview of its mandate. 
Schuman apparently was never paid by the Department; ancj 



though McCarthy implied that he was regularly used as a lectur- 
er, he appears to have lectured only once. As for Shapley, the Com- 
mittee correctly stated that his appointment by the Secretary of 
State was a routine confirmation of the recommendation of a pri- 
vate organization, as the law on the subject provides. However, 
Congress was on record as opposing the expenditure of govern- 
ment funds to pay the salary of anyone involved with a subversive 
organization. During the years when Shapley served with the Na- 
tional Commission for UNESCO and received compensation from 
the government, the prevailing understanding in the State Depart- 
ment was that a Rider to the Appropriations Act forbade the paying 
of funds to persons actively affiliated with any organization on the 
Attorney General’s list. And Shapley, according to the evidence 
before the Tydings Committee, clearly was such a person. 

The Committee, however, let the matter go with its comment on 
Schumans and Shapley’s employment status; and thus a significant 
piece of evidence that the State Department had been tolerant of 
pro-Communists went by the boards. Yet a responsible committee, 
with the issue before it whether or not the Department had main- 
tained adequate loyalty and security precautions was, as Mc- 
Carthy insisted, obligated to take cognizance of the Departments 
doing any business with Schuman and Shapley. 

The Case of Gustavo Duran 

Gustavo Duran is a Spanish immigrant to the United States, a 
onetime employee of the State Department and, in recent years, a 
high ranking member of the United Nations Secretariat.* He came 
to McCarthy’s notice because of his allegedly Communist activi- 
ties as an officer of the Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War. 
These activities McCarthy regarded as sufficient to warrant the 
judgment that Duran was a “possible bad security risk.” 161 Let us 
note that the only significance McCarthy attached to the Duran 
case was in the lessons to be learned from it about the Depart- 
ment’s past (pre-1950) record in protecting itself against Com- 
munist infiltration. 

The Tydings Committee seized upon the fact Duran had left his 
position as assistant to Spruille Braden in October 1946 as an 
excuse for not even discussing Duran. In flat violation of its man- 
date, it refused to go into the case at all— on the spurious grounds 
that his employment by the Department antedated President Tru- 
man’s Loyalty Order. The Senate, let us remember, had directed 
it to ascertain whether disloyal persons “are or have been em- 
ployed” by the State Department; and had not even mentioned the 
Loyalty Order, much less confined the Committee’s investigation 
to the period following its promulgation. 

Was Gustavo Duran a loyalty or security risk? If so, was evi- 
dence of this available to the State Department in 1946? If so, why 
was he cleared, and how did he subsequently get by in his UN 

To begin with, Duran had been a target of Senate investigators 
long before McCarthy documented the case against him. The Sen- 
ate Appropriations Committee, for example, questioned Secretary 
Byrnes about Duran in April, 1946, expressing grave concern over 
the employment in the State Department of a man who allegedly 
had been a member of the Communist secret police during the 
Spanish Civil War. Ah, Byrnes told them, but you’re all mixed up. 

* The State Department announced at the time of the Tydings Hearings 
that Duran was currently employed as Chief of the Cultural Activities Sec- 
tion of the Department of Social Affairs, United Nations. McCarthy, how- 
ever, charged — and continued to charge — that his own “physical check” re- 
vealed that Duran was with the International Refugee Organization, “en- 
gaged in work having to do with screening refugees coming into this 
country .” 152 



The Duran about whom the Senators have incriminating informa- 
tion, he said, is not the same Duran who is working in the State 
Department as an assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Spruille 
Braden; and taking Byrnes' word for it, the Senators let the matter 
drop. But some weeks later, members of the Committee were ad- 
vised of a new intelligence report from the U.S. Military Attache 
in Madrid 153 which (a) strengthened the charges against Duran, 
and ( b ) dispelled all doubt that the suspected Duran was the man 
then enjoying the intimate confidence of Mr. Braden. Senator 
Wherry promptly wrote to Byrnes requesting that he “immedi- 
ately discharge Gustavo Duran” 154 but received no answer to his 
letter for several months. In September he finally heard from As- 
sistant Secretary Donald Russell. There was no more talk about 
“mistaken identity”; there was, instead, news that “the Security 
Committee [has] recommended favorably on Duran . . . and I have 
approved their recommendations. ...” “While I recognize,” Rus- 
sell's letter went on to say, “that the above conclusions are at vari- 
ance with your own feelings, I have to do my duty as I see it. . . . ” 155 
A few weeks later, Duran voluntarily resigned. 

Senator McCarthy's evidence, presented some four years after 
these events, consisted exclusively of intelligence reports and other 
documents which had been in the State Department security offi- 
cer’s possession at the time they cleared Duran. 0 These documents 
reveal that U.S. intelligence officers became interested in Duran in 
1943. At that time, Military Intelligence warned Spruille Braden, 
then our Ambassador to Cuba, that Gustavo Duran, a member of 
his staff, had been a Communist before emigrating from Spain. 
McCarthy quoted from Braden's answer to this warning, contained 
in a memorandum to the Military Attache in Havana, of Decem- 
ber 21, 1943: 

Mr. Duran has now served as one of my immediate associates for more 
than a year. His work has been excellent and outstandingly useful to 
the United States Government. From my personal knowledge based on 
close association, Mr. Duran is not a Communist, but a liberal of the 
highest type. 156 

* These reports were also in the possession of Time magazine when it cited 
McCarthy's charges against Duran as an especially good example of Mc- 
Carthy’s mendacity ( Time , October 22, 1951). Even so, Time told its readers 
that “Duran, never a Red, was definitely and clearly anti-Communist," im- 
plying that McCarthy's story was sheer fabrication. See “Time Marches on 
McCarthy,” American Mercury , February, 1952. 



A week later, Intelligence replied to Bradens rebuff, emphati- 
cally confirming what it had previously said about Durans Com- 
munist record. The letter was written by Edward J. Ruff, U.S. As- 
sistant Military Attache in the Dominican Republic, and read as 

I cannot see . . . how our report can be branded as “absolutely incor- 
rect.” Our only statement in the report on Duran is that he was a mem- 
ber of the Communist Party in Spain . From further reports received , 
this information can now be evaluated as A-i. ... I, myself, am con- 
vinced that Duran was a Communist and consider Ambassador Braden’s 
statement that he is a “liberal of the highest type” to be a euphemism. 
. . . The Ambassador here is inclined to concur in my report , but has 
asked that [in view of Braden’s attitude] no further official correspond- 
ence on the subject be sent up. Hence this personal letter from me. 157 
[Italics added.] 

In response to Braden’s intervention, the heat was taken off 
Duran for the duration of the war. He moved to Washington with 
Braden when the latter became Assistant Secretary of State for 
Latin American Affairs. 

McCarthy’s next document was a confidential report dated June 
4, 1946, from Colonel Wendall Johnson, Military Attache to the 
American Embassy at Madrid, marked “for general use by any 
U.S. Intelligence Agency.” Most of the information it contains, 
Colonel Johnson noted, had been furnished (on request) by the 
Spanish Intelligence Service. Duran, the Spanish Intelligence re- 
ported, went to Madrid sometime during the twenties. He then 
drifted for several years in various European capitals and eventu- 
ally turned up in Paris as an agent of the Soviet Secret Service. 
“Upon [the] proclamation of the Spanish Republic,” the report 

the “Porcelana” [as Duran was nicknamed] returned to Madrid. His 
identity papers indicated that he was the representative of Paramount 
Film Co. However, his true mission was service of the GPU. Duran was 
greatly successful in his activities due to the political protection he en- 
joyed. He soon became one of the leading members of the Youths of 
the Communist Party. . . . [After the Franco revolution began], he was 
one of the principal leaders of the popular militia created by the Com- 
munists . . . and soon became captain, major, and lieutenant colonel of 
the “Red” Army. . . . When the international brigades were brought 
into the Madrid and Aranjuez fronts, Gustavo Duran formed part of 
the High Russian General Staff with headquarters at Tarancon. 158 



Turning from Colonel Johnson’s report, McCarthy produced 
testimony that Duran had been a regional chief of the SIM, the 
Spanish counterpart of the GPU. Duran’s role in the SIM was de- 
scribed by Socialist Minister of Defense Indalicio Prieto in his 
pamphlet Why and How I Left the Defense Ministry in the In- 
trigue of Russia in Spain* the relevant passages of which McCar- 
thy laid before the Committee. One of them : 

Because of insistent pressure [from the Russians] I created the SIM. 
Regional chiefs of the SIM were designated, and they [apparently the 
Russians] proposed to me a certain Gustavo Duran for the Madrid zone. 
It was not concealed from me that the person proposed was a Com- 
munist. I knew this, but in spite of that, he was appointed by me . 160 

Prieto went on to say that Duran then usurped power by ap- 
pointing agents in the Madrid organization without the authoriza- 
tion of his superiors ( i.e., Prieto ) . “Some hundreds” of the appoint- 
ees, says Prieto, “were Communists and only four or five were 
socialists. I faced an intolerable situation. ...” Duran, a commis- 
sioned officer in the regular Spanish Army, was later gotten rid of by 
being sent to active duty in the field. Prieto concludes by saying 
that a Russian agent subsequently put heavy pressure on him to 
reinstate Duran in the SIM . 161 

So much for McCarthy’s evidence. 

Like all other persons publicly named by McCarthy, Duran was 
invited to appear before the Tydings Committee and answer the 
charges. Duran declined to do so, citing Article 100 in the UN 
Charter, which provides that members of the UN staff “shall re- 
frain from any action which might reflect on their position as inter- 
national officials responsible only to the organization .” 162 But he 
did dispatch a lengthy memorandum to Senator Tydings in which 
he set forth his side of the matter. He was not, he said, and never 
had been a Communist. He had “never held any command in any 
international brigade.” He had indeed been an officer in the Span- 
ish regular army; and though he had been assigned to the SIM it 
was against his will. “I had a deeply rooted aversion toward the 
proposed type of activity.” His “actual tenure of office” was “about 

* Lest the title suggest to anyone a political confession designed to appease 
the Franco regime, note that Duran himself says this work was written by 
Prieto as a report to the Spanish Socialist Workers Party on August 9, 
1938. 159 



two weeks,” during which he had made a “few temporary appoint- 
ments. ... at the recommendation of the experts.” After the war, 
through the intervention of British and American diplomatic offi- 
cials, he had been evacuated to England, and had proceeded from 
there to the United States. 163 

By way of comment on McCarthy’s documents, Duran described 
the 1946 intelligence report from the U.S. Military Attache in 
Madrid as a “literal reproduction of a scurrilous attack on me pub- 
lished in the April 9, 1946, issue of the newspaper Arriba , which is 
the mouthpiece of the Falange Party of Franco Spain. The article 
. . . was part of the campaign of the Franco Government to counter 
the disclosures that had been made by the United States State De- 
partment on the relations between Nazi Germany and Franco 
Spain during the last World War. . . . The Franco Government, 
which had paid no attention to me for seven years, suddenly under- 
took to make me an agent of Moscow and to smear my character in 
the vilest possible way.” 164 

As for Prieto’s pamphlet, Duran went on to say, he had not even 
heard of it until 1946, eight years after it was written. In the course 
of these eight years, Prieto had been his house guest, and relations 
between them had been “cordial.” Upon first hearing of the report, 
therefore, he had written to Prieto, demanding an “explanation,” 
and had received the following statement in reply: “I have never 
accused you of being an agent of the Russian police nor a member 
of the Comintern ” 165 (Italics added.) (Note that, even on Du- 

ran’s showing, Prieto did not repudiate his pamphlet in which he 
had simply stated that Duran was a “Communist” and that he had 
appointed “hundreds of Communists” to the SIM.) In fine, Duran 
dismissed the intelligence reports to Ambassador Braden as “mere- 
ly repetitions of the charges that have been previously answered in 
this memorandum.” 166 

The gist of Duran’s defense, then, was that he had been the vic- 
tim of a calculated smear by the Franco Government. There are, 
however, several difficulties here. For one thing, the 1943 U.S. in- 
telligence report stating that Duran had been a Communist in 
Spain was written at least three years before the Franco govern- 
ment (according to Duran) “suddenly undertook to make . . . 
[him] an agent of Moscow.” Secondly, there is Prieto’s pamphlet 
to corroborate vital points in the indictment allegedly concocted 
by the Fascists eight years later. And Prieto’s later “explanation” 
to Duran does not retract a single one of the charges in the pamph- 



But the central question in the context of the Tydings investiga- 
tion was this: Had the State Department, at the time it cleared 
Duran in 1946, bothered to find out how accurate Colonel John- 
son’s information was? Or had it simply discounted it, perhaps to 
please Mr. Braden? The fact is that Duran was not suspended, 
pending an investigation of the adverse data, and that his clear- 
ance came down less than three months after the information was 
received ( hardly enough time for a full investigation ) . It is diffi- 
cult to avoid a suspicion, in short, that the State Department sim- 
ply took Durans word. The alternative hypothesis is one that re- 
flects even less credit on the Department’s security procedures: 
namely, that the Johnson Report was taken seriously but that 
Duran was kept on in spite of it. 

The Department, naturally, must consider the possibility that 
foreign governments with which we have tense relations will use 
the facilities at their disposal to discredit Department employees 
known to be inimical to their interests ( as Duran certainly was to 
Franco Spain’s). But this does not justify security officers in dis- 
missing unfavorable security information about an employee just 
because its source has reason to wish him ill. The State Depart- 
ment was obliged to look into the Johnson report with all possible 
care. Apparently it did not. And if it reacted much as Ambassador 
Braden did in 1943, when adverse information was brought to his 
attention, the Department was truant to its obligations. 

This was, in effect, McCarthy’s point throughout his testimony. 
“According to all existing rules, [the Johnson report] . . . called for 
Duran’s immediate dismissal— unless the facts were proved to he 
wrong.” 167 ( Italics added. ) And again : “It would be interesting to 
know what, if any, investigation was made by State Department 
officials as to his conduct while in a responsible, confidential capac- 
ity in the Department.” 168 Even the committee seemed to agree at 
first flush that the case would bear looking into. ( Senator Tydings: 
“We will investigate the case. . , . ”) 169 McCarthy also asked the 
Committee to find “who has gotten [Duran] . . . the important task 
of going to the UN.” “I have received,” McCarthy added, “a con- 
fidential report that Duran was recommended for his UN post by a 
member of the President’s [Truman’s] Cabinet .” 170 Said Tydings: 
“Senator McCarthy, I would like to say that your . . . [request] that 
we should find out who got him the job in the United Nations . . . 
will be a part of our inquiry. We don’t know who he is, whether 
innocent or guilty, but we will find out anyway.” 171 

In spite of Tydings’ pledge, the Committee failed to look into 


this or any other question raised by McCarthy's testimony. And 
this failure constitutes the gravest possible indictment of the Com- 
mittee. McCarthy, to say the very least, had presented prima facie 
evidence of gross negligence on the part of Department security 
officials, involving, perhaps, the complicity of a Cabinet officer. 
Evidence existed that a highly situated employee had been cleared 
by the Department in 1946 while charges were outstanding which 
raised serious questions as to his loyalty, and that he was currently 
presiding over an important UN department. In short, the Com- 
mittee had in hand a striking example of what McCarthy had been 
talking about these last months— the entrenched apathy of the 
State Department toward Communist infiltration. If the Commit- 
tee hoped to impress the people that McCarthy's charges were a 
“fraud and a hoax,” it would have to do some fancy footwork to 
divert attention from the implications of the Duran case. And with 
this in mind, it hit on the shabby expedient we noted above: “In 
view of the fact that [Duran’s] . . . employment in the Department 
ceased before the loyalty program was instituted, we do not feel 
that a discussion of him is merited in the body of our report.” 172 

The Case of John Stewart Service* 

In the aftermath of the war, United States political and military 
influence, in effect, swung to the side of the Chinese Communists 
and helped to establish them in power. The overriding question at 
issue in the Service case was, quite simply: had Service helped to 
bring about that shift of U.S. foreign policy; and, if so, had he done 
it out of honest confusion or out of partisanship for Communists? 

The Tydings Committee was determined to avoid this question. 
Why? Because its hearings took place at a moment when all but the 
incorrigibly naive were beginning to see that the shift in U.S. Far 
Eastern policy had been produced neither by chance, nor by the 
might and cunning of the USSR, nor by sheer blundering on our 
part; but, to some extent at least, by conspirational forces operat- 
ing on the highest levels of the U.S. government. 

The burden of McCarthy’s charge was that Service was “one of 
the dozen top policy makers in the entire State Department Far 
Eastern Division”* * and “part of the pro-Soviet group” which advo- 
cated that the United States overthrow Chiang Kai-shek “because 
the only hope of Asia was communism.” 173 The charge rested main- 
ly on Service’s reports from China. 

In his Report No. 40, of October 10, 1944, for example, Service 
had written the following comment on Chiang and the Kuomin- 
tang Government: 

We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang Government. . . . 
any new government under any other than the present reactionary con- 
trol will be more cooperative and better able to mobilize the coun- 
try. . . . The example of a democratic, non-imperialistic China will be 
much better counterpropaganda in Asia than the present regime. . . . 

* For reasons given at the beginning of this section, we shall not present 
a blow-by-blow account of the Service case, or of the Lattimore case, which 

** McCarthy’s charge related to a particular division (the Far Eastern) of 
the State Department. The Committee disposed of it with the remark that it 
is doubted whether “the entire State Department” (italics added) was in 
conspiracy with Service. It observed also, that at the time in question ( 1944- 
1945) Service was only a junior grade Foreign Service officer. The premise 
here, that the grade occupied by a man determines the extent of his influence 
on high policy is, of course, absurd: all available evidence supports Mc- 
Carthy’s argument here that the policy makers in the State Department lean 
heavily on the judgment of on-the-spot experts. 


The key to stability must be a strong, unified China. This can be accom- 
plished only in a democratic foundation. . . . Chiang’s main supports 
are the most chauvinist elements in the country. . . . We need feel no 
ties of gratitude to Chiang. . . . We cannot hope to deal successfully 
with China without being hardboiled; secondly, we cannot hope to 
solve China’s problems (which are now our problems) without con- 
sideration of the opposition forces. Communist, Provincial and Liber- 
al. .. . It is impractical to seek Chinese unity without the use of the 
Communist forces. . . . We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger 
of Chirms collapse . . . . There may be a period of some confusion , but 
the eventual gains of the Kuomintangs collapse will more than make 
up for this . . .” [Italics added.] 

The Tydings Committee denied, in effect, that this report re- 
vealed any pro-Communist bent on Service’s part. But it did not 
really argue the questions it raised. Instead, it pontificated about 
the impropriety of “singling out” one report from a series of reports. 
It simply ignored what the report “singled out” uncontestedly 
proved: Service had urged that America should transfer its support 
to the Chinese Communists. 174 

Besides, the Committee’s own record makes it clear that no mat- 
ter what Service report might be “singled out,” one was likely to 
find pro-Communist bias. Note the following excerpts, all available 
to the Committee: “This widespread popular support must, under 
the circumstance in which it has occurred, be considered a practi- 
cal indication that the policies and methods of the Chinese Com- 
munists have a democratic character” (September 4, 1944). “The 
Communists have used their influence in a democratic way and to 
further democratic ends” ( September 10, 1944. ) “ Politically , any 
orientation which the Chinese Communists may once have had 
towards the Soviet Union seems to be a thing of the past . . . . The 
Communists have worked to make their thinking and program 
realistically Chinese, and they are carrying out democratic policies 
which they expect the United States to approve and sympatheti- 
cally support” ( September 28, 1944). (Italics added.) 

The most casual reading of these reports would convince an im- 
partial observer that Service in fact recommended the “change of 
policy,” which was one of McCarthy’s charges. This, however, does 
not dispose of the possibility that Service, rather than entertain 
pro-Communist sentiments and a wish to serve the Communist 
cause, made his recommendation with the best of patriotic inten- 
tions. One must— so argues the defense— take into account the cir- 
cumstances in which Service’s reports were written. 


The issue here seems to boil down to two questions: Are we 
retrospectively entitled, in view of Service’s experience in China 
and his position as a U.S. official observer in the field, to demand of 
him an informed account of what was going on in China? And: 
Did his reports present an accurate picture of what was going on? 

The answer to the first question is inescapable: Service was 
ideally situated to know whereof he spoke. He was a man of rare 
experience in China, having spent most of his life there; and, as 
the U.S. Government’s accredited representative, he was in con- 
stant contact with the Nationalist and the Communist leaders. He 
was thus one of the few American officials in China ( Owen Latti- 
more, Oliver Clubb and John Vincent being three others) whose 
expertise as American advisors on China was of the sort that evoked 
special confidence in their acuity and reliability. 

The answer to the second question— did Service’s reports present 
an accurate picture of what was going on?— depends on whether or 
not Communism in China was an indigenous democratic move- 
ment at the time Service said it was— or, to put the issue in a way 
that takes into account the Communists’ talent for disguising their 
proximate objectives, it depends on whether Chinese Commun- 
ism, at the time in question, really looked to seasoned experts on 
Chinese affairs like a democratic movement. 

This second question, of course, is by no means so easy to answer 
as the first. Service’s defenders are in position to say: "If Service’s 
picture of the Chinese Communist movement was so obviously 
wrong, then other experienced observers of Chinese affairs would 
surely have been giving a different picture at that time. Give us 
some reference to the official and/or scholarly literature of the day 
that will produce a different picture, the one you now say to be tl\e 
correct one— or else give up your point that Service must have 
deliberately lied.” 

And indeed, the China literature that “informed” this country in 
the forties predominantly supported Service’s contentions. But no 
one who has read the McCarran Committee report has any reason 
to be surprised at that, for the Far East literature of the day was 
largely written by active participants in the cabal surrounding 
Owen Lattimore. Moreover, the whole argument (“everybody was 
saying it, so why deny that Service could honestly have believed 
it?”) is a logical trick calculated to transfer the burden of proof 
from where it belongs, on Service, to where it does not belong, 
on Service’s accusers. For the relevant question is not, What did 


the Far East literature of that time say about the Far Eastern situ- 
ation of that time; but rather, What does the competent Far East 
literature, of today, no longer monopolized by Lattimore et aL show 
to have been the Far East reality of the forties. And that litera- 
ture does not say that China, when Service wrote his reports, 
looked as he said she looked. It does not say that the Chinese Com- 
munist movement, after the Service reports were written, under- 
went a sea-change, ceasing to be what Service then said it was and 
becoming what we know it to be. The reliable literature says it 
then was what we know it to be now. Thus the presumption must 
be that Service misrepresented what he was seeing. For all agree 
that he is a sane man with*his wits about him. 

This being the case, why did he not report what he saw? What 
were his motives? One possible explanation is that he was trying to 
sell the Communist line to his superiors in Washington. The facts, 
in other words, inexorably raise (though they do not necessarily 
answer) the question of loyalty. And the burden of proof, once 
the? loyalty question is raised, falls on the “accused.” 

Service’s China record, as it stood, provided grounds under the 
“reasonable doubt” standard for his dismissal from the Depart- 
ment. His activities on returning to the United States, far from 
dispelling the doubts that had arisen, made things a great deal 
worse. For he got caught transmitting classified government docu- 
ments to the editors of Amerasia , a Communist magazine. 

His having done so rocked the Tydings Committee: “We must 
conclude that Service was extremely indiscreet in his dealings with 
Gayn and Jaffe. . . . ” 175 (Italics added.) (To be sure*, the Commit- 
tee did not lose its sense of balance by acknowledging the logical 
upshot of this evidence, i.e., that a government employee cannot 
possibly be “extremely indiscreet” with classified government 
documents and not be a security risk.) But the question of Serv- 
ices guilt in the Amerasia affair had, after all, been laid to rest by 
the 1945 grand jury which had voted not to indict him. Apparently 
lost on the Committee was the fact that some of the most incrimi- 
nating evidence against him, e.g., that obtained by wire-tap, could 
not, because of legal insufficiency, be considered by the grand 
jury. Here is an example of the evidence Tydings could weigh, but 
which was not before the grand jury. The FBI had recorded a con- 
versation between Service and Amerasias editor, Philip Jaffe. 
Service had said at one point: “Well, what I said about the military 
plans is, of course, very secret.*’ When questioned by the Commit- 


tee about this remark, Service’s reply was: “I chose my words very 
unwisely, because I was not revealing any military plans.” The sug- 
gestion was made to him: "You think you misspoke?” He answered, 
"I think I misspoke, yes .” 176 The Committee pressed the matter no 

McCarthy also charged that Service had "Communist associa- 
tions,” and cited the Amerasia case in proof of them. Though the 
grand jury had no-billed Service, his "association” with those who 
were indicted was never denied. Service claimed, however, that he 
had not known they were Communists. Yet since Service testified 
that he was acquainted with many prominent and militant Com- 
munists, the "conclusion” of the Tydings Committee ("the charge 
that Mr. Service had well-known Communist associations, is com- 
pletely unfounded ”) 111 is fantastic; as, indeed, are all the Commit- 
tee’s broadsides concerning Service and the Amerasia affair. 

One of Service’s most vocal defenders was Mr. John Peurifoy, 
then Deputy Under Secretary of State. His following statement 
on Service captures unerringly the sentimental confusion and in- 
vincible ignorance of the Department’s security division: 

In the person of J. S. Service we have an able, conscientious, and a 
demonstrably loyal Foreign Service officer. . . . On the basis of implied 
“guilt by association ” that has been used in most of the other “cases’' 
thus far presented to the Senate Sub-Committee, he underwent a grand 
jury investigation back in August 1945 in connection with the charges 
that he had transmitted classified material to unauthorized persons. . . . 
Mr. Service's file has been reviewed three times during the ensuing 
five years, and in each instance the findings of the reviewing agents 
have been completely favorable. . . . But now, as a result of Senator 
McCarthy's resuscitation of these dead, discredited, disproven charges 
against him, Mr. Service finds his character once more called into ques- 
tion . . . and his brilliant career as a diplomat once more interrupted so 
that he can be defended, and can defend himself, against such baseless 
allegations all over again. ... It's a shame and a disgrace. ... I would 
like to say that the sympathy and good wishes of the entire Depart- 
ment go out to them [Mr. Service and his family] .* [Italics added.] 

* Later, to be sure, Peurifoy was somewhat more cautious. He made the 
quoted statement on March 16. On June 21 he was asked by the Tydings 
Committee whether he still held the opinion he had expressed earlier. Peuri- 
foy replied: . . that statement was probably misinterpreted; maybe I went 

too far/" Mr. Morris insisted: “Did you know at the time, that Mr. Service 
had passed secret documents to Mr. Gatley, the Soviet secret agent?” Mr. 
Peurifoy answered, “At that time, I did not know it.” (Tydings Hearings, 

E . 1246.) (The mysterious Mr. Gatley has never, to the authors’ knowledge, 
een identified.) 



The Tydings Committee evidently thought much the same way 
about Service. It ultimately reported that his case was one of “com- 
plete innocence”— “not disloyal, pro-Communist, or a security 
risk ” 118 (Italics added). And with this the matter ended— not with 
exposure or remedy, but with a routine denunciation of “McCar- 

But McCarthy was to be vindicated in a way that even the Tyd- 
ings Committee, had it still existed, would have understood. After 
Service’s clearance by the Tydings Committee, the State Depart- 
ment’s Loyalty Security Board had him up four more times, and 
each time cleared him. But in December of 1951, Service was 
dropped from the State Department “as the result of an adverse 
finding as to his security qualifications by the Loyalty Review 
Board of the Civil Service Commission.” 

The Case of Owen Lattimore 

On June 27, 1952, the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Secur- 
ity, in detailing the IPR’s impact on American foreign policy, an- 
nounced several corollary findings : 

"The IPR possessed close organic relations with the State De- 
partment Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent were influ- 

ential in bringing about a change in United States policy in 1945 
favorable to the Chinese Communists.” 

“Owen Lattimore was, from some time beginning in the i93o’s, 
a conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy.” 
“Owen Lattimore testified falsely before the subcommittee with 
reference to at least five separate matters that were relevant to the 
inquiry and substantial in import.” 179 

In due course, a Grand Jury indicted Owen Lattimore for hav- 
ing testified falsely under oath with respect to seven separate 

Two years before, the Tydings Committee had written its find- 
ings on Owen Lattimore. Everything that McCarthy had said 
about Lattimore, the Committee reported, was false. Lattimore 
was not a spy, not a State Department employee, not the architect 
of our Far Eastern policy, not a Communist or a witting associate 
of Communists. Rather, he was a victim of “promiscuous and 
specious attacks upon private citizens and their views.” Further- 
more, the Committee recorded its regret that it had gone into the 
Lattimore case: such inquiries should rather be conducted by “the 
duly constituted agencies of our Government that are equipped to 
handle such matters by intelligent and proven methods designed 
to obtain the truth without injustice, character assassination and 
a prostitution of the American concept of fair play.” 180 

To be sure, McCarthy had got off on the wrong foot in the Latti- 
more case— by assuring the Committee (in closed session) that Lat- 
timore was “definitely an espionage agent . . . one of the top espion- 
age agents . . . the top Russian spy . . . the key man in a Russian 
espionage ring.” 181 The words had hardly left McCarthy’s mouth 
when Drew Pearson leaked these charges to the nation. Thus Mc- 
Carthy was immediately put on the defensive in the Lattimore 
case. But the fact is that here indeed was his “best” case, i.e. the 

* A U.S. District Court subsequently dismissed four of the seven counts. 
(Its ruling is, at tins writing, being appealed.) 


most sensational, and the one with respect to which McCarthy was 
in a position to adduce the most damaging evidence. “I am willing 
to stand or fall on this one,” he told the Committee in turning over 
Lattimore’s name. And for this he had excellent reasons. 

Soon after making the “top espionage” charge against Lattimore, 
McCarthy modified it on the floor of the Senate. “I fear,” he said, 
“that I may have perhaps placed too much stress on the question 
of whether or not he had been an espionage agent. . . . ” 182 It soon 
became clear, however, that no matter how precisely or how mod- 
erately McCarthy might have put his indictment of Lattimore, 
the Tydings Committee had no intention of making an exception 
to its policy of clearing everyone on whom McCarthy put the 

Though Lattimore was not an employee of the State Depart- 
ment in the orthodox sense, McCarthy started off, he was never- 
theless “one of the principal architects of our Far Eastern pol- 
icy.” 183 This allegation was important. For one thing, the technical 
propriety of the Committee’s investigation of Lattimore hinged on 
whether or not Lattimore was, or had been, pertinently connected 
with the State Department. For another, Lattimore emphatically 
denied having had any relationship whatever with the Depart- 
ment. And as for being influential, said Lattimore, "... I am the least 
consulted man of all those who have a public reputation in this 
country as specialists in the Far East.” 184 Much, then, turned on 
whether McCarthy could prove that Lattimore had played a 
quasi-official role in the preceding years. 

He started in: In 1941, he said, Lattimore was chosen by Presi- 
dent Roosevelt to be the personal political adviser of Chiang Kai- 
shek. He stayed with Chiang until the end of 1942. 

From 1942 to 1944, Lattimore was the chief of Pacific operations 
for the Office of War Information which, McCarthy inferred, natu- 
rally worked hand-in-hand with the State Department. 

In 1944, Lattimore accompanied Vice-President Henry Wallace 
on his trip to Siberia and China. 

In 1945, Lattimore was appointed by Truman as a member of 
the Pauley Reparations Mission to Japan. 

In 1949, Lattimore attended a State Department conference on 
China policy.* 

Throughout this period, Lattimore had been extremely active 
in the IPR, whose “organic relations” with the State Department 

* See above, “The Case of Philip Jessup.” 


were demonstrable well before the McCarran Committee began 
its investigation. 

What is more, added McCarthy, Lattimore at one time even had 
a desk in the State Department. 

All of this ( except for the “State Department desk” ) was a mat- 
ter of record. Yet Lattimore hotly resisted the implication that 
the data added up to a firm connection between him and the State 
Department. “I told the newspapermen,” he wrote in Ordeal by 
Slander , “that Senator McCarthy was crazy if he had got me mixed 
up with the State Department. I had never been in the State De- 
partment.” 185 The Committee consulted the Department on the 
matter, and concluded that Lattimore was right. 186 

Two years later, during the McCarran Committee’s interroga- 
tion of Lattimore, the Committee counsel, Mr. Morris, showed 
Lattimore a photostatic copy of a letter Lattimore had written to 
Benjamin Kizer on June 12, 1942. The last paragraph of the letter 

My home address is as typed above, and my home telephone is Tow- 
son 846- W. I am in Washington about 4 days a week, and when there 
can always be reached at Lauchlin Currie's office, room 228, State De- 
partment Building; telephone National 1414, extension 90. 

Yours very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimore 

At the time he gave evidence to the Tydings Committee, Mc- 
Carthy had no intimation of the close relationship between Latti- 
more and Lauchlin Currie (named a Communist under oath), 
whose office was put at Lattimore’s disposal. Lattimore testified be- 
fore the McCarran Committee as follows: 187 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, isn't it a fact that when Currie went 
away for a period of time he would ask you to take care of his mail at 
the White House? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. . . . 

Mr. Morris. Tell me this, Mr. Lattimore. Is it your testimony that 
you did not at the request of Lauchlin Currie take care of his mail at 
the White House when he was away? 

Mr. Lattimore. That certainly is my statement. 

Morris subsequently adduced a letter written by Lattimore to 
E. C. Carter of the IPR, on July 15, 1942, the first paragraph of 
which read: “Dear Carter: Currie asked me to take care of his cor- 



respondence while he is away and in view of your telegram of 
today [addressed to Currie, presumably], I think I had better tell 
you that he has gone to China on a special trip. This news is abso- 
lutely confidential until released in the press. 

After reading the letter, Morris continued: 

. . . Did the top official of the State Department — 

Mr. Fortas [Lattimore’s lawyer, interrupting]. Excuse me just a mo- 
ment, Mr. Morris. 

( Mr. Lattimore conferred with counsel. ) 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Morris, I should like to add to what I have just 
said that this refreshes my recollection and that I believe that Currie 
told his secretary to open his mail and to pass on to me anything that 
might be of concern to me.* 

Another matter, flippantly dismissed by Tydings, was caught up 
and made to stick by McCarran. McCarthy told the Tydings Com- 
mittee, to show Lattimore s influence on American policy, that 
Lattimore had visited Truman shortly before the Potsdam Con- 
ference to urge upon the President his views on Far Eastern policy. 
Lattimore admitted having gone to the White House. “Our con- 
ference lasted about three minutes,” he later told the McCarran 
Committee. But it developed that, however long Lattimore had 
actually conferred with Truman, he had left with the President a 
memorandum detailing his recommendations on Far Eastern 

Senator Ferguson. Did you show the exhibits that we have now on 
the record, of your visit to the White House, that is, the memorandum 
and the letter, to any member of the Tydings Committee? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Or the staff? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account, Mr. Lattimore, for not 
making that part of the record? Did you not think that was material on 
the question as to whether or not you ever had anything to do with the 
foreign policy of the Far East, as far as the President or the State De- 
partment was concerned? 

Mr. Lattimore. I did not think it was material. The question of 
whether the committee wanted to see it was up to them. 

Senator Ferguson. How would they know that it existed? You did 
not disclose it to any of them. 

Mr. Lattimore. ... as a citizen I would not take the initiative in 

* Lattimore was subsequently indicted for having committed perjury in 
this matter. 

revealing the details of a citizen asking to see the President of his 
country. . . . the responsibility lies with the Committee. I see no obliga- 
tion to volunteer anything of that kind . 186 [Italics added.] 

Thus, with Lattimore seeing no obligation to volunteer any in- 
formation that might throw light on the points at issue, and with 
the Tydings Committee seeing no obligation to press Lattimore 
for such information, it was only left for the two parties to recog- 
nize their obligation to expose McCarthy’s blackhearted mendac- 
ity, and this cause mobilized them both— above and beyond, even, 
the call of duty. We are not implying, to be sure, that the Tydings 
Committee was in a position to bring to light the data on Latti- 
more which at that time reposed peacefully in an old barn in Lee, 
Massachusetts. We are saying, however, that McCarthy demon- 
strably fulfilled his function of giving to the Tydings Committee 
enough leads to justify its going into Lattimore’s record. McCar- 
thy, in fact, gave the Committee more; he gave it enough leads to 
enable it to blow sky-high Lattimore’s pretensions to being a disin- 
terested and sedentary expert on the Far East, enough data to put 
the State Department on warning against further traffic with Latti- 
more, and enough, even, to have spared the intelligentsia the last- 
ing embarrassment of taking Lattimore’s snivelling book, Ordeal 
by Slander, to their bosom, and of martyrizing its author, who now 
succeeded Alger Hiss as the First Lady among American witches. 

For McCarthy had not confined himself to “document-snitch- 
ing-type” charges; 0 he invited the Committee to inspect Latti- 
more’s writings, and on his insistence Miss Freda Utley was called 
in to analyze them out of her expertise on the Communist Party 
line on the Far East. Miss Utley summarized her testimony: 

Soviet Russia, in all of Lattimore’s writings, is always sinned against 
and is always represented by Lattimore as standing like a beacon of 
hope for the peoples of Asia, even when she is collaborating with the 
Nazis or aggressing on her own account. Russia is never in the wrong 
and if he is forced to take cognizance of a few slight misdemeanors on 
her part, he excuses them as only a reaction to American imperialism 
or some other country’s misdeeds . 189 

* We borrow Miss Utley’s shrewd observation on McCarthy’s “top spy” 
charge against Lattimore: “To suggest that Mr. Lattimore’s great talents have 
been utilized in espionage seems to me to be as absurd as to suggest that 
Mr. Gromyko or Mr. Molotov employ their leisure hours at Lake Success, or 
at international conferences, in snitching documents.” 



And if the views of Miss Utley ( as a premature anti-Communist) 
were suspect, the Committee might have turned for a summary of 
one of Lattimore’s books to his own publisher. This blurb had ap- 
peared on the jacket of his Solution in Asia: 

He [Lattimore] shows that all the Asiatic people are more interested 
in actual democratic practices such as the ones they can see in action 
across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo- 
Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism. . . . 
He inclines to support American newspapermen who report that the 
only real democracy in China is found in Communist areas. 

Yet the Committee declared, simply, that Lattimore’s writings 
“obviously cannot be declared to approach Communist dogma/’ 190 

McCarthy then charged that Lattimore had associated with 
known Communists. To mention a few: Frederick Vanderbilt Field 
(“As far as I knew/’ Lattimore told the Committee . . he was 
rather a liberal young man. . . .”); Philip Jaffe (“. . . one of those 
Americans who had a very bright and open view of the democratic 
nature of the Communists in China, but I had no reason to believe 
that he was himself a Communist” ) ; Agnes Smedley ( . . she is 
not and never could be a Communist”); Nym Wales (“I have no 
reason to believe that she is or was a Communist”); T. A. Bisson 
(no grounds “whatever” for believing him to be a Communist); 
and Chao-ting Chi (“I don’t know that he is in fact a Communist 
[even] now.” “Is there any doubt in your mind,” retorted Senator 
Hickenlooper, “that he would be here as the proposed representa- 
tive of Communist China to the UN if he is not a Communist?” 
“It is possible. Senator. The Communist government in China ap- 
pears to have taken over the services of a considerable number of 
non-Communists especially where they were men of specialized 
training of various kinds ”) 191 

The Committee concluded that Lattimore was not a witting asso- 
ciate of Communists. 

McCarthy charged that Lattimore was a Communist and under 
Party discipline. Louis Budenz corroborated McCarthy’s charge 
in what was perhaps the Committee’s most dramatic session. For 
he testified that, in 1937, Communist leader Earl Browder, in the 
presence of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, had agreed with him (Bu- 
denz) that Lattimore should take over the general direction of the 
move to depict the Chinese Communists as “agrarian reformers”; 
that in 1943 he (Budenz) had heard Field report at a Communist 



Party meeting that Lattimore had been instructed of a change of 
the party-line on Chiang Kai-shek; that in 1944 he (Budenz) had 
been instructed by Jack Stachel, one of the highest Communist 
Party functionaries in the United States, to consider Lattimore a 
Communist; that in 1945, Stachel, at a session at Communist head- 
quarters, had indicated that Lattimore had been of service to the 
Communist Party in the Amerasia case. 192 

. . The whole story is a plain, unvarnished lie,” 193 said Latti- 

The Tydings Committee caught its cue and dismissed Budenz’s 
evidence as “hearsay.” 194 

As we have said, we shall not be treating the Lattimore episode 
in detail. Those who want more— and there is a great deal more- 
will find a near-definitive exposure of Lattimore in the hearings of 
the McCarran Committee. These hearings** should be read side- 
by-side with Ordeal by Slander . 

Suffice to note here, simply, that in addition to the evidence we 
have briefly treated here, McCarthy gave the Committee a num- 
ber of additional leads, none of which the Committee undertook 
to follow up with anything like the perseverance necessary to trip 
up those whose occupation implies, after all, a considerable talent 
for throwing investigators off the scent. 

McCarthy exposed one of the most important political opera- 
tors of our time. Owen Lattimore’s skills, energies, and single- 
mindedness enabled him to play a dominant role in a movement 
that dispossessed our allies in the Far East of their homeland, en- 
slaved four hundred million people, and doubled the perimeter of 
the Iron Curtain. Owen Lattimore had moved discreetly through- 
out the period. His name was not known— except in academic and 
Far Eastern circles— until McCarthy attacked him. But in his unob- 
trusive way, Lattimore was serving the Roosevelt and Truman 
Administrations as the oracle on all matters Asiatic. His books were 
standard in American colleges and graduate schools. He and his 
votaries dominated the book review sections of the metropolitan 

* “Listening to Budenz,” wrote the disingenuous Mrs. Lattimore in Har- 
pers (September, 1950) u . . . describe his sordid life in the Communist un- 
derworld in which he spent 10 years was a gruesome experience. He built 
up a picture of a sinister, murky world of Communist conspiracy which for 
all I know may exist.” 

Mr. John T. Flynn has written an excellent condensation of the hear- 
ings. See The Lattimore Story (New York; Devin-Adair, 1953). 


press. If a new book on China followed the Party line, it won their 
endorsement. If it so much as intimated the tragic folly of our 
Far Eastern policies, it was doomed either to denunciation or to 

Yet despite all Lattimore’s precautions, some Americans had got 
on to him. Shortly after McCarthy connected with Lattimore, Time 
magazine commented on three figures in the week's news— Joliot 
Curie of France, John Strachey of England, and Owen Lattimore. 

All formed their political consciousness in the years of World War I, 
when a generation was assaulted by the century’s most vicious fallacy, 
i.e. that communism was akin to progress. All were affected by the fal- 
lacy in varying degrees, and all, being gifted with brilliant intellects, 
did a great deal to spread this paralyzing poison through the West’s 

The fact did not make any of them a traitor, either in law or in mor- 
als. . . . But the legal right to be wrong had somehow gotten distorted 
into a lazy translation that assumes all ideas to be created equal, part 
right, part wrong — and who is man to try to judge between them? It 
was this same public negligence about ideas that made wrong ideas 
dangerous. . . . 

The fact that Lattimore is no Soviet agent* does not clear him of hav- 
ing had, in less dramatic ways, a disastrous influence on the foreign 
policy of his country. . . . [Lattimore’s memorandum to the State De- 
partment on Far Eastern policy] paid lip service to the idea that Asiatic 
Communism must not be appeased, but it was in effect a thorough and 
detailed program for appeasement. . . . Lattimore’s ideas did work to 
thwart the development of an effective program of U.S. help to anti- 
Communist forces in China.” 

And yet, if one looks through the Readers Guide to Periodical 
Literature for the years preceding McCarthy’s exposure of Latti- 
more, not a single article is found warning America against Lat- 
timore’s insidious influence— not even in Time magazine.* ° This job 
was left to the junior Senator from Wisconsin, who for his pains 
met with the damnation of the intelligentsia that had countenanced 
Lattimore and in fact had been bewitched by him for so many years. 

* It should be recalled that this article was written on April 17, 1950, 
before the IPR investigation was undertaken. 

** Columbia Magazine , an organ of the Knights of Columbus, published 
an article by the Reverend James K. Kearney attacking Lattimore in Sep- 
tember of 1949. References to Lattimore’s party-lining had also appeared in 
The Chicago Journal of Commerce, and in the New Leader . 


w ' Warmed-Over Charges” 

T he foregoing nine public cases must be viewed as McCarthy's 
earnest money towards the investigation he had been prom- 
ised. For that reason we have taken a detailed and perhaps 
laborious look at them; for on that basis alone we have to decide 
whether McCarthy had a prima facie case against the security prac- 
tices of the State Department. We believe that, on the whole, the 
record here vindicates McCarthy. 

Notwithstanding, the Tydings investigation of the State Depart- 
ment, to all intents and purposes, ended with its hearing of the 
nine cases. 

Yet there is more to the Tydings saga. More must be said about 
certain things the Committee purported to do, and did not do, in 
the process of discrediting McCarthy; and about things that it did 
not even purport to do but had to do under its mandate to investi- 
gate the State Department. For the Tydings Committee's most 
obvious obligation was, of course, to undertake a thorough study 
of the eighty-one cases McCarthy had presented in his Senate 
speech of February 20 (only two of which— Philip Jessup and 
Esther Brunauer— were “public cases”). 

Over and over again, the anti-McCarthy literature bears down 
exultantly on the “fact” that a subcommittee of the House Com- 
mittee on Appropriations of the Republican-controlled 80th Con- 
gress had already investigated all of McCarthy's cases in the winter 
of 1947-1948; and had cleared them all. There is no more funda- 
mental— or more pervasive*— inaccuracy in this field. 

* Even the shrewd and ungullible British author. Miss Rebecca West, is 
ensnared by this legend. See her otherwise admirable article in US News 
and World Report, May 22, 1953. 



Here is how the Tydings Committee put it: 

There is no factual information relative to any one of the February 20 
cases which does not have its identifiable counterpart among the “108 
list.” . . . The subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee of 
the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress which considered the 
108 memoranda did not regard them of sufficient significance even to 
submit a report concerning them or the loyalty of State Department 
personnel generally . 1 

Here are the facts: In the fall of 1947, the subcommittee in ques- 
tion, through its chief clerk, Mr. Robert E. Lee, conducted an in- 
vestigation of State Department security practices. The aim was 
an evaluation of the Department's security program, its standards 
and its administration. Lee’s investigators prepared summaries of 
the loyalty files of “108 present, former, and prospective” Depart- 
ment employees. The subcommittee studied these summaries, in- 
terrogated responsible State Department officials, and reported its 
conclusions, early in 1948, as follows: 

The Committee held extensive hearings on the security phase of the 
Department fof State] and the employment of individuals that were 
considered poor risks from the security angle. Committee investigators 
disclosed and reproduced from Department files the employment his- 
tories of 108 present, former and prospective employees. Files on the 
prospective employees were active, and the individuals, at the time of 
the investigation, were being considered for employment, even though 
information of record pointed to their being poor risks. The Committee 
does not feel that the Department has been as diligent as it might have 
been in the selection of its personnel and has not sufficiently exercised 
the prerogative given it under the so-called McCarran Rider , contained 
in appropriation acts for this Department for the past several years. . . . 
It would seem to the Committee that any doubts in connection with 
employment of personnel in the Department of State should be resolved 
in favor of the United States, and officers or employees who are sus- 
pected in the slightest degree should be encouraged to resign.* [Italics 

The members of the subcommittee, in other words, made no se- 
cret of their belief that the State Department had been lax in its 
security practices. Moreover, committee members did not always 
express their feelings in the matter with such restraint. 

0 House of Representatives Report No. 1433, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 
February 27, 1948, p. 3. The report, presented to the House by Congress- 
man Karl Stefan, was unanimous. 

"warmed-over charges” 163 

During the Committee's questioning of Mr. Hamilton Robinson 
( the Department's director of the Office of Controls ) , Congressman 
Karl Stefan's exasperation became uncontrollable. “I am just a man 
from the prairies of Nebraska/' he blurted out, “just asking you why 
it is that these people are on the pay roll when the people of the 
United States are trying to get behind the Government to fight 
communism and the encroachment of communism in this country 
and all over Europe. And here we find them employed in the State 
Department.'' 2 

When the House Committee concluded its interrogation of Mr. 
Robinson, the Chairman remarked: 

I have no other questions at this time. However, I would say this to 
you, that it makes me disturbed as to whether we have any representa- 
tion of the United States in the State Department. I have not been as 
much disturbed in a long time. . . . here are 100 cases and many of 
them are still on the payroll and the people are going to ask us, what 
are we going to do about it. 3 

Yet on the basis of such facts the Tydings Committee and its 
camp-followers dared conclude that the Subcommittee had cleared 
the State Department! 

Only a few weeks after the House Appropriations Committee 
had questioned the Department about the 108, another House 
Committee— Expenditures in the Executive Department— was ask- 
ing Deputy Assistant John Peurifoy to bring it up to date on the 
Lee list. He stated that 9 of the 108 were still being considered for 
employment, that only 57 of the 108 were currently employed by 
the Department and that, of the employed group, 22 were being 
checked by the FBI. He added that the resignation of one of the 
57 was pending. Thus, 42 of the 108 were by this time already 
separated from the Department. 

Then, on March 3, 1948, Representative Stefan again focused 
attention on the 108— “concerning most of whom,'' he said, “there 
was some doubt as to loyalty.'' 4 In no way did he, any more than the 
Committee that had heard Peurifoy, express satisfaction with the 
State Department's handling of personnel security. 

The 108 came up for notice on several other occasions in the en- 
suing months. On March 25, for example, Representative Busbey 
sharply criticized the State Department Director of Controls, Mr. 
Hamilton Robinson, and particularly emphasized the derelictions 
revealed by the investigators who compiled the list of 108. 5 


In short, there was indeed a list of 108 cases. Drawn up in the 
last days of 1947, it did receive a great deal of public attention; 
and the testimony before the Expenditures Committee to the effect 
that only 57 of the 108 persons on it were currently employed did 
serve to assuage Congressional anxiety. But there is no record of 
any Congressional “clearance” for the entire list of 108 or any 
part of it; rather , there is clear evidence that the House Appro- 
priations Committee , which gathered the data on the 108, ex- 
pressed marked dissatisfaction with the State Department secur- 
ity after examining them . To pursue the matter any further was 
impossible for any Congressional committee because, on the 13th 
of March, 1948, Truman banned the release of security data to 
Congress; and that information was absolutely indispensable to any 
comprehensive evaluation of security practices in the State De- 

The Tydings Committee “found” that all numbered cases pre- 
sented to it by Senator McCarthy were “old and stale.” Its Report 
said that “there is not one of the cases discussed [by McCarthy] on 
February 20, 1950, on the Senate floor which is not to be found 
among the "108’ list”— implying that all McCarthy’s (non-public) 
names were taken from the Lee list. Nowhere in its report did the 
Committee comment upon the fact that McCarthy had given it a 
number of names which had not appeared on the Lee list. In short, 
the Committee consciously attempted to persuade the public ( and 
in this it was successful) that McCarthy furnished no names— or 
evidence— that had not already been reviewed by Congressional 
committees in 1948. 

Let us be very clear about the relation between the Lee list and 
the McCarthy list. It is quite true that the two lists overlap. But 
the Lee list did not include the entire McCarthy list. What is more, 
a State Department document in the Appendix to the Tydings 
Hearings (pp. 1814-17) reveals that much!** 

9 Two other committees of Congress are often said to have cleared the 
State Department in 1948 and, in the process, the 108. One is the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations of the 80th Congress, and we have noted the 
explicit denial of any such clearance by one of its most active members. 
Senator Homer Ferguson. The other — the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs — delegated the task of checking on State Department security to a 
committee-of-one. Congressman Bartel Jonkman, whose amusing “report” 
we mentioned in a previous chapter. 

00 This document is not, however, either completely accurate (e.g., it fails 
to note that McCarthy's Case No. 14 corresponds with Lees No. 10) or 
exhaustive (it makes no mention of any of McCarthy's cases after his 81st). 

“warmed-over charges” 165 

McCarthy gave to the Ty dings Committee 110 persons to be 
investigated. * Of these, 37 were not on the Lee list. And of the 37, 
26 were still employed by the State Department at the time Mc- 
Carthy brought his charges. 

Yet in the teeth of such facts, countless books and editorials 
have stated, and continue to state, that McCarthy did nothing 
more than renumber the Lee list! 

As we say, McCarthy gave the Committee 110 names. Of these, 
62 were employed by the State Department at the time of the 
Tydings hearings: * * 

6 had been cleared by the State Department before Feb- 

ruary, 1950, and were not being reprocessed as of 
June, 1951; 

19 were cleared between February, 1950, and June, 1951; 

29 were being investigated under the President’s Loyalty 
Order as of June, 1951; 

7 had never been investigated as of June, 1951; 

x resigned in December, 1950, while under investigation. 

Total: 62 

In short: within one year after Tydings had unambiguously 
cleared all persons on McCarthy’s list, and the State Department 
had indignantly affirmed their loyalty and reliability, the Depart- 
ment saw fit to reprocess f no less than 49 (out of 62!), 29 of whom 
were still “in channels” as of June, 1951. 

The high incidence of “reprocessings” cannot be explained away 
on the grounds that President Truman’s Executive Order of April 

0 This excludes duplications and unidentified persons, and includes Mc- 
Carthy’s public cases. For a detailed breakdown or these and ensuing figures, 
see Appendix C. 

** Information on the balance of McCarthy’s cases, those who were work- 
ing for the State Department at the time he brought his charges, is derived 
primarily — though by no means exclusively — from one fairly comprehensive 
and absolutely authentic document, dated June 13, 1951, to which the au- 
thors have had access. For that reason, and that reason alone, that date ap- 
pears in the ensuing breakdown. 

f Wo say reprocess because, in the light of the age of the derogatory 
evidence against them, it is virtually a foregone conclusion that the 49 were 
back in loyalty-secunty channels they had already weathered in the days 
before Tydings. 



28, 1951, changing the loyalty standard from “reasonable grounds ” 
to “reasonable doubt ” had forced the State Department to re- 
process all employees against whom derogatory information had 
ever been received. As we have shown above , the Department had 
been operating for years under the “ reasonable doubt 99 standard 
in the security category . Neither the Department nor the apolo- 
gists for its security program can take refuge here in the plea that 
the rules of the game had been changed. What had changed was 
the Department's disposition to observe them. 

Eighteen of the 49 McCarthy cases reprocessed after the Tyd- 
ings hearings had left the Department as of the first of January, 
1953. We do not know whether they all were classed, or were about 
to be classed, as loyalty or security risks. But the presumption lies 
in that direction with respect to a number of them; if for no other 
reason than that the turnover among McCarthy cases ( 18 out of 
62) is a good deal higher than that of the Department as a whole. 

To sum up: During the Tydings hearings, State Department 
officials time and again asserted that all of McCarthy's cases had 
been “thoroughly investigated” and, on the strength of these in- 
vestigations, cleared. The Committee itself reinforced this verdict 
with its own across-the-board clearance. Yet a year later, 80 per 
cent of McCarthy's cases had been put into loyalty or security 
channels; and before long, 29 per cent of them were separated. 
The Department, in other words, by its decision to take a new hard 
look at the 49, tacitly admitted what McCarthy had been saying 
all along: that an important number of State Department employ- 
ees had not been given an adequate security screening. It is evi- 
dent, then, that we are indebted to McCarthy's campaign for jolt- 
ing Department officials into reopening the question to see whether 
their investigations had been thorough enough or their evaluations 
stern enough. 


Some Unanswered Questions 

W e have by now learned enough to pass judgment upon the 
Tydings “investigation.” “Fraud” and “hoax” are pretty 
good words for describing not McCarthy’s charges, but 
Tydings’ conclusions about them, i.e., ( 1 ) that the persons Mc- 
Carthy had accused were patriots beyond a reasonable doubt, ( 2 ) 
that the State Department’s security division had been efficient 
and effective when, according to McCarthy, it had been lax and 
futile, and ( 3 ) that Senator McCarthy was a charlatan. 

We must remember, however, that investigation of McCarthy’s 
specific charges was but the first item on the Committee’s agenda— 
and could not be interpreted as anything more in the light of the 
Committee’s mandate to investigate the State Department. The 
Tydings Committee’s tacit assumption that if it could discredit 
McCarthy’s charges it was automatically justified in endorsing the 
total loyalty-security program of the Department, was entirely un- 
warranted. The Committee’s mandate, though ambiguous in some 
other respects, was quite clear in this one regard: the State Depart- 
ment was to be thoroughly investigated. 

Senator Lodge apparently sensed that, in deference to the wishes 
of American Liberaldom, his Democratic Committee colleagues 
were about to hand down a blanket endorsement of the State De- 
partment. For he read into the record no less than 19 specific 
questions which had been raised by persons other than McCarthy; 
and Lodge argued that the Committee had no business reporting 
that the State Department’s security program was satisfactory 
while they remained unanswered. 

To none of these 19 questions did the Tydings Committee 
address itself either in its investigation or in its report. Lodge’s list, 
to be sure, by no means exhausted the available supply of such 
questions; it did not purport to be more than a sampling of ques- 



tions relevant to State Department security that then wanted ask- 
ing (and that, for the most part, want asking today). Yet it was 
sufficiently revealing to merit citation in full. Senator Lodge asked: 

What State Department officials were responsible for placing Hiss 
and Wadleigh in the State Department? 

What person or persons were primarily responsible for sponsorship 
for employment of the 91 sexual perverts who were in the State Depart- 
ment and who were reported as having been dismissed beginning with 
January 1, 1947? 

Were those State Department officials who opposed United States 
recognition of Soviet Russia and who thereafter warned against any 
appeasement of the Soviet regime in any way discriminated against or 
unfairly treated by the State Department? 

What were the procedures whereby Communists gained entry into 
the United States upon the basis of visas obtained through our con- 
sular service abroad? 

What are the facts with reference to the release of the Soviet spy 
named Gaik Badalovich Ovakimian on July 23, 1941? 

What are the facts with reference to the release of the Soviet spy 
named Mikhala Nickolavich Goran on March 22, 1941? 

What is the significance of the statement by Adolph Berle to the 
House Un-American Activities Committee that Alger Hiss belonged 
to the pro-Russian clique in the State Department? 

Who in the State Department was responsible for obtaining the serv- 
ices of Frederick Schuman and Owen Lattimore as speakers for the De- 
partment’s indoctrination course for Foreign Service employees? 

What are the facts of the charge that a State Department security 
officers decision that 10 members of the Department be discharged 
was subsequently reversed by higher authority? 

What State Department officials were responsible for advice given 
higher officials that the Soviet Government would allow free elections 
in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and the other satel- 
lite countries? 

What are the facts surrounding the case of Arthur Adams, an alleged 
Soviet spy, who was permitted to leave the United States in 1946? 

It is reported that die FBI had prepared a chart which purported to 
show the number of “agents,” “Communists,” “sympathizers,” and “sus- 
pects” in the State Department as of May 15, 1947. Who are these Com- 
munists and agents and sympathizers and suspects? What are their 
names? Why are they there? 

In the Lattimore case, there are a number of questions to which an- 
swers were not obtained. For example: 

There is no authoritative and detailed presentation in the record 
from the State Department setting forth the precise facts, dates, etc., 
concerning Mr. Lattimore’s relationship with the State Department. 

The persons mentioned by Mr. Budenz as having had relations with 


Mr. Lattimore have not been examined. There were some 16 in number. 

Those who headed the China desk in the State Department have not 
been questioned to determine whether Mr. Lattimore gave advice on 
United States policy on China and whether this advice was followed. 

The United States Ambassadors to China who held that office during 
Mr. Lattimore’s period of activity have not been questioned along the 
same lines. 

The subcommittee has not discovered whether any new information 
has come into the possession of the Department of Justice respecting 
Mr. Lattimore since March 24, 1950, when the members of the sub- 
committee were allowed to see a summary of Mr. Lattimore's file. 

On April 25, Mr. Budenz stated that he would furnish the subcom- 
mittee with names of Communists whom he knew to be in the State 
Department. That fist has not come to the subcommittee. 

Investigation has not been made of all those whom Mr. Lattimore is 
supposed to have brought into the Institute of Pacific Relations. 1 

The Tydings Committee chose not merely to ignore all these 
matters, it attempted also to conceal their existence from the read- 
ing public: some member of the Committee , or someone on its staff, 
saw to it that the portion of the transcript containing Senator 
Lodge's questions was deleted from the published record of the 

Lodge detected the omission several days after the Committee 
submitted its Report. He expressed his indignation to the Senate in 
no uncertain terms. “Is the Senator [Tydings] aware ... of the fact 
that in the printed copy of the hearings of the subcommittee on 
disloyalty, there are omitted, beginning at page 1488, about 35 
typewritten pages of the transcript of the subcommittee meeting 
on June 28? . . . Permit me to say that I shall not attempt to charac- 
terize those methods and the tactics of leaving out of the printed 
text parts of the testimony and proceedings. ... I shall not char- 
acterize such methods, because I think they speak for themselves/' 2 

Senator McMahon hurried to the rescue: someone had slipped 
up, he said; but, happily, there was a remedy, namely, to run the 
omitted portions in an amended version of the hearings. 

No, Lodge retorted, the explanation would not do. “The omis- 
sion . . . could not have been a mistake, in the sense that by mistake 
the entire latter part of the proceedings was omitted, because after 
the omission of the large number of pages to which I have referred, 
in the printed copy of the hearings appear the last several sentences 
shown in the typewritten transcript, including the statement about 



the adjournment” 3 In other words, someone * had simply moved 
the closing sentences in the original transcript back some thirty 
pages, evidently in a desperate and childish attempt to shield the 
Committee from the embarrassment to which such adroit ques- 
tions from one of its own members might expose it. 

The thirty-five omitted pages contained, besides the Lodge ques- 
tions, other testimony that put the Committee in an extremely poor 
light. Siding with Lodge, Senator Hickenlooper had protested 
against the inadequacies of the investigation: “We have 20 or 30 
names [that have come up in the course of the investigation] that 
I think we ought to look into.” 8 If the Committee would reconsider 
its decision to close the hearings that day, he continued, he would 
draw up a list of the “20 or 30” names, and “you can have it tomor- 
row afternoon.” But the majority was adamant. Senator Tydings : 
“I think our work is pretty well concluded, if you want my opinion.” 
It is not hard to see from the ensuing dialogue, why the Committee 
majority elected to suppress those thirty-five pages: 

Senator Hickenlooper. I don't think it has even started, Mr. Chair- 

Senator Tydings. You disagree with me? 

Senator Hickenlooper. I disagree with you. 

Senator Tydings. But I disagree with you, so there we are. 

Mr. Morris [Minority counsel] . Senator, may I mention just one case 

* The identity of the culprit (s) has never been revealed. Note, moreover, 
that this is not the only indication that the Committee was underhanded in 
preparing its Report. Senator Hickenlooper has branded the Report “a mys- 
terious and a mysteriously prepared document .” 4 And Senator Ferguson, 
speaking four days later, went still further: “I really feel that the subcommit- 
tee . . . should resume its work and undertake an investigation of its own 
staff. . . /’ 5 

Nor is even that all. Senators Lodge and Hickenlooper had intimated dur- 
ing the hearings that they would not sign the sort of report the majority ap- 
parently had in mind to submit to the Senate. They were not even given an 
opportunity to see it before it was sent to the Senate and copies had been 
given to the press . 6 And Senator Mundt detected yet another bit of sharp 
practice. The report was at first ‘labeled a ‘subcommittee report' and . . . 
after the [parent] Committee on Foreign Relations had disavowed paternity 
of the report, it was finally printed, and, in the process of printing, the jacket 
was changed from ‘subcommittee report’ to indicate that it was a report of 
the full committee. . . .” “I wonder,” Mundt concluded after hearing Senator 
Ferguson list some of the more patent derelictions of the Committee, 
“Whether the Senator from Michigan [Ferguson] will agree with the Senator 
from South Dakota that this whole business of a report and censored set of 
hearings comes very close to being a hoax and a fraud, to use the words of 
the original report .” 7 


Senator Tydings. Mr. Morris, we can mention cases from now until 

Mr. Morris. It is in the record, Senator. May I just finish? 

Senator Tydings. Of course, you are not a member of the Commit- 
tee. When we want counsel to speak, we will ask them, but I am going 
to let you speak. However, that is a matter for the Committee to decide. 

Senator Lodge. I would like to hear what he has to say. 

Mr. Morris. There is a case of a man named Theodore Geiger. He 
has been an employee of the State Department. He is now one of Paul 
Hoffmans top assistants. He is doing work that is quasi-State Depart- 
ment in character. I have gone and gotten some witnesses together who 
will testify that he was a member of the same Communist Party unit 
as they were, and I think that we would be delinquent if in the face of 
this evidence that is now on the record — 

Senator Tydings. Why didn’t you tell us this? Why did you wait un- 
til this hour to tell me? 

Mr. Morris. I am not waiting. Senator. One day Senator Green made 
me a witness and I put it all in the record. 

Senator Tydings. You haven’t told me about it. This is the first I 
have heard about it. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I assume that you are aware of everything in 
the record. 

Senator Tydings. No, there are some things in the record I haven’t 
been able to read. 

Mr. Morris. Certainly Mr. Morgan [the Committee’s chief counsel] 
knows it. I have mentioned it several times to him. . . . 

Senator Tydings. Turn it over to the FBI or do something with it. I 
would like to get a decision here. We don’t want to waste this after- 
noon 9 

Such are the facts. Yet it is still being claimed that the Tydings 
Committee found nothing left to investigate once it had gotten at 
the “truth” behind McCarthy's specific charges! 

The Committee's investigation of the loyalty files (which Tru- 
man finally consented to hand over to it) was a farce. This is so 
for a number of reasons that will be detailed in the Appendix, 
where we will also consider McCarthy’s charge that the files had 
been skeletonized. Suffice to quote the first sentences of Senator 
Lodges estimate of the futility of the Committee's review of the 

After having read a representative cross section of the 81 loyalty files 
[he told the Senate] , the conviction was reached that the files alone did 
not furnish a basis for reaching firm conclusions of any kind and that 
to attempt to conclude with respect to an individual case on the basis 



of the files alone would be a most half-baked and superficial proce- 
dure. . . . The files which I read were in such an unfinished state as to 
indicate that an examination of each file would be a waste of time. . . . 

Two possible avenues of investigation the Committee did con- 
sider. Both merit only brief treatment here since the salient facts 
about one of them, the Amerasia case, are widely known; and those 
about the other, the mysterious “FBI chart,” are still unavailable- 
thanks largely to the inertia of the Tydings Committee. 


The Tydings Committee would almost certainly never even have 
glanced at the Amerasia case but for the public pressure the 
Scripps-Howard newspapers generated in the spring of 1950 with 
a series of articles by Fred Woltman. These articles demanded that 
the questions left unanswered by the Hobbs Committee inquiry of 
1946 be cleared up once and for all. 

The major facts of the case appear to have been these. In Feb- 
ruary, 1945, OSS agents discovered a number of highly confidential 
State Department documents in the offices of the Communist Amer- 
asia magazine. The FBI undertook a physical surveillance of per- 
sons who appeared to be involved in the theft of the documents. 
On June 6, arrests were made and 1069 additional documents 
seized at the Amerasia offices ( 540 of them classified ) . 

Of the six persons who were arraigned on charges of conspiracy 
to steal government documents relating to the national defense,* 
four went scot free; the two others were let off with fines of $500 
and $2500, respectively. And at least two questions had seemed to 
cry out of those facts. First, did they mean that someone had 
stumbled into a network of spies whose tentacles extended into 
the State Department? And, second, had the conspirators and their 
sponsors exercised influence on the government to short-circuit in- 
vestigation of the affair’s ramifications? 

The first step in seeking answers to these two questions was, of 
course, to look into the handling of the case by the Justice Depart- 
ment. The Tydings Committee turned to that very Department 
for judgment on the matter, and ended up taking the Justice De- 
partment’s word that all charges levelled against the Justice De- 

0 Three of the six defendants, John Service, Mark Gayn and Kate Mit- 
chell, were no-billed by the Grand Jury; it indicted Andrew Roth, Emmanuel 
Larsen and Philip Jaffe. 



partment, in connection with the case, were unfounded. Had hid- 
den forces masterminded a whitewash of the Amerasia case? The 
Justice Department said no. Had the Justice Department, despite 
the fact that the case seemed of the open-and-shut variety, pressed 
it with something less than its usual vigor? Certainly not, said the 
Justice Department. Was there evidence that at least three of those 
arrested ( Jaffe, Larsen and Roth) had put classified State Depart- 
ment documents at the disposal of the Communists? As far as it 
went, yes, that was correct, said the Department. Had the Justice 
Department nevertheless let the Roth prosecution drop altogether 
and made deals with Jaffe and Larsen (that it would recommend 
only nominal fines if they would agree to enter pleas of “guilty” and 
“nolo contendere,” respectively)? Yes, said the Department; but 
there were legal obstacles that made the case against the Amerasia 
defendants weaker than it seemed to the layman. 

The above is no caricature of the minuet between the Tydings 
Committee and the Justice Department. The Committee called be- 
fore it the Department officials who had been involved (Mr. James 
Mclnerney, head of the Department's Criminal Division, and Mr. 
Robert Hitchcock, the Department prosecutor in charge of the 
Amerasia case) and asked them to recite, as they had done to the 
Hobbs Committee four years before, the Department account of 
the matter. And having heard what the Justice Department had to 
say, the Committee published over its imprimatur a lengthy memo- 
randum on the legal points involved— not, as one might have ex- 
pected, a canvass of the legal pros and cons, but a venture in advo- 
cacy that pleaded the case against the prosecutor as passionately 
as the accused's attorneys would have dared to plead it. But the 
Committee was at least honest enough not to conceal the sources 
from which the memorandum was obtained: it was conceived and 
executed in the Justice Department itself! 

In the circumstances, it was the clear obligation of the Tydings 
Committee to obtain an impartial verdict on the tenability of the 
Justice Department's legal premises, and write that verdict into its 
report. And the place to go for such a verdict was not to the 
Justice Department, but to a body of disinterested legal experts 
brought together ad hoc under the Committee s auspices. Let us 
note some of the issues such a panel would have been in a position 
to consider; and then we shall leave the Amerasia case as the Tyd- 
ings Committee has left it— a deep and disturbing mystery. 

First; Were the Amerasia defendants prosecuted under the right 


law? The original complaints charged violation of a statute that 
dealt with conspiracy to steal government documents relating to 
the national defeme . This charge was subsequently dropped, and 
the cases were finally prosecuted under a law that deals simply 
with conspiracy to steal government property. The reason for this 
change, as stated by the Department attorneys, was their uncer- 
tainty about being able to prove that the theft was “for the purpose 
of obtaining information respecting the national defense.” Was 
this a reasonable explanation in view of the nature of the stolen 
documents? The documents included, to identify just a very few 
of them: a report on the disposition of the Japanese fleet prior to 
the Battle of Leyte; a report on the development of the Chinese 
Nationalist armies, giving the location, strength and armament of 
all Nationalist troops, division by division; a report on the Navy’s 
schedule for bombing Japanese strategic targets; the Navy’s coun- 
ter-intelligence “organization plan”; a report on the location of 25 
American submarines in Pacific waters; an “Eyes Only” message 
from President Roosevelt to Chiang proposing that General Stil- 
well be given supreme military command in China. As we say, 
when it drew up the original indictment, the Justice Department 
felt it might possibly convince a court that such documents re- 
lated to the national defense. * 

Beyond this, there was the question, Why did the Department 
fail to add to its complaint a still further account, namely, espio- 
nage? In its memorandum to the Ty dings Committee, the Depart- 
ment attorneys did not even mention this possibility; and we must 
assume they had felt they could not prove that transmitting govern- 
ment documents to a known Communist (Jaffe), and to a maga- 
zine that could easily be identified as Communist, amounted to 
transmitting them to a foreign power. And it may be true that such 
a charge could not have been made to stick in 1945. But this does 
not dispose of the question, Were the possibilities of making it 

9 The Department attorneys pointed out that, since the maximum penalty 
provided by each of the statutes in question was the same, i.e., two years in 
jail, it was a matter of indifference which law was used; the Tydings Com- 
mittee obediently reported that the issue was, therefore, "academic.” Any 
reasonably imaginative person should be able to see why the choice of the 
law under which the case was to be prosecuted was crucial: If the "national 
defense” statute had been used, the Department would have had a “spy” 
case on its hands, and Congressional investigation would very likely have 
resulted from the attendant publicity. Thus, the national Administration stood 
to avoid considerable embarrassment if the case could be passed off as 
small-time pilferage. 


stick good enough to warrant an attempt to make it stick? We must 
remember that the overriding issue here is not whether the Gov- 
ernment would have won its case had it vigorously pressed the 
prosecution, but whether the chances of its winning it were good 
enough to warrant the old school try. 

Secondly: Was it advisable for the Government to conceal from 
the court the Communist element in the case? The Department 
attorneys advanced two rather different theories for having kept 
Roth’s and Jaffes Communist connections, as well as Amerasia’s 
political coloration, out of the case. They told the Tydings Com- 
mittee (a) that to have brought in the Communist angle would 
have weakened the case, since the Communists were friends and 
allies at the time; and (b) that to bring it in would have been 
“prejudicial” to the defendants and thus grounds for a mistrial 
since Communism was anathema at the time! Mr. Morris, minority 
counsel for the Committee, took the position that such evidence 
certainly would have been admissible, and most certainly would 
have strengthened the case ( even though the charge was simply 
theft of government documents ) , since it would have helped estab- 
lish a motive for the crime. At any rate, let us note how this aspect 
of the Jaffe case had been handled before Judge Proctor of the U.S. 
District Court: 

Mr. Arent [Jaffe’s attorney]. Your Honor, this indictment charges 
the defendant and others with conspiring to obtain various Govern- 
ment papers. The Government does not contend that any of this materi- 
al was used for any disloyal purposes. ... If Mr. Jaffe has transgressed 
the law, it seems he has done so from an excess of journalistic zeal. . . . 
We recognize, technically, the violation — and not from any desire to 
enrich himself, as demonstrated by the character of the publication, or 
any intent to jeopardize the welfare of his country. . . . 

The Court. I think it would be well, perhaps, if, in view of the state- 
ment that has been made, which I understand you [the Government 
attorneys] approve of as a correct statement — 

Mr. Hitchcock [the prosecutor] (interposing). In substance, yes. 
Your Honor. . . . 

The Court. Let me ask you this question, please: Is there any evi- 
dence that the use to which these documents were put would be a use 
whereby injury or embarrassment would come to the Army or the 
Navy in the conduct of the war? 

Mr. Hitchcock. We have no evidence of that. Your Honor, and, 
furthermore, no evidence that they were intended to. 

The Court. Was there anything in the nature of publication that 
had that tendency? 



Mr. Hitchcock. There was not, Your Honor, as far as we know. So far 
as we know, there was nothing in the use put of these documents that 
had that tendency nor is there anything that we have in our possession 
that would indicate — in fact quite to the contrary — that the defendant 
intended that they should have that tendency. To us, it was largely to 
the purpose of lending credence or variety to the publication itself, and 
perhaps increase its circulation and prestige. . . . 

The Court. ... I accept without any doubt the assurance both of 
your [Jaffe’s] counsel and of the Government attorneys that there was 
no thought or act upon your part which was intended or calculated or 
had a tendency to injure the Government or the military forces in the 
prosecution of the war. It would make quite a difference to me if 1 did 
not have that assurance and did not know , confidently , that that was 
true. . . . 10 [Italics added.] 

Third, and most important, What of the “evidentiary” problem 
that lies at the heart of the dispute about the Justice Department’s 
handling of the case? The Department argued— and this argument 
has ever since been the mainstay for its defenders in what has 
amounted to a legal hot stove league— that the documents seized 
in Amerasia 9 s offices were “tainted evidence,” and thus would have 
been inadmissible in a trial. Specifically, the Department main- 
tained that it had been compelled to make a “deal,” and to do so 
in a hurry, since one of the defendants (Larsen) had discovered 
that illegal searches and seizures had been undertaken by the OSS 
and the FBI prior to the arrests, and thus might have moved, suc- 
cessfully, to quash the indictment. 

The argument by which the “tainted” or “polluted” evidence 
theory is applied to the Amerasia case runs as follows : The OSS 
raid and several FBI searches prior to the arrests were conducted 
without search warrants. But knowledge obtained from these ille- 
gal raids led to the procurement of the warrants that authorized 
the arrest of the defendants and the seizure of 1,069 Amerasia 
documents. Therefore, under the theory that evidence is inadmis- 
sible which has been discovered through illegal means, the De- 
partment argued that none of the Amerasia documents would have 
been admitted in evidence at trial, and thus that the success of the 
prosecution depended upon the defendants’ not finding out about 
the illegal searches. And once Emmanuel Larsen had got wind of the 
illegal entry, the case was jeopardized— and deals had to be made. 

There were indeed legal precedents supporting the Depart- 
ment’s position. On the other hand— and this is the crucial con- 
sideration in evaluating the handling of the Amerasia case— there 


was also authority for the view that the evidence was admissible. 
Six weeks before the Tydings Committee made its report, on June 
2, 1950, Senator Ferguson submitted to the Senate a lengthy and 
detailed analysis of the legal considerations, and he came to the 
conclusion that, at the very least, the evidentiary issue involved in 
the Amerasia case was moot. According to Ferguson, at least six 
separate arguments supporting the admissibility of the govern- 
ment’s evidence— all of them backed by legal precedent— would 
have been available to the Department attorneys had they elected 
to press the prosecution: 

a) The tainted evidence rule does not apply where the prior 
illegal seizure involves the recovery of stolen Government 

b) The Government’s procurement of the arrest warrants and 
thus the seizures of June 6 did not depend exclusively upon 
knowledge obtained in the course of the illegal searches and 
seizures that preceded the arrest . The Government had 
grounds for the arrest in the knowledge it had obtained from 
other sources; for example, from the discovery, prior to the 
OSS raid, that one of the restricted documents had appeared 
almost verbatim in the pages of Amerasia ; 

c) Since they were necessary in protecting national security in 
wartime, the OSS and FBI raids were legal, even in the ab- 
sence of warrants, under an implied exception to the Fourth 

d) The protection of the Fourth Amendment, at the most, ex- 
tends to the magazine Amerasia (whose premises were vio- 
lated by the original OSS seizure) not to the individuals 

e) The “tainted evidence rule” is, simply, not good law in 
situations of this kind. As a U.S. District Court said in a case 
involving the Government’s seizure of certain machinery 
parts: “[the contention that the seizure is illegal] . . . would 
have to rest on the single fact that the Assistant U.S. Attor- 
ney knew where the parts were [due to a previous illegal 
raid]. If we so held, we would say in effect to [the defend- 
ant:] . . . since the first seizure was illegal, you now have a 
chance to spirit away the evidence, for no search can be 
made until some time after the FBI has lost track of its 
whereabouts. The protection of the Fourth Amendment is 
not to be secured by adopting rules of hide and go seek.” 11 



But if the evidentiary question was moot— and it is the authors’ 
opinion that the panel of impartial experts would have so found- 
then, of course, the Justice Department is left without a leg to 
stand on. For the prosecution, particularly in a case as important 
as the Amerasia case, is obliged to test the law when there are rea- 
sonable grounds for believing that a conviction can be obtained.* 


On June 6, 1950, Senator McCarthy made, on the floor of the 
Senate, a profoundly disturbing revelation. It was based, he said, 
on "information which has never before been brought to the atten- 
tion of the American people”— information, moreover, that had 
been elicited from a report on the State Department by one of its 
own officials, a Department security officer named Samuel Klaus. 
This report, McCarthy continued, contained a chart prepared by 
the FBI, showing the size of the Soviet task force in the State De- 
partment. As of May 15, 1946, the chart allegedly revealed, there 
were 20 "Communist agents,” 13 "Communists,” 14 "Communist 
sympathizers,” and 77 "suspects” working in the Department. The 
chart also contained, according to McCarthy, an amended count 
made two and a half months later; by that time, as a result presum- 
ably of Department personnel action, there were 11 "agents,” 10 
"Communists,” 11 "sympathizers,” and 74 "suspects” left. 

"Can the Senators conceive of it?” McCarthy asked. "Eleven 
Communist agents were left in the State Department two months 
after the FBI had labeled them and said, Our files show these 
men are Communist agents.” 13 

Nor, let us note, has anything been done, seven years later— 
as far as we have been able to learn— by way of ascertaining how 
many of the employees in question, if any, are still around. But a 

* This view of the matter is the more convincing because the Department 
itself adopted it in another case that arose at about the same time. A man 
named Harris was caught trafficking in U.S. draft cards, and there was some 
question whether the charge could be made to stick, it being far from clear 
that the incriminating evidence had been legally seized. The Government 
attorneys might easily have persuaded themselves, “on the basis of prece- 
dent,” that the weaknesses in their case were fatal. But they went ahead all 
the same and, in a United States Supreme Court decision that marked a mile- 
stone in the evolution of U.S. Constitutional law, they finally won out. How 
explain the Department’s zeal in putting behind bars a small-time offender, 
and its apathy (with much the same legal issues involved) in prosecuting 
Communists who had stolen secret government documents ? 12 



year after McCarthy’s revelation, steps were being taken to punish 
him for having brought the matter up! In September, 1951, Sena- 
tor Benton announced to the Gillette-Monroney Committee that 
McCarthy’s “FBI chart” was one of the occasions on which Mc- 
Carthy had deliberately deceived the Senate. How so? By telling 
it that the FBI had prepared the chart; whereas J. Edgar Hoover 
has denied that the FBI had done any such thing. 

True, after McCarthy’s speech. Hoover asserted that Mr. Klaus’ 
statement attributing the chart to the FBI was erroneous. But Mc- 
Carthy, without claiming any personal knowledge of the matter, 
had merely relayed to the Senate a piece of information from a re- 
port that he had had every reason to regard as authentic; which lets 
him off, but certainly not his accusers, to whom the chronology of 
McCarthy’s claim and Hoover’s denial was readily available. (To 
be sure a contradiction remains on the record: some one— maybe 
Klaus, maybe Hoover— either misrepresented the facts or misunder- 
stood them. Mr. Hoover has a reputation for undeviating honesty; 
but so does Klaus. Which appears to be all that can be said about 
the matter— except to note one hypothesis that lets both men off 
the hook: namely, that FBI personnel had prepared the chart, but 
without the authorization or knowledge of Mr. Hoover.) 

In any case, no one has ever questioned that the chart existed 
or that it was available to the Tydings Committee— which should 
have made it its business to find out who drew it up and what the 
State Department had done about the state of affairs the chart 
described. Here, certainly, was something for the Committee to 
move in on, and interesting questions should not have been hard 
to think up. Who were the “Communist agents,” the “Commu- 
nists,” the “sympathizers,” the “suspects,” referred to in the chart? 
How many of them had continued in the Department’s employ? 
For how long? Were some of them, by any chance, still in the De- 
partment in 1950? If so, had the security division acted wisely in 
clearing them? 

The Committee squared off to the chart in characteristic fashion: 
“While these charges are not before us” its Report stated, “. . . it is 
believed proper that the reader should have the facts in the mat- 
ter.” 14 Whereupon it reprinted Hoover’s letter denying FBI author- 
ship of the chart, and a letter from John Peurifoy, the State Depart- 
ment’s Deputy Under Secretary, which declared that “the condi- 
tions mentioned by Mr. Klaus do not exist today. . . . none of these 
persons are now employed by the Department, except those who 



have since been investigated and who have been checked and eval- 
uated under the loyalty program.” 15 

Once again, the Committee had signed up the State Department 
to find out whether the State Department was delinquent in its 
handling of loyalty and security cases. The Committee’s explana- 
tion as to why it was not going into the matter itself (“these 
charges are not before us” ) is, in the light of its mandate, simply 
unintelligible. What we must conclude is that, as its hearings 
moved into their fourth month, the Committee decided to narrow 
its arbitrary and unwarranted interpretation of Senate Resolution 
231 even further: not only would it limit its investigation to 
charges made by McCarthy before the Committee; charges made 
outside its chambers were to be ignored— even if they were made 
on the floor of the Senate. 

The reader, having examined this much of the Tydings Commit- 
tee’s performance, will perhaps agree that McCarthy’s general 
charge that shocking security conditions prevailed in the State De- 
partment was not disproved, but merely set aside. And why did, 
the Committee refuse to do the job that had been assigned to it? 
Some say the Committee’s shortcomings were due to the incompe- 
tence or the inexperience or the ignorance of its members, or a 
combination of the three. But this answer is more recommended 
by its charitableness than by its plausibility. Incompetence was a 
factor, all right; but it leaves too much unaccounted for. The Com- 
mittee’s hearings and its Report demonstrate beyond reasonable 
doubt that the Tydings Committee— determined from the first to 
vindicate the State Department— consciously set out to destroy Mc- 
Carthy and make of him an example for all who, in the future, 
might feel tempted to agree that the Democratic Administration 
was jeopardizing the national security by harboring loyalty and se- 
curity risks in sensitive agencies. The record is there; and it shows 
that the Committee’s majority never had any intention of conduct- 
ing an objective investigation of the State Department; that, from 
the day the Senate adopted Resolution 231 to the day McCarthy’s 
charges were pronounced to the Senate and the nation at large to 
be a “fraud and a hoax,” Senators Tydings, Green and McMahon 
played the role of Administration hatchetmen. 

This explains a great many things that would otherwise remain 
incomprehensible. For one thing, it explains the Committee’s haras- 
sing of McCarthy before he was even allowed to begin his presen- 
tation, of which the usually imperturbable Senator Lodge spoke as 


follows: “a perfectly extraordinary procedure. I have never seen 
anything like it, and I have been here since 1937 I do not under- 

stand what kind of a game is being played here.” 16 

It explains, also, the Committee's dogged refusal to allow the 
man presenting the charges, and the only person present who had 
made prior study of the evidence, to cross-examine the witnesses. 
Time and again McCarthy requested the routine privilege of inter- 
rogating persons before the Committee— a courtesy that tradition- 
ally is extended by any Senate Committee to any Senator. 17 He was 
turned down every time. At first, Tydings ruled, unprecedentedly, 
that the courtesy would be extended to McCarthy only if he were 
willing to be cross-examined in turn by the witnesses. When Mc- 
Carthy consented to this arrangement, Tydings changed his mind, 
and refused to let him cross-examine at all. 18 

Our hypothesis also explains the Committee's consistent refusal 
to go beyond the evidence McCarthy had presented, and its re- 
peated acceptance of a denial by the “accused” as the conclusive 
refutation of the allegation. It explains the Committee's insulting 
treatment of all witnesses whose testimony pointed to laxity on the 
part of the Department's security division; and, by the same token, 
its lickspittle bearing towards any and all, including Communists, 
whose testimony tended to discredit McCarthy's charges. 

Consider its treatment of Louis Budenz, whose reliability as a 
first-hand source of detailed information about the Communist 
conspiracy was by then firmly established. He told the Committee 
that Lattimore and Hanson were Communists. The Committee 
used on him every known technique for humiliating a man. The 
following is an instance of its effort to discredit him by ridicule. 

[Budenz had just finished itemizing the sources from which he had 
learned that Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist Party.] 

Senator Green. Do you know Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Budenz. Do you mean personally? 

Senator Green. Yes. v 

Mr. Budenz. I do not. 

Senator Green. Have you ever seen Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Budenz. No, sir; I have not. As a matter of fact, however, I did 
not see Mr. Alger Hiss, either, and I knew him to be a Communist and 
so testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. 

Senator Green. But you are not reasoning that everyone you have 
never seen and never heard may be a Communist . Is that your argu- 

Mr. Budenz. No, sir; that is not . 19 [Italics added.] 



Or consider the Committee's behavior toward Miss Freda Utley, 
a woman with an international reputation as a courageous and 
knowledgeable anti-Communist. She had known Lattimore person- 
ally, and had given years of study to the Communist Party line in 
the Far East; so she ought to have merited attention in connection 
with the Lattimore case. When, however, she attempted to demon- 
strate, passage by passage, how Lattimore's writings had tallied 
with the Communist line, Tydings scornfully and impatiently cut 
her short: “We don't want opinion evidence here. We want facts, 
f-a-c-t-s. We are getting very few of them. We are getting mostly 
opinion /' 20 ( If ever a group of men needed some expert opinion, 
o-p-i-n-i-o-n, on how to spot party-lining in the area of Chinese 
policy, this one certainly did. ) 

After Miss Utley had finished her prepared statement, the Com- 
mittee, instead of questioning her about Lattimore and his writ- 
ings, plied her with impudent queries about herself. It wanted to 
know (a) whether she was Alfred Kohlberg's stooge, (b) whether 
she was being subsidized by the Chinese Nationalists, and (c) 
whether she had been a Nazi sympathizer. * 

Consider now, by way of contrast, the Committee's demeanor 
in the presence of, first, Earl Browder, and second, Frederick Van- 
derbilt Field. 

Let us look in on the Committee at the moment when Senator 
Hickenlooper has been asking Browder whether he knew this or 
that person to have been a member of the Communist Party. Brow- 
der has refused to answer ( “I want to declare to the Committee 
that I consider it outrageous that this hearing should be devoted 
to the development of new smear campaigns,'' etc., etc. “I refuse to 
take part in such proceedings "), 21 and Senator McMahon is moved 
to intervene: 

Senator McMahon. . . . there are two names Senator Hickenlooper 
has presented to you. . . . Miss Kenyon and Mr. Hanson were named 

° These questions were asked by the Committee's counsel, Edward Mor- 
gan. But they had been prepared, and placed in Morgan's hand, by Abe 
Fortas, Owen Lattimore's lawyer. The innuendo regarding Miss Utley's 
Nazi sympathies was based on one of her books, The Dream We Lost ( 1940), 
in which she urged a negotiated peace with Germany, so as to avoid Soviet 
domination of Europe, and predicted that a war of “unconditional surren- 
der' against Germany would open the way to such domination. The insinua- 
tion that she was a pawn of Kohlberg was based on the sole fact that she 
was a member of the China Policy Association, of which Kohlberg was chair- 
man of the board. The insinuation about her receiving financial support 
from Nationalist China was based on heaven only knows what. 



openly and charged openly by Senator McCarthy. ... It occurs to me 
that whatever your answer may be, that to withhold an answer to Miss 
Kenyon and this other gentleman, if you are sincerely interested in not 
contributing to a smear campaign, that your withholding of an answer 
on them, if the answer is in the negative, is contributing to that smear. 

On the other hand, if the answer is in the positive, since those cases 
are before the Committee, I believe you should answer. . . . 

Senator Tydings. Allow me to talk to the witness a moment. . . . The 
chairman would like to bring this matter to your attention and in the 
interest of fairness and truth, and in pursuing the investigation which 
we are ordered to make, to ask you if you will not reconsider on those 
two names, and tell us whether or not you know or do not know they 
are members of the Communist Party. 

Browder is not to be outdone in courtliness by a mere democratic 

Mr. Browder. I am quite willing to answer the question about those 
two persons, and I refused to answer before only because . . . [the 
question] was obviously the beginning of a fishing expedition for new 
names to smear by association. ... I would say, without the slightest 
hesitation, that neither one of them ever, in my period of leadership in 
the [Communist] organization . . . had any organized connection as 
members or friends. 

Senator Tydings. Thank you very much for cooperating. . . . 22 

Several moments later it is called to Tydings 5 attention that 
Browder has refused to answer with respect to two other “McCar- 
thy cases . 55 He moves in to clear up the record: 

Senator Tydings. . . . To your knowledge is Mr. John Carter Vincent 
or Mr. Service, members [sic] of the Communist Party? Those are the 
only two names I shall present to you. 

This time, however, Browder gets cantankerous and puts the chair- 
man on warning that, at some point, enough gets to be enough: 

Mr. Browder. Yes — before it was two other names. Now, it is two, 
maybe one by one we will get into a list of thousands. 

Senator Tydings now plays his trump card— an appeal to Mr. 
Browder’s natural wish to strengthen the State Department, to help 
Congressional committees, and to gain the chairman’s gratitude. 

Senator Tydings. ... I see your point of view. I am not arguing at 
the moment, but I do think you are defeating the purpose of this in - 



quiry in a way that you perhaps do not realize , if you allow this to be 
obscured, and if you felt that you could answer, in the cases of Mr. Vin- 
cent and Mr. Service, I would be very grateful to you. . . . 

Mr. Browder. ... I would say that regarding the two names you 
mentioned, to the best of my knowledge and belief, they never had any 
direct or indirect connection with the Communist Party. 

Senator Typings. Thank you, sir. 23 [Italics added.] 

As for Field, who appeared the next day, he too, at first, but only 
at first, refused to take the Committee into his full confidence. 
Then Tydings reminded him, as he had reminded Browder, that 
a refusal to answer would damage the persons involved more than 
it would help them. Field’s better nature promptly asserted itself: 

Mr. Field. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to state I have no — 
to the best of my knowledge — Mr. Vincent is not and never has been a 
Communist. . . . 

Senator Tydings. I want to thank you for your cooperation, and I 
hope, after the conference with your attorney, you can go into other 
areas. ... I would like to ask you whether or not these three men — 
Haldore Hanson, John S. Service, and John Carter Vincent, or any of 
them, insofar as you know — have committed any act of disloyalty to the 
Government of the United States, including the State Department, of 

Mr. Field. No, Mr. Chairman; to the best of my knowledge, none of 
these three men have committed any act of disloyalty. 

Senator Tydings. Thank you . 24 

Our hypothesis explains the Committee’s startling decision to 
deny Senator McCarthy, and even the minority s counsel , Mr. Rob - 
ert Morris , access to the Committee’s chambers while Louis Bu- 
denz was testifying in executive session— despite the presence in 
that chamber of both Owen Lattimore and his lawyer Abe Fortas! * 

Our hypothesis explains why the most important of McCarthy’s 
witnesses was made the victim of an unspeakable venture in char- 
acter assassination on the floor of the Senate— with, it seems, the 
connivance of the Committee’s majority. Let us listen to Mr. Mor- 
ris as he relates this phase of the story in an article in The Freeman 
magazine (October 30, 1950): 

... A high point in calumny was reached when Lattimore introduced 
into evidence a sealed copy of the transcript of the Santo deportation 
proceedings, at which Budenz had been the principal government wit- 

* Only after strenuous protests by McCarthy did the Committee finally 
ask the Lattimore people to leave. 


ness. It included a record of what the Communists through their attor- 
ney, Harry Sacher, had thrown at Budenz in that hearing.* The Im- 
migration authorities, sensing its vileness, had decreed that only one 
copy be made, a fact that was verified in writing by the District Direc- 
tor of Immigration in New York, who asserted that this one copy had 
been given to Sacher in the event he had to use it on appeal. Santo 
never appealed; he voluntarily went behind the Iron Curtain. But Lat- 
timore received (obviously from Sacher) that one copy of the tran- 

Then, surprisingly, Senator Dennis Chavez (Dem., New Mexico) re- 
vealed its contents on the Senate floor, even though it was sealed and 
the contents were never made known to Senators Hickenlooper and 
Lodge or myself. Senator Tydings, as Chairman of the Subcommittee, 
and Senator Lucas, as Democratic floor leader, officially joined Chavez 
in this attack. It was but one of many instances pointing to a secret 
liaison between the Communists, Lattimore, the Subcommittee and the 
Democratic Administration. . . . 

The Tydings Committee, moreover, published the entire Sacher 
transcript in the Appendix section of its hearings . 

Our hypothesis explains the Committee’s vicious smearing of 
private citizens who had supported McCarthy— who, indeed, had 
anticipated him— in demanding an investigation of the State De- 
partment. We have in mind, specifically, Plain Talk editors Isaac 
Don Levine and Ralph de Toledano, and Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, 
whom, along with General Patrick Hurley, the Committee identi- 
fied as the three “well-defined sources” of the charge that U.S. 
China policy had been undermined by saboteurs. 

Plain Talk had published, in 1946, an article by Amerasia defend- 
ant Emmanuel Larsen entitled “The State Department Espionage 
Case.” Larsen, however, attempted to repudiate his article, assert- 
ing that Levine and de Toledano had completely rewritten the 
original draft of his piece and had exerted financial pressure 
on him to authorize publication of the revised version. The Com- 
mittee, though conceding that Larsen’s “credibility generally is 
open to serious doubt,” 25 nevertheless proceeded to print his 
story as the authoritative version of the incident, without so much 
as putting in a telephone call to Levine or de Toledano for a 
check on the facts. And as if this were not enough, the Committee 
levelled a disgraceful and cowardly libel at the two editors: C( The 
fact that these persons have been reported to us as professional 

* Sacher had attempted to discredit Budenz by submitting him to smutty 
questioning on his personal life prior to his conversion from Communism. 



‘anti-Communists’ whose incomes and reputations depend on the 
developing and maintaining of new Communist fears , while not 
deemed necessarily significant , has not been altogether overlooked 
by the subcommittee ” 26 (Italics added.) 

Several days after the publication of the Committee's Report, 
Levine and de Toledano requested Tydings to repeat the state- 
ment without the benefit of immunity. Tydings promised to repeat 
outside the Senate anything from the Report, if pressed for satis- 
faction by allegedly injured parties. Yet he never repeated this 

We have already told how the IPR smeared Alfred Kohlberg. 
The Tydings Committee went ever further than the IPR: “[Mr. 
Kohlberg’s] wealth appears to have stemmed from contracts with 
representatives of the Nationalist Government of China.” This “in- 
dividual behind the scenes,” the man “responsible . . . [for] a great 
deal of Senator McCarthy’s assertions,” is “reported,” to have a 
“financial stake in the. eventual victory of the Nationalist Govern- 
ment.” 27 But there is not a single shred of evidence in the Commit- 
tees records (or anywhere else, to our knowledge) to support the 
implications of this charge— unless it be the two undeniable facts 
that Mr. Kohlberg was (a) an importer of Chinese textiles, and 
(b) an anti-Communist American, and as such certainly had “a 
stake” in the “eventual victory of the Nationalist Government.”** 

Some other things our hypothesis can explain are: 

—The Committee’s failure to hear the testimony of the “20 or 30” 
witnesses described by Senator Hickenlooper as persons “to whom 
the trails in this thing lead.” 

—The Committees refusal to go into the numerous (Senator 

0 Levine and de Toledano also forwarded to the Committee their account 
of the handling of the Larsen article — which Senator Tydings did not circu- 
larize or, as far as is known, examine. 

00 The facts on Kohlberg are: (1) He has never had a financial transac- 
tion of any character whatever with the Nationalist Government, any of its 
subsidiary or affiliated organizations, or any individual who has ever been 
connected officially with the Chiang regime; moreover, he has formally of- 
fered to so testify under oath; ( 2 ) he is on record as having favored a China 
policy detrimental to his own financial interests: in February of 1949, when 
the Communist conquest of China was a foregone conclusion, Kohlberg made 
an energetic effort to persuade the Far East-American Council of Commerce 
and Industry (a “Chamber of Commerce” for American business interests in 
Asia) to adopt a stand opposing all trade with China. Only one other member 
of the Council was willing to go along. He, in short, was one of two persons 
doing business with China who were prepared to put their anti-Communjsm 
above their commercial interests. 


Lodge, as we have seen, listed nineteen) questions that arose in the 
course of the hearings and that remained unanswered at the time 
the Report was written. 

—The Committee’s manipulation of the portion of its transcript 
that dramatically revealed the inadequacies of the investigation. 

—The Committees consistent practice of passing to the public 
the State Department’s answers to charges brought against that 
very agency. 

—Some of Tydings’ more shameless ventures in sideshowman- 
ship— for example, his turning his formal presentation to the Senate 
of the Committee’s Report into burlesque. 

Of that last item, more must be told. When the Senate convened 
on July 20, to hear what its investigating committee had found out. 
Senator Tydings had a stage act prepared for his colleagues, props 
and all. He pointed to a large chart set against the chamber wall. 
It purported to show that eight Congressional committees had pre- 
viously reviewed and cleared McCarthy’s 81 cases.* “. . . I love 
this little chart,” said Tydings, “I call it Behind the 8 Ball. . . . 
Some time I hope it will earn merit in the National Gallery of 
Art. (Laughter.) I have titled this futuristic design and paint 
'Whitewash/ I have seen whitewash before, but it is the first time 
I have ever seen it applied with eight coats on any political fence 
in America.” 28 

But the act had just begun. On a stand in front of the chamber 
Senator Tydings ceremoniously placed a phonograph. “I wonder,” 
he asked, "if I could get unanimous consent to play a radio record- 
ing of the Senator’s [McCarthy’s] own voice on one of these occa- 
sions?”** Tydings was determined to make the point once and for 
all that McCarthy’s version of the Wheeling speech was a bald lie. 
“I am not asking the Senators to take my word, but to hear the 
Senator’s own voice, who says he has not made a statement of 
this character.” 

Senator Wherry rose at this point, not to make a formal objec- 
tion, but to observe that for the sake of decorum the record might 
better be played “some place else than on the floor of the United 
States Senate.” 

* The Committee's report made the more modest claim that four com- 
mittees had processed and cleared McCarthy's cases; as we have seen, even 
this claim is patently false. 

° ° Tydings referred to McCarthy's Wheeling speech and the raging con- 
troversy as to whether he had said he had “in hand" the names of 205 Com- 
munists in the State Department or simply 57. 



Tydings promptly withdrew his request, although Wherry in- 
sisted that he had not actually objected. Tydings was adamant: “If 
the unanimous-consent request is to be denied, I withdraw it. I 
withdraw the unanimous -consent request and retain the floor. . . . 
I will play this record off the Senate floor in due time, but admission 
will be by card only. [Laughter.]” He went on referring again and 
again to the recording that would “once and for all” settle doubts as 
to whether Senator McCarthy was a truthful man. In summing up, 
he hammered the point home a final time: “Then what is there,” he 
asked, “other than a fraud and a hoax and a deceit about this whole 
matter? It ought to make the blood of Americans boil, that they 
have been told these foul and vile charges— and here is a record to 
prove it. And if that is broken, I have duplicates. [Laughter ]” 29 

Next morning, newspapers all over the land headlined Tydings’ 
“proof” that McCarthy had lied. But when a number of newspaper 
reporters asked Tydings for a private audition of the Wheeling re- 
cording, he put them off. He had to put them off. For Tydings had 
no such recording , and did not have one when speaking before the 
Senate ! The only recording made of the Wheeling speech had been 
destroyed the day after the speech was made— a fact discovered by 
the State Department investigators who reported on the Wheeling 
episode to the Tydings Committee— and this was well known to 

So much for the things our hypothesis explains— a hypothesis, we 
may note, which is confirmed by a story that had appeared in 

* Tydings later admitted, at a deposition hearing pursuant to McCarthy’s 
libel suit against Senator Benton, that he had never possessed the Wheeling 
recording. Why, then, did Tydings so expose himself? Was it sheer bravado? 
Perhaps; but leavened with the cool calculations of a parliamentary veteran. 
Tydings unquestionably counted on the objection of a Republican Senator to 
his prepared stunt — in which case he would proceed, as he in fact did, to 
draw precisely the same inferences about McCarthy’s truthfulness as if he 
had actually played the record and it had proved McCarthy a liar. As for the 
next day and the press, he would simply put them off — as he did — and the 
issue would sooner or later simmer down — as it did; but McCarthy would 
have been damaged all the same. And in the unlikely event that no one in 
the Senate should have objected to the playing of the recording, Tydings 
was prepared for this contingency, too. For he did have a record — of the 
Salt Lake City broadcast. A careful reading of Tydings’ speech bolsters this 
hypothesis; for, until the time Wherry “objected” and Tydings “withdrew” 
the request to play the record, Tydings had spoken ambiguously on the point 
whether it was a recording of the Wheeling speech or of the Salt Lake City 
broadcast that he proposed to serenade his colleagues with. And only after 
Wherry had unwittingly obliged did Tydings firmly settle into the Wheeling 



Newsweek six weeks prior to the Tydings extravaganza of July 20. 
The story (a Newsweek scoop, later confirmed by Tydings him- 
self) told of a strategy meeting held at Tydings’ apartment on 
May 7, 1950, at which the course of the Administration campaign 
against McCarthy was charted. Present at the meeting were Tyd- 
ings, Committee Counsel Edward Morgan, and Deputy Under Sec- 
retary of State for Administration, John Peurifoy, the Department’s 
front-man in the McCarthy controversy. “The time had come, 
said Tydings [in the Newsweek account], to expose McCarthy. He 
had discussed it with the President and advised him that the coun- 
terattack would be launched on the floor of the House and the 

Thus, the chairman of a Senate tribunal, in league with the tribu- 
nal’s chief of staff, and the representative of the defendant, plotted 
together even before the tribunal had completed its deliberations 
to discredit the prosecutorl 

In Summary: 

McCarthy’s own behavior during the Tydings episode was far 
from exemplary. He showed himself to be inexperienced, or, worse 
still, misinformed. Some of his specific charges were exaggerated; 
a few had no apparent foundation whatever. All his transgressions 
we have recorded in detail, so that those whose concern it is to re- 
mind him and his countrymen about his past sins may at least know 
what sins he committed, and what sins he did not commit. 

McCarthy never redeemed his unredeemable pledge to reveal 
the names of “57 card-carrying Communists.” He did, however, 
unquestionably redeem his promise to expose shocking conditions 
with regard to State Department security administration. And if 
the Tydings Committee was unimpressed, the State Department 
as we have seen, was not; for it “reprocessed” 46 of the 59 “num- 
bered” McCarthy cases who were still in its employ— and before 
long, 18 of them were gone and then there were 41. Besides the 59, 
there were those former State Department employees named by 
McCarthy who had found their way into other federal agencies or 
into the staff of the United Nations. The Tydings Committee, in 
the teeth of its mandate to investigate present and past evidences 
of Communist infiltration in the Department, let slip through its 
fingers the chance to track down fellow travellers and loyalty risks 
so situated as to do hurt not merely to U.S. foreign policy, but also 
to U.S. governmental programs in general, and to the international 



organization on which, wisely or unwisely, the government has 
put its bets. 

The statement is interminably made that “McCarthy did not 
present evidence on one single Communist working in the State 
Department.” McCarthy himself, with his famous three days of 
orgiastic speeches and radio broadcasts, made it possible for his 
enemies to beat that particular drum. No doubt, McCarthy did not 
establish that his “57” were card-carrying Communists. Whether 
he named 57 Communists is another matter. We must remember 
that McCarthy was dealing with men and women who had com- 
promised themselves by joining Communist organizations, main- 
taining Communist associations, making and writing statements 
of such a nature as to arouse legitimate suspicions. The available 
information on the technique of the crypto-Communist has evoked 
a healthy respect for his elusiveness and ingenuity. Alger Hiss was 
able to fool intimate friends and such seasoned men of affairs as 
Dean Acheson and Felix Frankfurter. And who would today be- 
lieve Hiss was a Communist but for the tenacity and foresight of 
Whittaker Chambers and his uncanny prescience in preserving the 
pumpkin papers? We dare not assume that for every Alger Hiss 
providence will give us a Whittaker Chambers. 

Thus, a precise verdict on McCarthy’s charges would be as fol- 
lows: McCarthy did not present conclusive evidence that there 
were 57 card-carrying Communists in the State Department; and 
he should not have made the specific charge he made. It does not 
follow that none of the persons he named was a Communist; nor 
that in the light of their records they should have been permitted 
to remain employees of the State Department. Franklin Roosevelt 
is not widely remembered as the American President who repudi- 
ated virtually every plank of the platform on which he was elected. 
Just so, McCarthy should not be remembered as the man who 
didnt produce 57 Communist Party cards but as the man who 
brought public pressure to bear on the State Department to revise 
its practices and to eliminate from responsible positions flagrant 
security risks. 

After Ty dings’ Report, the odds were against McCarthy’s politi- 
cal survival, and certainly against his being remembered in this 
way. We must not, however, lodge the Tydings Committee with 
too great a share of the responsibility for the scandalous public 
misinformation about McCarthy. All that the unscrupulous au- 
thors of the Tydings Report could do was write a smear Report and 



file it. The fate of the Report was placed, as all such things are 
placed, in the hands of opinion-molders throughout the land. 

There was that Report— a palpable fraud. They could expose 
that fraud; or they could become accomplices after the fact. For 
the most part, they chose the latter course. And this— not McCar- 
thyism, not even the performance of the Tydings Committee— is 
the nation’s living shame. 


A Vindication 

I t is hardly possible to examine State Department security with- 
out having access to data that are as readily available as the 
latest statistics on the hydrogen bomb. Still, an authentic (as 
distinct from a complete) appraisal can be made by piecing to- 
gether the scraps of information that have become public and by 
searching out a few others. In our examination of the Depart- 
ment’s performance we have concentrated on the evaluative divi- 
sion of its security apparatus; that is to say, we have at all times 
assumed that the investigative arm has done its job thoroughly and 
in good faith. We then asked whether, given the information avail- 
able to it, the Department acted in the national interest. 

The document of primary importance in evaluating the Depart- 
ment’s security program is the transcript of Loyalty Security Board 
hearings. This is the Board before which a suspect employee ap- 
pears (if he so wishes) to answer charges made against him. But 
the transcript is highly confidential and its release to the public can 
only be authorized by the employee under investigation. These 
minutes would reveal the extent to which the “government’s case” 
is pressed before the Board. They would indicate whether suspect 
employees are being subjected to artful and penetrating cross- 
examination, and whether the Board evidences initial prejudice for 
or against the employee. They would expose any tendencies to 
stray from justice in the direction of either Kangarooism or white- 
washing. Finally, they would throw light on the quality of the 
working judgment of the Board’s panel members. For they would 
indicate whether these men are intelligently and rigorously apply- 
ing the loyalty and security standards set by Department direc- 
tives. The minutes would, in fact, be the best evidence as to whether 
or not the internal security of the United States is being adequately 
protected in the State Department. 


But only one set of Board minutes has, to our knowledge, been 
released. It deals with the case of John Stewart Service. 

John Stewart Service appeared before the State Department’s 
Loyalty and Security Board in May of 1950. Even then, Service was 
a strong contender for the title, “most frequently cleared man in 
all Washington.” He had been cleared by the Board on January 18, 

1949. After McCarthy made his charges, Service’s case had been 
reprocessed, and a new clearance had been given him on March 1, 

1950. He had been called up again, and cleared again, on October 
6, 1950. He had been cleared a fourth time on March 7, 1951. Three 
months after that, a fifth time; and on July 31, 1951, a sixth time. 
Several months later, however, the Civil Service Loyalty Review 
Board took the Service case out of the State Department’s hands 
and found, on December 31, 1951, that there was “reasonable 
doubt” as to his loyalty. Mr. Acheson immediately suspended Serv- 
ice (as is mandatory under the Executive Order) and subsequently 
fired him. 

The charges against Service were based on two separate counts. 
Between 1942 and 1945, Service was stationed in China as a For- 
eign Service Officer. From there he submitted memoranda to his 
superiors in Washington enthusiastically praising Mao Tse Tung 
and the Chinese Communists and avidly supporting the contention 
that their movement had its roots, not in Leninism, but in an aspira- 
tion for indigenous agrarian and democratic reforms. The Service 
memoranda were also severely critical of the Chinese Nationalists, 
whom they described as an effete, corrupt, and unreliable force. 
The question arose whether Mr. Service’s judgment, as expressed 
in these memoranda, was influenced by a devotion to Communism, 
or whether he simply suffered from a severe case of politico-ethical 
astigmatism. With this question we have dealt in an earlier chapter. * 

The second count was more dramatic and perhaps also more 
important. On June 6, 1945, Service was arrested by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation for having transmitted, without authority, 
classified documents to the editors of Amerasia , a Communist mag- 
azine. Other factors in the case, together with a precis of Service’s 
defense, are discussed in the foregoing chapter on the Tydings 
Committee. Here we concern ourselves only with a few security 
aspects of the case. And the following questions warrant careful 

x. Having at least prima facie evidence against Service (there 

* See “The Case of John Stewart Service.” 


was no disputing his breach of security regulations in 1945), why 
did the State Department wait several years* before presenting 
his case to a loyalty tribunal? 

2. Having been cleared on the loyalty count (“reasonable 
grounds” ) , why was he not dismissed as a security risk where ac- 
tion would have been governed by the “reasonable doubt” stand- 
ard? Is not the transmission of classified material to a Communist* * 
enough to create reasonable doubt of an employee’s reliability? 

3. What about the two of Service’s six trials that were held after 
the 28th of April, 1951, and hence under the revised, “reasonable 
doubt” loyalty standard? 

4. How many members of Congress, had they been ruling on the 
case, would have exonerated Service under the security standard? 
Which brings up the further question. Does it matter how mem- 
bers of Congress would have ruled? 

5. Why ( see Service’s published loyalty hearings ) did not a se- 
curity officer assume a function analogous to that of the public 
prosecutor in a trial? Service was represented by an able and con- 
vincing lawyer. The government was not. Government cross-exam- 
ination and rebuttal were, therefore, ineffective, unresourceful, 
and diffident. (This procedural deficiency confers a formidable 
and often crucial advantage on the “accused.” To be sure, members 
of the Board are permitted to cross-examine and even to contradict 
witnesses. But, by definition, as a panel of judges, they are expected 
not to show bias. Certainly they cannot legitimately do for the 
government the sort of job Charles Rhetts did for John Service.!) 

6. Does not the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board’s reversal 
of previous determinations indicate that its conception of what 
constitutes a “reasonable doubt” of loyalty differed from that of the 
State Department Board? Which of the two— the Civil Service 
Board or the State Department Board— exercised the sounder judg- 
ment on this point? Is it not perplexing— and significant— that, 
while the Civil Service Board ruled adversely even in the loyalty 

* During which time he was promoted. 

0 * By an officer who had given evidence, a few months before, of a distinct 
understanding of security regulations when he refused to reveal classified 
material to Mr. Brooks Atkinson of the New York Times. 

+ The same deficiency prevailed on the appellate level, where the defend- 
ant and his lawyer were entitled to plead before the Secretary of State (or 
his designee), while no one was allowed to argue for the other side. At the 
suggestion of Senator McCarthy (Senate Appropriations Committee Hear- 
ings [fiscal] 1953, p. 435), the State Department revised this procedure in the 
summer of 1952. 


category, the State Department had cleared Service on loyalty and 

McCarthy pressed the case against John Stewart Service before 
the Tydings Committee, which, as we have seen, cleared him. 

No other Board minutes, that we know of, have been released. 
For the most part, therefore, scattered data on particular cases 
must be leaned on to arrive at a judgment regarding the perform- 
ance of the State Department in the field of security. In discussing 
these cases in the following pages, we shall mention by name the 
persons concerned— but only if their loyalty has been publicly ques- 
tioned elsewhere. What is more, we shall not reveal damaging in- 
formation that sits, undiscussed, in the raw files of some of them; 
for some of the information may be false, or may be explainable, 
and may, for those reasons or others, have remained suppressed. 

William T. Stone 

William T. Stone left the Board of Economic Warfare to join the 
State Department as director of its Office of International Informa- 
tion and Cultural Affairs on the 12th of November, 1945. On the 
22nd of March, 1946, the Bannerman Security Screening Board of 
the State Department concluded a report on him as follows : 

. . . it is recommended that action be instituted to terminate subject's 
services with the State Department. It is suggested, to achieve this pur- 
pose, that an appropriate officer of the Department should inform 
[Stone] that his continued presence in the Department is embarrassing 
to the Department and that he be given an opportunity to resign. If 
[Stone] should not resign voluntarily, action should be instituted under 
Civil Service Rule 3 to terminate his services with the Department. 1 

The case against Stone was based on the following information: 

1. From 1937 to 1941, Stone was a member of the editorial board 
of Amerasia . Amerasia was not captured by the Communists; it 
had been pro-Communist from the outset. 

2. On December 10, 1941, Frederick Vanderbilt Field wrote to 
the head of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Edward C. Carter, as 



I have just had a conversation with Bill Stone over long distance. 
He was speaking from the office of the Economic Defense Board and 
indicated that we should go into the problem of my getting a job more 
fully in personal conversation. Nevertheless we had enough of a talk 
to convey a pretty clear picture. 

Bill said that there would be very formidable obstacles indeed to my 
getting a Washington job . 2 

Subsequently, Stone endorsed Field for a job in military intelli- 
gence. 3 Whether Stone knew Field to be a Communist, only he can 
say. Certainly he had reason so to regard him. ( See “The Case of 
Philip Jessup” for a discussion of the notoriety of Field’s Commu- 
nist activities at the time.) 

3. While Stone was Assistant Administrator of the Board of Eco- 
nomic Warfare, an adverse security report arrived from military 
intelligence on Communist spymaster Nathan Gregory Silvermas- 
ter, also employed by the BEW. Stone advised Silvermaster of the 
report— in fact, turned it over to him for his perusal. 

Mr. Stripling [Counsel, House Committee on Un-American Activ- 
ities]. Mr. Stone, of the Board of Economic Warfare, gave you a copy 
of the Naval Intelligence protest against you? 

Mr. Silvermaster. Yes. 

Mr. Stripling. He gave it to you? 

Mr. Silvermaster. Yes. 

Mr. Stripling. You answered that report yourself? 

Mr. Silvermaster. I answered the report. 

Mr. Stripling. You yourself answered it? 

Mr. Silvermaster. That is right. 

Mr. Stripling. Where was your report submitted? 

Mr. Silvermaster. ... to Mr. Stone . 4 [Italics added.] 

4. A report prepared for the House Appropriations Committee 
in late 1947 noted that “subject [Stone] has also since recommend- 
ed two former employees of the Amerasia Editorial Board to posi- 
tions with the State Department.” 

On June 18, 1947, after the replacement of Panuch, Bannerman, 
and other members of the relatively hard-hitting security staff of 
1946, a State Department official summarized the case of Stone as 
follows : 

It is not believed by this office that the information at hand raises a 
reasonable doubt as to the subject's loyalty to the United States, and 
accordingly, security clearance is recommended. However, this office 
intends at a later date, when the personnel is available, to review the 



issues of Amerasia Magazine from 1937 to 1941 and to determine if the 
contents of the articles are such as to have a bearing on the security 
status of subject. 

Four months later, the State Department had not yet reviewed 
these issues of Amerasia. It is not known whether the promised bit 
of research was ever accomplished; though it is known that even 
the very first issue of Amerasia satisfied the American Politburo on 
its faithfulness to the Party Line. 

And it is known that in the summer of 1950 Stone's case was in 
the State Department's loyalty and security channels, awaiting 
adjudication. He was cleared. A year later, in November or early 
December, 1951, presumably as a result of further investigation, he 
was again cleared. On January 31, 1952, the records of the case 
went to the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board for the customary 
post-audit. The Board expressed its dissatisfaction with the han- 
dling of the case and indicated it would take charge of it ( as it had 
done with that of John Stewart Service). On the 2nd of February, 
1952, William T. Stone resigned from the State Department, so that 
the reviewing Board never decided his case. 

It is quite possible that Stone has satisfactory explanations for 
having served on the editorial board of Amerasia; for having rec- 
ommended Frederick Vanderbilt Field for a job in military intelli- 
gence; for having tipped Silvermaster off on his dossier in the Naval 
Intelligence files; and for having recommended other Amerasia 
editors for positions in the State Department. Still, it was the view 
of the Civil Service Board, as of January of 1952, that despite his 
State Department clearances there were still questions about Stone 
worth investigating. And if Stone was a loyalty or a security risk, he 
had six years time, while occupying an influential position, to dam- 
age the United States— even though his dismissal was recommend- 
ed in the first of these six years. His unexpected and untimely resig- 
nation, of course, does not inspire confidence in either him or the 
State Department officials who handled his case. 

William T. Stone's name is one of those given the Tydings Com- 
mittee by Senator McCarthy. He was McCarthy's Case Number 46. 

John Carter Vincent 

John Carter Vincent’s case is in some respects similar to the 
Service case. 

The doubts about Vincent rest, first, on his energetic activities in 


behalf of the Chinese Communists while occupying various impor- 
tant positions in the State Department. Vincent joined the State 
Department in 1924, and he rose rapidly after the beginning of 
the war. In 1943 he was appointed Assistant to the Chief of the 
Far Eastern Division of the State Department, under Joseph Grew. 
Later the same year he was appointed Special Assistant to Presi- 
dent Roosevelt’s Administrative Assistant for Foreign Affairs, 
Lauchlin Currie, whom former communist Elizabeth Bentley 
named as a member of the Silvermaster communist spy 
group. During the ensuing years, most particularly after he took 
over the Division of Chinese Affairs, Vincent had an important hand 
in U.S. diplomatic activities that hastened Mao Tse Tung’s con- 
quest of China. 

The report of the McCarran Committee, based on fourteen 
volumes of testimony concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations, 
concluded that “over a period of years, John Carter Vincent was 
the principal fulcrum of IPR pressures and influence in the State 

But in addition to doubts that reasonably arise concerning the 
reliability of a Far Eastern “expert” who so consistently misinter- 
prets vital data and misdirects American policy in favor of our 
enemies, the case against Vincent has been substantially rein- 
forced by the testimony of Louis Budenz who stated in the summer 
of 1951 that he had known Vincent to be a member of the Commu- 
nist Party. 5 

Yet on the 19th of June, 1952, Mr. Carlisle Humelsine, Deputy 
Under Secretary of State for Administration, testified that John 
Carter Vincent had been cleared three times by the Loyalty Secur- 
ity Board of the Department of State. 6 And Vincent was cleared 
twice again during the next six months. 

On December 12 , 1952, the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board 
reversed the State Department by finding that reasonable doubt 
existed concerning Vincent’s loyalty. 

This, then, is another instance in which a subordinate board re- 
peatedly clears a man on loyalty and security, and a superior board 
finds against him even on loyalty . If the Civil Service Review 
Board’s judgment was the sounder one, then the State Depart- 
ment’s security setup was such as to enable a loyalty risk to occupy 
crucially important posts indefinitely. During Vincent’s stay in the 
State Department, the Communist cause in the Far East was dra- 
matically advanced; and since a reasonable doubt about Vincent in 



1952 presumably constitutes a reasonable doubt about him in 1947 
( though the critical Budenz testimony was not elicited until 1951 ) , 
Vincent may have been instrumental in this advance. The McCar- 
ran Committee came to just this conclusion. 

Notwithstanding the Loyalty Review Board’s recommendation, 
Dean Acheson (although he suspended Vincent) did not fire him. 
Instead, he persuaded President Truman to repudiate, in effect, his 
own loyalty program. Truman set up a board, headed by Judge 
Learned Hand, to review the findings of the Review Board. Secre- 
tary Dulles dissolved this novel piece of machinery when he as- 
sumed office in January, 1953. 

But shortly thereafter, without authority and in clear violation of 
the regulations of the federal loyalty program* Dulles reversed 
the findings of the Loyalty Review Board. He went on to “request” 
Vincent’s resignation— on the grounds that he had shown bad judg- 
ment— but he publicly stated that, in his view, Vincent was neither 
a loyalty nor a security risk and, by implication, that any doubts as 
to whether he was either, were unreasonable. 

The refusal of the State Department Loyalty Security Board— 
and of Secretary Dulles— to declare Vincent either a loyalty or a 
security risk, commits them, incidentally, to the curious position 
concerning Louis Budenz’ veracity that, as we noted above, the 
Ty dings Committee took in the Hanson case: 

Louis Budenz declares that John Carter Vincent was a member 
of the Communist Party. 

Concealed membership in the Communist Party constitutes rea- 
sonable doubt as to a man’s loyalty. 

The State Department and Secretary Dulles find the loyalty of 
John Carter Vincent to be beyond reasonable doubt. 

* It is curious that Secretary Dulles was never censured for his cavalier 
disregard of the rules. The State Department’s Manual of Regulations and 
Procedures governing loyalty and security clearly implies that the Secretary 
of State has no power to overrule the Civil Service Loyalty Board. (See 
sections 396.11 and 366.41, May 4, 1951). Carlisle Humelsine of the State 
Department stressed the sovereignty of the Loyalty Review Board early in 
1952 before a Senate Committee: 

“Senator McCarthy. Am I correct in saying that Mr. Acheson [i.e., the 
Secretary of State] has the final say on both loyalty and security cases in the 
State Department? 

“Mr. Humelsine. He has the final say in the Department on security 
cases, hut in loyalty cases [Vincent's was a loyalty case], he does not have 
the final authority. The final authority rests with the Review Board” ( Italics 
added. Senate Appropriations for 1953, p. 982.) 



Therefore: The State Department and Secretary Dulles find no 
reasonable doubt but that Louis Budenz lied. 

This conclusion assumes especial interest if we bear in mind that 
Budenz' contributions to the work of the Federal Bureau of Inves- 
tigation have been warmly applauded by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, and 
that an official of the Justice Department has said of Budenz, “His 
evidence has been worth 20 divisions to the United States.” 

The question arises: If sworn testimony from the former manag- 
ing editor of the Daily Worker ( a witness whose reliability has been 
frequently tested ) , to the effect that a State Department official was 
known to him to be a Communist, is not sufficient evidence to satis- 
fy the State Department that reasonable doubt exists concerning 
that official's loyalty— much less reliability— what, then, does it take 
to arouse “reasonable” doubts? Secretary Dulles' unthinking rever- 
sal of the Civil Service Board has thrown a wrench into the security 
operation of the federal government. 

John Carter Vincent's name was given to the Tydings Commit- 
tee. He was one of McCarthy's numbered cases. 

Oliver Edmund Clubb 

The public case against Clubb, a career Far Eastern expert in the 
State Department, rests principally on his associations with such 
Communists and Communist sympathizers as Agnes Smedley, 
Michael Gold, Lawrence Todd, Philip Jaffe, and others.* 

There are scattered references to Clubb in the McCarran Com- 
mittee hearings on the IPR; and there is a note in Whittaker Cham- 
bers’ book, Witness , which tells of Clubb's visiting the editorial of- 
fices of the New Masses in 1932. All the above does not, in the opin- 
ion of the authors, justify a “reasonable doubt” as to Clubb's loy- 
alty; nor does it justify an adverse security finding. It seems a safe 
guess, then— though a guess just the same— in the light of what fol- 
lows, that the State Department or the FBI had assembled further 
and more conclusive evidence against Clubb. (An employee is 
presented with a transcript of his hearings before a loyalty board, 
and is privileged to release them. Clubb has not done this. ) 

0 The minutes of Clubb’s hearing before the State Department Loyalty 
and Security Board have not been released. The House Committee on Un- 
American Activities, however, interrogated Clubb on March 14, August 20, 
and August 23, 1951, and its hearings are public. 



On June 27, 1951, he was suspended from his job— an unusual 
step. The Department does not, as a matter of course, suspend an 
employee when he is put in channels, pending final action on him 
by the Department’s security division. 

On February 11, 1952, the State Department called in the press 
and announced that Clubb had been cleared. 

Q. [By a reporter] Did you say he was cleared of these charges? 

A. Absolutely cleared, — cleared on loyalty and security. 

Q. If there were loyalty charges, this new standard [reasonable 
doubt] was used and he was judged innocent? 

A. That is right. 

Q. Mac, [Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations, Michael Mc- 
dermott] you say he was cleared on both loyalty and security 
charges, — then there were both charges against him? 

A. He was cleared on both loyalty and security. It doesn’t say 
charges. There is no question about either one and he was re- 
stored to duty. 

This, it turned out, was not quite the whole story. Senators Fer- 
guson and McCarthy discovered (1) that the State Department 
Loyalty and Security Board had, by unanimous vote, decided that 
Clubb’s retention in the State Department constituted a security 
risk; (2) that Mr. Carlisle Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary for 
Administration and top official in the security field, had concurred 
in the Board’s judgment; (3) that Clubb had appealed to Secretary 
Acheson, who appointed a retired diplomat, Mr. Nathaniel Davis, 
to review the case; and that on Davis’ recommendation Acheson 
had overruled the Board and restored Clubb to duty; (4) that 
Clubb had promptly resigned— whether by prearrangement or not, 
it is impossible to say. 

On March 5, 1952, Mr. Acheson admitted to the press that Sena- 
tors Ferguson and McCarthy were correct. 

Oliver Edmund Clubb had been an employee of the State De- 
partment since 1928. He had held responsible posts in Hankow, 
Peking, Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, Shanghai, Saigon, Chungking, 
Kunming, Tihwa, Mukden, Harbin and Changchun, prior to his 
appointment as chief of the China Desk in 1950. If the State De- 
partment’s Board and the State Department’s chief security officer 
were correct in adjudging him a security risk his presence in the 
Department through the years that cost us China becomes (like 
the presence of Vincent and Service ) highly significant. 



Why was the State Department so tardy in investigating Clubb? 
Was the evidence against him unavailable until 1951? Or did the 
State Department satisfy itself with the blanket clearance given 
him by the Tydings Committee? 

Although Clubb was not one of McCarthy’s “numbered” cases, 
McCarthy gave the Committee Clubb’ s name and some of the evi- 
dence against him. 

Edward G. Posniak 

On July 6, 1948, the FBI transmitted to the State Department an 
eleven-page report on Edward G. Posniak who had been one of its 
employees since October 26 , 1945. He was then working as an in- 
ternational economist in the Division of Investment and Economic 
Development, Central and Eastern European Branch. 

Posniak, bom in Russia, emigrated to the United States in 1935 
and was naturalized in 1939. Except for a few months he had spent 
with a manufacturing concern in Stamford, Connecticut, in 1937, 
and a short period under contract with the Brookings Institute, 
Posniak had always worked for the government. Before entering 
the State Department, he had been employed, in that order, by the 
Department of Justice, the Federal Public Housing Administra- 
tion, and the Office of Strategic Services. He enlisted in the Army in 
August, 1943, and remained in the service for two years, doing 
work for the OSS. Then he joined the State Department. 

His State Department post was important. It is described in the 
FBI report as follows: 

In this capacity, he [Posniak] works with the Assistant Chief and 
other ranking officers in the drafting of final policy determinations re- 
garding various forms of economic assistance, investment and develop- 
ment programs. He also makes policy recommendations in connection 
with questions of public and private investment and effect on industrial 
organizations, economic stability and development of the central and 
eastern European areas and their relationship to the broad objectives 
of the United States “foreign policy.” For the past several months [i.e., 
in early 1948] he has been working on the question of exports to Rus- 
sia and the satellite nations. 

With respect to Posniak’s ideological affiliations, the report had 
this to say: 



An FBI agent who joined the Communist Party at the request of the 
Bureau in 1936 and was expelled from the Communist Party in 1948 
and whose record as an informant was one of complete reliability , 
stated that Posniak was a member of the Communist Party and per- 
sonally known to him as such, . . . 

According to this informant . . . Posniak came to a lot of "open unit” 
meetings and to all recruiting meetings of the Communist Party from 
1938 to sometime in 1942. This informant said he had no contact with 
Posniak since 1942, stating further that Posniak was horrified at the 
Russo-German alliance of 1939. 

Another reliable FBI informant recalled Posniak as a member of the 
Communist Party in the late 1930’s. [Italics added.] 

In the summer of 1938, while— according to the testimony of an 
FBI agent— Posniak was an active member of the Communist 
Party, he was engaged by the Brookings Institute to work on one 
of its studies. Before hiring him, the report goes on to say, his su- 
periors “specifically questioned Posniak as to any Communist con- 
nections he might have had in Russia or Europe, and Posniak said 
he had none, and expressed himself against Communist Party prin- 

Furthermore, an associate in the Federal Public House Admini- 
stration, who had known Posniak “from 1938 to 1941 and had 
worked under him for one year,” “highly regarded Posniak and 
stated [that] during the time he had known Posniak, Posniak had 
exhibited nothing reflecting on his loyalty/’ 

In short, Posniak appears to have had something of Hiss’ talent 
for persuading his associates that he was loyal to the United States. 

The FBI also included an affidavit from a responsible scholar 
who had been associated with Posniak for some time in the State 
Department. (In reproducing it, we withhold only the name of 
the informant, the names of other persons, and some identifying 
data.) The affidavit shows impressively how the presumption that 
State Department personnel had been thoroughly screened helped 
pro-Communists to influence the conduct of foreign affairs. 

I served [the informant stated, in] . . . the Czechoslovakian Commit- 
tee in May and June of 1946. My acquaintance with the person in whom 
you are interested is limited to this period. At the first meeting and at 
all meetings thereafter, I noted that he approached each problem from 
the standpoint "How will this help Czechoslovakia?” ... As I recall, 
such questions as German transit rates, the settlement of the Army’s 
debts, and further loans to Czechoslovakia were under consideration. 
I know nothing about the person in question, but the bias displayed 



was so marked that I queried [Miss X] and found she had reacted in 
a similar fashion. I assumed he was of Czech origin and checked the 
register as a matter of curiosity, only to discover that his origin was 
Russian. Since he had worked in other agencies and his origin would 
naturally have caused him to be thoroughly investigated, I did nothing 
further at the time. 

I recall two other episodes. He requested me to have reproduced, as 
a Committee document, an article by . . . which had appeared in the 
Congressional Record. (I believe at the request of Congressman Sa- 
bath, but am not certain. ) The article was a eulogy of Benes’ policy of 
friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Apart from the con- 
tents of die article ( about which I had grave questions ) , the request 
to publish it as a Committee document was peculiarly out of order. I 
spoke with [Y] and [Z] of the Secretariat about it, but they took the 
position that the Secretariat couldn’t question a Committee member’s 
request. I then spoke with . . . the Committee Chairman, stressing the 
inappropriateness and the expense (the article was lengthy). He di- 
rected me not to issue it as a document, but to obtain a few copies of 
the Record and circulate them for information. That was done. 

At that stage I was beginning to have doubts of the nature of the pro- 
Czech bias — was it pro-Czech or pro-Soviet? — particularly since the re- 
ports from our Embassy were to the effect that Czechoslovakia was 
over the hump and that we might be building up Czech industry for 
Russia. All the information coming into the Department during that 
period was certainly opposed to the position taken by the person under 
consideration, and policy in line with the reports was established by 
the Secretary shortly thereafter. Toward the end of June I attended a 
meeting of the Russian Committee under. . . . , Secretary of the Com- 
mittee, at which the individual under consideration was present. After 
the meeting, which was on a highly secret matter [X] commented that 
he considered the individual dangerously pro-Soviet and that he in- 
tended to discuss the question of his further attendance with the Chair- 
man of the Russian Committee. * I do not know what subsequently 
transpired, since I went on detail to . . . early in July. . . . 

It was considerably later, when all connection with the Committee 
and the individual had been terminated, that I recommended an inves- 

The determining factor was the realization , from facts emerging in 
another case , that the assumption of thorough investigation in view of 
background was not necessarily valid. I still hesitated since I am totally 
opposed to “ red-smearing ’ and other forms of harassment . I was 
questioned about another individual both by the Department security 
officers and by FBI agents and was impressed by their ability and by 
their sincerity in trying to search out the truth. With that assurance of 
a thorough investigation and fair hearing for the individual, I felt that 

* The person in question substantially corroborated this account of his 



I dared not refrain any longer from recommending an investigation. 
This is the only instance in over six years with the Department when I 
have felt that I had to take such action. [Italics added.] 

The FBI report stated that Posniak had continued to associate 
with at least three Communists and fellow travelers into 1948, that 
is, up to the latest moment the report covered.* 

On the other side of the ledger, the FBI report contained a dozen 
or so statements from former associates and employers to the ef- 
fect that they believed Posniak to be loyal. 

With this evidence before it, the Loyalty Security Board of the 
State Department cleared Posniak in 1948 on both loyalty and se- 
curity and he resumed his duties with the Department. In the minds 
of the Board’s members there were no grounds for believing Pos- 
niak to be a loyalty risk, and no grounds for justifying even a rea- 
sonable doubt that he was a security risk! 

Two years later, on November 15, 1950, the State Department 
wrote to the Loyalty Review Board that Posniak “elected to resign 
rather than accept suspension pending investigation and adjudica- 
tion of certain charges bearing on loyalty.” 

Evidently, the FBI had had information on Posniak’s Communist 
allegiances as early as 1938. Did it communicate this information 
to the OSS and to the State Department? If so, how was Posniak 
able to get jobs in those sensitive agencies? Why did the State De- 
partment Loyalty and Security Board wait until 1948 before proc- 
essing him? And how, in the face of the FBI agent’s testimony, did 
it persuade itself Posniak was clearable? Why— with the same secur- 
ity standards valid in 1950 as in 1948— did Posniak get cleared in 
1948 and find himself suspended in 1950? 

Edward C. Posniak’s case was submitted by McCarthy to the 
Tydings Committee (Case No. 77). 

* Also included in the report is a bizarre affidavit from a confidential in- 
formant who volunteered his opinions about Posniak’s loyalty because he 
had distributed literature of the America First Committee (during 1939 and 
1940) — “which at that time I considered to be a group which were [sic] 
disloyal to the United States.” “I believe Mr. Posniak was a member of the 
America First Organization,” the informant went on, “because he tried to 
sell the principals [sic] of the organization to two of the elevator operators 
which he intimated to the operators as being better than our American way.” 
Messrs. Roger Baldwin and Alan Barth will be pleased to note that true to 
its claims, the nonevaluating FBI passes along all its information, no matter 
how ridiculous. 



David Zablodowsky and Stanley Graze 

David Zablodowsky resigned from the State Department on 
July 7, 1946, having served as chief of its Editorial Branch. (He 
then became Director of the United Nations Publishing Division.) 

Six years passed. On October 23, 1952, Whittaker Chambers tes- 
tified before the McCarran Committee that he had known Zablo- 
dowsky as a member of an underground espionage ring in 1936. 
This Zablodowsky admitted, though he denied ever having been a 
“member” of the Communist Party (which, in the circumstances, 
is neither here nor there ) . 

Zablodowsky was McCarthy’s Case No. 103. Like everybody 
else, Zablodowsky was cleared by the Tydings Committee. 

Stanley Graze worked for the State Department until 1948. On 
April 20, 1948, he was cleared by the Loyalty Security Board. He 
resigned from the State Department ten days later to go to work 
at the United Nations. 

On October 14, 1952, Graze refused to answer the following 
question put to him by the McCarran Committee: “Are you now 
or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?” He 
also refused to answer the question: “Are you now engaged in espi- 
onage activity against the United States?” 

How, in view of these refusals, are we to explain his having 
survived his hearing before the State Department Board? Did the 
Board ask him whether he was a member of the Communist Party? 
If so, did he on that occasion (as before the McCarran Commit- 
tee ) refuse to answer— and win a clearance notwithstanding? If he 
did answer and denied Communist Party membership, how explain 
his refusal to answer the same question four years later? Is the 
State Department in a position to furnish the Justice Department 
with a transcript of the Graze hearings, with a view to determining 
whether perjury has been committed? 

Graze (McCarthy’s Case Number 8) was cleared by the Tyd- 
ings Committee. 

Esther Brunauer 

Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer (for a full discussion see Chapter 
VII) joined the State Department in November, 1944, and rose to 
the position of policy liaison officer for UNESCO (July 1, 1947). 



Immediately after her husband’s suspension by the Navy for 
security reasons in April, 1951, Mrs. Brunauer was suspended by 
the State Department— where suspension of an employee pending 
adjudication of a security proceeding was by no means a common 
practice. There is reason to believe that the evidence against her 
prompted this unusual action.* 

On June 16, 1952, Mrs. Brunauer was dismissed by the State 
Department, as a security risk. 

Senator McCarthy submitted the Brunauer case to the Tydings 
Committee. She was McCarthy’s Case Number 17. 

The following cases, briefly summarized, throw light on one or 
another of the points at issue in this book. In most instances, the 
persons listed below were members of the State Department who 
brushed up against its security division. They are not all— by any 
means— transparent security risks. In one way or another, however, 
their experiences add to the picture of a fumbling and insensitive 
security program. 

Herbert Fierst was hired by the State Department in Septem- 
ber, 1946. In 1951, he got into the loyalty-security channels of the 
State Department. The Civil Service Loyalty Review Board ex- 
pressed dissatisfaction with the handling of his case, and sent it 
back to the State Department Board for readjudication. In short, 
a judgment was handed down by the Central Board (as the Civil 
Service Loyalty Review Board is often called ) that a State Depart- 
ment officer’s loyalty status had not been explored with sufficient 
thoroughness even after seven years. Fierst was one of McCarthy’s 
numbered cases. 

John Paton Davies had been processed at least four times by 
the State Department Board on the strength of charges of pro-Chi- 
nese-Communist activity. In December, 1952, the Civil Service 
Board ( whose jurisdiction extends only to loyalty, not to security 
cases) ruled that no reasonable doubt existed as to Davies’ loyalty. 

0 Senator Ferguson: . . your board has already decided in the loyalty 

channel that there was sufficient evidence to suspend [Mrs. Brunauer] ?” 
Mr. Humelsine: “There was.” ( Senate Appropriations for 1Q53, p. 457, 
March 27, 1952.) 



However, in April, 1953, Davies was transferred by the new admin- 
istration from an important post in Germany to a relatively unim- 
portant post in Lima, Peru. In the meantime, the McCarran Com- 
mittee had found that Davies had "testified falsely before the sub- 
committee in denying that he recommended the Central Intelli- 
gence Agency employ, utilize and rely upon certain individuals 
having Communist associations and connections. This matter was 
. . . substantial in import.” 7 Davies was one of McCarthy’s num- 
bered cases. 


Hans Lansberg had left the State Department before the Tyd- 
ings Committee began its work, to take a job with the Department 
of Commerce. As a former State Department employee, however, 
he came under the purview of the Tydings Committee, which 
cleared him. A year later he was ruled a loyalty risk by the Com- 
merce Department, a ruling which the Civil Service Loyalty Re- 
view Board upheld on May 25, 1951. In other words, the State 
Department’s loyalty-security machinery failed to apprehend a 
loyalty risk whom a less sensitive agency disposed of as such at a 
later date. And here, as elsewhere, the Tydings Committee not only 
slept on a tip from McCarthy that was to be vindicated in due 
time, but actually gave the individual a further "clearance” to 
point to. Landsberg was one of McCarthy’s numbered cases. 


Val R. Lorwin joined the State Department in December, 1945. 
He became chief of the Department’s European division of inter- 
national labor, social and health affairs; subsequently, he worked 
for the Department as a labor economist. A year after the Tydings 
Committee cleared Lorwin, the Department suspended him— on 
February 5, 1951. He was restored to duty by the Department on 
March 28, 1952, and in June was formally cleared of all charges 
bearing on loyalty or security. Shortly after, he resigned, and went 
to work for the University of Chicago as an assistant professor of 
social sciences and industrial relations. 

On December 4, 1953, a Federal Grand Jury handed down an 
indictment of Lorwin, charging that he had lied under oath in 
claiming (1) that he had never been a member of the Communist 



Party, (2) that he had never carried a Communist Party card, and 
(3) that he had never held a Communist Party meeting in his 

Lorwin was McCarthy’s Case Number 54. 


Peveril Meigs joined the State Department in September, 1945, 
and resigned in 1948, to go to work for the Department of the 
Army. He was cleared by the Tydings Committee. Several months 
later he was suspended by the Army Loyalty Board and, subse- 
quently, was discharged. Meigs was one of McCarthy’s numbered 

[Writes Whittaker Chambers: ] The treasurer of the Ware Apparatus, 
Henry H. Collins, Jr., Princeton and Harvard, and a scion of a Phila- 
delphia manufacturing family, was my personal friend. He also served, 
voluntarily and, in fact, irrepressibly, as a recruiting agent for the So- 
viet apparatus among members of the State Department. It was he who 
recruited one of the Bykov apparatus' State Department sources , a man 
of much more glittery social background than Alger Hiss . 8 [Italics 

The person referred to in the italicized portion of the above para- 
graph (his name has never been publicly discussed) joined the 
State Department in 1940, and resigned in December of 1948. At 
that time the State Department had had in its possession for over 
two years a memorandum stating that he was a “recognized leader” 
of the Communist underground in the State Department. He was 
McCarthy’s Case Number 53. 


Dorothy Kenyon* was hired by the State Department in 1947 
to act as United States Delegate to the United Nations Commission 
on the Status of Women. Three years later, the Tydings Committee 
was given documentary evidence of her participation in at least 
twenty-four Communist fronts during the thirties and forties. 
Judge Kenyon’s appointment with the State Department expired 
* For a full discussion of the Kenyon case, see Chapter VII. 



the last day of December, 1949. She had never been so much as 
investigated by the State Department during the years of her em- 

Judge Kenyon was one of McCarthy’s cases. 

Haldore Hanson* wrote an allegedly pro-Chinese-Communist 
book, Humane Endeavor , in 1939. Before that, he was associated 
with Edgar Snow and Nym Wales, named communists, on a maga- 
zine in Peiping. Hanson was employed by the State Department in 
1942, and rose to the position of Chief of the Technical Cooperation 
Project Staff shortly before the time the Tydings Committee con- 
vened. Louis Budenz testified to the Committee that he had known 
Haldore Hanson to be a member of the Communist Party. The 
Committee— and the State Department— cleared** Hanson. It was 
not until September, 1953, that he was dismissed from federal 

He was one of McCarthy’s public, unnumbered cases. 

William Remington is in jail, having been convicted of perjury 
for denying his membership in the Communist Party. McCarthy 
cannot be given the credit for exposing Remington; he did, how- 
ever, give his name to the Tydings Committee at a time when Rem- 
ington was widely considered guiltless. Remington had been 
cleared by the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board. Remington was 
not an employee of the State Department, but he held a job with 
the Commerce Department in which he worked closely enough 
with the State Department to be of interest to its security office. 

He was McCarthy’s Case Number 19. 


Robert T. Miller joined the State Department in June, 1944, and 
resigned on the 13th of December, 1946. State Department secur- 
ity officers under Panuch urged his dismissal as early as July 24, 

* For a full discussion of Haldore Hanson, see Chapter VII. 

* * The implications of this clearance in the face of Budenz’ testimony are 
identical with those discussed above in connection with John Carter Vincent. 



1946, and the investigators for the House Committee on Appro- 
priations classified him, in 1948, as “in all probability the greatest 
security risk the Department has had ” Former Assistant Secre- 
tary of State, William Benton, in whose office Miller worked, has 
testified 9 that Assistant Secretary Russell, even with the McCar- 
ran Rider in hand, did not feel he had enough evidence to fire 
Miller. In 1951, Elizabeth Bentley testified before the McCarran 
Committee: “Robert Miller was one of the Communist Party mem- 
bers that I took on as an espionage agent way back in 1941. . . . He 
was one of the people I dealt with directly, collected his dues and 
got his information.” 10 

Robert T. Miller was McCarthy’s Case Number 16. 

It would be comforting to state, at this juncture, that we have 
mentioned every security dereliction in the State Department dur- 
ing the period from 1947 to *95° ■ But we have not. Indications are 
that what we have pieced together is but a tiny, though horrifying 
representative fragment of the whole security picture— much of it 
brought to the attention of an unresponsive public by the irrepres- 
sible efforts of one man. 



... alot of people get the idea that this particular program 
[the State Department’s security program] is not under Con- 
gressional scrutiny. I have to go up and get the budget of the 
Department of State each year , and I go before two appropria- 
tions subcommittees , one in the House and one in the Senate 
. . . and they are satisfied that we are running this program in 
the proper way —Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under 
Secretary of State for Administration, on “Meet the Press,” 
August 19, 1951. 

M cCarthy's “terrorization of the Department of State” has 
for several years now been the central preoccupation of our 
intelligentsia. They see in it conclusive evidence that the 
new Age of Conformity is upon us. The Department, they allege, is 
petrified: unable to go about its normal business because it must 
forever be warding off a new McCarthy offensive, unable to recruit 
the talented young men it needs because no self-respecting young 
man would hazard the indignities McCarthy will subject him to, 
powerless in dealing with foreign nations because it is known 
around the world that McCarthy has undermined public confi- 
dence in the State Department. 

To be sure, at least until the change of administration in 1953, 
the State Department often behaved as if McCarthy were its 
Number One problem. The public work on that problem was nor- 
mally left to Mr. Acheson’s low-echelon operators— in part, no 
doubt, because it would have been infra dignitate for Mr. Acheson 
himself to engage in such sordid encounters. In any case, these un- 
derlings, especially those responsible for the operation of the secur- 
ity program, went at the job lustily and certainly not in the manner 
of men terrorized by the mighty McCarthy. 

In October of 1951, for example. General Conrad E. Snow, 
Chairman of the State Department’s Loyalty Security Board since 



its inception, had this to say about the State Department’s troubles 
in a speech delivered at George Washington University: “What, 
then, is all the shouting about? . . . The old saying is— where there 
is so much smoke, there must be some fire. There is, however, no 
excuse for mistaking dust for smoke. The dust in the present case 
is created by one man, tramping about the Nation and making, 
over and over again, the same baseless and disproved accusations. 
The one man is able to raise so much dust only because (1) he is 
a Senator of the United States, and ( 2 ) he speaks in a loud and 
determined voice and waves in his hand a bunch of photostats 
that nobody takes the trouble to examine.” 

Two months earlier, on Meet the Press , Carlisle Humelsine, 
whom moderator Martha Rountree introduced as “the man who is 
responsible for the security program in the State Department,” 
faced a battery of newspaper men and welcomed their questions. 
“Senator McCarthy,” one reporter asked, “has been quite active in 
this field [loyalty in government]. How many new leads would 
you say he has given you for investigation of people in the Depart- 

Very few indeed [Humelsine answered]. The Senator picked up an 
old list that was furnished to the 80th Congress. A couple of new 
names were provided by him. Those have been carefully investigated, 
and as a result of that investigation they have been cleared. Now, it 
might be of interest ... to tell you a story of one of those investigations 
because he charged — among these various lists of names he gave one 
particular name. We looked into this case. The FBI had a very careful 
investigation. They found nothing wrong with the man but they did 
find something wrong with his dad. They found that his dad when a 
young man had been accused of drunken driving and the drunken 
driving had occurred on a bicycle. Now, is that the type of man that 
you want us to get rid of in the State Department? 

The consensus of the reporters present and of the national tele- 
vision audience was, presumably, No, that’s not the type of man 
we want you to get rid of. “Most of these investigations you are 
talking about, at least those which grew out of Senator McCarthy’s 
charges beginning in February, 1950,” asked another reporter, 
“have occurred while you have been in charge of the security work 
of the Department, haven’t they?” Humelsine: 

Well, most of the investigations growing out of Senator McCarthy’s 
charges occurred before I even got in this business because he has taken 


old names that have been gone over and dredging [sic] them up anew. 
I mean, he is riding piggy-back on the 8oth Congress committee that 
made the investigation and cleared the State Department. [Italics 

When asked whether anyone in the Department was furnishing 
McCarthy with material, Humelsine went out of his way to issue 
a warning to all State Department personnel: “I don't know . . . 
[but] if I catch anyone that is feeding him information, I am afraid 
they wont be in the State Department any longer.” 

On March 25, 1952, a few months after this broadcast, the prin- 
cipals in the controversy, excluding only Mr. Acheson, met face to 
face. A subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations 
had taken up the question of loyalty and security in the State De- 
partment. Humelsine and Snow and various of their associates had 
appeared to represent the Department. The Committee, composed 
of Senators McKellar, Ellender, Hill, Kilgore, McClellan, Bridges, 
Saltonstall, Ferguson and McCarthy, was headed by Senator Me- 

The Committee's hearings on loyalty and security in the State 
Department runs to several hundred pages and, even including the 
ex parte hearings of the Tydings Committee held some two years 
earlier, they constitute the most exhaustive inquiry into State De- 
partment security practices that any Committee of Congress has 
ever conducted. We shall, therefore, examine them here at some 

The interrogators did not neglect the early phases of the State 
Department's security program. What, asked Senator McCarthy, 
had become of the employees whom Secretary Byrnes, in his 1946 
letter to Congressman Sabath, had described as unfit for con- 
tinued employment with the State Department because their loy- 
alty was questionable? Humelsine did not have the information at 
hand, and had to set his researchers to dig out the facts. He later 
summarized the findings as follows: 

Investigations by the screening committee [under Byrnes], includ- 
ing those spot checked and those reviewed after full investigation, re- 
sulted in 341 disapprovals. Of these 342 cases, 46, as stated above, after 
receiving full clearance , are still employed by the Department. Of the 
remaining 295 cases two were discharged under the McCarran rider. 


The remaining 293 persons were removed through various types of 
personnel action. 1 [Italics here and throughout this chapter are added.] 

This makes especially interesting reading if we go back two years 
and examine a State Department memorandum to the Tydings 
Committee. The memorandum summarized the fate of the Byrnes’ 
board findings as follows: 

Investigations by the screening committee, including those spot 
checked and those reviewed after fuller investigation, resulted in 341 
“disapprovals.” Of these 341 cases , 58, after receiving full clearance , 
are still employed by the department. Of the remaining 283 cases two 
were discharged under the McCarran rider, referred to hereafter. The 
remaining 281 persons were removed through various types of person- 
nel action. 2 

After two years of denouncing McCarthy, and touting the effi- 
ciency of its security division, the State Department, in other words, 
gave the Senate Committee a paragraph from an old memoran- 
dum, freshened up a bit with some new arithmetic— and even 
failed to notice that its manicured figures proved how truly its se- 
curity program had been defective. Consider what the two para- 
graphs, taken together, say: In 1950 the Department assures the 
Tydings Committee and the American people that the entire 
Byrnes list has been thoroughly investigated; that the security 
risks have been weeded out; and that of the persons in question 
only 58 remain— completely trustworthy employees who have re- 
ceived “full clearance.” Two years later it tells another Senate 
committee that the entire Byrnes list has been thoroughly investi- 
gated; that the security risks have been weeded out; and that of 
the persons in question only 46 remain— completely trustworthy 
employees who have received “full clearance.” At the very outset 
of his campaign against the State Department, McCarthy had 
asked for a full report on the Byrnes list. Nothing to worry about 
there, the State Department had explicitly answered: Only 58 of 
them are still around and they are all right, take our word for it. 
But the Department was apparently prompted to go back and take 
a second look; and twelve of the 58 did not survive that second 
look. Needless to say, the State Department did not acknowledge 
its admitted twelve delinquencies; it did not even bring in a new 
phrasemaker to plead its case. 

The Committee asked: Had the State Department in the entire 
history of the President s loyalty program ever found against, and 



separated, anyone as a loyalty risk? Answer: No.* However, for 
the first time in its history, the Loyalty Security Board had gone 
so far as to rule that somebody— three employees, to be exact— was 
a loyalty risk. But the three were not out yet: the adverse decisions 
were being appealed. What is more, a veritable purge was in the 
offing. For before the year ( 1952) was over, the Board was to find 
ten security risks; and the preceding year it had found six security 
risks.** The Department had found only one security risk— McCar- 
thy's Case No. 53 incidentally— in 1948, one in 1949, and two in 

x 95 a 

Since the President's ban on security information does not pre- 
clude the furnishing of statistical— as opposed to personal— data, 
the authors requested the security division of the Department to 
release the dates on which the persons dismissed as loyalty or 
security risks between 1948 and 1952 had been hired . The informa- 
tion is, to say the least, startling. 

The one employee separated in 1950 had joined the Department 
in 1944. Of the five persons separated in 1951, one had been hired 
in 1933, two in 1946, and one each in 1948 and 1949. Of the nine 
separated in 1952, one each had been hired in 1935, 1942, 1944, 
1945, 1947, 1948, and 1949, and two in 1946. In other words: all 
15 were employed by the Department at the time McCarthy be- 
gan to criticize Department security practices! 

Now what are we to think of this? That the employees in ques- 
tion joined the Communist Party in 1951 and 1952, having been, 
up to that moment, unimpeachably patriotic Department employ- 
ees? That the FBI had neglected, over a period of years, to transmit 
available derogatory evidence to Department security officials? Or, 
that the Department was finally prompted to act on evidence it 
had possessed all along? Clearly, the last of these hypotheses is 
the only convincing one. 

One thing, at least, is certain: In 1950, when State Department 
officials were so vociferously asserting the Department's inviolable 
security, at least 15 persons whom it was itself finally to classify as 
of doubtful loyalty or reliability, were still in its ranks. It is impos- 
sible, due to the President's ban, to ascertain just how many of 

* John Stewart Service had, to be sure, recently been fired as a loyalty 
risk; but only after the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board had overruled the 
Department board and ordered his ouster. 

0 * There is no way of telling how many of these loyalty and security risks 
were among the twelve on the Byrnes list who, according to Humelsine’s 
report, had been removed between 1950-52. 


these persons McCarthy had named to the Tydings Committee. 
We do know, however, that he had named some of them.* 

In any case, what clearly stands out from these statistics is the 
softness of the Department's security attitude at a time when it was 
pretending to be hard. And this is confirmed by what we learn 
from other sources. 

Hiram Bingham, former Republican Senator from Connecticut, 
replaced Seth Richardson as head of the Civil Service Loyalty Re- 
view Board on the 3rd of January, 1951. On February 13 and 14, 
he convened the Board to discuss, among other things, the State 
Department. The minutes of this meeting reached Senator Mc- 
Carthy, who brought them to the attention of the Appropriations 

"I think it is fair to say,” Bingham observed, “that the State De- 
partment, as you know, has the worst record of any department in 
the action of its Loyalty Board. . . . The Loyalty Board, in all the 
cases that have been considered in the State Department, has not 
found anyone— shall I say, ‘guilty' under our rules. It is the only 
Board which has acted that way.” 

It quickly became clear that Bingham was not alone in this view. 
Said one of his colleagues: 

... I don’t understand their position at all, because although their 
board has not held their people ineligible under the loyalty test, who 
should have been held ineligible under that test, they have plenty of 
power to remove them as a security risk. Why haven’t they exercised it? 
They haven’t exercised it, in spite of all the searchlights that have been 
turned upon them. 

The following exchange, initiated by a fourth member of the 
Board, further clarifies the picture: 

Board Member. What are you going to do when the attorney who is 
presenting the charges acts as though he were the attorney for the in- 
cumbent? I read 100 pages of a record where the three members of the 
Board were acting as attorneys for the employee. . . . 

Executive Secretary. Oh, you’re talking about the State Depart- 
ment. They’re taking the attitude that they’re there to clear the em- 
ployee and not to protect the government. We’ve been arguing with 
them since the program started. 

Another Member. That brings up a question that has been on my 
mind a little. ... I have been disturbed about the State Department — 
their remarkable record of never having fired anybody for loyalty, and 

* See “A Vindication.” 



yet we do nothing about it as far as the Board is concerned. I have been 
troubled about whether or not we owe the duty of having somebody 
call the attention of the President, for example, to the fact that the 
program simply does not work in that Department and let him worry 
about it. It seems to me we assume more responsibility when we sit 
back (as we have done) for three years and know that the country 
rests in a false sense of security that we are looking after their interests 
here when we know dam well that it is completely ineffective in one of 
the most important departments of the Government, and I wonder 
whether we ought to say anything to anybody about it. 

Mr. Bingham reminded his colleagues that he had recently 
spoken to the Secretary of State and had said to him: “You’ve got 
to tell the Loyalty Board members [of the State Department] to 
behave themselves.” And Mr. Acheson, he reported, had promised 
to do something about this. 

When the Committee confronted Humelsine with this judg- 
ment of his division s performance by members of the President’s 
Central Loyalty Board, he answered in effect: If the Board indeed 
felt that things were all that bad, why had it not pre-empted juris- 
diction over the alleged loyalty risks in the Department and— as it 
was entitled to do under its own regulations— ordered their ouster? 
Since they had done so in only one case (that of John Stewart 
Service),* didn’t this mean that the situation was not quite as 
serious as it had been painted by a bunch of overwrought gentle- 

Not, let us note, a bad answer. The Civil Service Board did un- 
questionably have the authority to overrule the Department; and 
the question does arise why, given the vehemence with which the 
Board members spoke of the Department, they did not regularly 
invoke that authority. McCarthy, however, was ready with an an- 
swer. For one thing, until 1951 the Board had been restricted by 
Presidential decree to the “reasonable grounds” standard; for an- 
other, it had a millstone around its neck: Seth Richardson was its 
chairman. 3 

Neither of McCarthy’s points here was by any means idle. The 
reasonable grounds formula saddled the administrators of the pro- 
gram with difficult problems, as we have submitted in an earlier 
chapter. For that reason, a few days after he succeeded Richardson 

* Six months later, the Loyalty Review Board acted again, reversing the 
State Department on John Carter Vincent. In 17 instances, the Board expressed 
dissatisfaction with the Department’s handling of a case, and ordered them 
reopened ( Hearings , p. 462) . 



as Board Chairman, Bingham requested President Truman to re- 
vise the standard. As for the attitude of Richardsons Board— and 
McCarthy's point about Richardson himself— it is difficult to quar- 
rel with. During his tenure, the Review Board overruled a great 
many decisions of subordinate boards.* But the fact that the deci- 
sions reversed were decisions against employees suggests pre- 
cisely the kind of bias McCarthy attributed to the Review Board 
while Richardson was Chairman. ( There were of course no rever- 
sals of State Department decisions, because none of them went 
against employees while Richardson was chairman. ) 

“I regret the destruction of any government employee,” Rich- 
ardson once told an editor of the New Republic (February 4, 
1952). “It’s a terrible penalty to be called disloyal. That’s why the 
Board has leaned back in the way it has.” Thus it is not surprising 
to find him writing to Mrs. Roosevelt, on December 6, 1949, that 
the “penalty of a disloyalty discharge is so disastrous that the 
Loyalty Review Board has inclined toward resolving all doubts 
in favor of an involved employee ” Or consider how the Director 
of Personnel of the Government Printing Office testified in August 
1 953 ( before the McCarthy Committee ) as to why Edward Roths- 
child, a GPO employee, had been cleared despite abundant evi- 
dence that he was a member of the Communist Party: 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this: the other day [in executive 
session] as I recall you said your board operated under the general 
rule — I think that is an exact quote — the general rule that mere mem- 
bership in the Communist Party was not sufficient to bar a worker un- 
der your loyalty program. Is that the general rule under which you 

Mr. Hipsley. That is true. I went further, sir, if I may take another 
moment, and told you that Seth Richardson gave us the philosophy be- 
hind that. He gave us a long-winded story about the fact that some time 
ago he wanted to become a member of the IOOF [Odd Fellows] and 
he had no knowledge of the charter and bylaws, and he wanted to be a 
member of the IOOF not because of its charter and bylaws, but be- 
cause it has a nice library of books he wanted to read. He said [there- 
fore that] it was the purpose of the membership [i.e., in the Communist 
Party] , why you belonged, that was important. That was his explana- 
tion. He was our guide . 4 [Italics added.] 

0 See The Federal Loyalty -Security Program , by Eleanor Bontecou (Cor- 
nell, 1953), p. 57. Notorious among the employees so rescued was William 
Remington, whom the Board exonerated in 1949, reversing an agency deter- 



Seth Richardson was perhaps always a little terrified with his 
authority. "You know,” he once said, "the State Department is the 
first department in the government. When Truman walked up to 
Congress the other day Acheson was there next to him. . . . Well, 
I always felt that they felt chagrined that anybody else— especially 
just a board in the Civil Service Commission— should have the pow- 
er to check up on State. They always seemed to say: 'You let us run 
the State Department/ ” 5 

No wonder that Senator McCarran’s Judiciary Committee de- 
cided to sit on Richardson s suggested appointment as chairman of 
the Subversive Activities Control Board set up under the McCarran 
Act, and thus eased him along toward retirement from public life. 

There is, however, a further explanation of the Central Board’s 
record: it never had jurisdiction over security (as distinct from 
loyalty) risks. Thus, it could legitimately interest itself only in the 
more blatant cases; and these, of course, it had to review under the 
"reasonable grounds ’ standard. Richardson reminded Mrs. Roose- 
velt of this in the letter mentioned above: . . as you may be 

aware, the Loyalty Review Board was not clothed with any power 
whatever in relation to security matters. Our own hairshirt, is the 

question of loyalty ” Hiram Bingham understood this. In answer 

to the question, "Why isn’t your Board empowered to consider the 
security risk?” Bingham answered, 6 "Because the President, in the 
last paragraph of Executive Order 9835, says, 'You will have noth- 
ing to do with security cases/ . . 

"Wouldn’t it be better if [your Board did both] . . . ?” 

"It would be much better, in my opinion. . . /’ 

In sum, then, it appears that Bingham’s Central Board, to the 
extent it was not engaged in throwing stones from a glass house, 
was criticizing the State Department’s practices in the security risk 
field in which (as Humelsine well knew) it was powerless to 
intervene. But it appears further that the Board, even with Bing- 
ham as chairman, and with the revised standard, and despite its 
avowed alarm over Department loyalty practices, simply let 
things slide— except, of course, in the cases of Service and Vincent. 
That the Board did not move to oust either Edward Rothschild or 
Haldore Hanson is evidence of its lethargy. Bingham, who after 
all was a Truman appointee, seems to have been a little on the 
diffident side when it came right down to overruling ( as distinct 
from simply criticizing) the State Department— although there is 
no evidence of the kind of obsequiousness on his part that his pred- 
ecessor showed toward the State Department. 



The Civil Service Board did not (for a number of reasons we 
have mentioned, and perhaps for others we know not of) force 
the Department to act on all its loyalty risks. Still and all, there is 
no getting around the fact that various Board members, including 
its chairman and its executive secretary, felt strongly in 1951 that 
the State Department was jeopardizing America’s security. And 
it is significant that, in the two years following the Board’s indict- 
ment of the Department, the Department’s security division did 
root out four times as many security and loyalty risks as during the 
preceding three years. 

Just as light is thrown on the Central Board’s activities by what 
we know of Seth Richardson, so light is thrown on the Depart- 
ment’s Loyalty Security Board by what we know of the mind and 
manners of its chairman. General Conrad Snow. His statements 
before the Appropriations Committee, and elsewhere, show him 
up as a well-meaning blunderer, without any clear idea of what 
the whole thing was about. 

Take his speech at George Washington University on October 
25, 1951, and his speech before the Harvard Club on November 17, 
1951. His topic on both occasions was “Loyalty in the State Depart- 
ment”; his clear purpose, on both, was to discredit McCarthy and 
to reassure his listeners about the Department’s security division.* 

When Snow came before the Committee, Senator McCarran 
wanted to know whether the speeches put forward merely the per- 
sonal views of General Snow, or whether they argued the official 
“line” of the State Department. “You were speaking as an individ- 
ual in this case?” McCarran asked. “Yes, sir,” Snow answered. 

But it developed that the State Department had printed and 
circularized the speeches; that General Snow’s staff had helped 
him prepare them; and that the Department had cleared both 
manuscripts for delivery. Snow had said in one of the speeches, “I 
can speak only for the Department of State and for the period 
1947 to the present.” And this seemed to the Committee difficult 
to square with what Snow was now telling it. “You state there,” 
said McCarran, “that you are speaking for the Department of 
State.” “Yes; that is right.” But had he not just testified, asked 
Senator Ferguson, that he spoke only as a private citizen? Snow: 
“That is right.” Senator McCarran and his colleagues became 
curioser and curioser: 

* The two addresses are printed in full in Senate Appropriations, Hearings 
for (fiscal) 1953 , pp. 502-12. The page references that occur below in the 
body of the text refer to these hearings. 



Senator McCarran. You say that you are speaking as an official of 
the Department of State? 

Mr. Snow. I do not want to get confused with the issue that you have 
just raised. 

Senator McCarran. You told your people — 

Mr. Snow. I was saying that I was speaking about the Department 
of State. 

Senator Ferguson. That is not what you say. You say: "I speak only 
for the Department of State for the period 1947 to the present.” 

Mr. Snow. That is right. The word “for” in both cases has the same 
implication. I was not speaking for the Department of State in any dif- 
ferent sense than I was speaking for the period 1947 to date. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, wait a minute. You are a lawyer, are you 

Mr. Snow. Yes sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you use words in their proper meaning? 

Mr. Snow. I try to. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when you say that you speak for the De- 
partment of State, you are the spokesman for the Department of State? 

Mr. Snow. I might be so construed. What I meant there was — when 
I said that I speak for the Department of State, in that particular case 
I meant that I was speaking about the Department of State and about 
the period 1947 to the present. The word “for” there — 

Senator Ferguson. I am not speaking about the period. You say 
that you are speaking for the Department of State for a certain period 
of time. 

Mr. Snow. I am speaking in relation to the Department of State only. 

Senator Ferguson. That is not what you said. 

Mr. Snow. I said “for,” but what I meant was “with relation to.” 

Senator McCarran. And this speech was evidently censored, passed 
upon, and approved before you gave it? 

Mr. Snow. I think it was; yes sir. [pp. 477-78.] 

And so on— until the Committee concluded that Snow had in- 
deed been speaking as a representative of the Department; and 
this, of course, gave the speech added significance. 

Snow's two addresses differed only slightly. In his first speech, 
Snow had said: 

Since December 17, 1947, when the President's loyalty program was 
implemented . . . the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State 
has had before it over 500 cases of State Department employees who 
have been investigated for loyalty by the Federal Bureau of Investiga- 
tion — the FBI — and not one case has been found of a present Com- 
munist working in the State Department. Over that period eight em- 
ployees have been held to be security risks. ... I cannot discuss indi- 
vidual cases. [p. 502.] 



In short, General Snow revealed on October 25, 1951, that in a 
period of three and one-half years, the Loyalty Security Board had 
found no loyalty risks and eight security risks. 

In his second address (November 11, 1951), he dealt rather dif- 
ferently with this aspect of his Board’s record: 

During the whole period — June 1947 to the present, the Board of 
which I am Chairman has adjudicated 594 cases; and has found ad- 
versely on both loyalty and security grounds in numerous cases — I can- 
not give statistics, [p. 508.] 

Now in the first place, General Snow could have given statistics, 
just as he had done three weeks earlier: President Truman's ban 
does not extend to statistical information. What is more, far from 
finding adversely on “both” loyalty and security grounds in “nu- 
merous cases,” the Board had yet to make its first adverse loyalty 
determination! It was two months after this speech was delivered 
(on January 24, 1952) that a loyalty risk was uncovered by the 
Loyalty Security Board. 

But how should one account for Snow’s radical change in em- 
phasis? In the first speech, he tells his audience ( citing statistics ) 
that security risks in the Department have been few and far be- 
tween. In the second, he tells his audience (withholding statistics) 
that the adverse findings of his Board have been “numerous.” Had 
Snow discovered that the public reaction to his first speech was 
different from what he had anticipated? That, far from inspiring 
confidence by citing the small number of adverse determinations 
the Board had made, the speech caused widespread dismay to a 
public conversant with the success of Communist penetration of 
the State Department? Whereupon, in his second effort, he aban- 
doned this line in favor of something less accurate but bigger 
sounding? The Senators, regrettably, did not spot the anomaly; and 
General Snow was not questioned about it. Hence it is possible 
only to guess what caused him to swing around so abruptly. 

Let us consider another aspect of the two speeches. General 
Snow had made it clear in both of them that he was speaking of 
the period since 1947, i.e. the period during which he had been 
head of the Department’s Loyalty Security Board. This, among 
other things, permitted him to exploit the Hiss case (under him, 
said Snow, Hiss would not “have been employed by [the Depart- 
ment] ... for a day after [his] . . . acts were discovered”), and yet 
give it a Wide berth. 



I should like to limit the field of inquiry to the limits of my own 
competency, ... I am sure that you would much prefer that I speak 
of matters within my own knowledge, rather than speculate on what 
may or may not have occurred in the State Department during the hec- 
tic days of war, under Hull, Stettinius, and Byrnes, and under security 
programs previous to that set up by Secretary Marshall in June, 1947. 
... I mention this particularly because every time I discuss the pro- 
gram which I have helped administer for over 4 years, someone wants 
to argue the case of Alger Hiss, and I know no more about the Hiss case 
than anyone else who has read the newspapers. . . . [p. 508.] 

Hiss was a bad customer, all right, but, General Snow concluded, 
“My point is that one swallow does not make a summer, nor does 
this Hiss case make out an infiltration of the State Department by 
Communists.” The Committee, on the other hand, tacitly adopted 
another view, namely, that the chairman of the State Department’s 
Loyalty Security Board ought to know more about the Hiss case 
than what had appeared in the newspapers, and certainly ought 
to know as much about it as was public knowledge. Yet the more 
Snow talked, the more evident it became that he knew less about 
it than a well-informed newspaper reader. When reminded that 
reports about Hiss had been submitted to the Department by Berle 
and by the FBI years before 1947, his recollections were vague. 
When pressed about Hiss’ contacts in the Department and about 
the persons with whom Hiss had most closely associated, he had 
nothing to contribute. And the demonstrated fact that there had 
in fact been a second, a third, and even a tenth swallow to help 
make the summer had never crossed his mind. 

And if none of this was calculated to quell the Committee's 
anxieties. Snow’s estimate of the implications of the Hiss case ( as 
expressed in the first of his two speeches) could only multiply 
them: “The Hiss case and the case of Judith Coplon in the Depart- 
ment of Justice ” he had said, “have done more harm in terms of 
public confidence than any harm Hiss or Coplon ever did in the 
delivery of classified papers .” 

To judge from a few scattered comments, public reaction to 
this statement was not favorable. The New York Journal American, 
for example, in an editorial entitled, “Strange Theory” 7 com- 
mented, “If this [statement by Snow] means anything at all, it 
means that the man charged with determining the loyalty of men 
and women employed at the highest level of Federal responsibil- 
ity believes there is more harm in catching criminals than in letting 


them have complete freedom to do their utmost to destroy the 

Nothing of the sort, said Snow in his second speech; nothing he 
had ever said could be construed to mean that he “deplored the 
prosecution of Hiss. Nothing could be further from the fact. While 
I deplore the undoubted harm, in terms of loss of public confidence 
in the Department that the public disclosure of Hiss’ acts has 
done, I am, of course, entirely in favor of public prosecution of 
illegal actions.” (p. 508.) 

The Committee duly noted General Snow’s amplifications in his 
second speech, but it persisted in asking the General the still unan- 
swered question, Which has done more harm— Hiss’ exposure or 
Hiss’ treachery? Senator McCarthy took the lead: 

Senator McCarthy. You say: “The Hiss case and the case of Judith 
Coplon in the Department of Justice has done more harm in terms of 
public confidence than any harm Hiss or Coplon ever did in the de- 
livery of classified papers.” Now, by that you mean that the exposure 
of them did the damage rather than their spying? 

Mr. Snow. No, sir. What I meant by that was that the damage 
which they did by being traitors to their country had done more 

McCarthy, baffled, turned to a colleague: “Senator Ferguson, 
I think we have different speeches.” Senator Ferguson: “I know 
we have different speeches.” General Snow tried again: “What I 
meant to emphasize was the infinite damage that both Hiss and 
Coplon did by being traitors to their country. That is what I in- 
tended to emphasize, that the infinite damage which they did by 
becoming traitors to their country was greater than the damage 
they could have done by being spies.”* 

Senator McCarran took a deep breath: “ . . Is it not clear that 
what you were saying there was that the harm was done by the 
public exposure of Hiss and Coplon rather than by their spying 

Snow finally capitulated: 

Mr. Snow. I must admit, Senator, that the language that I used must 
have been subject to misinterpretation because it was misinterpreted 
not only by you, sir, but by the public. 

0 General Snow now serves the Eisenhower administration as the State 
Department's legal adviser to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. 



Senator McCarran. Anyone would construe it the way the Senator 
is construing it. A 6-year-old child would. . . . 

Mr. Snow. ... I had no such intention. 

Senator McCarthy. Would you not think that the normal person 
would so interpret that? 

Mr. Snow. I am afraid that the normal person might, because it has 
been so interpreted. * [pp. 475-76.] 

The Committee came finally to the animadversions about Mc- 
Carthy and McCarthyism in Snow’s speeches, but soon found itself 
dealing with matters of far greater moment than whether or not 
McCarthy had been maligned. 

General Snow had defined McCarthyism in his speech as follows: 

This is McCarthyism — the making of baseless accusations regarding 
the loyalty and integrity of public officers and employees, by a person 
who is himself in high public office and who uses his office at one and 
the same time as a platform from which to shout his accusations and as 
a screen to protect himself from action for defamation. The purpose of 
it all is, of course, not the public interest, but political advancement in 
a period of public tension and excitement, [p. 503.] 

Against whom, McCarthy wanted to know, had he made base- 
less accusations? Snow ran for cover. “I cannot,” he replied, “dis- 
cuss individual cases under the prohibition I labor under, [sic]” 
McCarthy then tried a different approach. You have just finished 
telling us in another connection, McCarthy reminded Snow, that 
54 disloyal cases were allowed to resign under investigation and 
that three other individuals had been found to be disloyal or are in 
the process of appeal. That, by a strange coincidence makes 57, 
does it not? (p. 481) Could it be, McCarthy wondered out loud, 
that these 57 tally with the 57 on the original McCarthy list? No, 
answered General Snow, they were “not the same individuals”— 
which might have been well enough had he not, a few seconds 
later, confessed that he did not know the names of the 54 who had 

McCarthy pounced: 

. . . Mr. Chairman, I want to call the chairman’s attention to the 
statements made by this witness. [Turning to Snow] I think you should 

* In finally acknowledging that a “normal” person would so interpret 
these remarks, General Snow had come a long way. For he had written to 
the editors of the Journal American (pp. 540-41) a few months before: “Just 
how you could torture my speech ... to mean [what you wrote about it] . . . 
is a mystery to me.” 



be sworn now. . . . He made the statement a minute ago that the 57 
individuals whose names [I gave] . . . were not the same as the 57 who 
either resigned or were found disloyal. Now he says, "I do not know 
who the 54 were. I do not know what their names were.” 

Now, either you are lying Mr. Snow, when you said that you did not 
know who they were, or you were lying to us when you said they were 
different from the 57 that McCarthy names. You cannot be telling the 
truth at both times. Does not that follow as the night follows the day? 

Mr. Snow. No, it does not. 

Mr. Humelsine. [interrupting] I do not think that is fair . . . General 
Snow . . . would not know anything about the 54 who resigned when 
under loyalty investigation. He would not have anything to do with the 
54 resignations. 

Senator McCarthy. Then he must not lie to us if he does not know 
anything about it. Mr. Snow just got through saying that the 54 were 
not the 54 on McCarthy’s list, and now you say you could not possibly 
know.* [p. 481.] 

McCarthy reverted to his request that Snow mention an instance 
from McCarthy's Tydings list in support of his charge that McCar- 
thy had made "baseless accusations.” And this time Snow at- 
tempted momentarily to meet the challenge: 

Mr. Snow. As I recall, Haldore Hanson was on that list. 

Senator McCarran. What is that? 

Mr. Snow. As I recall — 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Snow says that Haldore Hanson is on that 

But immediately, General Snow retreated. 

Mr. Snow. Now, I cannot answer questions about his case. 

Senator McCarthy. Your position is that I made baseless accusa- 
tions against Haldore Hanson. Have you ever read what I said about 
Haldore Hanson? 

Mr. Snow. I think so, yes. 

Senator McCarthy. You have? 

Mr. Snow. Yes. 

Senator McCarthy. [What I have said about Hanson] ... is here in 
the document. Will you take that and tell me what in it are baseless 

* As it happens, General Snow was correct in his guess that the two sets 
of names were not identical; we have seen in the section on the Tydings 
Saga, that only 18 of McCarthy's cases had been separated from the De- 
partment as of January, 1953. 



Mr. Snow. I cannot do that, I say, without discussing the individual 
case. ... I cannot discuss the case of Haldore Hanson, Mr. Chairman, 
without going into the substance. 

Senator McCarthy. . . . Let us forget your files and look at this and 
see if you can tell us anything which is baseless on the basis of the in- 
formation available to the public. In other words, take the public in- 

Mr. Snow. I don’t know of any information available to the public. 
I do know something about the files and I cannot discuss them. 

Senator McCarran. Now, there is a peculiar situation here, Mr. 
Snow. You can go out to the public and accuse a member of the Con- 
gress of the United States of falsifying and you can call him by a cer- 
tain name. You call it McCarthyism. Now, you come before this com- 
mittee, and when you are confronted with the situation you go under 
cover that you cannot disclose. 

Mr. Snow. . . . The only information I have about Hanson is from 
my files. I do not know him personally. The only information that I 
have about him is from my files. 

Senator McCarthy. . . . Mr. Humelsine, may I ask you a question? 
. . . Let me ask you this: In view of the fact that Mr. Snow has publicly 
stated and now before the committee states, that the charges . . . against 
Hanson are baseless, do you think he is competent to act as chairman of 
the board to hear the evidence and decide whether the charges are 
valid, or not, keeping in mind that the Hanson case is now pending be- 
fore Mr. Snow’s Board? Do you think that he is disqualified from his 
job as the result of this? 

Mr. Humelsine. Obviously, I think the general is competent to per- 
form the duty or I would not have him in that particular assignment. 

Senator McCarthy. Will you try to answer my question? 

Mr. Humelsine. What is your question again? 

Senator McCarthy. Let us narrow it down. When Mr. Snow says 
that the charges against Mr. Hanson are baseless, was Mr. Hansons 
case pending before the Board as of [that day?] . . . does not that dis- 
qualify him from sitting on that case and determining whether or not 
the charges actually are baseless? 

Senator McCarran. In other words, it is a preconceived conclusion. 

Senator McCarthy. Yes. 

Senator McCarran. Is that what you mean? 

Senator McCarthy. Yes. You are a lawyer, Mr. Humelsine. Would 
you not say that Mr. Snow is disqualified? 

Mr. Humelsine. I would have to look into that question further and 
give you an answer to it, Senator. I cannot on that basis give you an 

Senator McCarthy. You mean that when a man publicly states that 
the charges against Mr. X of Communist affiliations or connections — 
when he publicly states that those charges are baseless, and condemns 
the man who makes them, can you now tell us whether or not you 


think that disqualifies him from sitting on a board and making a deci- 
sion on it? 

Mr. Humelsine. I would have to decide whether he is right, or not; 
whether the charges are baseless. 

Senator McCarthy. All right. 

Senator McCarran. [Snow] is the one who decides. He has already 
decided that they are baseless. Do you not see the position you are in?° 
[pp. 482-87.] 

Snow began reading a summary of McCarthy’s indictment of 
Hanson, and agreed that the first few charges were not, in point of 
fact," baseless.” But after a few minutes’ reading, Snow objected: 
"The next allegation is that he [Hanson] spent several years in the 
Communist army in China writing stories and taking pictures 
which the Communists helped him smuggle out of the country. I 
cannot comment on that without a reference to the files.” 

Senator McCarthy. You can answer that by referring to his [Han- 
son s own] book [Humane Endeavor ], Mr. Snow. Have you read his 

Mr. Snow. I have not read his book. 

Senator McCarthy. And you are passing on him? 

Mr. Snow. That is right, [p. 491.] 

At last Snow finished his perusal of the precis of McCarthy’s 
statements about Hanson. He was not able to single out one charge 
that was clearly "baseless.” 

The Committee moved to other matters. What, it asked, about 
Snow’s statement that there were no known Communists in the 
State Department? Had there been, General Snow answered, "the 
FBI would have found out about it. The FBI reports would come 
to my board, and my board would pass on it.” 

"Just a minute,” McCarthy said: "Let us not start giving the FBI 
the blame for this. You have the Posniak case, Mr. Snow, before 
you. That case was called to your attention by me. I sent you copies 
of 12 FBI reports. I put those reports in the Congressional Record. 
Your board cleared him by a split decision of 3 [2?] to 1. . . . You 

0 It was subsequently revealed (p. 493) that the Hanson case no longer 
lay, as of this moment, before the Loyalty Security Board. But the question 
remains whether it was Hanson’s case that Snow had in mind on October 25, 
1951 when he made his first speech on McCarthyism and whether the case 
lay before the Board at that time. 


had before you evidence that he had been a member of the Com- 
munist Party. You have had before you evidence that he was living 
in the same apartment with a man known to the FBI as an indi- 
vidual who was recruiting Communist spies. That is in your file, 
Mr. Snow. Now why do you tell us that no evidence has ever come 
before your board that you had a Communist in the State Depart- 
ment? . . . Now, you just got through saying that if there was a 
Communist, the FBI would notify you.” 

Mr. Snow. That is right. 

Senator McCarthy. Now, what more notification can the FBI give 
you than what they gave you in the Posniak case where there were 12 
investigations, I cannot say. 

Mr. Snow. I cannot discuss the Posniak case, I am sorry. I would 
have to have the file before me. 

Senator McC arran. You always come to a dead end. You come to 
the point where we cannot go further. 

Mr. Snow. That is right, [pp. 489-90.] 

After a luncheon recess, General Snow returned. He came back 
with a definite plan of action. He would outline, he told the Com- 
mittee, five statements that had been made over the years by Mc- 
Carthy, on the basis of which he felt entitled to call McCarthy, in 
effect, a liar. He had cited these statements in his second speech. 

The first of these, it turned out, was Senator McCarthy’s state- 
ment at Wheeling on February 9, 1950: “ I have here in my hand a 
list of 205— a list of names that were known to the Secretary of 
State as being members of the Communist Party and who never- 
theless are still working at shaping policy in the State Depart- 
ment” (p. 494.) 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Snow, you are aware of the fact that the 
investigators for the Gillette-Monroney committee went to Wheeling, 
West Virginia, and completely disproved what you have said? 

Mr. Snow. I am not aware of that. 

Senator McCarthy. Did you not read that in the paper? 

Mr. Snow. No, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. ... You say “baseless”; that my statement was 
baseless. ... I would like to read two paragraphs into the record from 
the statement by the Investigator for the Gillette-Monroney committee. 
He said: “My job in Wheeling I thought was to find the facts, to find 
whether, as Senator Benton charged, McCarthy had said that he had 
lists of 205 Communists in the State Department, or whether, as Sena- 
tor McCarthy maintained, he had said he had a list of 57 individuals. 



either members of or loyal to the Communists [sic]. While in Wheel- 
ing, I thoroughly interviewed a large number of witnesses who were in a 
position to know what Senator McCarthy had said. Every one of 
those witnesses save one supplied information which cast grave doubt 
and suspicion on Senator Benton’s story and substantially corroborated 
Senator McCarthy’s account of the facts.” [pp. 488, 532. The investiga- 
tor was Mr. Dan Buckley. See above, “The First Charges.”] 

General Snow went on to the second of McCarthy's five allegedly 
false statements— i.e., a statement that, said Snow, McCarthy made 
on the Senate floor on February 9, 1950: “I have in my hand 57 
cases of individuals who would appear to be either card-carrying 
members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party , but who nev- 
ertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy” 

Actually, McCarthy had made no such statement on the Senate 
floor on the date Snow mentioned. Snow presumably had in mind 
the Wheeling speech ( McCarthy's version ) , which McCarthy re- 
peated on the floor of the Senate on February 20, 1950. In any case, 
Snow was not familiar enough with the history of the McCarthy 
controversy to nail the Senator down on his most vulnerable state- 
ment, that made at Salt Lake City on February 10, 1950, to the 
effect that he knew of 57 "card-carrying Communists” in the De- 
partment. McCarthy challenged Snow (whose assistants, at least, 
knew the identity of McCarthy's cases ) to name names by way of 
showing that the statement ("57 . . . individuals who would appear 
to be either card-carrying members or certainly loyal to the Com- 
munist Party”) was baseless. Snow again declined, on the grounds 
that the regulations forbade him to discuss the persons concerned. 

“The third statement [General Snow continued] was made on 
May 6, 1950, in Chicago , that the loyalty files in the Department 
were ‘skeleton,’ ‘ purged ’ and ‘phony’ ” "That was further devel- 
oped on May 15, at Atlantic City, [Snow continued] when he 
[McCarthy] said they had been ‘rifled’; on June 9 at Milwaukee, 
when he said they were ‘raped,' ‘denuded,’ and ‘tampered with'; 
and on July 12, 1950, when he said they had been ‘stripped.’ ” 

These allegations of McCarthy are discussed in some detail in 
the Appendix. For present purposes, we can content ourselves with 
excerpts from the resulting give-and-take between McCarthy and 

Senator McCarthy. [You say that my] statement that the State 
Department files had been rifled is one of the “baseless” and “un- 


proved” charges. Are you aware of the fact that there were submitted 
to the Tydings Committee the statements of four State Department 
employees, one of Burney Threadgill, who is in the FBI; another one 
of Paul Sullivan, who is in the Foreign Service School at Georgetown, 
and two other State Department employees? 

They state that they personally had been engaged over a period of 
months in stripping from the State Department files any material which 
would adversely reflect upon a man’s loyalty or his morals. 

Are you aware of the fact that those statements have been put in the 

Mr. Snow. I am not aware of the statements to which you refer. 

Senator McCarthy. . . . Are you aware of the fact that we have 
those statements? 

Mr. Snow. No, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. You never heard of them? 

Mr. Snow. Never heard of them; never saw them. 

Senator McCarthy. As chairman of the Loyalty Board, do you not 
think you have the duty to check those affidavits? 

Mr. Snow. First, I would have to know about them to have the duty 
to check them. I knew nothing about them, as I say. 

Senator McCarthy. You never heard of them? 

Mr. Snow. Never heard of them. 

Senator McCarthy. Before you made the speech which was O.K/d 
by the State Department did you try to find out what evidence I had 
given that the files were rifled? 

Mr. Snow. I still don’t believe the files were rifled. 

Senator McCarthy. I do not care what you believe. I asked you a 
question. Before you make the statement such as you made in the 
speech, that McCarthy was a liar because he claimed the files were 
rifled, do you not think you have a duty to check and see what evidence 
I had presented of rifling? 

Mr. Snow. How could I find what evidence you had, Senator? 

Senator McCarthy. What evidence I had publicly presented to the 
Tydings Committee. 

Mr. Snow. I didn’t know anything about it and didn’t know you pre- 
sented it. 

Senator McCarthy. You did not answer my question. You went out 
to Chicago and said McCarthy is a liar because he said the files were 

Mr. Snow. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. My question is this: Before you call me a liar 
on that, do you not think you had a duty to check with the Tydings 
Committee and see what evidence I had presented of the rifling, and 
check on the veracity of the men who gave the statements? 

Mr. Snow. ... I was so confident that the files had never been rifled 
that I had no presentiment [sic] of any duty to investigate what the 
basis of your speech was. [pp. 495-97.] 



General Snow’s answers are extraordinary in more ways than 
one. They reveal not only the wantonness of State Department 
criticism of McCarthy, but also General Snow’s total ignorance of 
an important aspect of the Tydings investigation— which was held 
several years after his 1947 point of recall. And the Tydings inquiry 
was certainly a strategic event in the history of the State Depart- 
ment’s security division. 

The fourth “lie” Snow had in mind ( and the last one we shall 
discuss) * was “[McCarthy’s charge] made on April 20, in his ad- 
dress before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Wash- 
ington, in which he said: c The President's own Security Board ' 
which , he said , had listed 205 persons as had security risks , was 
gotten rid of by Secretary Acheson ‘in favor of a weaker board ' " 

Senator McCarthy. One of the men on that original board was 
[Robert] Bannerman; is that right? 

Mr. Snow. I don’t know who was on the original board. It was before 
my time. 

Senator McCarthy. Do you know whether [J. Anthony] Panuch 
was on it? 

Mr. Snow. I don’t know. 

Senator McCarthy. Do you know who got rid of Bannerman? 

Mr. Snow. I don’t know anything about that except the board went 
out of existence before we came in under Secretary Marshall. 

Senator McCarthy. But Bannerman and Panuch were the men hav- 
ing to do with security in the State Department. You know that, do 
you not? 

Mr. Snow. That was before my time. 

Senator McCarthy. You are talking about things before your time. 
You know those are the men who named the 284 and they said they are 
unfit to serve. You know that, do you not? 

Mr. Snow. Yes, I know they had prepared a list that they said would 
not be employed continuously [sic] by the State Department. 

Senator McCarthy. And you know that those men did disappear 
from the Department before your board took over, do you not? 

Mr. Snow. No; I do not know that. 

Senator McCarthy. You do not know whether they did, or not? 

Mr. Snow. No; I do not know that. 

Senator McCarthy. Do you say I lied when I said Acheson had 
gotten rid of them? 

* The fifth: McCarthy, said Snow, had falsely claimed that a recommenda- 
tion by Alger Hiss had in “dozens of cases” been enough to “completely 
clear” Department employees. But Snow chose not to press this point — per- 
haps because he was at all times adamant about his ignorance of all events 
prior to June of 1947 (by which time Hiss had left the Department). 


Mr. Snow. Yes. 

Senator McCarthy. Acheson was in the State Department in 1946, 
was he? 

Mr. Snow. I believe he was Under Secretary. 

Senator McCarthy. Do you know? 

Mr. Snow. I can find out. 

Senator McCarthy. You made the statement that you are objecting 
to my statement that Acheson had gotten rid of them. Do you know 
what his job was at that time? 

Mr. Snow. He was the Assistant Secretary at that time. 

Senator McCarthy. You know that Bannerman and Panuch are no 
longer there, do you not? 

Mr. Snow. I don’t know that; no. 

Senator McCarthy. In other words, your testimony now is that you 
do not know who was on that board; you do not know whether Acheson 
got rid of them; you do not know who fired them; nevertheless, you 
say, McCarthy lied because McCarthy said Acheson fired them. Is 
that a correct resume of your testimony? 

Mr. Snow. Yes. [pp. 499-500.] 

Here then is a short summary of what General Snow did not 
know: (1) The security board in question did not complete its 
mission in 1946; it continued to operate until June of 1947, when 
it gave way to General Snow’s Board— which developed in Decem- 
ber, 1947, into the present Loyalty Security Board. (2) Banner- 
man was not only a member of that Board but its executive officer, 
and continued in this function until his separation from the De- 
partment in the spring of 1947. (3) Acheson was Under Secretary— 
not Assistant Secretary— of State until he resigned in June of 1947. 

(4) Marshall became Secretary of State in January of 1947 when 
the so-called Bannerman board had not yet ceased to operate. 

(5) Until January 1947, the entire security program of the State 
Department was under the direction of J. Anthony Panuch. 

On the point whether or not Bannerman and Panuch were 
fired— the crux of the matter at issue— Carlisle Humelsine inter- 
vened to assure the Committee that neither of them had been dis- 
missed. “I would not want the record to show that, because that is 
not a fact. Neither Mr. Panuch, who happens to be a very close 
personal friend of mine, nor Mr. Bannerman, for whom I have the 
highest regard— he is well and favorably known to me— neither of 
those was fired. They both left of their own accord.” 

Now just to keep the record straight, and to check en passant on 
Humelsine’s knowledge and/or veracity, we may pause to note 



why this question seemed to the Senators worth pondering; and 
whether, in fact, Bannerman and Panuch were fired. Bannerman 
was separated from the State Department early in 1947; and while 
it is not known whether he was fired, his departure certainly coin- 
cided with a considerable exodus or reassignment of people who 
entertained views like his own on the loyalty-security issue; and 
his departure was later associated with the sudden paralysis of the 
Department’s security division. But with respect to the departure 
of J. Anthony Panuch, the facts are available. On the 25th of June, 
1.953, he presented to the Senate Internal Security Committee his 
own account of his separation. 

Mr. Chairman. Will you tell us about your departure from the State 
Department, when that was consummated? 

Mr. Panuch. I was dismissed instantly. I will give you the data on 
it. . . . Mr. Byrnes resign fed] in January. My superior, Mr. Russell, im- 
mediately tendered his resignation, which was accepted, to clear the 
decks for General Marshall, and I tendered my resignation to Mr, 
Byrnes. I told him I wanted to get out because my life wouldn’t be 
worth a nickel after the new team took over. 

Mr. Chairman. Why do you say that, Mr. Panuch? 

Mr. Panuch. I was a very unpopular man in the State Department. 

Mr. Chairman. Why? 

Mr. Panuch. Well, on account of the issues that I have testified 

However, Panuch went on, Byrnes persuaded him to stay on 
in the Department to guide General Marshall on the Departmental 
matters of which he had expert knowledge. Panuch consented, 
though he went through the formality of submitting his resigna- 

Mr. Panuch. . . .When General Marshall came from Hawaii, Secre- 
tary Byrnes did talk to him and I was told that “General Marshall 
wants to see you, talk to you immediately, and he wants to have you 
stay on.” 

The next day I was told by a newspaperman that I was slated to get 
the full treatment, and I found out that Secretary Acheson, who was 
then Under Secretary Acheson, who was expected to be Under Secre- 
tary for George Marshall during an interim period until Under Secre- 
tary Lovett could come over from the War Department, would not 
tolerate my being around the Department. 

Senator Walker. Who was this? Dean Acheson would not tolerate 
your being around the Department? 

Mr. Panuch. If he were Under Secretary under George Marshall; 


yes. . . . Under Secretary Acheson called me into his office, and we had 
a conversation and he said, "Joe, y ou an d I haven’t gotten along very 
well,” and he said "Now General Marshall has asked me to take over 
here as Under Secretary until Mr. Lovett comes over and I told him 
that I would do so only on condition that I would have complete 
charge of the administration of the Department and, as you and I don’t 
see eye to eye on various matters, I would like your resignation.” 

So I told him I had already tendered my resignation to Secretary 
Marshall, and he said, "Really?” And I said "Yes.” ... It was one of 
the simple ones: "I resign at your pleasure. Acting Secretary for Ad- 

. . . Acheson . . . reached out a ( prepared ) letter accepting my resig- 
nation, signed by General Marshall, effective as of the close of business 
that date, which under Department rules, was 10 minutes later. 

Such were the tribulations of General Conrad Snow. He had 
shown himself to be ignorant of data that had a crucial bearing 
not only on his specific charges against McCarthy, but on the work 
of the division in which he was playing a vitally important role. 
His humiliation could hardly have been more complete. "Would 
you make this speech over again?” Senator Ferguson asked him. 
“Oh, no; certainly not,” he answered. Senator McCarthy volun- 
teered his own summary, which included some of the most pene- 
trating remarks he has made on the loyalty-security problem: 

I may say, in fairness to Mr. Snow, I think I understand his reasoning 
better than some of his friends do. He is the son of a judge; his grand- 
father was a judge. I understand they were kindly men. I think that he 
feels that he is in effect trying criminal cases; that he must give every- 
one the benefit of the doubt, and if there are any doubts which can be 
resolved in favor of the employee, he resolves them in favor of the 

It is the kindly thing to do, but makes him completely incompetent 
to act as head of that board. 

I do not accuse you of being an evil man, Mr. Snow, but watching 
the results that come from your board, I am trying to find out what 
prompts you. And I have talked with some of your friends. The general 
report that we get is that you are a kindly individual who just dislikes 
seeing a man lose his job. 

The bulk of the Committee's questions, however, were directed 
not at Snow but at Carlisle Humelsine. Humelsine proved a dif- 
ficult witness— not because he was arrogant ( few bureaucrats are 
when dealing with an appropriations committee), but because of 
his remarkable capacity for misunderstanding every question put 



to him by the Committee, and for coming up with answers so ob- 
lique as to puzzle all within earshot. His testimony is an example 
of the sort of Washingtoniana that once caused Senator Douglas 
to weep noisily on the floor of the Senate after struggling with 
the President’s budget. 

Senator McCarthy attempted to find out from Humelsine 
whether the State Department Board had followed the practice of 
“sitting on” loyalty cases— i.e., postponing almost indefinitely a 
final adjudication of them— so as to prevent the Central Board from 
assuming authority over them. McCarthy knew pretty well that 
Humelsine would never admit any such thing; so he tried to get at 
the problem from a different angle: Did the Central Board have 
the power to pre-empt jurisdiction before final adjudication of a 
case by an agency board? And, if so, the significant question arose: 
did it do so as a matter of practice? 

Senator McCarthy. Is there anything to the suspicion on the part 
of some that you [the State Department] hold some of these cases 
indefinitely after suspension because the Review Board cannot get 
them until you get through with them? In other words, if you hold the 
Brunauer case indefinitely, the Review Board never can see it, can they? 

Mr. Humelsine. The Review Board cannot post audit [(a) it can; 
(b) how is this observation relevant?] but the Review Board could and 
has the authority at any time, as I understand it, to take the case out 
of our hands and handle it themselves. 

Senator McCarthy. Has that ever been done? 

Mr. Humelsine. Yes, sir; it has been done in two cases. 

Senator McCarthy. In what cases? 

Mr. Humelsine. They took the Service case and one other case, two 

Senator Ferguson. Before you were through with them? 

Mr. Humelsine. No, sir; after they had been sent over to them. 

Senator Ferguson. Why do you not answer the Senator's question? 

Senator McCarthy. Why do you not try to answer my question? It 
is like pulling teeth. I should not have to ask several questions, in order 
to get the truth. I asked you whether the Review Board had ever taken 
a case away from you. 

Mr. Humelsine. They have in that sense. 

Senator McCarthy. Now, you heard my question. 

Mr. Humelsine. Yes. 

Senator McCarthy. You said the Brunauer case was pending. 

Mr. Humelsine. That is right. 

Senator McCarthy. Was being processed. 

Mr. Humelsine. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. My question was: Can the Review Board get 



this case until you finish it. You see, there is a serious suspicion on the 
part of some — will you listen to me? 

Mr. Humelsine. Yes. 

Senator McCarthy. There is a suspicion on the part of some, includ- 
ing myself, that you hold some of these cases indefinitely and wait until 
you get through and make a decision, knowing that the Review Board 
never does come over and pick up a case until you have finished with it. 
You said they could do that, and I asked to name one case in which 
they have done it. You said the Service case. 

Mr. Humelsine. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. But you said that you had finished the Service 

Mr. Humelsine. It was over there for post auditing. But as I under- 
stand rule 14 of the Board, they can take jurisdiction of a case at any 

Senator McCarthy. Do you know of a single case where they have 
ever done that? 

Mr. Humelsine [finally!]. They have not taken jurisdiction in a case 
up to this time until it has gone to them for post audit, [pp. 455-56.] 

Or take the effort of the Committee to get to the bottom of the 
Department’s suspension regulations and procedures. Humelsine 
was asked: Do the Department’s rules call for an employee’s sus- 
pension when the charges are first brought against him, or only af- 
ter an adverse determination has been handed down by the Loyal- 
ty Security Board? In other words, does an accused employee have 
access to secret material while his case is pending? If so, is this 

Suspension, it was learned finally, was not mandatory at any 
stage of the loyalty-security process.* That is to say, neither the 
President’s Executive Order, nor the regulations of the Loyalty 
Review Board, nor Public Law 733— as the latter had been con- 
strued— required that at such and such a stage an accused em- 
ployee must be suspended. Only when investigation had absolutely 
established an employee’s present membership in the Communist 
Party, or in any other organization bent on overthrowing the 
government by force, did suspension— and, indeed, firing— become 
mandatory under section gA of the Hatch Act ( and under various 
appropriations riders forbidding the expenditure of public funds 
to pay the salaries of employees belonging to such organizations ) . 

So much for the Department’s regulations on the subject. The 

* This was established only after interminable wrangling, in the course 
of which Humelsine admitted his own confusion on the subject, (pp. 447 




Committee, however, was more interested in its practices. This is 
what it learned: If an employee fell under suspicion resulting 
from information or allegations about him that had come to the 
security office s attention, a full field investigation was ordered, 
in most cases to be conducted by the FBI. After that field investi- 
gation the security officials decided whether or not there was suf- 
ficient adverse evidence to warrant further probing. If they were 
satisfied that certain questions needed clarification, those ques- 
tions were forwarded to the employee. Upon receipt of his reply, 
the security ofiBce determined whether to let it go at that or pro- 
ceed to the next step on the security ladder. In the latter event, the 
employee received a formal “letter of charges,” and was after- 
ward given a hearing by the Loyalty Security Board. 

Now, General Snow had said in his speech that only when there 
w as “reasonable doubt” of any employee’s loyalty or reliability did 
he receive a letter of charges. McCarthy went on from there: 

Senator McCarthy [addressing Mr. Humelsine]. Mr. Snow says 
that letters of charges are filed only when there is reasonable doubt 
there is a loyalty or security risk. 

Mr. Humelsine. Yes , sir . 

Senator McCarthy. ... I am wondering now, if you can tell us, af- 
ter you have decided there is reasonable doubt of a mans loyalty or 
security, even though he may be ultimately cleared, why do you not 
deny him access to top-secret material unless he is at least cleared. 

Mr. Humelsine. We have not decided at this point whether there is 
reasonable doubt as to the mans security and loyalty. At a later stage 
is where that particular determination might be made. At this stage it 
is determined that we cannot clear this case up without having a formal 

Senator McCarthy. I just read to you what General Snow had to 
say. I ask you if you agree with this. He says, on page 6 of his speech, 
“It is only in cases where there is reasonable doubt as to loyalty or se- 
curity risk that a case comes on for hearing.” My question is this: If 
you have reasonable doubt about a man’s loyalty or his security, why 
do you still give him access to secret material? 

Mr. Humelsine. If we have a reasonable doubt as to a mans security 
or reasonable doubt as to a man’s loyalty, we suspend him. 

Senator McCarthy. If you have reasonable doubt, you file charges? 

Mr. Humelsine. At that point you cannot have doubt or you can 
have doubt. It depends on the situation. . . . [pp. 411, 412.] 

All that emerged from the contradictions and tergiversations of 
General Snow and Mr. Humelsine was this: the Department would 


not suspend an employee unless there was “reasonable doubt as 
to the man's security and loyalty”; but neither would it file a letter 
of charges unless there was “reasonable doubt as to the man's se- 
curity and loyalty”; thus, according to inexorable rules of logic, 
the reason for filing a letter of charges against a man was ipso 
facto the same reason that required his suspension. Yet it proved 
impossible to make Mr. Humelsine understand, much less acknowl- 
edge, this situation. 

Senator McCarthy went back to the subject at a later meeting 
of the Committee, using this time the directest possible approach. 
He asked General Snow: “Let us take the three cases that you 
have found against— you found [on] disloyalty. That is much more 
serious than being a bad security risk. But after letters of charges 
have been filed on these individuals, and until your board has held 
the hearing, I understand that if they are in the State Department 
they can move around freely, associating with people handling 
secret material and perhaps having access to classified material 
themselves. Is that not an extremely dangerous situation?” 

General Snow answered this question with perhaps the supreme 
paralogism of the year: 

It might be in some cases. I do not think that in either of the three 
cases to which you refer that that was so however. The three cases 
were quite innocuous-appearing on the surface . It was not until we got 
into the hearing and heard the cases that we arrived at any conception 
that suspension was desirable . 

In short, the Committee was never able to squeeze out of the 
State Department spokesmen an intelligible account of Depart- 
ment policy with respect to the suspension of suspect employees. 
Yet at the time the Committee met, 90 Department employees had 
been in loyalty channels “over” two months. Just how long over 
two months? Humelsine was asked. An average of 7.2 months. Of 
course, there is no way of knowing how many of the employees 
who were ultimately found to be security risks had been suspended 
during the long period in which their cases had been pending. But 
the suspicion is strong that many of them were not; for in the entire 
history of the Department’s loyalty security program, only 29 em- 
ployees (out of 800 candidates) had been suspended while “in 
channels”! (pp. 523, 998, 999.) 

Perhaps the most important line of inquiry the Committee pur- 
sued had to do with the criteria governing the Department’s deci- 
sions as to whether or not an employee was a loyalty or a security 
risk. What, the Committee asked, were the operating standards in 
determining whether "reasonable doubt” existed as to the loyalty 
or reliability of an employee? 

Senator McCarthy led off. "Let us assume,” he said, 

that a man is affiliated with four or five or six Communist fronts. 
Would you consider that sufficient grounds to hold against him under 
the loyalty procedure? 

Mr. Humelsine. That would place him in the loyalty channels. 

Senator McCarthy. You did not get my question. Would you hold 
against such a man under the loyalty procedure? 

Mr. Humelsine. I don’t know how I can answer that question. What 
you do is look at a fellow’s record. It may be that he may have been a 
member of only one front organization, but a sufficient amount of mate- 
rial in connection with that one would make him a loyalty case. I don’t 
think you can go on the basis of the number. It is a matter of degree. 

Senator McCarthy. In other words, you think the number may not 
be important. 

Mr. Humelsine. It may, or it may not be. 

McCarthy upped the ante. 

Senator McCarthy. Let us say that I work in the State Department 
and that I have affiliations with, say 20 or 25 organizations named as 
Communist front organizations. Can you conceive of any circumstance 
under which I should then be cleared? 

Mr. Humelsine. I would have to look at the case. 

Senator McCarthy. Even though I belong to 25 Communist fronts 
you would still look at the case? 

Mr. Humelsine. I think in fairness I would have to look at the case. 

Senator McCarthy. You would what? 

Mr. Humelsine. In fairness, I would have to look at the case. I do 
not think it would be fair for me to answer that question without going 
into the facts. On that basis, I would want to look at the case. Maybe 
the person has gotten into that situation for any one of a number of 
reasons. I would not know. 

McCarthy, of course, was interested in what "reason” would sat- 
isfy the Department that a person who had "gotten into that situa- 
tion” was blameless beyond a reasonable doubt. As he put it, what 
were some of the circumstances which, in the case of an employee 
who joined 25 Communist fronts, would satisfy the Department’s 
security officers that no risk was entailed in keeping him on? 


Senator McCarthy. . . . You would say that even though you knew 
I belonged to 25 Communist fronts, that in and of itself would not be 
sufficient to order me discharged? You would still want to examine the 
case further? 

Mr, Humelsine. Sure, I would want to examine the case. , , „ 

Senator McCarran. Let me ask you this, Mr. Humelsine: Where the 
Department of Justice, acting under the law, declares an organiza- 
tion to be subversive, you would not take issue with that? 

Mr. Humelsine. Oh, no, sir: I am not taking issue with that. 

Senator McCarran. Regarding the question put to you by the Sen- 
ator from Wisconsin, if a man belonged to 23 subversive organizations 
as declared by the Department of Justice, you would not clear him for 
loyalty, would you? 

Mr. Humelsine. I would want to look into the whole case and find 
out when he got into the organizations and the circumstances surround- 
ing the particular case. I mean it is not a definite case, and it is hard 
to say. 

McCarthy accepted the implied challenge: 

Senator McCarthy. Let us make it a definite case. Let us assume 
that you know that I have belonged to 23 organizations that at the 
time [I joined them] were subversive and have been declared sub- 
versive by the Attorney General. Would you say that you would look 
into the case before you would discharge me? 

Mr. Humelsine. I would want to see what your motives were and 
why you belonged to them. 

Senator McCarthy. The mere belonging to 23 subversive organiza- 
tions at the time they were subversive, and declared so by the Attorney 
General, you would not consider in and of itself as sufficient for dis- 

Mr. Humelsine. I would certainly put that case in loyalty channels, 
and I would want to find out — I would examine the record right away 
and if the record showed that you were a loyalty risk I would want to 
suspend you. 

Senator McCarthy. I think it is very important to get your attitude 
on this. ... It is very important to know what those of you who are 
running this program consider [a] disloyalty [risk] or [a] bad security 
[risk] and for that reason it is extremely important to get your answer 
to the effect that you would not consider membership in 23 subversive 
organizations that are declared subversive — you would not consider 
membership in them in and of itself sufficient to discharge me. If that 
is your attitude that explains to a considerable extent the unusual 
workings of the State Department Loyalty Board. 

Mr. Humelsine. That is not my attitude, though. Senator. 


Senator McCarthy. You say that you would want to look into the 

Mr. Humelsine. I would say that I would want to examine them. It 
may be, for example, that someone is charged with having belonged 
to 23 subversive organizations and maybe he did not belong to any of 
them. That is quite possible. It is quite possible that that could happen. 
Now, that is farfetched, but it is possible. 

Senator McCarthy. My question did not say that belonging to the 
23 organizations was charged. My question said that he belonged to 

Mr. Humelsine. Suppose I made the statement some morning that 
Mr. So and So belonged to 23 subversive organizations, organizations 
that had been subversive and that had been so determined by the Jus- 
tice Department. I have made that statement as a private citizen. Well, 
the thing I would want to do is to find out whether that is the fact, 
because you have to operate this program based on facts, not on insinu- 
ation or allegation. 

Senator McCarthy [wearily, we assume]. Let us assume that you 
have established the fact — I would like to get your attitude on this pro- 
gram — let us assume that you have established the fact, it is not hearsay 
but rather you have established the fact that I have belonged to 23 or- 
ganizations that have been declared subversive. I have belonged to them 
at a time when they were subversive. Before you would order me dis- 
charged, you would still want to look further into the case? 

Mr. Humelsine. I would want to find out all the circumstances con- 
nected with the case before I took action. 

Senator McCarran [intervening with a fourth qualification]. Let us 
add one more element to the hypothetical situation. If it was established 
that he knew when he belonged to them that they were subversive, 
would you then — 

Mr. Humelsine. There is no doubt about it, Senator. 

Senator McCarthy. You said that there would be no doubt about it. 
You mean that you would order him discharged? 

Mr. Humelsine. If he knew those organizations were subversive, I 
would certainly discharge him. 

Senator McCarthy. Good. [pp. 393-95.] 

Senator McCarthy was probably too exhausted to go further into 
the matter. He did not bring to Humelsine's attention the fact that 
what he had just finished saying virtually committed him to a 
standard of eligibility which the Department had nominally de- 
serted as inadequate seven years earlier! For Humelsine had im- 
plied that nothing short of proof of an employee's evil intentions 
would bring his dismissal as a loyalty risk. Humelsine had said, in 
effect, that the Department stood ready to be persuaded that a 



joiner of 23 Communist fronts, already cited as subversive at the 
time he affiliated himself with them, had satisfactory reasons for 
having joined them.* 

This may appear to be a hasty indictment of Humelsine. But 
note that Humelsine did not say, “Nothing short of a discovery that 
such a person was instructed to join 25 Communist fronts by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation or by some federal security agency 
would satisfy us that he was not a loyalty risk,” or any such thing. 
Rather, he stressed again and again that the case would have to be 
“gone into”— and he persevered with this answer until Senator Mc- 
Carran broke the camel's back by asking whether or not the dis- 
covery that the employee intended subversion would bring action 
from the State Department's security office. 

Senator McCarthy might well have asked Mr. Humelsine two 
pointed questions: (1) In the hypothetical situation described, 
what sort of evidence is sufficient to persuade the State Depart- 
ment that the employee in question <c knew” the 23 Communist 
fronts he joined to be subversive? ( 2 ) What has happened to the 
“reasonable doubt” standard to which the Department is osten- 
sibly committed? and (3) If that standard is operative, must not 
the employee who had belonged to 23 Communist fronts be pre- 
sumed to have belonged to them because they were Communist 
fronts? Yet Humelsine comes close to implying that no such pre- 
sumption guided the Department or at least that no such presump- 
tion guided him, the Department's top security officer. 

The Department, in short, had evidently not made much prog- 
ress in the five years that had elapsed since an Assistant Secretary 
had been confronted by three Senators with evidence that one of 
his secretaries was a Communist. But “I know she is not a Com- 
munist,” he had told the Senators. “I looked her straight in the eye 
and asked her, ‘Are you a Communist?' and she said, ‘No.' ” 8 

* We are not dealing, of course, with reformed Communists, but rather 
with persons who insist that at no time were they pro-Communist. 


Closing Ranks: Some Proposals 
for the Civil Service 

F or nearly three decades a handful of prophets— an American 
Resistance— tried to alert the nation to the Communist threat; 
and fought a lonely and costly fight. After the Second World 
War, in the dawn of a new realism about international affairs, 
these prophets began to get a hearing; for it had become apparent 
that nothing but the integrity of the United States stood between 
the Soviet Union and world domination. But it was only when one 
spy scandal after another rocked the nation that the American 
Resistance enlisted recruits in sizable numbers and fixed our atten- 
tion on the problem of Communist infiltration. By 1950, a genuine 
mobilization was under way. And Senator McCarthy— having fair- 
ly recently been mobilized himself— became one of its leaders. 

Why have we focused attention on the record of Senator Mc- 
Carthy rather than on that of the other mobilization leaders? Be- 
cause it is predictable that, if McCarthy's enemies are successful 
in discrediting him, the mobilization will lose momentum and, 
perhaps, grind to a dead halt. Thus we have analyzed McCarthy’s 
performance in generous detail and have tried to evaluate it, com- 
mending him where we think he ought to be commended, and 
censuring him where we think he ought to be censured. But we 
have pressed our analysis under certain important limitations: 
We have examined McCarthy, for the most part, in the light of 
the basic assumptions of the society he is seeking to mobilize. 

It is now time to say that, in our opinion, some of these assump- 
tions are inappropriate to the emergency. We do not, we hasten to 
add, attribute a similar view to McCarthy. He has often acted as 
if he questioned the serviceability of some of our society's prem- 
ises in the present situation; but he has never said so. He has not, 
at any stage in his hurly-burly campaign against subversion. 



paused to articulate a new philosophy of national mobilization. 
The lack of an articulate philosophy of national mobilization is the 
country’s greatest single handicap in its duel with Communism. 

For we are not winning this fight. International Communism 
thrives increasingly with each passing year. Most of the issues in- 
volved in our appalling failure the authors leave, willingly enough, 
to other books by other writers whom the mobilization may in due 
course enlist. We shall here address ourselves to one problem with 
which Joe McCarthy has primarily concerned himself: How can 
the American people make sure that the State Department is 
manned by personnel able and eager to destroy the enemy? This 
is by no means a minor aspect of the total problem. For as long as 
the war against the Soviet Union is a cold war, our first-line troops 
are the working staff of the State Department; and success or fail- 
ure in our duel with Communism hinges to a great extent on the 
ability and eagerness of these men to match the wits and the 
single-mindedness of their counterparts in the Kremlin. 

Those who have been responsible for security in the State De- 
partment seem to have formulated programs and regulations with 
three principal objectives in mind. They have sought to get rid of 
persons whose employment in the Department might jeopardize 
the security of the United States. They have sought to shield from 
social ignominy and from the hazards of unemployment persons 
whose dismissal was in the national interest. And they have sought 
in their operations to accommodate the philosophy that the civil 
servant has, other things being equal, a “right to his job”; and that 
therefore his job may not be taken away from him without a quasi- 
legal adjudication of his claim to it. 

Now it seems to us that, in seeking to realize all three of these 
objectives at one and the same time, the security officers have 
failed to accomplish any one of them. They have failed not neces- 
sarily for lack of trying, but because the three objectives are in 
certain situations incompatible. It is possible, as we shall hereafter 
be arguing, to achieve the first and the second of these objectives 
side by side; but they tend to be achieved only at the expense of 
the third. 

Protecting the Government 

Security officials invariably preface their public lectures on the 
Government’s security program with such apothegms as “national 



security must come first” or, “a government job is a privilege not a 
right”— both of them principles with which we are in agreement. 
They go on, however, to talk about the present security program 
(or its earlier version under Truman) as though it reflected these 
principles; while we submit that, in important respects, it does not. 

Another way of saying “national security must come first” is to 
say: Whenever the interests of government security conflict with 
the interests of the employee— i.e., his earning power, his vocational 
preferences— the interests of the employee must give way. The 
principle does not exclude attempts to reconcile the two interests; 
and it most certainly does not imply that the interests of the em- 
ployee are insignificant. But it does hold that the reconciliation 
must not be achieved at the expense of the government’s interest; 
and that, where reconciliation cannot be achieved, the interests of 
the government shall be given exclusive consideration. 

Tested this way, the Truman Loyalty Program and (though to 
a lesser extent ) the Eisenhower Security Program are defective in 
at least three particulars: (a) they assign the decision as to what 
constitutes the security interest of the government to the wrong 
people; (b) they stipulate procedures which in and of themselves 
obstruct a single-minded attention to the government’s interest; and 
( c ) they rest on the assumption that a security program deals only 
with actual or potential traitors. These defects are fundamental. 

The correct approach to government security in sensitive agen- 
cies like the State Department is, in our opinion, embodied in the 
McCarran Rider (1946). The Rider flatly authorizes the Secre- 
tary of State “in his absolute discretion ” to terminate the employ- 
ment of any Department officer or employee “when he shall deem 
such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the na- 
tional security .” 

The Rider embraces the axiom that the government’s interest 
must come first and points the way— explicitly in some respects, im- 
plicitly in others— to a suitably hard program for enforcing secur- 
ity in sensitive government agencies. It provides that the Depart- 
ment itself must determine whether an employee satisfies its secur- 
ity requirements. It implies that the dismissal of employees who 
fail to meet these requirements must be summary in nature, there 
being no reference to traditional jurisprudential safeguards. And, 
by focusing on “the interests of the national security,” it ( again by 
implication) discourages the notion that disloyalty or suspected 
disloyalty are the only bases on which employees may be separated. 

The President’s Loyalty Program is sometimes looked upon as 


an implementation of the Rider, because it established certain pro- 
cedures for adjudicating an employee’s fitness. Actually, however, 
it repudiated the Rider’s approach to the problem. By assigning 
to a board of laymen the authority to determine an employee’s fit- 
ness, the President’s program called for “judgment by one’s peers” 
rather than judgment by persons with a claim to the expertise such 
judgment calls for. The McCarran Rider implicitly acknowledged 
the existence of expertise in matters of loyalty and security: it con- 
ferred upon the Secretary of State himself the power to decide se- 
curity cases. And by not setting up a board of laymen to oversee 
the administration of stipulated procedures, the Rider maximized 
the likelihood that he will turn for advice to the only persons who 
deal, day in and day out, with security matters— i.e., to the Depart- 
ment’s own security staff. This staff consists, theoretically at least, 
of experts— experts on the nature of the Communist movement and 
on its methods of infiltration; experts also in their knowledge of 
the particular security requirements of the Department. 

On the other hand, the members of the Department’s Loyalty 
Security Board, as well as those of the Civil Service’s Loyalty Re- 
view Board, were qualified primarily by their civic respectability. 
There is no reason to suppose that these men— lawyers, business 
men, diplomats ( in the case of the State Department Board) are 
fit to evaluate with any special acuity information relating to the 
Communist conspiracy, or even to adjudge the particular sensitiv- 
ity of a given State Department post. The rationale for staffing the 
loyalty boards with laymen is directly traceable to the common law 
notion that the ends of justice are best served when an unbiased 
tribunal of average citizens decides whether an accused is guilty 
or innocent. But justice, we are saying, is not the major objective 

A second serious deficiency of the traditional loyalty-security 
program is its insistence upon quasi- judicial procedures. This tends 
to inject factors into fitness-determinations which distract the tri- 
bunal from the only task it has any business considering— protect- 
ing the national interest. 

Let us be very clear about this. We are saying that it is not the 
function of a security board to give the employee his “day in court”; 
his “side of the story” should be heard, but the hearing of it has a 
limited function of enlightening the government. The function is 

p Under the Eisenhower program, the ‘leading citizens” from other De- 
partments sit on a Department s Security Board. See below. 



to provide the government with facts, otherwise unavailable to it, 
which may help security officers in deciding whether the employee 
is qualified to retain his job. An employee’s case should be “heard,” 
not because he stands to gain by the hearing, but because the gov- 
ernment needs the information he possesses. 

Now it is clear that formal board hearings are not necessary for 
the purpose of eliciting information; an interview with security 
officers will achieve this purpose well enough. But beyond this 
there are affirmative reasons why formal hearings, at which the 
employee is permitted to argue his case through legal counsel and 
through the testimony of friendly witnesses, tend to distract atten- 
tion from the government’s interests. Such hearings, precisely be- 
cause they suggest analogies with the judicial process, very natur- 
ally assume the character of a contest between the Department 
and the employee. Given the psychological prepossessions of men 
and women who were brought up on Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, 
it is predictable that “justice” to “litigants” will be the central 
theme of a loyalty board proceeding. And this, in turn, makes the 
board ( as Seth Richardson of the Loyalty Review Board has said 
himself) “lean over” backwards to favor the employee. The legal 
paraphernalia, meant to assure fair adjudication of disputes be- 
tween two parties equally privileged in the eyes of the law, ought 
not to apply to proceedings whose clear purpose is to safeguard, 
at whatever cost to the party of the second part, the interests of 
the party of the first part. 

The loyalty-security type hearing also tends to favor the em- 
ployee because it is, in effect, an ex parte proceeding,— i.e., ex parte 
the employee. The “State’s case,” as Conrad Snow once described 
the charges against the employees, is not orally argued at these 
hearings; it consists in written information uncovered by the in- 
vestigating agencies. While, indeed, the members of the board 
may direct questions to the employee about this or that item, there 
is no “advocate” present to press the Department’s “case.” On the 
other hand, the employee’s case is a “live one”: he is there himself; 
his side of the dispute is presented by legal counsel; and friendly 
witnesses are called in by him. 

But by far the most important consequence of using judicial 
devices in settling the question of a man’s fitness for government 
service is the “presumption of innocence.” We have discussed this 
presumption and its implications in connection with the Ty pin gs 
investigation; and we saw there that it may well turn out to be the 



controlling consideration in determining an employee's fitness un- 
der a loyalty-security type program. Philip Jessup, for example, 
could not be considered a security risk because the presumption of 
innocence was a factor in the equation. This was unavoidable, for 
it is unrealistic to assume that an adjudication of a man’s “inno- 
cence” or “guilt” can be made in this country unrelated to our 
traditional principle that a man must be presumed innocent until 
he is proven guilty. Indeed, the presumption arises even where 
the attempt is made to prevent its intrusion. For even under the 
confining “reasonable doubt” standard, the decision as to whether 
there is a doubt is influenced by the presumption. 

The presumption of innocence will remain the major barrier in 
the way of an effective security program as long as fitness adjudi- 
cations resemble criminal trials. 

The Eisenhower Administration's security program offers little 
hope of circumventing the hazards we have been discussing. Un- 
der it, the State Department has set up a Security Hearing Board; 
which means that it will continue to hold hearings before a quasi- 
judicial tribunal which, of necessity, will look after the “rights” 
of the employee. True, the new regulations contain one consider- 
able improvement: under Truman the Loyalty Security Board 
(in theory at least) had the last say;* while under the new dis- 
pensation, the Board is merely to hand down “advisory decisions.” 
The Secretary of State may now, if he so wishes, turn to experts 
for guidance as to whether or not to follow the recommendations 
of the laymen Board. If he does so often enough, the Board, hap- 
pily, will cease to be functional; and in the course of time its use- 
lessness may even be acknowledged. For, indeed, such a Board 
must be either abolished or eviscerated if an appropriately single- 
minded approach to government security is our desire, as it is 
our need. 

The hardness we are urging cannot, of course, be generated by 
a government edict; a government edict is more likely to result 
from a change in the public attitude to security in government 
rather than produce it. But statute regulations that encourage such 
hardness can obviously be helpful. If we truly accept the theory 
that “a government job is a privilege not a right” then we must 

* Acheson overruled it twice; the Loyalty Review Board overruled it 
twice. Acheson overruled adverse decisions by the Board: the Department’s 
regulations did not provide for an appeal to the Secretary from a decision 
favorable to the employee. 



adopt methods for determining an employee’s fitness that are bet- 
ter suited to an adjudication of a “privilege” than to an adjudica- 
tion of a “right.” 

But there is yet another reason— perhaps the most important of 
all— why the old approach has not and could not have given us 
the sort of security program we require. The government has pro- 
ceeded on the notion that an employee must come under a rea- 
sonable suspicion of being, if you will, a wicked man (wicked 
enough to serve as an agent for an enemy government ) before he 
can properly be separated from the State Department. In other 
words, by equating bad security with great evil we tend to go after 
the latter and thus fail to cope with the former. 

The nature of the predicament shows up pressingly when you 
discuss the loyalty programs with the Very Bright Liberal. You 
have only to state that “John J ones * s a loyalty risk,” and the pat 
question is forthcoming, “What definition of loyalty have you in 
mind?” You are, of course, to consider yourself routed unless you 
come up with an unassailable definition. And a very good defini- 
tion is, indeed, hard to come by. 

Any definition of loyalty that calls for unconditional allegiance 
to the government of the United States is obviously unsatisfactory: 
most of us recognize a natural law that supersedes the artifacts of 
man and even compels us, on occasion, to disobey our govern- 
ment. Nor is the next definition that suggests itself much better: 
to define loyalty as an attitude that has the “best interests of the 
United States ( as distinct from those of a foreign power ) at heart.” 
The difficulties, here again, are obvious: Who is to say Owen Lat- 
timore did not believe that the interests of the United States would 
be served by allowing Asia to go Communist? Or that William 
Foster lies when he affirms his belief that the United States will 
be better off when it is governed by soviets? 

The Liberal, in other words, is on his type of “firm ground,” and 
he will take us every time we agree to meet him on that quick- 
sand. But this does not mean he is right and we are wrong. It 
means, rather, that the loyalty-security vocabulary is inappropriate 
to the problem in hand . The subjective disposition called loyalty 
is virtually impossible to identify, and is thus a poor yardstick by 
which to estimate fitness for government employment. The loyalty 
concept is unserviceable, because it cannot at the margin differen- 
tiate the Lattimores and Fosters from, say, the Lodges and Dul- 
leses, and thus it quite obviously fails to distinguish between those 



who are and those who are not fit to make and execute policy. But 
beyond being unserviceable, the concept is irrelevant; for when 
we look closely at the matter, we find we are interested in talking, 
not about “Who is loyal?” but about “Who favors those policies 
that are in the national interest as we see it?” 

In short, when we discuss the need for a tight security program 
in the State Department in loyalty-security terms, we are apt to 
forget the basic reason why we need one. We do not, of course, 
want traitors working in sensitive government agencies. But the 
reason we don't want traitors working there is that they tend to 
frustrate America's defense against the Soviet Union. We intend to 
eliminate traitors not so much because treason is wicked but be- 
cause it gets in the way of American interests. It is the advance- 
ment of American interests that a properly conceived security 
program has to consider and to guarantee. Consequently, the man 
who frustrates American policy without wicked intent is no less 
objectionable than the man who frustrates it with wicked intent. 
Let us assume that Owen Lattimore, John Stewart Service, John 
Carter Vincent— or any of a dozen others who come to mind— have 
had the interests of the United States consistently at heart. Yet is 
the damage they did to American interests lessened a single bit 
by our conceding their good intent? 

This brings us to some unpleasant truths. When we speak of 
personnel who frustrate the advancement of American interests 
we speak of a group that includes some men who are not traitors; 
men whose only fault may be that they are incompetent political 
analysts, men of bad judgment. And if the ultimate objective of the 
security program is to remove from government service all who 
frustrate the advancement of American interests, the merely in- 
competent men must go out along with the traitors. Let the latter, 
if they can be identified, pay some stiff price over and above the 
loss of their jobs. But let us agree that the former will have to lose 
their jobs. 

In a word: our security program must be designed to eliminate 
personnel who, on the basis of past performance or present atti- 
tudes, will predictably hinder our cause, whether this be their 
conscious aim or not . Is the employee, given his past performance, 
likely to advance the interests of the United States? This is the 
only feasible standard by which to determine the fitness of a State 
Department employee to continue in a post in which he can influ- 
ence policy. 



The Liberal's answer to this is easy to anticipate. He will strike a 
posture of humility, invoke the axiom of human fallibility, and ask, 
who , pray tell, can say which policy is in the national interest? Who 
is to say that one mans analysis and judgment are sound and an- 
other's unsound? Even assuming we should dismiss employees 
whose judgment is predictably bad (he will go on), we would 
have to be able to say with utmost confidence that Jones has a 
long record of making “bad” judgments; and this, in the nature of 
the case, we could never do. For we can say, perhaps, that his 
judgments have had unfortunate consequences in the long pull; 
but Jones had to make them in the light of what was known and 
knowable at another moment in time. In short, the Liberal will 
have none of our apodictical talk about “bad judgment" because, 
he insists, it involves the assertion of our own infallibility. 

Now the Liberal is quite right in saying that we cannot always 
pass upon the merits of past judgments with absolute certitude. 
But to say that, therefore, we cannot evaluate past policy recom- 
mendations so as to decide whether we want Jones to draw up 
future policy is to talk nonsense. We repudiate the notion that the 
national interest is so vague, and good judgment exercised on its 
behalf so elusive, that we are never in a position to say which 
man's judgment endangers the national interest. And we reject the 
mystification involved in the Liberal's other gambit— namely, the 
query: who, after all, is to say at any particular moment what the 
national interest is? 

Bearing in mind that the Liberal is seldom so demure when as- 
serting his own opinions, let us remember that under our system 
of government decisions as to what the national interest is, and 
which persons are on the record likely to formulate and execute a 
foreign policy that will advance it, are made by the people acting 
through their elected representatives. There would seem to be 
nothing bizarre in the notion that the men elected to put into effect 
a certain policy should be the ones to decide what kind of profes- 
sional workers are equipped to carry out that policy. Yet many who 
would never challenge a President's right to select his own Secre- 
tary of State (or the Secretary’s right, in turn, to select his own 
principal assistants ) stop short of what seems to follow as a matter 
of course: that all employees whose responsibilities touch upon 
the making of policy, but whose demonstrated views and attitudes 
on critical issues are athwart the Administration’s, should be sum- 
marily sent on their way. 



Protecting the Employee 

President Truman advertised his loyalty program as one de- 
signed to achieve two goals— that of protecting the government 
and that of protecting its employees. The first goal, as we have 
seen throughout this book, was not achieved. The second was 
achieved in the sense that government employees were given a 
high degree of job security— in other words, to the extent the first 
goal was not achieved. But even as regards the protection of em- 
ployees who did lose their jobs, the program had conspicuous de- 
fects. We are speaking of the blighting of personal reputations, 
which the government is obliged to avoid, wherever possible. 

The administrators of the Truman program undoubtedly appre- 
ciated the desirability of shielding discharged employees from 
public exposure. Out of the hundreds of persons separated from 
government service under the federal loyalty program since 1947, 
only a handful are known to the public— and some of those identi- 
fied themselves by taking public exception to the adverse decisions 
of the loyalty boards. Some others became identified in the course 
of public disputes about the security program. Some leaks, how- 
ever, did occur; and in some other instances, where the Depart- 
ment was successful in keeping the public uninformed, we must 
suppose that an employee’s friends and close associates were in a 
position to find out or guess the reasons for his separation. At any 
rate, some reputations have suffered from the government loyalty 
program; and the fault lies not so much with the security officials, 
who tried hard, as with those who drew up the rules of the game. 

The first mistake made by the authors of the Truman program 
is their way of describing a person found unfit to work for the gov- 
ernment— i.e., as a “loyalty risk.” The loyalty-disloyalty criterion is 
unserviceable, as we have seen, from the government’s point of 
view; its consequences are even more unfortunate for the em- 
ployee. The government can, if it sees fit, walk around the philo- 
sophical obstacles and use the term “disloyal” as merely meaning 
“disloyal to the interests of the United States as the government 
understands these interests.” But the employee is not in a position 
to plead philosophical niceties. The public cannot be counted on 
to inquire into the semantics of the term “disloyalty.” No matter 
how it is explained, “disloyalty” evokes the most invidious images 


in everybody’s mind; it occupies, quite simply, the top niche in the 
hierarchy of public sins. 

Nor was it particularly helpful to the employee’s reputation 
that the government darkly labelled him a “loyalty risk” instead 
of affirmatively charging him with disloyalty. For one thing, the 
public ( if it hears of the matter at all ) is not likely to distinguish 
between the “risk” and the “sure” case. For another, the govern- 
ment’s standards are such as to invite speculation that the em- 
ployee was a good deal more than a risk; for to be a “risk” is as bad 
as you ever can get in the Department. If Georgi Malenkov had 
a desk there, the worst that the State Department Loyalty Board 
could call him ( assuming it found against him ) would be a “loy- 
alty risk.” 

The loyalty program, in other words, adopted standards for ad- 
judicating an employee’s fitness that are alien and repugnant to 
our jurisprudence. In the interests of national security, it adopted, 
quite properly, the theory that, although a man may be innocent 
before the law, he may nonetheless fall short of meeting the 
much more stringent standards for government employment. But 
then, having arranged things so that Jones would be found want- 
ing by a loyalty board, although he might easily have survived the 
same charges in a court of law, it proceeded to pin on him a label 
every bit as damaging to his reputation as any contained in the 
vocabulary of crime. 

And what worked against the employee in this regard was, 
ironically, the elaborate procedures that were carefully designed, 
and expensively executed, to protect him. For leaks were normally 
traceable to the fact that the investigated employee became in- 
volved in procedures which could not be concealed from his imme- 
diate associates. However tight-lipped and evasive the security 
officials might be, the procedural mill usually betrayed the fact 
that an employee was in loyalty or security trouble. 

Of course, no security program can so operate as to preclude 
the possibility that the “security risk” will get publicly identified. 
But Truman did not go far enough in protecting the employee in 
this respect. And out of the past performance, certain remedies 
suggest themselves. 

The first is to do away with the formal hearing. And this, as we 
may have shown, would serve the interests of both— government 
and employee. But something still more drastic is necessary: the 



distinction the Truman program made between employees who 
are undesirable for security or loyalty reasons , and employees who 
are undesirable for other reasons must be erased . The State De- 
partment ought to dismiss the security risk and the "policy misfit” 
the same way it dismisses an employee who is habitually late for 
work. And, for public consumption, the Department ought to have 
a stock phrase covering all separations. (The Eisenhower Admin- 
istration seems, in this regard, to be moving in the right direction. 
There is reason to suppose that many or all of the 1,456 security 
risks who had been discharged from executive agencies as of Octo- 
ber 1953, were at the time of their separation camouflaged as 
"rifled” ["Reduction In Force”] cases; and thus, friends and asso- 
ciates of the dismissed employees attributed their separation to 
government economies. Whether this procedure is to be a per- 
manent feature of the Eisenhower security program it is too early 
to say. ) 

But to erase the distinction at the separation stage is not to 
eliminate it altogether, since the security risk will have gone 
through certain screening procedures that the late-to-work em- 
ployee has not. Indeed, by advocating that security experts mo- 
nopolize the handling of security risk cases, we have retained an 
obstacle to the equalization of security cases and other cases. But we 
also propose that as early as possible in the process— at the instant 
the security experts have ruled that an employee should be sepa- 
rated— the risk should be "thrown” into a common channel with all 
other employees about to leave the Department for sundry reasons. 

These proposals have a twofold advantage. Conscientious secur- 
ity personnel are more likely to execute a hard security program if 
everything has been done to lighten the consequences for the sepa- 
rated employee . They feel less tempted to indulge the "presump- 
tion of innocence” if they are no longer forced to adjudicate 
"guilt”; and if the public has no longer a reason to regard separa- 
tion from a sensitive agency as evidence of such an adjudication. 
On the other hand, the plight of the separated employee is indeed 

There remains the argument that some persons deserve to have 
their reputations blighted: the community should be informed that 
the loyalty of a dismissed department employee was in question— 
so that he does not land an even more strategic position in Ameri- 
can society than that which he has forcibly lost. And the idea that 
some people deserve to have their reputations blighted is, we be- 



lieve, widely held. However that may be, we are better off leav- 
ing matters of judgment and retribution to Providence. The func- 
tion of a security program is to get misfits out of government— not 
to persecute them.* 

No doubt, the notion that a security risk ought to be exposed so 
that the community can protect itself is a notion of some merit. 
The point is that an adverse security finding should not be regarded 
as a positive proof of a man’s displaced allegiance; and an adverse 
adjudication of a person s fitness for government employment is 
not and should not be regarded as a prejudgment of his fitness 
for participation in normal community life. If we want the govern- 
ment to supply stricter standards in protecting itself than we are 
willing to incorporate into our jurisprudence generally, we ought 
to be satisfied to conclude nothing more from the dismissal of a 
government employee than that he is not qualified for the particu- 
lar job he was holding. 

Job Security 

The protests against the dismissal of government employees on 
loyalty or security grounds are becoming rare; and not because 
this is the callous “Age of Conformity,” but simply because the 
public, including many Liberals, began to grasp the elementary 
fact that the national interest supersedes any individual’s job priv- 
ileges. But the public is not, it seems, prepared to come to the 
same conclusion about what we have called the “policy misfit,” 
the government employee who gets in the way of the cold war be- 
cause he holds attitudes and opinions that, however respectable, 
incapacitate him from contributing to the realization of current 
United States objectives. 

One reason for this bias is clear: in our society, a man’s job is 
deemed one of his most precious possessions. The fact that “job 
security” has been the underlying theme in one national election 
campaign after another shows how zealously Americans look upon 
their job “rights.” The passionate attachment of some civic organ- 
izations to the idea of a permanent and professional career service 
in government indicates the same tendency. Nor do we ourselves 

* The solicitude proper in most classes of security risks is, of course, not 
indicated when a man has committed espionage or has perjured himself. 
But such a man is the proper concern of the Justice Department — not the 
State Department. 



wish to appear indifferent to the need for a professional civil serv- 
ice— a career that able young Americans can enter with confidence. 

But the essential question is not whether there should be a pro- 
fessional and permanent Civil Service, but whether, in our deter- 
mination to achieve such a service, we have defeated our own 
purposes by giving government employees ( a) a kind of job secur- 
ity that few others in our society enjoy, (b) a kind of job security 
that goes far beyond what reason can justify, and (c) a kind of job 
security that undermines rather than enhances the efficiency and 
the professionalism of the civil service. Therefore the question is 
worth asking why government workers should not be treated the 
same way the community treats other clerical and professional 
workers. Why should government jobs not be related to the legit- 
imate day-to-day needs of the consumers of government (i.e., the 
electorate ) , just as other jobs depend on the day-to-day consumer 
needs as expressed in the marketplace? Indeed, in discussing the 
legitimacy of discharging governmental misfits, the burden would 
seem to lie not on those who would do away with special protec- 
tion for the government employee, but on those who would grant 
him extraordinary privileges. 

Seventy years ago, the authors of the Civil Service Act advanced 
persuasive arguments in behalf of security of tenure for the gov- 
ernment employee. Civil servants, they said in effect, are in a dif- 
ferent category from other employees in that they can discharge 
their obligations to their ultimate employers only if they stand in 
a peculiar protected relationship to their immediate employer. 
Their ultimate employers are the nation; but their immediate em- 
ployer, for whom they perform the manifold clerical, managerial, 
and administrative functions involved in the implementation of 
policy, is the political party in power. And the latter depends 
upon patronage as a means of obtaining and maintaining political 
advantage. Thus, if left to its own devices, the immediate employer 
will act as though the primary qualification for government em- 
ployment were party loyalty rather than competence; and as a 
result, employees who cannot meet this requirement will, with 
each incoming Administration, be discharged— to the great injury 
of the nation. If, then, the interests of the ultimate employer— the 
nation— are to be given first consideration, the power of the imme- 
diate employer (the political party in power) to discharge em- 
ployees must be restricted. The solution to which all this points, 
so the argument runs, is to draw persons of demonstrated profes- 

sional competence into the Civil Service and guarantee their 

But this rationale, it will be seen if we recall where the argu- 
ment started, rests on the assumption that civil servants are not 
involved in policy but merely perform routine functions. The con- 
clusion to which it leads is, therefore, no better than the assump- 
tion; or at least can be applied only where the assumption is valid. 
Where the responsibilities of a government employee carry him 
into the policy-making area, the whole argument fails. Permanent 
tenure for such an employee invites a situation where policies re- 
pudiated at the polls by the “ultimate” employer live on forever 
in the departments. 

If things had worked out in, say, the State Department, as our 
legislators of seventy years ago expected them to work out, policy 
would be made, exclusively, by the Secretary and his principal 
assistants, none of whom is a member of the Civil Service or the 
Foreign Service. But policy is often made and inevitably influenced 
at much lower levels, and therefore by career personnel. Policy is 
made by an Edward Posniak, putting the case for Communist 
Czechoslovakia before a Department liaison committee; or by 
Oliver Edmund Clubb, drafting memoranda for the Secretary that 
reflect not only the knowledge and experience in virtue of which 
Clubb was chief of the China Desk, but also his views on Commu- 
nism and the future of China. Posniak’s and Clubb’s personal views 
are the more likely to influence policy because they are assumed 
to speak out of expertise rather than partisan persuasion. The 
modem business of the State Department is, in a word, of such 
character that the traditional line between policy and routine func- 
tion is difficult if not impossible to draw. 

Worse still, many U.S. civil servants are no longer expected, and 
no longer try, to maintain the attitude of policy impartiality that 
the traditional view called for. In an era of passionate ideological 
tensions they become, unavoidably, militant defenders of par- 
ticular policies. George Kennan, for example, was an “impartial” 
Foreign Service Officer when his name stood for the Policy of 
Containment. John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent were 
not, in theory, policy makers, yet they supported an identifiable 
policy toward China; if they were still in the Department, it is 
clear that they would find it difficult to make common cause with 
the Eisenhower Administration. Charles Bohlen, also a “career 
man,” is known as a defender of the Yalta Agreement to such an 

26 o 


extent that several Senators had legitimate doubts about his ability 
to serve as Eisenhower's Ambassador to Soviet Russia. 

That "it works in England” is no answer at all. British civil 
servants are far more careful than ours to maintain attitudes of, 
and a reputation for, impartiality and, in fact, indifference in policy 
matters. The British foreign officer seems competent and willing, 
one day to draft measures designed to implement a Conservative 
government's policy of holding on to India, and the next day, to 
draft for a Labor government the measures by which India may 
be turned over to the Indians. It may be desirable that State De- 
partment employees act in the British way and acquire the 
British skill of repressing or avoiding strong convictions. The 
point is that American civil servants do not do this. And they can- 
not expect to have it both ways: to act as policy-makers from day 
to day, and to be treated as impartial janitors when another party 
comes to power. 

Obviously, an incoming administration should be forced, by in- 
sistent pressure from public opinion interested in preserving the 
Civil Service, to go as far as is consistent with its mandate in avoid- 
ing the evils of the spoils system. But there is a transcendent com- 
mitment postulated in the American philosophy of government: 
the premises of democracy demand that the electorate be entitled 
to employ civil servants who will execute policies the electorate 
wants undertaken. And the premises of republicanism insist that 
an administration holding the popular mandate must have the au- 
thority to implement that mandate. 

This is not to suggest, by any means, that the State Department 
should embark on a wholesale purge of its personnel after each 
national election. The great majority of Department employees 
are undoubtedly flexible or dispassionate enough to carry out, 
most faithfully, the policies of any American administration. But 
those who are seriously committed to a particular policy must no 
longer claim tenure immunity. 

A final point: all present civil servants are parties to an implied 
contract that their employment will not be terminated except un- 
der standards which were in effect at the time they got their jobs. 
Thus, and without doubt, compensation is in order for those who 
are to lose their jobs because the standards have changed: the 
government must be prepared to make generous financial provi- 
sions for employees dismissed under the new security program, and 
payments from the government should not cease until the em- 



ployee finds a new job, with comparable economic return, else- 
where in the community. 

It is perhaps not necessary to discuss, in detail, administrative 
minutiae of the security program we have in mind. But we owe a 
general indication how it would work in the State Department 
should the quasi-judicial loyalty-security boards be abolished and 
should the Department’s security office handle “security risks” 
and “policy misfits” solely from the point of view of the govern- 
ment’s interest. 

1. The preliminary advisory decisions as to whether a State De- 
partment employee is a “security risk” or a “policy misfit” would 
be made, respectively, by the security and the policy-making of- 
ficers of the Department. The final decision on security cases would 
be made by the chief security officer of the Department, on “policy 
misfits” by the Secretary of State or his designee. 

2. The men who make the preliminary determination should be 
qualified by expert knowledge of both Communism and of current 
Department policy. Their up-to-date conversance with the latter 
would, of course, be assured only if they received regular briefings 
from area offices. 

3. Data on security cases would be supplied by the FBI, by De- 
partment investigators, and by other investigative agencies; and, 
as is the current practice, the discovery of any derogatory data 
would warrant the attention of the security office. On “policy mis- 
fits,” the data would be furnished by the relevant Assistant Secre- 
tary. The decision as to whether a policy case should be called to 
the attention of the security office would be made with reference 
to the decisive standard— namely, is there a reasonable doubt that 
the employee is capable of working effectively on behalf of the 
resolved Department policies? 

4. If, having given the benefit of every doubt to the government, 
the security officers conclude from the available information that 
the person involved may be an “undesirable” from either the secur- 
ity or the policy standpoint, they would notify the employee of this 
fact and of the specific reasons which prompted their decision. 
The employee should then appear for an interview. In security 
cases, suspension of the employee should follow automatically 
upon preferment of charges.* 

5. The employee would be invited to submit to the security 

0 This is the recent Department practice. 



office any affidavits or documents that may shed light on his secur- 
ity or his policy status. 

6. The sole aim of the interview with the employee would be 
to elicit information that might shed light on his fitness, security 
or policy aptitude, as the case may be. 

7. When it has obtained all available information about the 
employee, the security office would determine directly whether 
the employee retains his job. The sole standard for judging the 
security risk: is the employment of this person, beyond a reason- 
able doubt, consistent with the interests of the national security? 
The sole standard for judging the policy risk: is the employee 
suited to implement the policies as enunciated by the Secretary 
of State? 

8. In the event of an adverse decision and subsequent termina- 
tion of employment, every effort would be made to withhold from 
the public the effective reason for the employee’s separation. 

The Secretary of State should let his chief security officer have 
the final say in security cases. We propose this because the chances 
are overwhelmingly against the Secretary of State being qualified 
to pass judgment on such cases. The Secretary is not, and ought 
not to be, chosen by the President for his experience and shrewd- 
ness in coping with Communist infiltration techniques, or for his 
ability to grasp the complex significance of diverse Communist 
affiliations. His qualifications ought to be primarily those of the 
statesman skilled in fields altogether different from security en- 
forcement. From a practical standpoint, to make the Secretary re- 
view every finding of his chief security officer is absurd for he 
obviously cannot discharge any such time-consuming duty. He 
would, consequently, designate the job to someone else; and since 
the person to whom he ought to designate it is the Department’s 
chief expert on security problems, and since the chief expert is 
presumably the officer who handed down an adverse decision in 
the first place, nothing is to be gained by institutionalizing a round 

These arguments, clearly, do not apply to the policy risks. In 
these cases the Secretary is eminently qualified to intervene and 
to decide himself. 

We have argued that the State Department is the best judge of 
the fitness of employees engaged in implementing its policies. But 
it does not follow from this that the Department, or any other 



sensitive agency, will as a matter of course undertake a hard secur- 
ity program. Nor should the public or Congress take it as a matter of 
faith that such a security program will take care of itself. The 
events of the past few years, if they establish nothing else, estab- 
lish the wisdom of Congressional supervision of security in the 
sensitive agencies. The stakes are too high, the dangers of lassitude 
in matters of security too great, for Congress to assume unques- 
tioningly that the executive departments keep their houses clean. 
The responsibility falls on Congress. 

Congress must, therefore, have ready access to the data without 
which intelligent security evaluation in the sensitive executive 
departments is impossible. Nothing in recent political history can 
quite match the futility or the humiliation that Congress suffered 
when, during the Truman Administration, it tried to live on infor- 
mation scraps tossed to it by arrogant bureaucrats. This is not to 
overlook the reality of a dilemma the Executive faces as custodian 
of security data: it cannot release the data indiscriminately, as 
this could damage both the individuals concerned and the ma- 
chinery by which the data are obtained; but on the other hand, 
it cannot withhold data without preventing the Congress from 
doing its duty. 

The Truman way of resolving the dilemma (by disregarding 
Congress and protecting loyalty-security suspects at whatever 
price) clearly will not do. Nor is an adequate solution to be found 
at the other extreme, i.e., by giving all Congressmen easy access to 
all security data : this would be tantamount to opening the security 
files to the general public. Thus, a standing joint committee of 
both houses should be created, patterned on the Committee on 
Atomic Energy, which would be furnished copies of all security 
information in executive files* and would be enjoined by Con- 
gress to keep the data confidential. 

Such a standing committee’s job would be, quite simply, to 
conduct a continuous survey of security management in govern- 
ment. It would not, of course, be empowered to overrule the find- 
ings by agency officers; but it would feel free to discuss loyalty- 
security actions with them, advocating a change in procedure 
here, a reversal of a finding there, as the situation indicated. 

The Security Committee would make periodic reports to Con- 
gress on security practices in the several agencies. Should a report 

* Excepting, of course, the names of confidential informants, the identities 
of FBI penetrators of the Communist Party, and such-like information. 



indicate that the security program of a given agency was being 
conducted unsatisfactorily, Congress should be left to cope with 
the situation by putting pressure on the President, by exercising 
its power over the appropriations, or by carrying the issue to the 

The Congressional Security Committee here envisaged is no 
fool-proof device for ensuring hard security practices; nor is such 
a device to be found anywhere else. Perhaps the most notable de- 
fect of the committee proposal is that it fails to provide for the 
sort of situation that harassed McCarthy in 1950. The Tydings 
Committee ( an ad hoc Congressional Security Committee not un- 
like the one we are proposing) ended up encouraging lax security 
practices; and McCarthy's efforts to make it behave proved futile. 
The Tydings Committee, to be sure, was encouraged to play its 
obstructive role by the virtual Executive monopoly of security 
data; but also, as we have shown, it needed no encouragement. 

So where is a recourse? Under the American political system, 
there is no guarantee that a future committee will not betray its 
mandate, and its responsibilities, other than the force which gen- 
erated the recent American mobilization : the individual Congress- 
man who has enough devotion to the commonweal to raise some 
hell when it is being violated— and the sensitivity of the voting 
public to that kind of hell-raising. 



Senator McCarthy’s Method 


T o approve of Senator McCarthy’s “aims” is considered in civ- 
ilized circles the maximum concession anyone can make to 
McCarthyism and still hang on, if precariously, to his virtue. 
Everyone, on the other hand, must agree that Senator McCarthy’s 
“method” is abhorrent, hence the common, stop-loss phrase, “I 
approve of Senator McCarthy’s aims, but I disapprove of his 

An analysis of Senator McCarthy’s “method” is not easy, pri- 
marily because his method is so variously defined. No single volume 
could adequately examine all the characteristics imputed to it, 
and all the objections made against it. A great deal of confusion, 
what is more, seems to beset McCarthy’s critics when they talk 
about what they call McCarthy’s “method.” And since McCarthy’s 
critics pretty well rule the communications industry, they have 
enmeshed the public in their own hectic confusion. 

For instance, “damaging the reputations of innocent people” is 
talked about as an aspect of McCarthy’s “method”; yet it is clear 
that while damage to a reputation may result from McCarthy’s 
practice of his method, the result would not appear to be a part 
of the method . Again, the imposition of “thought control” is often 
spoken of as a “method” of McCarthy; but while a measure of 
“thought control,” or “conformity,” is indeed being sought by Mc- 
Carthyism (as we shall see in a later chapter), this would appear 
to be a proximate end of McCarthyism, not a part of McCarthy’s 
method. Once again, McCarthy’s constant urging of the “conspira- 
torial view of history” to explain the reversals of the West in its cold 
war with the Soviet Union— as well as his imputation of pro-Com- 
munist motivations to some of his critics— are characteristic of 
McCarthy’s method only if it can be established that he does not 



believe what he is saying. Thus, should McCarthy tell the Ameri- 
can people that Alger Hiss is responsible for the terms of the Yalta 
Agreement, we would need to ask ourselves, Does McCarthy ac- 
tually believe this to be so? If he did ( as in the absence of con- 
trary evidence we should have to assume), then his saying so 
would amount to nothing more than his own evaluation of history— 
to be criticized, perhaps, as ignorant, over-simplified, or simply 
mistaken— and has nothing whatever to do with his method . On the 
other hand, if it could be shown that McCarthy did not himself 
believe what he said, then his making such a charge would indeed 
be a part of his method, his immediate end being, let us say, to 
frighten the American people, or to embarrass the political party 
that countenanced Alger Hiss. 

In other words, an examination of anti-McCarthy literature and 
journalism reveals that under the heading of McCarthy’s 'method” 
there is commonly found a disorderly array of indictments difficult 
to classify. Lumped together under McCarthy’s method are the 
consequences of McCarthyism, the ends of McCarthyism and, 
even, the spirit of McCarthyism ( suspicion, fear, paranoia, etc. ) . 

To disentangle such rampant confusion calls for nothing less 
than deep metaphysical therapy. This, let the reader rejoice, we 
will not attempt. We shall content ourselves with merely indi- 
cating the nature of a very, very complex problem. For example: 
Are the predictable consequences of an act an intrinsic part of 
that act, or are the two separable? If McCarthy discovers that a 
State Department official was a member of the Communist Party 
in 1945, and thereupon exposes that fact, are the ill effects of that 
exposure, as felt by the bureaucrat, a part of McCarthy’s method, 
or are the exposure and the means of exposing alone his method? 
Is McCarthy’s loyalty risk-hunting an end in itself? Is McCarthy 
like an amateur fisherman whose goal is not so much the selling 
or the eating of the fish, but rather the catching of it? Or is loyalty 
risk-hunting the means through which McCarthy seeks to achieve 
a limited objective (security in government) the achievement of 
which in turn becomes a means of furthering another end ( Ameri- 
ca’s victory in her war against Communism) in turn a means of 
insuring still a further end and so on? Such questions, and many 
others like them, are pertinent to a definitive discussion of Senator 
McCarthy’s or anyone else’s method. But they do, as we say, in- 
volve a philosophical treatise on method; and this is not contem- 
plated here. 



We will, rather, having acknowledged the complexity of the sub- 
ject, discuss only those characteristics of McCarthy's modus oper- 
andi which constitute, invariably, the staples of the anti-McCar- 
thy diet. It is charged that ( 1 ) McCarthy impugns people's loyalty 
on the basis of insufficient evidence; hence he “smears innocent 
people'' (he has impugned Lattimore's loyalty); that (2) McCar- 
thy exaggerates the evidence and regularly makes unwarranted 
specific accusations; thus, also, he is guilty of “smearing” (he has 
accused Lattimore of being the “top Soviet espionage agent”); 
that (3) McCarthy publicizes charges that ought to be kept secret 
(he runs around the country questioning Lattimore's loyalty); 
that (4) McCarthy hides behind his Congressional immunity, thus 
giving his victims no legal come-back (he sees to it that those of 
his charges against Lattimore that are actionable are made on the 
floor of the Senate); that (5) McCarthy calls all his critics Com- 
munists in an effort to discredit them (he turns on those who dis- 
agree with him about Lattimore and calls them pro-Communists ) . 

These charges form the hard core of contemporary criticism of 
McCarthy’s method. They will be examined in an attempt to 
throw light on two questions: (1) How has McCarthy in fact 
operated? and (2) Does he deserve censure or praise for the way 
in which he has operated? 

The Smearing of Innocent People 

It is certainly not characteristic of McCarthy to come forward 
with dispassionate recitations of the facts. Rather, like an attor- 
ney summing up his case for the jury, McCarthy emerges as an 
interpreter of the fact: he assumes the role of the government 

McCarthy, characteristically, seizes upon information that tends 
to point to disloyalty on the part of a government employee, 
raises the broad issue of the employee’s loyalty, and makes certain 
charges against the employee— i.e., he characterizes the employee 
as a “loyalty risk,” as a “pro-Communist,” as the “pioneer of the 
smear campaign against Chiang Kai-shek,” or what have you. Mc- 
Carthy’s critics insist that it is a part of his method to do all these 
things without sufficient evidence to back him up. They insist, 
that is to say, that in almost every instance McCarthy has insuffi- 
cient factual data, either to call into question the employee’s loy- 
alty, or to justify his particular characterization of the employee. 
Thus they conclude that he “smears innocent people.” 

We propose to survey McCarthy’s record with a view to an- 
swering these two questions: Does the evidence he presents justify 
him (a) in raising the loyalty issue, and (b) in using the particular 
words that he uses in making his charges? Let us, however, be 
very clear as to why these are different questions, and why they 
both need to be asked. 

To be sure, McCarthy does not commit separately the two sins 
with which he is charged. Obviously he does not accuse an em- 
ployee of being a “pro-Communist” without at the same time ( di- 
rectly or indirectly) raising the question of the employee’s loyalty. 
But clearly, while in certain situations McCarthy ought to be cen- 
sured for having used certain words in describing his target, he 
may nevertheless have been justified in raising the question 
whether his target is a loyalty risk. 

McCarthy's friends may feel we are wasting time in fastidiously 
recording the precise language in which McCarthy couches his 
charges. After all, they will say, the particular words that McCar- 
thy used do not, anyway, stick in the public’s mind; the public re- 
calls merely that a man’s allegiance has been called into question. So 
why hold him to account for the exact wording of his accusations? 
And, as a matter of fact, McCarthy’s most violent critics appear to 



take precisely this position— except, of course, where it turns out 
that McCarthy has a particularly good case, in which event they 
hold McCarthy to the exact phrase he used. (For example, after 
Owen Lattimore was clearly shown to be at best a loyalty risk, 
they would not let McCarthy forget that he had called Lattimore 
“the top Soviet espionage agent,” not simply a “loyalty risk.”) For 
the most part, however, Liberal talk about “smearing” focuses not 
so much on McCarthy’s language as on the contention that, how- 
ever he happens to phrase it, McCarthy manages to put a person’s 
good name under a cloud, and this on the basis of insufficient 
evidence. Be that as it may, we intend to analyze McCarthy’s 
method under both tests, harkening again to Lord Acton’s counsel 
that one should try to make out for one’s opponents an even strong- 
er and more impressive case than they present themselves. 

But before we do this, a word needs to be said about two other 
fashionable tests by which we are invited to judge the sufficiency 
of McCarthy’s evidence. What might be called the absolute test 
of whether McCarthy has “smeared” people is proposed by the 
Liberal’s question: Is there a discrepancy between what a man 
has actually done, or what a man has actually thought, and what 
McCarthy has charged that man with having done or having 
thought? If this test could be applied, it would surely be the final 
word as to whether a “smear” has been levelled; but it is obviously 
unserviceable for purposes of evaluating the charge that a man is 
pro-Communist. In most other situations the test is indeed service- 
able, and of course advisable. If, for example, a man is charged 
with being a member of the Americans for Democratic Action, we 
can tell whether a smear has been born simply by finding out 
whether he is a member of the Americans for Democratic Action; 
and this we can do easily enough because members of the ADA do 
not, as a rule, conceal their membership. But one of the Commu- 
nist movement’s greatest single strengths lies in the skill and deter- 
mination with which it prevents society from finding out which 
citizens are loyal Communists, and thus disloyal citizens. Thus it 
becomes very difficult indeed to determine whether X, in calling Y 
a Communist, has smeared him. The best we can do in the circum- 
stances is to ask whether the charge ( by which we mean both the 
specific accusation and the general impugnation of the person’s 
loyalty) is justified in the light of necessarily circumstantial evi- 

In addition to the “absolute proof” test, we must reject what 


might be called the "legal sufficiency” test. Many of McCarthy's 
critics are given to pointing out that his evidence in nearly every 
case is insufficient to establish that the accused has broken the 
law, which is usually true. But they are also given to saying that 
this is evidence of McCarthy’s irresponsibility, which is foolishness. 
Only in the rare exception does McCarthy even accuse his targets 
of having broken the law. But he does insist, as a general thing, 
that the evidence he offers is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of 
his targets from government service. Thus, those who quarrel with 
McCarthy on this score ( taking the position that only proven law- 
breakers should be dismissed from the government) should address 
their grievances to those who drafted the rules for government em- 
ployment— not to McCarthy, who merely plays by these rules. For 
by 1947, a * the ver y latest, Congress and both political parties had 
explicitly endorsed the notion that government service is a priv- 
ilege, not a right; and that therefore government personnel must 
meet standards a good deal more exacting than those set forth in 
the criminal code. Job security for civil servants was therefore to 
depend not only on their staying outside the law’s reach, but also 
on their satisfying their superiors that their employment was in the 
national interest. 

All this appears to be obvious; but it apparently is not, else we 
would not hear, so frequently, that McCarthy is to be damned be- 
cause he goes after government employees without adhering to 
the standards of proof required of a district attorney going after 
a thief. 

Let us go on now with a review of McCarthy's record, keeping in 
mind the two questions: Is the evidence he presents sufficient, 
typically, to justify what McCarthy says about his targets? And is 
it sufficient, typically, to warrant his calling their loyalty into 

On the whole, McCarthy’s attacks have followed a pattern. Most 
often he has gone after government employees, or former govern- 
ment employees. If the target of his attack is still employed, Mc- 
Carthy calls for his dismissal. If he is no longer employed, he calls 
for an investigation of the security agency of the Department in 
which he worked. If he finds the employee has not even been 
processed (which is often the case), he lets the world know that 
he is flabbergasted. If he finds the employee has been processed 


and cleared (which is also often the case), he also lets the world 
know that he is flabbergasted. 

McCarthy's critics have so effectively popularized the notion 
that McCarthy smears a half dozen Americans every week that the 
statistics may be surprising: the Grand Inquisitor of the Twentieth 
Century has publicly accused, as of questionable loyalty or reli- 
ability, a total of 46 persons.* Of these 46, McCarthy mentioned 
twelve** only once, and then only to point out that their security 
status was pending in the State Department and that eleven of 
them had nevertheless not been suspended from their work. 

With respect to tenf others, McCarthy merely quoted from 
derogatory reports developed by other investigators, with a view 
to persuading the Senate that at least a prima facie case existed for 
questioning the operating standards of a loyalty program that had 
cleared them. With one exception ( Remington), little public atten- 
tion was given to these ten. They do not, in short, classify as “Mc- 
Carthy cases” for purposes of shedding light on his method. 

It is, consequently, on the basis of charges against twenty-four 
persons, whose cases he has especially dramatized, that McCar- 
thy has earned his reputation as “a wholesale poisoner, a perverted 
destroyer of innocent reputations.”J 
To get down to cases : McCarthy has never said anything more 

0 Forty-six is as close a figure as diligent research will bear out. It is pos- 
sible, though not likely, that McCarthy has accused someone or several peo- 
ple — perhaps in an unpreserved campaign speech here or there — and that we 
are unaware of the accusations. We naturally exclude McCarthy's frequent 
references to such established Communists as Alger Hiss, Earl Browder, Ger- 
hart Eisler, Carl Marzani, George Shaw Wheeler et al. We also exclude, for the 
sake of accuracy, accusations made after the first of January, 1953. This pro- 
cedure is clearly not calculated to tilt the scales in McCarthy's favor; for no 
one will dispute that McCarthy had been branded a smearer of innocent 
people well before January of 1953 and that, if anything, his conduct and 
language have mellowed since Eisenhower's inauguration. 

00 Gertrude Cameron, Nelson Chipchin, Arpad Erdos, John T. Fishbum, 
Stella Gordon, Victor M. Hunt, Esther Less, Val Lorwin, Franz L. Neumann, 
Robert Ross, Sylvia Schimmel, and Francis Tuchser. 

+ Robert Warren Barnett, Herbert Fierst, Harold Glasser, Marcia Ruth 
Harrison, Paul Lefantieff-Lee, Daniel Margolies, Ella Montague, Olga Os- 
natch, Phillip Raine, William Remington. 

X The incident most often singled out as the outstanding example of Mc- 
Carthy’s “reckless smearing” is that involving George Marshall. Hence we in- 
clude Marshall in this figure. However, the Marshall episode, while it tells 
us something about McCarthy’s judgment, tells us very little about his meth- 
od. In the circumstances, we will deal with it in the Appendix, where, by vir- 
tue of the unique factors involved, it belongs. 


damaging about Lauchlin Currie, Gustavo Duran, Theodore 
Geiger, Mary Jane Keeney, Edward Posniak, Haldore Hanson, and 
John Carter Vincent, than that they are known to one or more 
responsible persons as having been members of the Communist 
Party, which is in each of these instances true. The fact that this 
charge against Hanson and Vincent is underwritten exclusively by 
Louis Budenz is not the basis of legitimate criticism of McCarthy; 
he cannot be called a smearer because he chooses to rely on the 
integrity of Budenz. Nor is McCarthy guilty of reckless character 
assassination because he chooses to take the word of the Spanish 
Government as against Gustavo Duran’s; nor because he finds the 
testimony of the FBI undercover agents on Posniak’s membership 
in the Party more persuasive than Posniak’s denials. Mr. Robert 
Morris, assistant counsel for the Tydings Committee, offered to 
present to the Committee “some witnesses . . . who will testify that 
[Theodore Geiger] . . . was a member of the same Communist 
Party unit as they were. . . ” Elizabeth Bentley has testified that 
Lauchlin Currie was a member of a Soviet apparatus. Mary Jane 
Keeney, having been named as acting as a Communist courier, 
was dismissed from her post with the United Nations after adverse 
loyalty reports on her were submitted by the State Department, 
and has since been cited for contempt by the Internal Security 
Committee of the Senate. 

In short, McCarthy cannot, in our opinion, be indicted as a 
character assassin for circulating the above facts and for turning 
them into an accusation against the person concerned. And it 
readily follows that, in the light of such data, he was fully entitled 
to call their loyalty into question. 

Lattimore has been identified as a member of the Communist 
Party by Louis Budenz, and as a member of Russian Military Intel- 
ligence by Alexander Barmine; and the McCarran Committee clas- 
sified him, in a unanimous report, as a “conscious articulate instru- 
ment of the Soviet conspiracy.” There can be no denying, then, 
that McCarthy was justified in calling Lattimore’s loyalty into 

But McCarthy’s specific charges against Lattimore went a good 
deal further than publication of the evidence that was available; 
and for this exaggeration he is indeed censurable. He told the Tyd- 
ings Committee (in executive session, to be sure) that Lattimore 
was the “top Soviet espionage agent in America”— a daring allega- 
tion in the light of our notorious ignorance of the hierarchy of the 


Soviet espionage apparatus. A few days later, McCarthy modified 
this charge, in a speech from the Senate floor. 

(It was not McCarthy, one must remember, who publicized 
Lattimore as the “top American espionage agent”; Drew Pearson 
broke the story that McCarthy had so described Lattimore in a 
closed session of the Tydings Committee. It was thus a friend and 
admirer of Lattimore who set in motion Lattimore’s “ordeal by 

Though McCarthy’s exaggeration is deplorable, it can hardly be 
maintained that it has been responsible for severely damaging 
Lattimore. Our society (as distinct from our laws) does not appear 
to attach much importance to the distinction between membership 
in the Party, and espionage in behalf of the Party. J. Peters is not 
more despised in America than Frederick Vanderbilt Field.* 

To return to the instances in which McCarthy did not misinter- 
pret or exaggerate: McCarthy’s insistence that John Stewart Ser- 
vice was a loyalty risk is supported in every respect. Service was 
named by General Hurley as a member of the State Department 
cabal that was attempting to undermine Hurley’s influence in 
China and urging a policy essentially pro-Chinese-Communist. And 
Service was arrested by the FBI on charges of releasing classified 
material to unauthorized persons. Nor is that all: the Civil Service 
Loyalty Review Board ultimately concurred in McCarthy’s judg- 
ment— to the extent, at least, of ruling that there was a “reasonable 
doubt” as to Service’s loyalty. 

Thus it cannot be said that McCarthy smeared Service either in 
the way he Lamed the charges against him or in the fact that he 
called into question Service’s loyalty. 

The same verdict holds with respect to Professors Schuman and 
Shapley. McCarthy merely accused them of inveterate party-lining 
and Communist-fronting. Of these activities they are unqualifiedly 
guilty (as we have seen in the chapter on the Tydings Committee. ) 

Of William T. Stone, McCarthy has said that his “Communist 
activities are legion.” What McCarthy refers to is set down in a 
previous chapter. An extremely cautious man might have said “du- 
bious” instead of “Communist.” But let us remember that the State 
Department security office, after studying Stone’s record as far 

* There is, of course, a great deal of difference between membership in 
the Party and espionage as far as the law is concerned. The law, however, 
does not distinguish between smear and non-smear, but between what is 
proved and what is not proved. 



back as March, 1946, had recommended that “action be instituted 
to terminate his services with the State Department immediately.” 
Held to strictest account for the phraseology of his charge, McCar- 
thy probably “smeared” Stone; but if he did, he smeared a man 
who through the years had taken little pains to protect himself 
from such charges as were levelled against him. As for the second 
question we are asking (was McCarthy entitled to call Stone’s 
loyalty into question?), the Department security divisions own 
recommendation provides the obvious answer: Yes. 

John Paton Davies has been a target of McCarthy ever since 
1950. McCarthy quoted General Hurley as having accused Davies 
of encouraging, behind his back, a policy favorable to the Chinese 
Communists. “Davies has been suitably rewarded by Dean Ache- 
son for his sell-out of an ally,” said McCarthy to the Senate. 
“Davies [is now] ... in Washington as a member of the State De- 
partment’s Policy Planning Committee, where he is strategically 
placed to help further the betrayal he began in Chungking.” Hard 
talk, certainly. But “betrayal” is a word that American political 
lingo was using generously long before McCarthy appeared; and 
we cannot demand of McCarthy greater verbal precision than is 
considered par in his metier. But we must not beg the question: 
McCarthy unquestionably considers Davies a security risk. He is 
at least not alone in questioning Davies’ reliability; the McCarran 
Committee found that Davies “testified falsely” on a matter “sub- 
stantial in import” 1 (i.e., concerning his alleged recommendations 
that the CIA retain certain persons known to be Communists). 
We do not believe, therefore, that either McCarthy’s specific 
charges against Davies or his calling Davies’ loyalty into question 
were unreasonable. 

McCarthy’s charges against Philip Jessup, Dorothy Kenyon and 
Esther Brunauer have been treated amply in the chapter on the 
Tydings Committee, where we reached the conclusion that Mc- 
Carthy was justified in bringing their names into a loyalty probe. 
However, we also saw there that, in the Jessup and Kenyon cases, 
McCarthy was guilty, in two instances, of gratuitous sensational- 
ism— e.g., his singling Jessup out as the “pioneer” of the anti-Chiang 
conspiracy, and his calling Miss Kenyon’s Communist-front col- 
leagues her “fellow-reds.” 

Summarizing the security file on Peveril Meigs, McCarthy said 
in February, 1950, “So far as I know, everything in this individual’s 
file indicates that he is actively working with and for the Commu- 



nists.” Whether this is so, and therefore whether McCarthy is 
guilty of having smeared Meigs, we do not know, not having had 
access to the file in question. It is public knowledge, however, that 
subsequent to McCarthy’s charges against Meigs, he was dis- 
charged from the Army under the loyalty program. Therefore, the 
presumption is that McCarthy’s questioning of Meigs’ loyalty was 

Drew Pearson definitely was smeared by McCarthy on both 
counts; and the only defense McCarthy could possibly make 
(which we do not propose to encourage) would run in such terms 
as, "Those who live by the smear shall perish by the smear.” ( Pear- 
son’s case is treated in another section of this chapter, where it is 
particularly relevant.) 

This, then, is McCarthy’s record.* As regards one of the two 
fundamental questions we have been asking (are McCarthy’s spe- 
cific charges warranted in the light of his evidence?), it is clear 
that he has been guilty of a number of exaggerations, some of 
them reckless; and perhaps some of them have unjustly damaged 
the persons concerned beyond the mere questioning of their loy- 
alty. For these transgressions we have neither the desire to defend 
him nor the means to do so. Measured against the moral command 
that proscribes every witting divergence from the truth, they are 
reprehensible. It remains only to be said that McCarthy's record is 
nevertheless not only much better than his critics allege but , given 
his metier , extremely good . 

As regards the other standard for determining whether smearing 
has been a characteristic of McCarthy’s method (Does the evi- 
dence McCarthy presents justify calling into question his targets’ 
loyalty?), the case-by-case breakdown clearly renders a verdict 
extremely favorable to McCarthy. With the two exceptions of 
Drew Pearson and George Marshall, not a single person was ac- 
cused by McCarthy whose loyalty could not be questioned on the 
basis of a most responsible reading of official records. And this is 
the only test that seems to be relevant for deciding whether Mc- 
Carthy "habitually smears people.” When a man’s loyalty is ques- 
tioned, more often than not it makes little difference to him just 
how and in what terms it is questioned. 

* Five of McCarthy’s cases are not discussed because the information on 
them is too scanty to make possible even a preliminary judgment as to 
whether they were smeared. We refer to Stephen Brunauer, Leon and Mary 
Keyserling, David Demarest Lloyd, and Philleo Nash. 



We may be wrong. But if we are right in insisting that this is the 
apter test, then the record clearly exonerates McCarthy of “habit- 
ual character assassination” and of “smearing of innocent people.” 

“Character assassination” is, of course, a part of McCarthy’s 
method only if we so choose to call the exposure of past activities 
and associations of government employees. McCarthy has tireless- 
ly combed the records of public servants; and, when the evidence 
has warranted it, and Administration intransigence blocked other 
alternatives, he has publicly disclosed their past activities and as- 
sociations and has raised the question whether, given their records, 
they merit public confidence. In this, McCarthy has served, so to 
speak, as a public prosecutor. His concern has not been with estab- 
lishing “guilt,” but with seeing to it that security personnel apply 
standards stringent enough to give this country the protection it 
needs against well-camouflaged Communists. 

The role of public prosecutor is never an enviable one. His com- 
petence is usually judged, unfortunately, on the basis of the num- 
ber of convictions he wins. The counterpart of the public prosecu- 
tor in the security field cannot hope for such clean-cut vindications. 
At most he succeeds in persuading the “jury”— the Loyalty Secur- 
ity Board— that the doubt as to Jones’ loyalty or reliability is “rea- 
sonable.” And even then, he must face the vituperation of those 
who not only deem the doubt unreasonable, but openly challenge 
the competence of any tribunal to adjudicate such a question. 

Let us remember in this connection that it is never particularly 
difficult to offer a plausible explanation or defense for any stand— 
or association— that raises doubts as to loyalty or reliability. How 
often we find ourselves sympathizing, spontaneously and warm- 
heartedly, with the witness who accounts for his participation in 
a Communist front in terms of a deeply felt identification with the 
humanitarian objectives with which that front was ostensibly con- 
cerned. And how often we fail to remind ourselves that, if the 
organization was in fact a Communist front, somebody concerned 
with it wasn’t so much concerned with social reform as with fur- 
thering the interests of the Soviet Union, and that therefore the 
function of security agencies is precisely to look skeptically at ex- 
planations commonly accepted as plausible. The layman is perhaps 
entitled to accept the accounting of the front-joiner, and to despise 
the “morbid” suspiciousness of the person who does not accept it. 
But not the security agencies— and not a United States Senator 



who feels a vocation to see to it that they do their job. For the 
hard fact of the matter is that the suspicious person may be the 
wiser person. And because of bitter experience, we have adopted 
a national security policy which instructs security personnel to be 
suspicious, and to find against the individual if so much as a rea- 
sonable doubt exists as to his reliability. 

The case of John Stewart Service, if we may drag it up again, 
illustrates the problem. McCarthy has been severely castigated 
for imputing disloyalty to a man “whose only crime has been bad 
judgment.” Service, an experienced China hand, dispatched from 
the field report upon report to his superiors in the Department of 
State. These reports are of such character as to discredit the hypoth- 
esis that their author was both ( a ) a shrewd reporter, familiar with 
China, and (b) an anti-Communist. Two alternative hypotheses 
suggest themselves: (a) Service is not a shrewd reporter; i.e., he 
is congenitally naive, or else he was temporarily bamboozled; or 
(b) he was shrewd but not an anti-Communist. The first explana- 
tion is the more attractive, but the second is not unthinkable. 
Then, on top of it all, John Service gets himself arrested by the 
FBI for turning over classified information to unauthorized per- 
sons who, as it happened, were Communists. Two explanations 
again arise: (a) Service did not deem the information to be in any 
way critical, and hence he granted himself the authority to reclas- 
sify classified information (sometimes exercised by public serv- 
ants ) ; or ( b ) Service wished to supply the Communists with infor- 
mation to which they might not otherwise have access. Either 
explanation could account for Service’s action. But in the context 
of an international emergency, McCarthy steps forward to argue 
that there is at the very least a reasonable doubt of Service’s loy- 
alty, and that the State Department should therefore dismiss him. 
McCarthy was perhaps not acting generously, but he certainly was 
acting reasonably.* 

This, then, is “McCarthy’s method.” Notwithstanding the hec- 
tically promoted public impression, McCarthy does not make a 

0 Note the polarization of viewpoints on such men as Owen Lattimore, 
who is acclaimed by some of his admirers as a “noble man, an earnest, fear- 
less and industrious scholar,” and denounced by McCarthy as the “top Soviet 
espionage agent in America.” There is, perhaps, room for disagreement about 
Lattimore, but the area of controversy, at least, is clear: we must choose be- 
tween the two propositions: “Lattimore-innocently-swallowed-the-Commu- 
nist-bait, hook-1 ine-and-sinker,” and “Lattimore-consciously-was-out-to-fur- 

28 o 


practice of fabricating evidence. He does, however, make a prac- 
tice of acting on the proposition— on which he insists the govern- 
ment also act— that Alger Hiss was not the last of the Soviet agents 
in our midst, and that Hiss’ comrades do not publicly parade 
their allegiance to the Soviet Union. 

We have likened McCarthy’s role to that of the prosecutor; but 
let us keep in mind the hazards of carrying the analogy too far. The 
greatest psychological propaganda victory the Communists and 
the Liberals have scored in this whole area has been to force every- 
one to discuss the loyalty-security issue in the terminology of law. 
The authors of this book are themselves guilty of having used, in 
the preceding pages, the organically inappropriate imagery of the 
law, because otherwise they could not join issue with the opposi- 
tion. But it is palpably foolish to speak, in the area of government 
security, of “defendant” and “prosecutor,” of “guilt” and “inno- 
cence,” of “proof,” of the “presumption of innocence,” of the “right 
to confront one’s accuser,” of the “right to cross-examination,” of 
“judgment by one’s peers,” and the rest of it. So long as we con- 
tinue to use this terminology we can hardly hope to understand the 
problem at hand, much less to cope with it. We have, in fact, under- 
stood and coped with it just to the extent that we have fought our- 
selves free, at some points, from the legal imagery and its mislead- 
ing implications. 

It is all to the good that we make the district attorney respect 
the rights of the accused and depend, for a verdict of “guilty,” 
upon the unanimous approval of the jury. Only at our peril do we 
abandon such revered customs. But let us not be deceived by cer- 
tain similarities between the role of a public prosecutor and the 
role of a McCarthy, or between the position of the accused in a 
murder trial and the position of a Vincent in a security proceeding. 
The differences between the two are far greater than the similar- 
ities, and they reflect all the wisdom we have acquired about how 
to deal with the Communists in our midst. 

The essence of McCarthy— and McCarthyism— lies then in 
bringing to the loyalty-security problem a kind of skepticism with 
which it had not been approached before. Others took it for 
granted that Service backed the Chinese Communists and gave 
away classified material because he was fooled. McCarthy was pre- 
pared to suppose he did so because he was pro-Communist. Others 
explained Shapley’s party-lining in terms of devotion to world 



peace; McCarthy recognized that devotion to world Communism 
was an alternative hypothesis that merited equal treatment. And 
he keeps on being skeptical; if, as so often happens, the evidence 
does not conclusively establish either hypothesis, McCarthy is 
there to insist that we cannot afford to act on any but the hypoth- 
esis that favors our national security. McCarthy would unquestion- 
ably admit that Service might be innocent; but he would never 
consent to reinstate him in a position of public trust. 

This is the heart of McCarthy's method. It is in many respects 
as revolutionary as the Communist movement itself— and so it is 
unlikely to commend itself to people so short on knowledge, or 
even instincts, as to the nature and resources of the Soviet conspir- 
acy as not to realize that we live in an unbrave new world, in 
which certain cherished habits of mind are not only inappropriate 
but suicidal. 

The Publicizing of His Charges 

Another aspect of Senator McCarthy's method lies in his demon- 
strable preference for "carrying to the people” certain controver- 
sial issues that others wish to see handled in the absence of public 
debate. This, of course, is not how his critics put it. They say that 
McCarthy merely seeks personal publicity. They say that the issues 
McCarthy concerns himself with are best settled by "cold, silent 
professionals” working in an atmosphere of secrecy. 

As big government has evolved, a greater and greater share of 
the nation’s business has indeed been conducted in secret. Also, 
an ever-growing number of policy decisions have been made by the 
Executive and the bureaucracy rather than by Congress. The peo- 
ple and Congress, acquiescing over the past twenty years as the 
Chief Executive, his Cabinet, and the executive agencies have 
taken over functions and authority normally reserved to the state 
governments and the national legislature, have largely renounced 
active supervision of the affairs of state. The Liberals, in general, 
have watched this trend with a good deal of satisfaction. 

We shall not argue— or attribute to McCarthy the view— that all 
transactions of the government must at all times be made public. 
There are of course situations in which certain information is best 
withheld from the citizenry. An example, perhaps, is that of in- 
formed estimates as to the striking power of our air force, the 
deliverability of the atom bomb, and the evaluated intentions and 
capabilities of the enemy. 

But not all the withholding nowadays is of this character. The 
State plays what James Madison called "the old trick of turning 
every contingency into a resource for accumulating force in the 
government”; and, in so doing, denies to the people (and their 
elected representatives ) essential information that is legitimately 
theirs. Truman’s press censorship order of 1951 is perhaps the most 
blatant example of this sort of thing; another, more relevant to our 
present inquiry, is President Truman’s Executive Order forbidding 
Congressmen access to data on the loyalty of government per- 

The President’s order, in effect, instructed Congress that in the 
future it will have to take blindly for granted that the executive 
departments administer the loyalty and security program compe- 
tently and thoroughly. Truman rationalized his action in terms of 



an admittedly laudable objective. For it is desirable, in most cases, 
to insure privacy in the proceedings of loyalty and security panels: 
even if an employee is exonerated by such a panel, he is saddled 
with the stigma of having had to appear before it; and if he is dis- 
charged, he has no recourse, as State Department security regula- 
tions point out, to “an outside tribunal which can positively affirm 
his loyalty.” 

But what all this proves is merely that the less information that 
leaks out about the identity of persons processed by the loyalty 
board, the better for them . It certainly does not dispose of the 
question whether we, as a people, are not entitled to know whether 
our security program is effective, whether it is the proper concern 
of Congress to check on the Administration’s handling of the secur- 
ity program, and to speak up when there are reasons to believe it is 
being mishandled. 

These questions cannot be dismissed by pointing out that the 
Chief Executive must himself appear before the people, for a vote 
of confidence, every four years. The people cannot possibly decide 
whether the President has done a satisfactory job in the security 
field without knowing about the job he has done. If a fleet of our 
own B-5 o’s, piloted by our own aviators, carrying our own atomic 
bombs, attacks Detroit, and then lands in Siberia, the people will 
deduce that the President’s security program has been slipshod. 
But in the absence of such clues, they are without data to make 
relevant judgments about government security except as their 
representatives are in a position to evaluate security performance 
on the basis of spot checks and some periodic investigations of a 
more exhausting nature. Yet the people’s representatives cannot 
do their duty without examining the minutes of loyalty and secur- 
ity hearings on specific individuals. 

Early in 1950, Senator McCarthy concluded that, on the available 
evidence, the security program, most particularly in the State De- 
partment, was being irresponsibly administered. As it turned out 
his conclusion was unquestionably and unanswerably correct. But 
almost immediately after McCarthy made his first charges, in Feb- 
ruary, 1950, the President, the State Department, and the majority 
leader of the Senate, publicly and categorically denied them. Mc- 
Carthy persevered, and the public sentiment he aroused undoubt- 
edly contributed to the decision of the Democratic majority to ar- 
range an investigation. 


Moreover, let us remember that McCarthy refused, at first, to 
release to the public the names of the loyalty risks he had in mind. 
Only when the Tydings Committee had revealed its intention of 
investigating not State Department security but Joe McCarthy, 
did he begin in earnest to pound names, dates and figures into 
the consciousness of the people. And later, with the Tydings Com- 
mittee’s unbelievable report in his hand, McCarthy toured the 
country insisting that the Truman Administration was protecting 
loyalty risks in the government, and that something ought to be 
done about it. The people responded. As a starter, they retired 
Scott Lucas and Millard Tydings. 

Those who, knowing all the circumstances, still denounce Mc- 
Carthy’s method, must be prepared to argue that he should have 
kept silent about loyalty risks in critical government positions— in 
the teeth of his deep personal conviction that they were being 
protected— because he should have felt himself bound by arbitrary 
decisions as to what issues are best left to the executive process. 
But McCarthy is of course not bound by such decisions. He makes 
his own. If McCarthy were to learn the figures on our production 
of atom bombs and felt that our supply was dangerously low, he 
would probably keep silent, reasoning that a short supply is less 
dangerous than Soviet knowledge of it. (McCarthy’s record for 
acting responsibly in this area is, on the whole, excellent. He does 
not automatically reach for a megaphone every time he is dis- 
pleased, his negotiations with the Greek ship owners being a case 
in point. Not until his Committee had concluded an agreement 
with them to ban commercial traffic to Red China did McCarthy 
make an announcement on the subject. ) 

To revert to the first question we raised: is McCarthy above all 
a publicity seeker, and is his traffic with the people nothing more 
than his way of gratifying a lust for national attention? This ques- 
tion neither McCarthy’s friends nor his foes can answer. Motives 
of this sort can of course be advanced and defended to explain the 
activities of most public figures. But this is strictly a parlor game. 

Only one thing is certain: McCarthy receives publicity— more 
publicity than any American save the President. There are several 
reasons for this. McCarthy deals with sensational issues, and sensa- 
tion is newsworthy. And McCarthy, day in and day out, deals body 
blows to the soft underbelly of American Liberals, whose screams 
of anguish are so infrequent (by virtue of their entrenched power) 



that when they are made to scream, the occasion is, again, news- 
worthy. And, of course, having occupied the front pages for so 
long now, McCarthy has become a national figure, and the public 
is curious about national figures, particularly those who are con- 

But to say that because McCarthy gets publicity, he does what 
he is doing simply because he wants publicity, is a specious piece 
of tendentious reasoning.* Such inferences about the motivations 
of public figures can of course never be conclusively refuted, but 
since the need for a public ventilation of the government’s security 
derelictions is now firmly established, the presumption, in a world 
still prepared to concede that a concern for the commonweal can 
be genuine, o ught to be that the Senator who met that need was 
motivated by a desire to serve the people. Obviously, McCarthy 
cannot carry issues to the people without getting their attention; 
and there is no way of focussing the people’s attention on an issue 
without at the same time drawing attention to oneself. In short, 
McCarthy must be judged on whether his program is commend- 
able— not on whether one of the program’s concomitants is to keep 
McCarthy on the front pages. 

It is curious that what is widely thought of as a contemptible 
aspect of Senator McCarthy’s method actually amounts to nothing 
more than his intimacy with the people. McCarthy’s continuous 
appeal to the people sorely aggravates the same Liberals whose 
certified faith in the people’s judgment never extends to those situ- 
ations in which the people disagree with the Liberals. Thus, if 
McCarthy had been repudiated at the polls on any of the several 
occasions when he invited a public verdict on his activities, the 
Liberals would have rushed forward to praise the overarching wis- 
dom of the people. He was not repudiated; so the Liberals talk 
out of the other side of their mouths. The people, they tell us, were 
swept away by primitive passions— of the sort that never unsettle 
the Liberals, except when they contemplate McCarthy. 

0 Estes Kefauver’s television crusade against crime is, of course, suscep- 
tible to the same interpretation. But Liberals were disposed to infer noble 
intent in this situation. Kefauver exposed to public view persons against whom 
charges of malfeasance in office, bribery, racketeering, theft, gambling and 
murder, had been made or insinuated. McCarthy exposed to public view per- 
sons charged with serving the interests of the Soviet Union. The Liberals, for 
reasons best understood by themselves, have sympathized with McCarthy’s 
victims while worrying very little about Kefauver’s. Yet it is McCarthy’s 
victims whom ti e ordinary processes of the law clearly cannot reach, and for 
whom, therefore. Congressional hearings are especially in order. 

The Use of Congressional Immunity 

Not only does McCarthy accuse people on insufficient evidence, 
not only does he then proceed to publicize his charges against 
them, he also protects himself from any legal recourse they might 
have by hiding under Congressional immunity. So runs another 
Liberal indictment of McCarthy’s method. 

We have, throughout, stressed the substantive differences be- 
tween processes of law and loyalty actions, and have warned 
against the danger of assimilating the two. At the same time, we 
have occasionally referred to the similarity between McCarthy’s 
role and that of a public prosecutor. Should we be charged with 
inconsistency, our answer would be, simply, that both the similar- 
ities and the differences are there . Indeed, McCarthy has assumed 
the role of public prosecutor— but in a type of action that does not 
reach the courts and to which, therefore, the rules that govern 
court actions are inapplicable. 

One of the similarities between McCarthy, the anti-Communist 
tribune, and the conventional public prosecutor lies in the fact that 
both enjoy a considerable immunity against legal action for libel 
and slander— and would not be able to perform their functions 
without such immunity . If a prosecutor, whose job it is to urge 
the jury to return a verdict of “guilty,” could be held legally re- 
sponsible for all the statements he makes in the course of a trial, 
he would be at the mercy of all vindicated defendants— and would 
be careful not to make statements that he needs to make to plead 
his case. It is not unusual for the prosecutor to sum up his case by 
informing the jury that that accused is a deceitful and practiced 
liar, a foul and callous adulterer, a degenerate thief, or a cold- 
blooded, cynical and ruthless murderer. Not infrequently the per- 
son so described walks out of the courtroom a free man. Free, that 
is, except that he cannot file suit against the prosecuting attorney 
for slander. 

The privileges Senator McCarthy exercises in his present role 
are essentially those of the district attorney. They are also the priv- 
ileges the framers of our Constitution deliberately extended to our 
national legislators— lest they fail, for fear of subsequent court ac- 
tion, to speak out against persons they deem to be public male- 

To furnish the sort of “proof” that would satisfy a court that 


John Jones is pro-Communist remains in most cases impossible— 
by definition of Communist conduct. Often McCarthy has had 
nothing to go on but a set of facts amassed by State Department 
or FBI investigators, which seemed to constitute strong prima 
facie evidence that John Jones, currently with the State Depart- 
ment, is a loyalty risk. After exhausting other means of getting 
Jones out of the Department, McCarthy makes a speech about 
Jones on the floor of the Senate. Jones promptly says he will sue 
McCarthy if he will waive his immunity. McCarthy refuses to do 
so. And he must refuse: for to authenticate his charges, McCarthy 
would have to furnish a jury with the original investigating re- 
ports; and neither the State Department nor the FBI can make 
them available. But for his immunity, McCarthy would have to 
preserve a discreet silence about Jones. In short, the monopoliza- 
tion by the Executive of much of the evidence relevant to loyalty- 
security cases is the major difficulty a Congressman faces in uproot- 
ing security risks. 

Another difficulty is of course the reluctance of Communists to 
furnish evidence against each other. A case in point developed 
from Elizabeth Bentley’s public reiteration, early in 1949, of her 
immunized charge before the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities that William Remington had been known to her as a 
Communist. When she repeated the statement over the radio. 
Remington filed suit against the General Foods Corporation (the 
program’s sponsor), the National Broadcasting Company, and 
Miss Bentley, asking $100,000 in damages. Miss Bentley named 
persons who had known Remington as a Communist; but none of 
them stepped forward, at that time, to testify in her behalf. The 
result: the broadcasting company and the sponsor had to pay 
$10,000 to Remington. Yet a few months later, the Justice Depart- 
ment furnished evidence— and witnesses— firmly establishing Rem- 
ington’s membership in the Party. He was convicted for perjury. 
McCarthy, too, has always to consider the Communists’ conspiracy 
of silence; and, but for his immunity, he could not get on with 
his job. 

A third difficulty for McCarthy (and everybody else who at- 
tempts to expose loyalty risks) is that even when he is fortunate 
enough to obtain investigative reports from the executive agencies 
he is not able to penetrate the secrecy which protects confidential 
informants. Yet much information is given to the FBI and other 
investigators: by informants who will not permit their identity to 



be revealed. It is the FBI’s responsibility to appraise the reliability 
of X-g, who states that John Jones is a member of the Communist 
Party. But this does not help McCarthy, since X-g is not prepared 
to come forward and reiterate his accusation against Jones in a 
court of law. Should McCarthy reveal X-g’s testimony against Jones, 
who is still working in the State Department? Or should he take no 
action at all in order to avoid criticism for “abusing” Congressional 
immunity? The questions, it seems to us, answer themselves. 

Again, there is the fact that the Communists and the pro-Com- 
munists are litigious beyond belief, determined, as always, to make 
the most of the legal and constitutional devices free society puts at 
their disposal. Louis Budenz testified to the Tydings Committee 
about a major policy decision of the Communist Party, made while 
he was still managing editor of the Daily Worker : 

. . . The Communist Party — and this is something that everyone should 
know — agreed that after that period of 1945, that with the cold war be- 
ginning, all concealed Communists should sue anyone who accused 
them of being Communists, sue them for libel. As Alexander Trachten- 
berg [a high officer of the Communist conspiracy] who made the re- 
port, said, ‘This is not necessarily for the purpose of winning the libel 
suit. It is to bleed white anyone who dares to accuse anyone of being a 
Communist, so that they will be shut up.” As a matter of fact, that be- 
came the policy. 2 

Budenz told of a lawsuit, undecided at the time he spoke, in 
which the defendant (who had charged the plaintiff with being 
pro-Communist) stood to lose $55,000 in lawyers fees alone — win 
or lose. 

Most relevant in this context are the obstacles the government 
had to surmount in proving what was altogether self-evident— that 
eleven top U.S. Communists were bent upon overturning our gov- 
ernment by force and violence. It took an estimated two million 
dollars, an eight months’ trial, a militia of lawyers, round-the-clock 
cooperation of the FBI, and the sacrifice of several valuable under- 
cover agents, to persuade a jury that our top Communists were out 
to do something that every informed American has known for over 
twenty years they were bent on doing. But are we to believe that, 
lacking the resources of the federal government, individual Con- 
gressmen should have refrained over the years from stating that 
Eugene Dennis, Gus Hall, Benjamin Davis, et al. were revolution- 
ary conspirators so as not to “abuse” Congressional immunity? 


Finally, there is the sheer loss of time in litigation— a loss of 
time no busy man can afford. For example, McCarthy himself filed 
suit in 1952 against the Syracuse Post-Standard, charging libel. Af- 
ter nine months of pre-trial hearings, depositions, briefs, confer- 
ences, and correspondence, the newspaper, acknowledging guilt, 
gave McCarthy $16,500 as a settlement. McCarthy’s lawyer’s fees 
( he told us ) were reasonable, just over $6,000. He therefore cleared 
about $10,000 which, as damages, was tax free. We commented to 
McCarthy that since the Syracuse paper had not said anything 
that many other papers had not also said, he might make a rather 
handsome living by filing suits against one rich paper after another. 
He might, indeed, McCarthy replied, and added: “But I would 
have to stop being a Senator. I cleared $10,000 from the Syracuse 
case, but I also spent what amounts to a total of two months of 
my time in connection with the suit. I haven’t got time to file suits 
and to keep up with my work.” 

Paragraph 1, Section 6, Article I, of the Constitution was de- 
signed to encourage Congressmen to speak their minds. It promises 
them that . . for any speech or debate in either house they shall 
not be questioned in any other place.” The guarantee is highly 
utilitarian, and McCarthy is by no means the only Congressman 
whom it has recently stood in good stead. Senators Kefauver, 
O’Conor and Tobey would have been hard put to defend some 
of the accusations and innuendoes they advanced in the course of 
their encyclopaedic investigation into American rascality.® Yet 
most of McCarthy’s detractors would be among the first to insist 
that the Kefauver investigation was in the national interest. 

It should, however, be recalled that Congressional immunity was 
written into the Constitution not to serve the Congressmen, but to 
serve the people. The decision of an early ( 1808 ) court specifically 
directed attention to this: “These privileges are thus secured, not 
with the intention of protecting the members against prosecution 
for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by 
enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their of- 
fice without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal.” 3 

All this is not to say, of course, that Congressional immunity 
always serves the public interest. Like all good things, it is subject 

* For exam] lie: Why, Senator Tobey asked William O’Dwyer, had James 
Moran accompanied him on a wartime visit to Frank Costello’s apartment — 
“To carry the little black bag?” 



to immoderate use; and, even when exercised within normal limits, 
it can be exploited by evil men for antisocial purposes. But on the 
record, no McCarthy critic, in charging him with abuse of Con- 
gressional immunity, appears to be speaking with reference to any 
developed or even intelligible doctrine as to what constitutes abuse 
of Congressional immunity . Some appear to mean merely that 
Congressional immunity protects his activities more extensively 
than its creators could have intended— i.e., that McCarthy takes 
refuge in it “constantly/’ It is, however, easy to show that this is a 
gross exaggeration. In the Appendix, we list, side by side, the most 
damaging charges McCarthy has made, on the floor and off the 
floor; and the reader will see that it is on the rare, not the every- 
day, occasion that McCarthy avoids litigation by wrapping him- 
self in Congressional immunity. 

Some of his critics point out that even when McCarthy goes 
through the motions of waiving immunity for utterances made off 
the Senate floor, he has not actually done so, because he is quoting, 
or paraphrasing, previously immunized allegations. If this is what 
is meant by “abuse,” the point is silly. If McCarthy quotes, out- 
side the Senate, Budenz’ immunized statement that Haldore Han- 
son was a member of the Communist Party, he is indeed just as im- 
mune as if he had quoted it inside the Senate— not because Mc- 
Carthy is a Senator but because Budenz testified before a Senate 
Committee. But what do McCarthy’s critics wish him to do? 

Say, himself, in so many words, “Hanson is a Communist be- 
cause 1 say so?” Since what McCarthy knows about Hanson he 
knows via Budenz, it would be foolish— and mendacious as well— 
for him to say anything except, “ according to Budenz , Hanson was 
a Communist.” By decrying McCarthy’s not calling Hanson a Com- 
munist on his own authority, his critics in effect talk as if they 
wanted McCarthy to commit a previously uncommitted smear 
just to give Hanson a chance to file suit! 

The denials by McCarthy’s victims, it is further said, never catch 
up with his accusations, in part because Congressional immunity 
tilts the scales to the disadvantage of the “accused.” Senator Mc- 
Carthy strikes out at Jones and makes page 1; Jones retorts and 
makes page 15. And Jones can’t get back at McCarthy because Mc- 
Carthy is privileged. 

Normally, the public figure has, indeed, readier access to the 
news pages. Most newspapers, however, appear to be aware of the 
inherent unfairness of such mismatched bouts and try to balance 


the scales. And when McCarthy is the accuser, this appears to be 
especially true. Not only, on the record, is the reply of die accused 
given equally prominent treatment in the papers, it is often much 
more extensive, and is often given editorial help on the side. The 
publicity given to Owen Lattimore's rebuttal when he appeared 
before the Tydings Committee in 1950 ( to say nothing of the ex- 
travagant editorial reception of his book, Ordeal by Slander) is 
an instance in point. But Lattimore, some would answer, was a 
special case. The authors have, therefore, examined the treatment 
given to McCarthy's nine public Tydings cases by five newspapers 
—the New York Times , the San Francisco Chronicle , the Wash- 
ington Post , the St. Louis Post-Dispatch , and the Des Moines Reg- 
ister . The results of this inquiry are detailed in the appendix. The 
upshot is that all these newspapers gave equally prominent space 
to the rebuttals and, in some cases, further editorial space in which 
to pass on their unfriendly opinions of McCarthy. 

McCarthy's own position on the use of Congressional immunity 
is far from clear. He must often have regretted the impassioned 
promise he made on the evening of February 20, 1950, when he 
was pleading for the creation of what was to be the Tydings Com- 
mittee. Senator Lucas had been trying to needle him into reveal- 
ing there and then the names of the 57 supposed Communists on 
his list, and had said: “The Senator is privileged to name them all in 
the Senate, and if those people are not Communists, he will be 
protected. That is all I want the Senator to do. . . 

I wish to thank the distinguished Senator from Illinois for his views 
[McCarthy answered], but I should like to assure him that I will not 
say anything on the Senate floor which I will not say off the floor. On 
the day when I take advantage of the security we have on the Senate 
floor, on that day I will resign from the Senate. Anything I say on the 
floor of the Senate at any time will be repeated off the floor. 

Two months later, his critics, pointing out that he had made 
several charges in the Senate that he had not made off the floor, 
were demanding that he eat his words. The best McCarthy could 
manage by w ay of reply was this : 

At that time I assumed [I] could get the files. Since then I have made 
statements about some six or seven individuals, furnished documentary 
proof. They have asked me to make statements off the floor. I have said 


that I will do that when they make their files available. . . . When they 
make those files available so they can be used, those statements will be 
made in public. 

One of your questions is: <tf Will you make the statement in public?” 
The answer is: No. Number two: “Are you going to resign?” The an- 
swer is: No . 4 

McCarthy certainly had a point in insisting that he could not 
hope to defend himself in court without access to files not avail- 
able to him in a lawsuit. Yet he would have done well to have 
taken specific note of this qualification two months earlier, when 
making his unqualified pledge. 

McCarthy’s present position, as expressed to the authors, is that 
he regards Congressional immunity as indispensable to the respon- 
sible discharge of Senatorial duty; and that no Senator has a right, 
much less a duty, to deprive himself of its protection. He is, how- 
ever, prepared to waive immunity on all statements he has thus 
far made provided ( 1 ) he be given access to the security files of all 
persons who may sue him, and (2) that he be not held legally 
responsible for those of his statements made in executive session 
or those he wished to make in executive session but did not be- 
cause the Tydings Committee would not let him. In our opinion, 
this proviso is entirely reasonable. We have seen (in the chapter 
on the Tydings Committee) how steadfastly McCarthy resisted 
pressure of various Democratic Senators to reveal in public session 
the names of the persons he was accusing, and how often he reiter- 
ated his request that the Tydings Hearings be held in executive 
session. Consequently, he does not and should not regard himself 
as responsible for the publicity given to the nine persons he named 
in open session at the direction of Tydings and his colleagues: 
Kenyon, Duran, Jessup, Brunauer, Hanson, Schuman, Shapley, 
Service and Lattimore. 

But, in our opinion, McCarthy misses an essential point. In the 
first place, mere access to the files would not always give him the 
ammunition he needs to defend himself successfully against libel 
suits. In the case of Edward Posniak, for instance, the files would 
reveal that “an” undercover agent and “a” secret informant of the 
FBI knew him as a member of the Communist Party. Since neither 
the agent nor the informant could be counted on to come forward 
in McCarthy’s defense, it seems highly improbable that McCarthy 
could defend himself should Posniak bring suit. So, too, in the 
Vincent and Hanson cases. Budenz might be willing to cooperate. 



but his word would hardly pass as courtroom proof of their mem- 
bership in the Party— indeed it would probably be ruled inadmis- 
sible as hearsay evidence. 

Yet, as we have argued above, Posniak, Vincent, Hanson, and 
Kenyon are clearly, under existing standards, security risks. The 
information against them should, therefore, have been brought to 
light. But McCarthy could bring it to light and relate it to the 
security problem only because of his immunity. For him to prom- 
ise to say nothing under immunity that, given courtroom access to 
the files, he is not prepared to repeat off the floor, is to circum- 
scribe his future usefulness in a manner the nation cannot afford. 

The position we should like to see McCarthy adopt is this: “I 
am, in a manner of speaking, a professional hunter of security risks 
in government. I shall continue to search the security risks out 
until I am satisfied that the job is done, or until I am convinced 
that the Administration is doing the job to my satisfaction. I shall 
attempt to be scrupulously accurate— to the extent that one can 
be, given the executive blackout on security data— and reasonable 
in my judgments. But I intend to spend my time in the Senate, 
not in the courthouse. I shall therefore avail myself, unapolo- 
getically, of the immunity granted me by the Constitution.” Mc- 
Carthy himself has said: . . the freedom of Senators and Con- 

gressmen to speak unpleasant and embarrassing truths without 
fear of prosecution in lawsuits is at times abused. Rather than re- 
move this freedom of speech, it would seem wiser for the voters 
to remove those who abuse that freedom of speech .” 5 

Impugning the Loyalty of His Critics 

Finally, some critics consider it characteristic of McCarthy that 
he imputes pro-Communism to everyone he disagrees with. Like 
most anti-McCarthy charges, this one is grossly exaggerated. Un- 
like many of them, however, it starts out from some incontrovert- 
ible facts. 

For example, there is McCarthy’s attack on Drew Pearson in 
December, 1950. McCarthy told the Senate: 

It appears that Pearson never actually signed up as a member of the 
Comunist Party and never paid dues. . . . [But] if the loyal American 
newspaper editors and publishers and radio station owners refuse to 
buy this disguised, sugar-coated voice of Russia, the mockingbirds who 
have followed the Pearson line will disappear from the scene like chaff 
before the wind. The American people can do much to accomplish this 
result. They can notify their newspapers that they do not want this 
Moscow-directed character assassin being brought into their homes to 
poison the well of information at which their children drink. 

[What is more, said McCarthy,] I have discussed this man Pearson 
with practically every former member of the Communist Party whom 
I have met during my recent and present investigation of Communists 
in Government. Almost to a man, they were agreed on a number of 
things: No. 1: That Pearsons all-important job . . . was to lead the 
character assassination of any man who was a threat to international 
communism. No. 2: That he did that job so well that he was the most 
valuable of all radio commentators and writers from the standpoint of 
the Communist Party. No. 3: In order to maintain his value, it was 
necessary that he occasionally throw pebbles at communism and Com- 
munists generally, so as to have a false reputation of being anti-Com- 
munist. 6 

Apart from recounting the aid Pearson had given to the Commu- 
nists by his systematic attacks on hard anti-Communists, McCar- 
thy based his charge against Pearson on one count: Pearson, he 
said, retained a leg-man and/ or principal assistant, named David 
Karr, whom McCarthy identified as a member of the Communist 
Party. Pearson promptly denied that Karr was or had been a Com- 
munist. McCarthy impressively documented his allegation ( 1 ) by 
quoting from a report, drawn up by the office of the Executive 
Director and Chief Examiner of the Civil Service Commission in 
1.943, which unambiguously asserted that Karr was an active Com- 
munist, and (2) by citing testimony from Mr. Howard Rushmore, 


a former Communist, that as a staff member of the Daily Worker 
Rushmore had given Karr, also of the Daily Worker , assignments. 
“He had to show me his party card to get those assignments 
Rushmore had added . 7 

With this and, as far as the public knew,* only this to go on 
(i.e., impressive testimony to the effect that Karr was, or had been, 
a Communist, and that he worked for Pearson ) , McCarthy ended 
tip saying such things as the following: 

"The relationship [between Pearson and Karr] is such that it is diffi- 
cult to know who is the master and who is the servant.” "Pearson 
[is] . . . under the direction of David Karr. . . .” “. . . Pearson never 
actually signed up as a member of the Communist Party. . . . However, 
that has not in any way affected his value to the party; nor has it af- 
fected his willingness to follow the orders of David Karr. . . "One of 
Pearsons extremely important tasks, assigned him by the Communist 
Party , through David Karr, . . .” etc. "So again, Pearson was assigned 
the task — assigned the job by the Communist Party , through David 
Karr . . etc. “Again Pearson is assigned the job by the Communist 
Party through David Karr, . . .” etc. ". . . the man through whom Pearson 
receives orders and directions from the Communist Party is one David 
Karr . . . .” f< David Karr is the connecting link between Drew Pearson and 
the Communist Party. He is the man who assigns to Pearson the impor- 
tant task of conducting a character assassination of any man who dares 
to stand in the way of international Communism .” 8 [Italics added.] 

McCarthy, in short, accomplished that rather improbable feat: 
he smeared Drew Pearson. 

Much has been said about McCarthy’s behavior in questioning 
James Wechsler of the New York Post in the course of an investi- 
gation of the State Department’s overseas libraries. One of the 
charges against McCarthy that has arisen from this encounter— 
that McCarthy was seeking to intimidate the anti-McCarthy press 
—is pure nonsense;* * but a further charge— that McCarthy was ad- 

* It was not yet public knowledge that Drew Pearson had also employed 
another named Communist, Andrew Older, whom he had kept on even after 
he was exposed — because, in Pearson's words, he had hoped to “convert” him. 

°* Mr. James Burnham neatly dispensed with this allegation in an article 
in The Freeman , June 15, 1953, which concludes with the following para- 
graphs: “No sanctions of any kind were invoked or contemplated against 
either Wechsler or the newspaper which he edits. In the hearing, Wechsler 
was given total latitude, much beyond rules that might legally and properly 
have been invoked, to say anything he wanted at whatever length he chose. 
He was permitted to evade and avoid direct questions, to declaim and divert, 



vancing a basically unsupportable standard for testing a man's 
loyalty— has some superficial plausibility to it, and merits brief 
consideration. McCarthy told Wechsler: 

I feel that you have not broken with Communist ideals. I feel that you 
are serving them very, very actively. Whether you are doing it know- 
ingly or not, that is in your own mind. . . . 

I have no knowledge as to whether you have a card in the party. . . . 
Your purported reformation does not convince me at all. I know if I 
were head of the Communist Party and I had Jim Wechsler come to 
Moscow and I discovered this bright man, apparently a good writer, I 
would say, “Mr. Wechsler, when you go back to the United States, you 
will state that you are breaking with the Communist Party, you will 
make general attacks against Communism, and then you will be our 
ringleader in trying to attack and destroy any man who tries to hurt and 
dig out the specific traitors who are hunting our [sic] country.” You 
have followed that pattern. 

McCarthy, it is alleged, is actually saying that if you support 
Communist objectives you are, obviously, a Communist, and if you 
attack them, this is a deceptive maneuver, and you are still a Com- 
munist— unless, of course, you subscribe to McCarthy's formula 
for attacking them. 

If McCarthy had intended to set up such a standard as a general 
yardstick for weighing a man's loyalty, he would indeed have em- 
barked on a venture in sheer insanity. For such a standard, with 
one or another modification, would indict as disloyal absolutely 
everyone who disagrees with McCarthy's brand of anti-Commu- 
nism. Now McCarthy may sometimes be imprecise; but heaven 
knows he is no lunatic. It is only the observer who is determined 
not to understand McCarthy who, on considering the context in 

to introduce a written statement in a manner directly counter to the estab- 
lished ruling of the committee and the Senate, and to denounce the Chair- 
man and other members of the nation’s highest legislative body in a fashion 
that in most other countries would be deemed not merely abominable taste 
but actionable as contempt and libel. . . . 

“Wechsler and McCarthy are political enemies. They condemn each other 
verbally in public. Where is the threat to free speech and free press in that? 
If McCarthy is trying to intimidate the press, then why is not the Post , with 
its unrestrained attack on what it describes as ‘the reactionaries’ of Congress, 
to be charged with intimidating the legislature and subverting the legislative 

“Wechsler can hardly be confused in his mind about all this. For him and 
his political associates, ‘free press/ and most of the other freedoms, are only 
clubs with which to beat their opponents — means, that is to say, to their ends.” 


which the above statement was made, will go on to wrench such 
a meaning out of it. McCarthy was not, be it noted, talking about 
just any American; he was talking about James Wechsler, an ad- 
mitted former Communist. He was laying down a standard one 
may or may not endorse, but one we have no business confusing 
with a standard for testing the bona fides of persons who do not 
have Communist backgrounds. 

With respect to the Wechslers, McCarthy is saying two things: 
( a ) it is not unreasonable to suppose that Communist “renegades” 
who are now demonstrated anti- anti Communists, are pulling the 
wool over our eyes; for it is clearly conceivable that there are men 
around us who, for tactical reasons, have been instructed by the 
Party to feign conversion in order to attend more effectively to the 
Party’s business; and (b) ex-Communists must therefore be looked 
at more skeptically than other persons when the question of their 
loyalty to the United States arises. They, McCarthy is saying, must 
prove their sincerity in a very particular sort of way— by doing 
their earnest best to expose the conspiracy of which they were a 
party; by disclosing, for example, the names of their former con- 
federates. This is a special form of penance that McCarthy is in 
effect asking for. He may have gone too far, but he is reasonable 
in applying a standard different from that applicable to persons 
innocent of involvement in the Communist conspiracy. 

Excepting his assault on Drew Pearson, McCarthy’s unwarranted 
attacks have been directed, almost exclusively, at particular news- 
papers rather than individual newsmen. He is especially fond, for 
example, of referring to the Washington Post as the “Washington 
edition of the Daily Worker”; to the New York Post as the “up- 
town edition of the Daily Worker to the Milwaukee Journal as 
the “Milwaukee edition . . .” etc. Yet such statements are more un- 
couth than vicious; they can probably be dismissed, even, as jocular 
indulgences in what Life magazine has called “groin-and-eyeball” 
polemics. Not so, however, some of the more specific charges Mc- 
Carthy has aimed at certain newspapers. 

On one occasion, for example, McCarthy advised certain adver- 
tisers in Milwaukee to withdraw their support of the Journal. “Keep 
in mind when you send your checks over to the Journal,” he said, 
“[that] you are contributing to bringing the Communist Party line 
into the homes of Wisconsin.” 

On another, he wrote about Time: “There is nothing personal 


about my exposing the depth to which this magazine will sink in 
using deliberate falsehoods to destroy anyone who is hurting the 
Communist cause . ... I feel that I have the duty to let those adver- 
tisers [who buy space in it] know that Time magazine publishes 
falsehoods for a purpose. Those advertisers, who are extremely 
busy in their work, are entitled to have it called to their attention 
if unknowingly they are flooding American homes with Commu- 
nist Party line material. . . .” 9 ( Italics added. ) 

And, in describing the Milwaukee Journal , the Madison Capital- 
Times , the New York Post , the Washington Post , the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch , and the Portland Oregonian as “consistently paral- 
leling the editorial line of the Daily Worker /’ McCarthy wrote : 10 

They, of course, criticize Communism generally to obtain a false 
reputation of being anti-Communist. Then they go all-out to assassi- 
nate the character and destroy the reputation of anyone who tries to 
dig out the really dangerous under-cover Communists. . . . Some who 
read those papers may at first blush violently differ with me. However, 
you need not take my word. Make your own decision. First check the 
editorial policy which the Daily Worker consistently follows. Then de- 
termine for yourself the extent to which the above papers follow that 
editorial policy. Do not be deceived, however, by any general con- 
demnation or tossing of pebbles at Communism generally. That is a 
perfectly safe sport which was indulged in even by Alger Hiss. The test 
is not whether they are willing to condemn Communism generally and 
the well-known, previously exposed Communists. The test is whether 
they follow a pattern of supporting or condemning the exposure of the 
sacred cows — the dangerous, under-cover Communists who have been 
promoted to positions of untouchability by the Communist and left- 
wing press. 

And there we have it in McCarthy’s own words— the reasoning 
which, he feels, justifies him in referring to the Podunk Post as the 
Podunk edition of the Daily Worker. And he has relied on it often 
enough to warrant its being treated as an integral part of his 
approach— if not, strictly speaking, a part of his method. 

It would be preferable, from McCarthy’s standpoint, if he had 
never attempted a logical explanation of his statements about 
these papers’ and Pearson’s Communist motives. Any way you look 
at it, of course, he is in these cases guilty of smearing. Had they 
occurred in the course of emotional responses to the uncounted 
smears and unmatched viciousness that all these persons and news- 
papers have heaped on McCarthy through the past few years, they 



might be understandable. But they did not, and therefore they can- 
not be classed with, say, letters from Mr. Truman to music critics. 

This aspect of McCarthy's “method” is traceable to several unten- 
able assumptions which, while they do not underlie his thinking at 
all times, certainly do so sometimes.* 

Assumption A: One cannot at one and the same time vigorously 
oppose Communism and McCarthy. 

Given a rigorously logical frame of reference, this assumption is, 
far from being palpably foolish, rather seductive. If McCarthy's 
activities are seriously damaging Communism, as at least McCar- 
thy and the Communists are convinced, why indeed, should an 
anti-Communist object to them? But the matter is not this simple: 
McCarthy sometimes fails to see that, while there are certainly 
those who object to his activities because they are anti-Commu- 
nist, there are also those who object to them because they don't 
deem them to be anti-Communist, or because they feel that, while 
they hurt Com munism some, they hurt American institutions more. 

Assumption B : Distortion of the facts about McCarthy indicates 
not merely malice , unbalance , naivete , or unscrupulousness , but 
also pro-Communism. 

Why, McCarthy must often ask himself, should my critics dis- 
tort and falsify the facts about what I do, unless it is because they 
are pro-Communists? But McCarthy should know that it is not 
only the Communists who distort and falsify information in order 
to discredit people whom they oppose. And many non-Commu- 
nists do oppose McCarthy, heaven knows. Therefore, while it is 
undeniable that many— perhaps most— of McCarthy's enemies are 
guilty of imponderable crimes against justice, it does not follow 
that one of these crimes is pro-Communism. 

Assumption C: All anti-Communists are agreed as a matter of 
course that “reasonable doubt” of reliability is sufficient cause for 
removing employees from government service (i.e., if you dont 
agree, you are not anti-Communist). 

McCarthy would do well to realize that the merits of having a 
loyalty program at all remains a live issue with some clearly anti- 

* We say “sometimes” because McCarthy has by no means impugned the 
loyalty of all his critics. McCarthy is on record as acknowledging the exist- 
ence of “honest” criticism: “There are . . . the completely honest newspaper 
editors who are sincerely opposed to what I am doing. . . (McCarthyism, 
p. 89) . McCarthy’s failure to attack some of his most relentless and conspicu- 
ous critics bears out the fact that he resorts to his have-you-stopped-following- 
the-party-line technique on rather special occasions. 



Communist Liberals. Most Liberals, of course, have long since con- 
ceded: their own front man, after all promulgated the Loyalty 
Order as far back as in 1947. But a tough loyalty program, one 
based on the “reasonable doubt” standard, is still bitterly opposed 
by a great many sincerely anti-Communist Liberals. And McCar- 
thy’s conviction— which we share— that one cannot be effectively 
anti-Communist and also oppose the “reasonable doubt” standard 
does not support the conclusion that one cannot be anti-Commu- 
nist at all and oppose the standard. 

Assumption D: Since a vigorous security program is indispens- 
able to legitimate anti-Communism, opposition to it is prima facie 
evidence of party-lining ( in a class with, say, declaring the Czecho- 
slovak coup a “people’s victory,” or accusing the United States of 
having used bacteriological warfare in Korea). 

The fact that a vigorous security program is geared to the nation- 
al interest, while the kind the Liberals want is not, raises interest- 
ing questions about the wisdom and vision of the Liberals; but not 
about their loyalty. The issues involved in a hard-hitting loyalty 
program are issues that separate Americans from Americans, not 
Americans from Communists. It is, in any case, a pretty precarious 
business to impute pro-Communism to someone on the basis of that 
person’s stand on a single issue. Sometimes it works. The informed 
American who asserts that there are no concentration camps in Rus- 
sia is, in all likelihood, consciously following the Party line. The 
American who has been around a little and yet states that Soviet 
Russia has no aggressive or imperialistic ambitions, can almost be 
counted on to be pro-Communist. But opposition to the loyalty 
program is not such a definitive test. McCarthy ought to know this— 
“just like a grown man,” as they say in Oklahoma. Consequently, he 
cannot accuse a newspaper of “following the Party line” merely be- 
cause that newspaper advocates a toothless security program. The 
most he can do is to say that in respect of security programs, news- 
paper X and the Communists are saying one and the same thing— 
which, in this case, means exactly nothing. 

And finally Assumption E: Those people who have the interests 
of the United States at heart act in such a way as to advance those 

This is the most fundamentally false of all McCarthy’s assump- 
tions; and the tragedy lies less in the fact that McCarthy some- 
times falls back on it, than in the fact that the assumption should 
be false. Not only do different people have different ideas about 


what constitutes a good society; the world has always been 
crowded with pestiferous blunderers who are incapable of acting 
in such a way as to promote even their own ideal society, much less 
the ideal society. The proximate end McCarthy most ardently 
seeks— security of the Civil Service against Communist penetra- 
tion— is also sought by a large number of his critics. And yet, most 
of these critics do get in McCarthy’s way every time he attempts 
to advance the goal which they are supposed to have in common. 
This evidently baffles McCarthy, and he sometimes finds that 
there is no satisfactory explanation except that they are not, after 
all, anxious to achieve the goal they profess. It is at this point that 
he kicks over lie traces and proceeds to impugn the loyalty of, 
say, the editors of the Washington Post. It was precisely this as- 
sumption that prompted McCarthy to impugn the loyalty of Gen- 
eral George Marshall, to explain in terms of treason a series of 
Marshalls international blunders that undeniably redounded to 
the benefit of the Communists.* And this he must not do. Ameri- 
cans would rather be called dolts than traitors; and, all things con- 
sidered— the law, the national ethic, our tradition— their prefer- 
ence should be; respected insofar as the evidence permits. 

McCarthy’s sporadic reliance on these assumptions, this aspect 
of his “method” not only weakens his claim to responsible conduct, 
but seriously midermines his effectiveness. For one thing, in calling 
Drew Pearson and the Milwaukee Journal pro-Communist, he 
loses the opportunity to make the far more telling indictment of 
them that their performance invites; that, whatever their inten- 
tions, they do act in a way that advances the fortunes of Commu- 
nism. For while Americans are by now fairly immune to the claims 
of doctrinaire Communism, they are still fearfully vulnerable to 
the blandishments of anti-anti-Communism. McCarthy has done 
well to concern himself with the threat of pro-Communists in the 
Civil Service. He would do even better to concern himself, equally, 
with the threat of circumspect anti-Communism. But to do this, 
he must force himself to recognize that the adherents of softness 
in combating Soviet Russia are, for the most part, persons gen- 
uinely concerned with the welfare of the United States. 

0 See Appendix, “The Marshall Episode.” 

McCarthy As Against His Contemporaries 

For Joe McCarthy, Owen Lattimore is not a ‘conscious, articu- 
late spokesman of Communism,” but America’s "top espionage 
agent”; Philip Jessup is not an inept statesman with an unexplained 
record of complicity with the Communist subversion of the Chi- 
nese Nationalists, but the “pioneer of the smear campaign against 
Chiang Kai-Shek,” "the originator of the myth of the ‘democratic’ 
Chinese Communists”; the State Department is not lax, or even 
criminally negligent with respect to loyalty risks, it is "infested” 
with "57 Card-Carrying Communists” and four times this number 
of loyalty risks. 

McCarthy can be depended on not to understate his case, which 
is what a great many people refer to when they talk about "Senator 
McCarthy’s method.” On the other hand, this aspect of McCarthy 
and his method must be judged with an eye to the fact that Mc- 
Carthy is a publicist among publicists. 

We would do well to remember that McCarthy was twenty- 
three, ambitious, and impressionable, when Franklin Roosevelt 
was elected President of the United States. The political tech- 
niques of the most important American political figure of our time 
must have dazzled and impressed him— much as they dazzled and 
impressed a people who set aside a tradition (which they were 
later, repentant perhaps, to legislate back into existence) in order 
to send him back to the White House again and again and again. 
Franklin Roosevelt campaigned for the Presidency four times. He 
did not see himself as running against a party which, in its own 
way, was trying to serve the country; he painted his opponents as 
"economic royalists,” representatives of "greedy and selfish inter- 
ests.” For Roosevelt, all members of the Republican Party, all recal- 
citrants in the Democratic Party, and all Supreme Court Judges 
over the age of 65, were enemies of the Republic. He drew a sharp 
line that separated him and his followers from other Americans. 
Those on his side were wise patriots; those on the other side, self- 
centered rascals. The American people, depending on how they 
voted, were either fulfilling a glorious destiny, or committing 

Two years after Joe McCarthy was elected to the Senate, and 
two years before he broke into fame as a result of a speech about 
the State Department, McCarthy witnessed the greatest political 


upset in the history of this country. In defiance of the predictions 
of almost all our political sages, with only token support from the 
influential members of his own party, faced with the active oppo- 
sition of the vast majority of the nation’s newspapers, Harry Tru- 
man outran the slick favorite from New York and went back to the 
White House for four years. 

McCarthy, the politician, can be assumed to have studied the 
campaign of 1948 with care. Harry Truman lacked the suavity of 
his predecessor; but clearly, he had no intention of deserting Roose- 
velt’s basic formula, i.e., that of persuading the people that their 
choice was not between two mildly different political parties, but 
between unscrupulous highwaymen and selfless public servants. 

Said Mr. Truman of Republicans, in the week of September 26 
to October 2, 1948: “They don’t want unity. They want . . . the 
kind of unity that benefits the National Association of Manufac- 
turers, the private power lobbies, the real estate lobbies and selfish 

Said Mr. Truman on October 19, to the International Ladies 
Garment Workers: “The Republicans plan a real hatchet job [on 
labor] .... The Taft-Hartley Law is only the beginning of the at- 
tacks they plan.” 

On October 30, in a final blast, Mr. Truman warned the country, 
" Powerful forces , like those that created European Fascists , are 
working through the Republican Party [to] undermine . . . Ameri- 
can democracy.” 

Not only did Mr. Truman win the election hands down, he also 
won the enthusiastic support of America’s Liberals. Their con- 
sciences were unruffled by Truman’s indictment of twenty million 
voters as pawns of Fascism. And not because their consciences 
were dead; for they were quickly aroused eighteen months later 
when McCarthy insisted that there were 57 Communists in the 
State Department. 

It is difficult, moreover, to argue that the political utterances of 
today are baser than those of yesterday. As a matter of fact, one 
commentator has publicly bemoaned the deterioration ( mostly in 
terms of skill and color) of modern invective. 11 His article in Life 
was sub-titled, “The Hollow Chant Has, Alas, Replaced the Verbal 
Brickbat.” He bemoans the passing of “an old and cherished rhe- 
torical tradition: the ad hominem thrust or verbal brickbat. . . . 
Could such a gem of vilification as Senator John Randolph’s great 
effort of 1826, ‘He shines and stinks like a dead mackerel in the 



moonlight’ emerge in the debates of the present generation of 
Congressmen?” We are reminded that Thomas Paine said of 
George Washington that he was "treacherous in private friendship 
and a hypocrite in public life.” Thomas Jefferson was described as 
"an atheist, an adulterer and a robber,” while Lincoln was classi- 
fied, among other things, as "The baboon president, a low-bred, 
obscene clown.” Theodore Roosevelt, William Jennings Bryan, 
Fiorello La Guardia, General Hugh Johnson, and Harold Ickes con- 
tributed handsomely to the glossary of American invective. Thus, 
though perhaps less so than a hundred years ago, public life re- 
mains hazardous.* 

Let us look at short extracts from public utterances of three con- 
temporary public figures, and begin with a classic— a campaign 
speech by candidate (now Senator) George Smathers, in which he 
informs an audience of backwoods Floridians about the character 
of his opponent: 

Are you aware that Claude Pepper is known all over Washington as a 
shameless extrovert? Not only that, but this man is reliably reported to 
practice nepotism with his sister-in-law, and he has a sister who was 
once a Thespian in New York. Worst of all, it is an established fact that 
Mr. Pepper, before his marriage, practiced celibacy. 

Or there is John L. Lewis paying his respects to management: 

When we sought surcease from bloodletting, you proffered indiffer- 
ence; when we cried aloud for the safety of our members, you an- 
swered, "Be content, ’twas always thus.” When we urged that you abate 
the stench, you averred that your nostrils were not offended. . . . When 
we spoke of little children in unkempt surroundings, you said, — "look 
to the State.” . . . You profess annoyance at our temerity; we condemn 
your imbecility. You are smug in your complacency; we are abashed 
by your shamelessness. . . . To cavil further is futile. We trust that time, 
as it shrinks your purse, may modify your niggardly and anti-social 

Joe McCarthy on the State Department, Dean Acheson, and 
other matters— from his celebrated Wheeling, West Virginia, 
speech of February 9, 1950. 

* In fact, its toughness is sometimes envied by those engaged in more 
tranquil pursuits. In a “Plea for Literary Mayhem/’ ( Saturday Review , April 
n, 1953)> Richard Hauser comments, “In political dispute we slash and 
hack and rip and bludgeon, and the arena is inevitably heaped high with 
mangled corpses and bloody survivors. But in our literary tussles a galloping 
leukemia sets in, and nobody ever gets hurt.” 


The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency [in inter- 
national affairs] is not because our only powerful potential enemy has 
sent men to invade our shores, but rather because of the traitorous ac- 
tions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. . . . 

This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young 
men who are bom with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who 
have been worst ... In my opinion the State Department, which is one 
of the most important government departments, is thoroughly infested 
with Communists. . . . 

As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loy- 
alty to a man jruilty of what has always been considered as the most 
abominable of all crimes — of being a traitor to the people who gave 
him a position of great trust. The Secretary of State, in attempting to 
justify his continued devotion to the man who sold out the Christian 
world to the atheistic world, referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount 
as a justification and reason therefor, and the reaction of the American 
people to this would have made the heart of Abraham Lincoln happy. 

When this pompous diplomat in striped pants, with a phony British 
accent, proclaimed to the American people that Christ on the Mount 
endorsed communism, high treason, and betrayal of a sacred trust, the 
blasphemy was; so great that it awakened the dormant indignation of 
the American people. 

George Smathers does his level best to make Claude Pepper a 
pervert by assonance, John L. Lewis persuades us that the mana- 
gers of Pennsylvania's coal mines are indistinguishable from the 
managers of Siberia’s salt mines, and Joe McCarthy represents 
Acheson as invoking divine sanction for Communism. Differences 
are not notable as regards the “method” of the three men in dealing 
with the opposition; differences— striking differences— however, 
emerge in our reaction to them. George Smathers comes out of it a 
bright and ingenious young man, John Lewis a lovable old sour- 
puss, Joe McCarthy a blackhearted son of a bitch. 

It is here that we arrive at a central enigma in the uproar over 
McCarthy’s “method”— the severity with which his verbal excesses 
are judged, as against the indulgence shown to other public figures 
whose language is, if anything, more distorted and more abrasive. 
This most perverse anomaly in Liberal behavior has occasioned 
surprisingly little comment. Outrage at McCarthy’s generalizations 
about the Democrats, New Dealers, Dean Acheson, and the State 
Department, appears to have unbalanced the judgment of many 
of his critics, and blinded them to the extravagances on their side 
of the fence. Our Liberal statesmen, journalists, professors, and 
preachers ululate whenever the hyperbole is used against them; 



but, in their mouths, it becomes a righteous weapon with which to 
smite down the Philistines. 

When, for example, James Wechsler, editor of the New York 
Post , tangled with McCarthy over the question of his Communist 
background, Wechsler was widely hailed as a courageous news- 
paperman in the front line of those martyrs who, in behalf of free- 
dom and decency, do battle with McCarthy. Now "Fighting” Jim 
Wechsler, clean of heart and heroic of posture, presides over a 
newspaper that divides its feature columns more or less evenly be- 
tween attacks on McCarthy’s "indiscriminate, reckless sensational- 
ism,” and serialized treatments of such subjects as "A Model’s Auto- 
biography,” "Married Infidelity,” and the alleged pro-Fascism or 
anti-Semitism of almost everybody James Wechsler disagrees with. 
The Post will feature an address by Alex Rose, union leader and 
officer of New York’s Liberal Party, in which he advises the world 
at large that the Republican Administration is deliberately set on 
bringing about a national depression "in order to break the back 
of American labor unions.” Yet two or three pages further on, in 
the same issue, a Post reporter or columnist or editorial writer will 
writhe in agony at the ‘lurid sensationalism of America’s national 
disgrace”— Joe McCarthy, of course. 

Most Liberals were silent as a tomb when Harry Truman accused 
Eisenhower, in 1952, of anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, "butcher- 
ing the reputations of innocent men and women” and indulging in 
a "campaign of lies.” As in the roughly similar circumstances of 
1948, the Liberals (for the most part) simply refused to be un- 
nerved or disconcerted by reckless and exaggerated charges— so 
long as they were being made by persons of whom they approved 
against persons of whom they disapproved.* 

The Liberal attitudes towards investigating committees follow 
much the same pattern. The inquisitorial method is “understand- 
able,” or “indispensable,” or even “desirable,” if it is used to uncov- 
er or embarrass Wall Street racketeers (the Nye Committee), the 
anti-union practices of management (the LaFollette Committee), 
or the financial angels of right wing organizations ( the Buchanan 
Committee). But the same method— even if more restrained and 
equitable in its application— is outrageous and fascistic when used 
to lay bare the activities of American fellow travellers ( the Com- 

* “It was a very dry campaign until Truman added some life to it,” com- 
mented Professor Robert E. Lane of Yale University's political science de- 
partment. (Yale Daily News , November 10, 1952.) 


mittee on Un-American Activities), to expose the ideological im- 
pact of the Institute of Pacific Relations (the McCarran Commit- 
tee) or to look into pro-Communism in the Voice of America (the 
McCarthy Committee ) . 

An understanding that this schizophrenia of the Liberals exists 
( even if we do not pretend to know why it exists ) , is indispensable 
to an understa nding of the issues treated in this book. For although 
the cliche runs, “I agree with Senator McCarthy's aims but I disap- 
prove of his methods,” it would reflect far more accurately the 
thinking of the Liberal if it said instead: “I agree with Senator 
McCarthy's methods, but I disapprove of his aims.” For it is Mc- 
Carthy's aims that demonstrably disconcert and frighten so many 
of his critics. They disapprove of McCarthy's method when it is 
used to further McCarthy's aims; but like it fine when it is used 
to further their own. 

Since it is not, we maintain, McCarthy's method that underlies 
their opposition to McCarthy, it must, indeed, be something else; 
for we do, after all, know that they do not like McCarthy, even if 
we are not in a position to understand just why. But if it is at all 
possible to analyze their stated objections to McCarthyism, to un- 
derstand just what it is they have in mind when they rail against 
McCarthy, it comes out more or less as follows: McCarthyism 
spells evil days ahead for our society; for McCarthyism has its 
roots in the desire of man to control the thinking of his fellow man. 
McCarthyism, with all its talk about the alleged dangers of Com- 
munism, is pushing us into an Age of Conformity. 

And this fear, so serious and so moving, we shall have to con- 
sider carefully. 


The New Conformity 

Our f<r Reign of Terror” 

F reedom of the mind, so high in our hierarchy of values, is said 
to be in an advanced state of atrophy in America— a result of 
McCarthy and McCarthyism. All conversations or discursive 
roads, from no matter where, lead to this subject. Perhaps most 
often, the theme is played under the solemn and sublime auspices 
of the baccalaureate ceremony. The President of college A, having 
been invited by the President of B to strike a blow for freedom of 
the mind at B’s commencement exercises, can be counted on to 
deliver a good solid talk about Socrates and how the Athenian 
witch-hunters did him in for merely disagreeing with them. The 
modern parallel springs quickly to mind— all the more easily due to 
a certain negligence in pointing out the differences between Soc- 
rates and Lattimore. And the warning, subsequently echoed in lec- 
tures, editorials and sermons all over the land, is always there: we 
are moving into a new Age of Conformity. Behind every tree there 
is a McCarthyite— and, for that matter, behind every sapling: for 
even the misdirected exuberance of 1952s crop of college students 
is written down as a manifestation of the New Inquisition. Yes, it 
has been seriously suggested that McCarthy was the final cause 
that drove college men to forage in women’s dormitories for panties 
and brassieres.* 

* “Rabbi Blames 'McCarthyism' In College Raids/ He Says 'Danger' of 
Voicing Dissent on Big Issues Makes Campus Restless/ Rabbi Louis I. New- 
man, preaching yesterday at Temple Rodoph Sholem, 7 West 83 Street, at- 
tributed the current dormitory raids' by college students to 'McCarthyism' 
which, he said, makes serious discussion and dissent on major issues danger- 
ous. ‘A vast silence has descended upon young men and women today in 
the colleges of our country, and they find an expression for their bottled-up 
energies in foolish and unseemly ''raids” upon dormitories,' Rabbi Newman 
said,” etc., etc. New York Herald Tribune , May 25, 1952. 



Only the most adventurous spirits among us, we are solemnly 
assured, would today dare to apply for a position in the civil serv- 
ice. For to do so is to invite first suspicion, then irresponsible perse- 
cution by some committee. Either you don't get the job— because 
sometime in your past you may have indulged an indepedent 
thought— or you do get it, whereupon you embark on a career of 
explaining your past to security personnel who, very likely, will 
frustrate any chance of advancement, and perhaps set you loose, to 
struggle through life with a blighted reputation. 

Worse still, soon we shall not even have enough gumption left 
to object to this state of affairs; for we are being taught at college 
to take it and like it. We learn from a celebrated series of articles 
by Mr. Siegel in the New York Times that a deadening uniformity 
has become a characteristic of the campus. How, Mr. Siegel asks, 
can the student be blamed? In an age that does its intellectual busi- 
ness under McCarthy’s auspices, the retaliation against freshness 
and originality— against thinking— is swift and sure. College stu- 
dents, knowing they must one day earn a living for themselves, pre- 1 
fer to succumb rather than to fight. Nor is it merely the under- 
graduate who feels the truths of Communism stirring within him 
that has to think twice about the future; the real, and furthermore 
the intended, victims of the oppression are those with Liberal 
ideas. Thus we find E. B. White, a humorist with a conscience, 
writing a deadly serious satire for the New Yorker , the sense of 
which is that were McCarthy so much as aware of the existence of 
Thoreau, he would damn him as a loyalty risk.* 

Those of us who have not felt the Reign of Terror are warned not 
to take the threat lightly. The professional mourners at the wake 
of American f reedom are unimpressed, in fact angered, by consola- 
tions, especially of the empirical sort. They appear to resent any 
distractions from their gloomy introspections. 

Mr. Eugene Lyons tells, 1 for example, of a meeting at Swarth- 
more College, in 1951, of “six bold men”— a solemn conclave of 
what they themselves termed “the unterrified,” calculated to prove 
that “Americanism is not yet extinct,” but also calculated to sug- 
gest that it is on its last legs. A spate of books, all favorably re- 

0 Which, incidentally, Thoreau was: not because he is the author of 
Walden , to which Mr. White refers exclusively in his satire, but because he 
also wrote the stirring and magnificent essay on “Civil Disobedience.” It 
would hardly ha ve been in the national interest for Thoreau to have occupied 
a high position in the War Department, say, during the Mexican War. 


viewed, have been sponsored by Cornell University and financed 
by the Rockefeller Foundation, and all of them conclude that free- 
dom today is moribund. Professor Henry Steele Commager has 
announced that “we are now embarked upon a campaign of sup- 
pression and oppression more violent, more reckless, more danger- 
ous than any in our history.” Harold Ickes wrote shortly before 
his death that “if a man is addicted to Vodka he is, ipso facto , a 
Russian, therefore a Communist.” Lester Markel, editor of the Sun- 
day edition of the New York Times , heralds the advent of a “black 
fear in the country brought about by the witch hunters.” 

Naturally enough, Mr. Markel welcomes to the Times * Sunday 
Magazine Section Earl Bertrand Russell, who writes of America, 
“If by some misfortune you were to quote with approval some re- 
mark by Jefferson you would probably lose your job and find your- 
self behind bars.” “The hardheaded boys,” Mr. Bernard De Voto 
writes in Harpers Magazine , “are going to hang the Communist 
label on everybody who holds ideas offensive to the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, or the 
steering committee of the Republican Party.” Lawrence Clark Pow- 
ell, librarian of the University of California, writes for a British 
publication : 2 “In this time of inquisitional nationalism, I know that 
I run a risk in confessing that I possess a French doctor’s degree 
and own an English car. And what dire fate do I court when I say 
that I prefer English books?” And when Dr. Ralph Turner, a pro- 
fessor of history at Yale, exposed the reign of terror to a convoca- 
tion of Eastern College students, the latter, after due deliberation, 
voted McCarthyism a greater threat to America than Communism. 

The notion that the United States is in the grip of a reign of ter- 
ror as the result of the activities of Senator McCarthy, Senator Jen- 
ner, Congressman Velde, the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities et al. y is, of course, palpable nonsense. This is not to over- 
look the fact, however, that America has stiffened on certain po- 
litical matters in the past five years. Joining a Communist front is 
no longer a profitable way to demonstrate concern for the down- 
trodden. Glossing over the barbarities of the Soviet Union in order 
to arrive at the Inner Truths of the Soviet “experiment” is no longer 
accepted as presumptive evidence either of objectivity or of wis- 
dom. Nor can the party-liners now play their old game of putting 



aside one disguise and appearing overnight in another. Four 
months after their humiliation at the polls, the Progressives, acting 
through the National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions, at- 
tempted a comeback by promoting a “Cultural and Scientific Con- 
ference for World Peace” at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York. The 
conference was practically hooted out of town, and the partici- 
pants— hard Communists and Communist dupes— went back to 
their classrooms, offices, and newspapers to proclaim what has al- 
ways been an invulnerable deduction to the Communists: that 
because the public refused to respond to the exhortations of the 
Communist Party, the day of Fascism has arrived in America. 

Yes, America s back has stiffened. There is little doubt that the 
conference would have been a rip-roaring success in, say, 1938 or 
even in 1947. And the stiffening is in evidence elsewhere: Frederick 
Vanderbilt Field would not today be invited to direct a national 
research association. Howard Fast is no longer being lionized by 
respected American publishers. And Paul Robeson has ended his 
long career as the prima donna of American culture. What is more, 
none of these men could pass a security investigation for govern- 
ment employment; not even, mirabile dictu, for employment in 
the State Department. 

America, in other words, is rallying around an orthodoxy whose 
characteristic is that it excludes Communism ; and adherents of 
Communism are, therefore, excluded from positions of public trust 
and popular esteem. 

The assertion that the growing firmness of the American people 
is also felt by any deviate from the line laid down at the last assem- 
bly of the National Association of Manufacturers is the red herring 
of our time. It was invented by hard-headed Communists, echoed 
by those Liberals who for the most part know not what they do, 
and popularized by those of our melodramatic clubwomen who 
hungrily devour whatever crumbs the Liberals throw their way. 

As everyone knows, Liberal and Socialist activities, both organ- 
izational and propagandistic, have not only not been interfered 
with in any w ay, they are at peak intensity all over the land. The 
partisans of the Brannan Plan, of socialized medicine, of continued 
and increased federal preemption of state functions, of the closed 
shop, of doctrinaire international philanthropy, of Clement Attlee, 
of Pandit Nehru, are as numerous as ever, and are more vocal with 
each passing day. Their converts among college students, very 


far from concealing their advanced views with an eye to their 
career, assure themselves success by proclaiming these views. The 
Democrats, the ADA’ers, and the World Federalists, continue to 
organize and propagandize, on the campus and off; and continue, 
on the campus and off, to think of themselves as the wave of the 
future. Thus, the annual “Vermont Conference” at the University 
of Vermont, when it assembled in the spring of 1952, heard nation- 
al issues discussed by a panel made up of Leon Keyserling, Sumner 
Slichter and James B. Carey; and international issues by a panel 
made up of Sidney C. Suffrin, Michael Straight and Saul K. Pad- 
over! In the course of a typical year’s program, the Yale University 
Political Union plays host to an endless succession of well-known 
Liberals— and for good measure also invites Howard Fast and Cor- 
liss Lamont. Yet the Grand Sachem of McCarthyism, McCarthy 
himself, is meanwhile unable to inflict his reign of terror in his own 
bailiwick: in a period of 18 months, the University of Wisconsin 
invited Eleanor Roosevelt, Norman Cousins, Owen Lattimore and 
James Carey to complain about McCarthy’s reign of terror to the 
student body. 

How the New Inquisition visits its wrath on the Liberals is prob- 
ably best indicated by the treatment accorded to the three major 
“victims” of McCarthy’s campaign speech (October, 1952). With- 
in six months of the speech, Archibald MacLeish received both the 
National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize for poetry. Bernard 
De Voto received the National Book Award for History. It being 
one of the unusual years during which Arthur Schlesinger Jr. did 
not write a book, he collected his tithe from the politicians ( rather 
than from the critics ) , who elected him co-chairman of the Ameri- 
cans for Democratic Action. In short, to say that Liberalism is on 
the run in America is akin to saying that Communism is on the run 
in Russia. 

It is true, of course, that irresponsible statements are made now 
and then about men and women of pronounced Liberal views. But 
such statements are nothing new on the American scene, and they 
are probably received with greater impatience than ever before. 
For example: 

—Early in 1952, Senator McCarthy learned that copies of Ed- 
mund Wilson’s Memoirs of Hecate County were being forwarded 



to Europe at government expense. Impulsively, and absurdly, Mc- 
Carthy denounced government sponsorship of books which “fol- 
low the Communist Party line”— although it is notorious that Wil- 
son turned his back on the Communists in the 30’s and is the author 
of some first-rate anti-Communist books and articles. Memoirs of 
Hecate County is a vulnerable book on a lot of counts; and the 
reason is obscure why it was selected for official distribution in the 
first place; but it is no more pro-Communist than its author. And 
McCarthy was told so in no uncertain terms by persons who, in 
general, view his activities with much approval. 3 Here, McCarthy 
himself was reckless; but “the forces of McCarthyism” did not sup- 
port him on the point he was making. And Wilson’s reputation as 
the dean of Anerica’s literati is as secure as ever— a fact which is all 
the more relevant to our thesis since he is an unrepentant socialist. 

—A year after the “Hecate” incident, Norman Cousins, editor of 
the Saturday Review, was one of several persons invited to Hagers- 
town, Maryland, to address a meeting sponsored by the Junior 
Chamber of Commerce. Cousins was to speak under the auspices 
of the United World Federalists. 

A Hagerstown American Legionnaire rushed forward to pro- 
test— on the grounds that Mr. Cousins’ name appeared in the files 
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The Commit- 
tee, when queried, revealed that Cousins’ name did indeed appear 
in its files, and in connection with the pro-Communist Waldorf 
Conference. But, the Committee added, the files revealed that 
Cousins had been the only anti-Communist speaker at the Con- 
ference, that be had been booed for criticising the USSR, and that 
when the moment came for him to leave the Conference, he had 
to be given police protection. Upon the release and digestion of 
this information, Cousins received an apology from the American 
Legion, and still another from the Junior Chamber of Commerce. 
Mr. Cousins has certainly not suffered from the incident, as the 
prosperity of his magazine and the success of his books and lectures 
will affirm. And this in spite of the fact that the cause he most 
persistently champions— World Federalism— is at sword’s point 
with the ideals of most American conservatives. 

—One more incident. In May, 1953, a Baltimore policeman was 
found listing the license numbers of automobiles parked in the 
vicinity of a World Federalist rally. When queried, the policeman 
reported that he was carrying out instructions he had received 



from his immediate superior. What happened then? Almost imme- 
diately, the Governor of Maryland, no less, was publicly apologiz- 
ing to all World Federalists everywhere, and, in fact, affirming his 
sympathy with their goals. 

In short, we have with us, as we have always had, men of scant 
information and abundant ill-will. But the evidence simply does 
not exist that their agitations constitute a national scandal, much 
less a national threat. We will always have with us ignorant and 
oblique attacks against the Left; just as we will always have with 
us ignorant and malicious calumny upon the Right. The notion 
that the former are more numerous or vicious or effective than the 
latter cannot be supported by evidence. A dispassionate survey of 
extremes of opinion and prejudice would surely conclude that, if 
“hysteria” reigns in the United States today, it is a hysteria whose 
blows are directed at the Right. Unwarranted charges of “reac- 
tion,” “fascism,” “anti-Semitism,” “chauvinism,” and “warmonger- 
ing,” are leveled every bit as frequently as unwarranted charges of 
“Communism” and “socialism.”* 

If we are in the throes of a reactionary revolution which threat- 
ens independent thought, then at least we may, with Eugene 
Lyons, derive some comfort from the world about us. “One conso- 
lation,” he writes, “as we face the propaganda portrait of a dis- 
traught, hysterical America is that it implies a nation of heroes. 
For the unterrified seem roughly equal to our entire population.” 
Of course the answer is that the jeremiads about the threat to free 
and independent thought and speech are self -refuting; they come 
from the tongues and pens of men who, in the very act of protesting 
against tyranny, i.e. in exercising their right to express opinions 
freely, expose their own hoax. “One evening recently,” Mr. Lyons 
writes, “I saw and heard Arthur Garfield Hays [counsel for the 
American Civil Liberties Union], his mouth opened wide, in a 
television screen close-up, shouting that in America no one any 
longer dares open his mouth.” 

Recently, a refreshingly honest and objective admission came 
from an unexpected quarter. The New Yorkers Mr. Richard Ro- 
vere, whom we hope we are permitted to call a card-carrying Lib- 
eral, wrote in the New Leader in the spring of 1952 that, while he 

* A factual laboratory report on this phenomenon, with particular empha- 
sis upon the handicaps suffered by anti-Communists, appeared in the Ameri- 
can Legion Monthly in September 1951, in an article, “America’s New Priv- 
ileged Class,” by Eugene Lyons. 



yields to no man in hatred and contempt for Senator McCarthy, 
he is forced to admit that he has found that attacking McCarthy 
"is just about as dangerous as drinking my morning cup of coffee.”* 

* One of the authors quoted this statement of Mr. Rovere in a column on 
Senator McCarthy written for the Spadea Syndicate in the spring of 1953. 
Mr. Rovere objected as follows: . . What you reported me as saying was 

correct enough, but in both text and context you will find specified a place, 
time and condition of life. I said then, and I would say today, that it would 
be ridiculous for me or anyone in a similar position to lay claim to moral 
courage for attacking McCarthyism. But my case is, if not unique, special. 
I do not work for the State Department; I have no plans to run for Senator; 
I am not an editor of Colliers. I am in short unlikely to suffer any personal 
loss or damage as a consequence of my view, and therefore, while it would 
be pleasant to be able to regard myself as brave, I fear IVe no grounds for 
doing so. But I think it is very different with many other people. . . .” Our 
point in this chapter, and in others in this book, is that it is not “different 
with many other people”; that it is only different with those people who are 
pro-Communist or whose record supports a reasonable doubt as to their reli- 
ability. And, of course, with those who are congenitally so meek, and worth- 
less, that they would not dare endorse Camels for fear they might displease 
Lucky Strikes. But these timid men have no business to enter into public de- 
bate in the first place; and surely Mr. Rovere would not want to call their 
disappearance a loss to intellectual life. 

The Question of Conformity 

McCarthyism, we are saying, has narrowed the limits within 
which political proselytizing can safely go forward in the Ameri- 
can community. The assertion that there is a “reign of terror” 
directed at all who disagree with Senator McCarthy, we are saying 
further, is irresponsible nonsense. But something is abroad in the 
land, and we have no objection to its being called a “reign of terror” 
provided it is clear that a metaphor is being used, and that the vic- 
tims are the Communists and their sympathizers. We may concede 
that America has come to insist on “conformity,” if you will, 
on the Communist issue . 

One of the problems that arises is that of stating precisely 
what the conformity, encouraged by McCarthyism, actually in- 
volves: what sanctions are being imposed upon what people to 
discourage what sort of activity. Defining the conformity is diffi- 
cult, if for no other reason than that its shape and coloring vary 
sharply from one part of the country to another, and from one 
field of activity to another. Another question entirely is whether 
we approve of the sanctions and of their being visited on the par- 
ticular people they are being visited on. But there is a third ques- 
tion: What about the argument underlying the Liberals’ deter- 
mined assault on McCarthyism— the argument that “conformity,” 
in any area whatever , is undesirable? A number of serious writers 
on the subject* profess to be disturbed not so much with the pecul- 
iar orientation of a “conformist” society, as with the fact that a 
conformity— any orthodoxy whatever— should exist at all. McCar- 
thyism is bad, we are told, and must be bad, just to the extent that 
it obstructs the free flow of commerce in the “marketplace of ideas.” 
The objection requires thorough consideration— not because it is 
profound, but because it elicits reflexive and emotion-charged sup- 
port from so many people who, for excellent reasons, are con- 
cerned with protecting “freedom of the mind.” 

Opposition to conformity of any sort arises from a failure to 
understand the ways of society, a failure to recognize that some 
conformity, in varying degrees and in diverse fields, has character- 
ized every society known to man; and for the reason that some 
conformity is just as indispensable as some heresy. 

The word “conformity” is too often used to connote collective 
adherence by an insensate and irrational society to an unimagina- 
a e.g. Alan Barth, Alexander Meiklejohn, Zechariah Chafee, Jr. 



tive and erroneous doctrine. Thus the frequent references to the 
“threat of coinformity,” to “arid conformity,” to “stultifying con- 
formity,” and so on. The word “conformity” is not necessarily mis- 
used when it is given that meaning. But it is also a useful word to 
describe the prevailing value preferences of highly civilized soci- 
eties ; and in that sense conformity may be a blessing rather than 
something to be avoided. In short, we rightly deplore the “con- 
formity” that obtained in Germany during the thirties— the ortho- 
doxy which evokes so vividly the image of an authoritarian, secu- 
lar, ethnocentric society, savage in its elimination of dissidents. 
But we may also speak of the “conformity” of English sentiment on, 
say, the subject of parliamentary government— and with some en- 
thusiasm. In the one case, a nation was wedded to an evil social 
doctrine which it defended by imposing brutal punitive sanctions 
upon dissidents. England, however, is wedded to what we deem 
a highly commendable political process— and wedded to it by the 
voluntary acquiescence of all, or nearly all, of its citizens. 

Our indictment of Nazi conformity is therefore based on two 
counts: (a) we don’t like the values the Nazis encouraged, and 
(b) we don’t 1'ike the fact that they violated persons who disagreed 
with them. Our approval of England’s conformity with parlia- 
mentary rule is based on our approval of the institution of popular 
government, and also on our approval of the fact that English- 
men are not embarked on an active campaign against dissidents. 

The conformity we are concerned with in this book— the one 
McCarthyism is promoting— resembles the English conformity on 
the first count: the vast majority of Americans are certainly in 
sympathy with those values Communism threatens. It is equally 
clear— as regards the second count— that McCarthyism (under- 
stood as including all the legal, economic and social measures that 
are being used to discourage adherence to Communism ) has little 
in common with pogroms and concentration camps. But on this 
score the conf ormity encouraged by McCarthyism is not like con- 
temporary English conformity either: for it is a calculated, pur- 
poseful national campaign levelled against Communist dissidents. 
Do we conclude, then— from this difference— that conformity, 
English-style, is desirable, while conformity, McCarthy style, is 

It is easier to understand the conformity McCarthyism is urging, 
and the sanctions being used to promote that conformity, if we 
recognize that some coercive measures— i.e., restrictive sanctions 


3 l8 

of some sort— against dissidents are indispensable to the achieve- 
ment of any conformity. Coercion takes different forms. It may 
be exercised through education, through social pressure, or through 
laws. But it must be exercised in one form or another if naturally 
diverse minds are to form a common tendency. 

What Liberals fail to understand is that even the orthodoxies 
they approve of have not come about through spontaneous con- 
sent. To act as though the Paraclete had, one bright morning, 
breathed into the hearts of Englishmen their allegiance to parlia- 
mentary rule, is, among other things, to do a severe injustice to the 
thousands of men who devoted their lives to dislodging British ab- 
solutism. England had to fight for her form of government; and it 
was several hundred tumultuous years before popular rule emerged 
as the imperious and unchallenged orthodoxy that reigns today. 

In short, we are apt to forget that conformity, in order to “be,” 
must first “become.” We cannot have our cake without first baking 
it. England’s conformity with parliamentarianism does not, today, 
depend on coercive measures to preserve its supremacy, because 
it is mature , because it is institutionalized to the point that it goes 
virtually unchallenged. McCarthyism, however, involves an ortho- 
doxy still-in-the-making; and therefore, as with all imperfect con- 
formities, some coercive sanctions are being exercised in its behalf. 

The sanctions imposed on behalf of favored values have often 
been violent, as when the guillotine was used as an instrument for 
winning converts to French republicanism, or when civil war and 
the Thirteenth Amendment were adopted as deterrents to slavery 
in this country, or when the Income Tax was written into our laws 
to encourage financial support of the government. Or, the sanctions 
may be relatively gentle: for example, the ubiquitous pressures 
which, for two decades now, have emanated from the classroom 
and from the bureaucrat’s desk, from political podiums and from 
a preponderance of our literature, in behalf of the leviathan State.* 

* As unabashed an acknowledgment of the Liberal orthodoxy being 
pressed in American schools today as the authors have ever seen appeared in 
an article in the July 1953 Atlantic Monthly written by Mr. Joseph S. Clark, 
Jr., Mayor of Philadelphia: “Fortunately, free compulsory education works 
for the liberals. . . . big business has not yet taken over American education. 
Adlai Stevenson has more supporters among schoolteachers and college pro- 
fessors than Tom Dewey. It is significant that what used to be called ‘history' 
is now called ‘social studies/ Spiritually and economically, youth is condi- 
tioned to respond to a liberal program of orderly policing of our society by 
government, subject to the popular will, in the interests of social justice,” 
(Italics added.) 


The sanctions imposed by McCarthyism are of both kinds. The 
legal sanctions, the anti-Communist laws , are, in a sense, “harsh” 
measures. The Smith Act, for example, punishes with imprisonment 
anyone who conspires to advocate the overthrow of the govern- 
ment by force. The McCarran Act harasses members of fellow- 
travelling organizations. The Feinberg Law denies employment to 
teachers who are members of subversive organizations. Miscel- 
laneous laws and executive orders deny government employment 
to persons regarded as loyalty or security risks. 

The social sanctions of McCarthyism are of the other, relatively 
mild variety- as when individual schools refuse to hire Communist 
professors, or radio stations close their doors to Communist artists, 
or labor unions deny membership to Communist workers. They are 
ordinarily milder because, in the absence of a law on the subject, 
there may be; other schools, radio stations, and unions that will 
give the Communists shelter.* 

To sum up, then, a drive for some conformity, and the turbulence 
often attendant on such a drive, are not unusual phenomena 
in our society or any other. And judging by past experience, if 
Americans, by the year 1999, learn to despise fellow-travelling with 
the same intensity and unanimity with which today they regard, 
say, slave-owning, it is predictable that the Liberals of that day will 
not bewail America’s anti-Communist orthodoxy. 

But we must probe deeper into the alleged threat to freedom of 
the mind posed by McCarthyism. Although the measures by which 
McCarthyism encourages conformity are clearly the same meas- 
ures by which societies have traditionally protected favored values. 
Liberals are not obliged to approve of what societies have done in 
the past. They can repudiate all sanctions designed to influence 
opinion, past, present and future; and they seem to be doing this 

0 Although legal sanctions are almost invariably harsher than social ones, 
there is, theoretically at least, no necessary difference between them as far 
as the hurt to the victim is concerned. If, for example, all schools refuse em- 
ployment to Communist teachers, the latter are as hard hit as they would be 
by a law forbidding them employment as teachers. And, looking at it the 
other way ’round, it is always possible to conceptualize a law that will ac- 
complish precisely the measure of restriction that results from a given social 
sanction. The fact that laws are, just the same, usually more restrictive than 
social sanctions is highly important and, as we shall see later, relevant in de- 
ciding how free societies ought to go about achieving conformity on a given 



when they universalize about the evils of “thought control” each 
time the subject of McCarthyism is brought up. 

It is perfectly true that the sanctions of McCarthyism (like 
those that have been used in the past on behalf of democracy, 
freedom for trade unions, and so on) do constitute “thought con- 
trol” in the sense that they hack away, and are intended to hack 
away, at opposition to certain values. But to condemn these sanc- 
tions is to condemn the natural processes of society. 

Freedom of the mind, we are told by the Liberals, is an absolute 
value; and thought control, “since it impairs this freedom,” an abso- 
lute evil. Few Liberals are aware that the first of these statements 
does not necessarily justify the second. The only freedom that an 
individual may never sacrifice is, providentially, one that he will 
never be without: the freedom to act as a moral agent at the choice 
level— to select, as between whatever alternatives are left open to 
him, the one which most closely coincides with the “good.” In re- 
ligious terms, man's only absolute freedom is his freedom to earn 
salvation; and this freedom is irrevocable because man has a free 
will. The Russian serf, even within the area in which he is allowed 
by the State to act, can triumph over evil every bit as decisively 
as can the American freeman.* 

* The religious-minded reader may feel we are stating the obvious, at 
this point; and the agnostic will surely tell us we are boring him. Neverthe- 
less, the hazy notion is at large that the debate about “thought control” and 
“freedom of the mind” somehow involves religious absolutes. It is method- 
ologically important, then, first to account for religious imperatives, and then 
to remove them from what is fundamentally a political discussion. Christian- 
ity justifies the assertion that freedom of the mind is an “absolute.” But this 
freedom, as we say, is one that man will never be without. Freedom of the 
mind is never at stake if free will is postulated. (For the determinist, the 
concept is meaningless by definition.) What the “freedom of the mind” cultists 
are actually worried about is (a) “guidance” of the mind, and (b) derivative- 
ly, freedom of action. These are political considerations and actually do not 
affect man’s moral standing. Though education and other pressures, social 
and legal, strongly dispose people to choose one course of action rather than 
another, it does not follow by any means that their moral freedom is im- 
paired. The citizen of the Soviet Union, faced with conflicting accounts, 
Pravda's and the Voice of America's , of how the Korean war began, is strong- 
ly influenced to accept the Pravda account, and probably will; but this act 
of choosing between them takes place in an area that is beyond the reach 
of the MVD. And similarly, although many alternatives are never privileged 
to compete for a man’s acceptance — as, for example, the idea of racial amal- 
gamation may never so much as occur to the ethnocentric Southerner — man’s 
freedom to choose among those alternatives he does consider is not affected. 
Likewise, the freedom to perform the chosen “good” does not affect a man’s 
moral standing. If performance were the vital Sling, then A, who chooses to 



There remains, however, the alluring political argument that if 
democracy is to prosper, sanctions must not be used to delimit the 
number of ideas our minds consider, or to make one idea appear 
more attractive than another. Democracy, so the argument goes, 
thrives on the "free market in ideas,” and to tamper with the mar- 
ket is, ultimately, to sabotage the machinery that makes possible 
enlightened self-government. In a democracy, therefore, every idea 
must be allowed to display its inherent attractiveness, so that it 
can be judged on its merits. All ideas must, so to speak, start out 
even in the race; and if an idea is to be rejected, this must be done 
by each individual for himself —free from coercion by his fellow 
men. McCarthyism embodies such coercion. Thus, ipso facto it is 
anti-democratic. 0 

Unquestionably, the claims of the free market in ideas are very 
strong. Hard experience through centuries has taught us to exercise 
self-restraint in insisting upon our own notions of what decisions 
society should make. Societies, we have learned, fare better when 
they have a wide selection of ideas from which to choose, if only 
because their citizens are then better able to articulate, and there- 
fore to realize, their wants. But when the Liberals go on from here 
to formulate an inflexible doctrine which, in the name of freedom 
of the mind, would prohibit a society from exercising sanctions of 
any sort, and when they talk as if even the freest society could 
manage this feat, they are talking very dangerous nonsense. 

Part of the Liberals’ difficulty is that when they think of sanctions 
against ideas, they think in drastic terms. They think in terms of 
denying employment to, or imprisoning the carriers of, "objection- 
able ideas.” They ignore altogether the areas in which the process 
of “controlling” thought takes a less dramatic form. They do not 
consider, and hence do not weigh, the more subtle, but infinitely 

attend church on Sunday but cannot because all churches are shut down, 
would be less worthy in the eyes of God than B, who chooses to go to church 
and is so situated that he can go. In short, the moral requirements of freedom 
are met if we are able, as we always are , to dispose our minds to pursue the 
dictates of conscience, whatever they may be. 

* A paradox is already evident in the premise of the Liberal theory: there 
is probably no idea in America more pervasive and more demanding of con- 
formity than that of the “free market in ideas/' How many schools fail to in- 
culcate it? How many writers challenge it? How many politicians fail to do 
homage to it? And let the Liberal beware of the answer that, after all, it is a 
“good idea,” etc. Though we agree that, in many respects, it is, the argument 
is fatal to his position. 


more important sanctions through which societies defend favored 

Our schools, for example, have thoroughly indoctrinated the 
average American with the virtues of democracy. A sanction of 
the subtle variety has been exercised; and one that will unquestion- 
ably affect his political judgment in a thousand ways favorable to 
one favored concept— the perpetuation of democracy. Where, again 
for example, social disfavor attends Jew-baiting, a sanction (not 
the less effective because it is subtle) is being imposed against 
racial intolerance. Once again, does anyone contend that polygamy 
is getting a fair break in the market of ideas? 

In short, every idea presented to our minds, as we grow up, is 
accompanied by sanctions of approval or disapproval which add 
to, or subtract from, that idea’s naked appeal. And these sanc- 
tions are “thought control”— whether they urge political conform- 
ity with democracy by jailing Communist conspirators, or aesthetic 
conformity with classicism by disparaging, in the classroom, musi- 
cal romanticism. 

The practice of thought control is so ubiquitous and so common- 
place as to make us wonder at the success of the Liberals in fright- 
ening people with only one, the crudest, of its many manifestations. 
They turn the trick, it seems, by dramatizing the sanctions that are 
deliberately and purposefully imposed, while keeping silent about 
the haphazard process by which society subsidizes approved prej- 
udices and preferences. And they disarm us by an impressive array 
of swear words which they apply only to the overt, dramatic type 
of sanction. 

Not long ago, in the course of upholding (on the grounds of 
precedent ) the constitutionality of Atlanta’s banning of the movie 
Lost Boundaries (which dramatizes, among other things, the evils 
of Jim Crow ) , a U.S. District Court launched into a ringing Liberal 
lament, excoriating all such laws. The fate they deserve, the Court 
insisted, is “interment in the attic which contains the ghosts of 
those who, arrayed in the robe of Bigotry, armed with the spear of 
Intolerance, and mounted on the steed of Hatred, have through all 
the ages sought to patrol the highway of the mind.” 

The judge apparently disapproved the action taken by Atlantans 
to forbid the propagation of certain ideas on their screens. This, 
he suggested, was “thought control.” Yet the question cannot be 
avoided: does the withholding of the ideas embodied in Lost Boun- 
daries from audiences in Atlanta constitute “thought control” in 



some sense in which the presentation of those ideas to New York 
audiences does not? Was the Atlanta Board of Censors tampering 
with freedom of thought in some sense in which a dozen movie 
producers do not regularly do, month in month out, as they decide 
what pictures advocating what ideas shall be produced? Clearly, 
the encouragement of certain ideas on race relations can affect 
thought, just as the discouragement of these ideas can— as, for ex- 
ample, when they are suppressed. We may feel that it is a mistake 
to suppress such ideas; that Atlantans would profit from a sympa- 
thetic presentation of a Negro family’s assimilation by white soci- 
ety. Yet this is merely a euphemistic way of saying that we would 
like to influence contrarily disposed minds in the direction of our 
own point of view— which is to plead guilty to the charge of thought 
control. We are certainly not less guilty than our fellow country- 
men in Atlanta, who seek to incline minds the other way.* 

In short, it is characteristic of society that it uses sanctions in 
support of its; own folkways and mores, and that in doing so it 
urges conformity. What we call the “institutions” of a society are 
nothing but the values that society has settled on over the years 
and now defends by sanctions. Most of us take fierce pride in our 
society’s institutions— quite reasonably, since it is our institutions 
that make us what we are. But it is well to remember that in exhib- 
iting this pride, we are applauding just so many manifestations of 
conformity which were brought about by the practice of “thought 
control” through many generations. 

Not only is it characteristic of society to create institutions and 
to defend them with sanctions. Societies must do so— or else they 
cease to exist. The members of a society must share certain values 
if that society is to cohere; and cohere it must if it is to survive. In 
order to assert and perpetuate these values, it must do constant 
battle against competing values. A democratic society, for example, 
dare not take for granted that the premises of democracy will, un- 
aided (i.e., solely in virtue of their ideological superiority), drive 
Communism out of the market. If the contest were to be adjudi- 
cated by a divine tribunal, society could sit back with folded hands 
and watch the show. But it is not; and hence a concomitant of 

* It should be noted that the Atlanta incident is cited merely to illustrate, 
in terms of thought control , the various sanctions and countersanctions com- 
monly exercised. Other issues, highly important, but not relevant here, were 
raised when the Board of Censors, in counterattacking against Hollywood, 
invoked the power of the State. 



man's selecting freedom as against Communism is his acting ration- 
ally in behalf of freedom and against Communism. If the contest 
were to be adjudicated by a divine tribunal, a society could afford 
to be capricious and patronizing towards the enemy’s ideas. It 
could even afford to act on Liberal premises relating to “freedom 
of the mind”— by seeing to it, for example, that the New York 
Daily Worker circulated as many copies as the New York Journal 
American . 

A hard and indelible fact of freedom is that a conformity of sorts 
is always dominant, as evidenced by such minutiae as that the 
Journal American and the New York Post are more heavily sub- 
scribed than the Daily Worker . And since a conformity of sorts 
will always be with us, the freeman’s principal concern is that it 
shall be a conformity that honors the values he esteems rather than 
those he rejects. 

This is not to say, of course, that society never makes mistakes 
in this area, and that the conformities selected by societies are, 
invariably, conformities with the eternal verities. Even free and 
enlightened men may use the power of sanctions in behalf of false 
and inferior values. But democracy is meaningless unless, having 
brought to bear on today’s problems their intelligence, their in- 
sights, and their experience, freemen take vigorous action on be- 
half of the truth as they see it. 

Thus Liberal spokesmen, who are forever warning us against 
attempting to get an inside run for our favored values, show a fun- 

The Liberals are forever warning us about the dangers of com- 
ing down hard on those who oppose the basic values of our society. 
The Communist problem, for example, according to one of the 
Liberals’ favorite lines of argument, is not inherently different from 
that which, prior to the Revolutionary War, our forefathers posed 
to the English; and we have no more business assuming our own 
infallibility vis a vis the Communists than the English had in as- 
suming theirs vis a vis the American Revolutionaries. “In 1940,” 
writes Alan Barth, 4 “the Alien Registration Act forbade all Ameri- 
cans to teach or advocate the duty or necessity of overthrowing 
by force or violence a government created by just such advocacy.” 

Two implications are clearly present in such a statement, namely, 
( a ) that the revolution America is seeking to frustrate through the 
Smith Act and, one supposes, through McCarthyism in general. 



cannot be written off as morally reprehensible unless we are pre- 
pared to write off, in like manner, the Revolution to which we owe 
our existence as a nation; and (b) that the English ought not to 
have resisted our insurrectionary forefathers. 

Both of the;se notions, we contend, are false, and the freeman 
must reject them as a matter of course: the one as contrary to his 
considered estimate of Communism, the other as politically ego- 
centric to the point of sheer naivete. 

We believe on the strength of the evidence, that the American 
Revolution against George III was a revolution in the interests of 
freedom and of civilization. But it does not follow that the English 
should have recognized it as such, and should, accordingly, have 
given it their blessing. Still less does it follow that the Communist 
revolution is in the interests of freedom and of civilization, and that 
we should give it our blessing. For each free society must decide 
these questions by its own lights as they arise, and there is no place 
to which it can turn for the kind of guidance that will exclude the 
possibility of error. Certainly not to such doctrines as “the divine 
right of revolution.” 

The individual freeman may, of course, find himself in disagree- 
ment with his society’s decision. If so, it is his duty to resist the 
majority, even if it be very large, to just the extent called for by 
the intensity of his disagreement. But let him not deny society’s 
right to consolidate around the institutions it favors. Or at least 
let him not deny this right in the name of a free society. 

The preaching of the Liberals on the subject of conformity, as 
we have already suggested, does not conform with their practice. 
In the light of their own habits, their sense of outrage in the pres- 
ence of McCarthy ism becomes difficult to explain. For where 
movements are concerned that conform with Liberalism, the Liber- 
als talk out of the other side of their mouths. 

The drum-beating for a “bi-partisan” foreign policy, for example, 
insistent and deafening as it was during the post-war years ( and 
is even today), is a call for “conformity” in one aspect of public 
affairs. And who has beat that drum more assiduously than the 
Liberals? Every time a diehard crosses the aisle and joins the bi- 
partisan ranks there is jubilation in the Liberal Camp. That no such 
acclamation greets the regeneration of a Louis Budenz, a Whit- 
taker Chambers, or an Elizabeth Bentley, is something for which 
the Liberals have yet to offer a convincing explanation. 

Where were the Liberals when the weapons they now forbid us 



to use against the Communists were being used, fifteen years ago, 
against American fascists and against a number of Americans who 
were not fascists? And how do the Liberals account for their past 
and present ruthlessness in assaulting all persons, groups, or even 
ideas, that are out of harmony with the Liberal orthodoxy? That 
Liberal weapons have been effectively wielded, many a business- 
man, many a so-called isolationist, and many a hard anti-Commu- 
nist can prove by pointing to his scars. 

What is more, the Liberals have been signally successful in many 
of their drives for conformity. Not many years ago, for example, 
most Americans believed employers were entitled to recognize or 
not recognize labor unions as bargaining agents for workers as 
they themselves saw fit. But more and more Americans became 
convinced that the ends of social justice would be better served if 
workers enjoyed a stronger bargaining position. The Liberals, 
however, were not content with a slow evolution of public senti- 
ment. They were in a hurry. And no sooner did they win a Congress 
and a President of their persuasion, than they passed a law making 
collective bargaining mandatory. The non-conforming employer 
could thenceforward (a) close up shop or (b) go to jail for con- 
tempt. It was, to be sure, the employers actions rather than his 
thought that the Wagner Act was intended to control. But it has 
also proved an extremely effective instrument of creeping thought- 
control, since it has produced a gradual consolidation of public 
opinion around the ideas of its authors. If the collective bargaining 
clause of the Act were repealed tomorrow, a few employers might 
conceivably turn the unions out. But an overwhelming majority 
would not. Sixteen years of collective bargaining, sanctioned by 
law and by society, have so deeply implanted this practice in our 
public morality that it has become, quite simply, an American 

The Liberals, in short, do want conformity— with Liberalism. 
The overriding sin, in their attitude toward McCarthyism as a drive 
toward conformity, is their duplicity. The fulminations of those 
Liberals who know what they are about are prompted not by a 
dread of conformity as such, but by the approaching conformity 
with values to which they do not subscribe. 

To say that all societies encourage conformity leaves open the 
question of how they ought to encourage it. And there is a consen- 
sus that a society concerned with preserving individual freedom 


will not take away from dissidents one iota of freedom that does 
not have to be taken away in order to protect its institutions. 

The traditional view among libertarians has always been that 
freedom tends to be maximized for both majorities and minorities, 
and thus for society in general, if social sanctions are preferred to 
legal ones. This view has normally been supported by two argu- 
ments: (a) that the genus State (which goes into action when 
legal sanctions are imposed) has natural aggressive tendencies 
that tend to feed upon each successive new grant of power; and 
(b) that social sanctions more accurately reflect the real “lay” of 
community sentiment. 

The first of these arguments is grounded in long centuries of 
experience which have taught us that the State has attributes one 
of which is a tendency to usurp functions that can be equally well 
and, in most cases, better performed by the citizens acting indi- 
vidually or through voluntary and spontaneous associations. The 
end result of such usurpations is, of course, fatal to freedom. Thus, 
wisdom instructs freemen not to whet the State's always enormous 
appetite for power by passing laws that add unnecessarily to the 
paraphernalia of the State. 

The second argument rests upon what we have learned in the 
long pull of history about the plight of dissenting minorities, even 
in the freest societies. A legal sanction is, in theory, one hundred 
per cent effective: all the citizens are made to conform, even if 
Only fifty-one per cent of them entertain the views that prompted 
the legislation. Thus, half the citizens of the State of New York, 
plus one, can, through control of the legislature, pass a law that will 
prevent Communists from teaching in any State school— even 
though half of the community, minus one, believes such a law to 
be bad or at least inadvisable. Social sanctions, by contrast, are 
effective roughly in proportion to the number of persons who wish 
to exercise them: if only fifty-one per cent of New Yorkers want 
Communist teachers kept out of the schools, and only social sanc- 
tions are used., then Communists will be kept out of, roughly fifty- 
one per cent of the schools; the minority is left free to resist the 
pressure exerted by the majority. 

In other words, minorities remain freer when majorities content 
themselves with the degree of conformity they can achieve without 
calling in the police. Freemen, other things being equal, will ar- 
dently desire to maximize the minority's freedom; and to the extent 
that they do they will advocate social evolution rather than legal 


revolution. The freeman who objects to nudism may inflict social 
indignities on the sun cultist, but he will not advocate legislation 
outlawing nudist colonies. The freeman will join in making life un- 
comfortable for Gerald L. K. Smith, but will not back a law forbid- 
ding Smith to publish his scurrilous literature. 

It is interesting that the Liberals have been far less concerned 
than libertarians about freedom for the minorities. They have a 
congenital fondness for passing laws, and a congenital distaste for 
waiting around while social sanctions engender conformity on this 
issue or that. The sure and swift machinery of the State fascinates 
them the way a real pistol fascinates youthful admirers of Hopa- 
long Cassidy; their faith in it knows no bounds. Thus, for example, 
the proposed federal Fair Employment Practice Law is a sturdy 
rallying point for all Liberals; while the libertarian prefers to en- 
courage racial conciliation through education and social pressures. 

The balanced libertarian does not, to be sure, hold that the ma- 
jority members of a free society must never be “in a hurry,” and 
that in no circumstances may they take the short cut conveniently 
provided by the statute-book. He well knows there are times when 
legal sanctions must be used, and he knows we live in such times 
today. He will advise the majority not to adopt unnecessary legal 
measures of a restrictive character; but not to hesitate to adopt the 
necessary ones, i.e., those that the exigencies of the situation clearly 
call for. 

Mr. Justice Holmes laid down a famous test by which free soci- 
eties can distinguish between the unnecessary and the necessary 
in this area. The “clear and present danger” doctrine is useful, and, 
probably, the best we have. The doctrine is, of course, incapable 
of furnishing wholly objective and unvarying standards, as Su- 
preme Court experience with it has proved.* But the central mean- 
ing of Holmes’ test is clear and serviceable as applied to deeds as 

* Holmes confined himself to ruling on the requirements that must be ful- 
filled before society restricts the freedom of advocacy. He did not, that is 
to say, propose that the same test be met by laws aimed at actions , while his 
standard seems to us equally as good for the one as for the other. The Su- 
preme Court was wrestling with the Constitutional problem of how to recon- 
cile the First Amendment with the right of a society to demand, on the 
level of utterance and publication, the conformity it needs for self -protection. 
The formula Holmes hit upon is dubious constitutional law. As Mikklejohn, 
Chafee and others have pointed out, the First Amendment states unam- 
biguously that freedom of speech and of the press shall not be abridged; 
and it seems improbable that the founding fathers meant by it anything dif- 
ferent from what they said. Holmes achieved a fairly happy balance between 
the right of the individual to advocate and the right of society to survive, 
but it was not an entirely honest way of amending the Constitution. 



well as speech. It authorizes the use of legal sanctions against any 
activity that offers an imminent threat to the survival of existing 
institutions, or an imminent threat to the safety of persons or 
property. It forbids their use against all other deeds and utter- 
ances, and insists, indirectly, that a free society, when not in jeop- 
ardy, protect its values through the use of social pressure. 

However we translate Holmes’ test, most of us are agreed that 
activity on behalf of the enemy in time of war poses a clear and 
present danger. 

We cannot avoid the fact that the United States is at war against 
international communism , and that McCarthyism is a program of 
action against those in our land who help the enemy. McCarthyism 
is (and, in our opinion, is likely to remain), nine parts social sanc- 
tion to one part legal sanction. But that one part legal sanction is en- 
tirely legitimate. The resulting restrictions on a minority’s freedom 
are certainly mild when compared with the drastic restrictions the 
majority imposes upon itself through such measures as military 
conscription. It is perhaps the crowning anomaly of present-day 
Liberalism that it should, on the one hand, sanction the total tyran- 
ny of compulsory military service, and yet balk at restricting the 
least freedom of our enemy’s domestic allies. 

Finally, the Liberals insist, our society cannot, even during war- 
time, afford to cut itself off from innovation . Whatever the emer- 
gencies of today, the argument runs, we must think about tomor- 
row. We must: make sure that our conformity shall not be so rigid 
as to barricade our minds against new ideas. The most terrifying 
nightmare of our intellectuals is that America may some day pass 
the hemlock to a Socrates, hang a Thomas More, or force a Gal- 

The Holmesian school — as well as the free speech absolutists— has al- 
ways, it seems to us, begged the question why advocacy should be placed in 
a different category for this purpose from deeds. Quite evidently, the distinc- 
tion cannot be justified on the grounds that speech is more valuable to the 
speaker than freedom of action is to the doer. If Jones wants to make a 
speech extolling the virtues of the Soviet Union, while Smith (who has no 
interest in politics) wishes to start a lottery — and if laws proscribing both 
activities are on the books, — to convince Smith that as a victim of thought 
control Jones is a good deal worse off than he will take some doing. Holmes 
was presumably concerned with the utility to society of freedom of speech, 
as against freedom of action. In fact, however, the two are, invariably, so 
intertwined that greater freedom in the one category tends to generate greater 
freedom in the other. Advocacy often influences actions, and action, through 
the roundabout process of “creeping thought control,” often influences 



lileo to recant. It can happen here, we are warned, if we give Mc- 
Carthyism its rein. 

This argument forgets that societies are, after all, educated as 
well as educable. It is one thing for society to give a hearing to new 
ideas, and quite another thing for it to feel impelled to put new 
ideas— simply because they are new or unorthodox— on a plane of 
equality with cherished ideas that have met the test of time. It is, 
for example, one thing to study Jean Paul Sartre and allow the free 
circulation of his books (which this country is doing) and quite 
another thing to give existentialist ideas the inside run in the cur- 
riculum of our university philosophy departments (which this 
country is not doing) . It should after all be clear that a free market 
in ideas ceases to be free or a market if the latest huckster to arrive 
can claim his share of trade without regard to the quality or appeal 
of the commodity he is selling, and merely because he is a parvenu. 
The Liberals, bewitched as they are with the value of innovation, 
tend to forget that a free market is one where the customers can, 
if they so wish, keep on trading with the same old butcher. 

Moreover, the argument tends to equate “innovation” with prog- 
ress. The innovator can regale society with a cornucopia of wealth 
and happiness; but he can also open a Pandoras box. A measure 
of healthy skepticism about new ideas is not a sign of obscurantism 
—nor, necessarily, an indication of stagnancy. Most of what we cor- 
rectly call progress is a matter of the natural development and 
growth of old ideas. The statement that the heterodoxy of today is 
the orthodoxy of tomorrow, which we hear so often in this connec- 
tion, is a piece of absurd oversimplification. One of today’s hetero- 
doxies may become tomorrow’s orthodoxy; but if so, then, by defi- 
nition, the remainder will not. And today’s heterodoxies are always 
numerous in a way that the cliche fails to recognize. Witness in our 
country the brief flowering and unlamented demise of Know-Noth- 
ingism and Ku-Kluxism— both of them heterodoxies that did not, 
on the morrow, become orthodoxies. Nor is it true, as the argument 
suggests, that there is net social gain, or progress, necessarily and 
as a matter of course, every time a heterodoxy displaces an ortho- 
doxy. Societies often progress backwards. 

Even so, progress does occur, and no intelligent society should 
adhere to a conformity so rigid as to make the airing of alternatives 
dangerous or impossible. Our major differences with the Liberals 
in this area have to do with whether McCarthyism tends in any 
such direction. And this brings us, at last, to the question: What is 
the actual extent of the conformity McCarthyism seeks to impose? 

McCarthyism’s Call to Conformity 

McCarthyism, on the record, is not in any sense an attempt to 
prevent the airing of new ideas. It is directed not at new ideas but 
at Communist ideas, of which the last thing that can be said is that 
they are new or untried. The McCarthyites are doing their re- 
sourceful best to make our society inhospitable to Communists, 
fellow-travelers, and security risks in the government. To this end, 
they are conducting operations on two fronts: (1) they seek to 
vitalize existing legal sanctions, and (2) they seek to harden exist- 
ing anti-Communist prejudices and channel them into effective 
social sanctions. 

Valid laws and auxiliary Executive Orders prohibited Commu- 
nists— or persons about whose loyalty or reliability there was a rea- 
sonable doubt -from holding government posts long before Senator 
McCarthy started talking; but they were frequently evaded, and 
sloppily administered. McCarthy and his allies have simply in- 
sisted that they be vigorously enforced. McCarthyism is primarily 
the maintenance of a steady flow of criticism (raillery, the Liber- 
als call it ) calculated to pressure the President, Cabinet members, 
high officials, and above all the political party in power, to get 
on with the elimination of security risks in government. In a sense, 
the major “victims” of McCarthy’s drive for conformity have been 
those responsible for the so-called loyalty program, whom he has 
tried to inch into performing their clear legal duties. 

On the second front, McCarthy has tied into fellow-travelers 
who have no tangible affiliation with the government. For example, 
he early aimed his fire at Harlow Shapley, Frederick Schuman, 
and Owen Lattimore.* McCarthy exposed their party-lining and 
did what he could to build up social pressure against them. He has 
not, or at least not yet, succeeded in eliminating them from posi- 
tions of power and influence in national academic life: all three 
continue to teach at important universities. But there is no doubt- 
ing the fact that they are less influential than they were before. 
Their pronouncements on foreign policy are no longer cited as 

0 To be sure, McCarthy first became interested in these men because of 
their alleged connection with the government. Insofar as their government 
affiliations were either past history or of a merely peripheral nature, it can be 
argued that he attacked them in the wrong context. But that is beside the 
point as far as the present question (what degree of conformity is McCarthy- 
ism attempting to bring about?) is concerned. 


authoritative. Lattimore’s future books about solutions in Asia are 
unlikely to become bestsellers.* 

The conformity attendant upon McCarthyism, then, adds up to 
something like this: (1) persons who conspire to overthrow the 
government by force are subject to legal sanctions ( the Smith Act, 
for example), primarily that of imprisonment; (2) persons in pub- 
lic service about whose loyalty or security there is a “reasonable 
doubt ” are subject to legal sanctions ( the various security regula- 
tions), primarily that of exclusion from government employment; 
( 3 ) persons other than government employees about whom there 
exist reasonable grounds for believing they are “pro-Communist," 
are to some extent subject to legal sanctions (possibly the McCar- 
ran Act or the Attorney General’s list of subversive organizations ) , 
primarily that of having their activities officially labeled as "Com- 
munist” or "subversive” or ( as with the Feinberg Law or the statu- 
tory loyalty oath requirements ) that of being excluded from cer- 
tain jobs; they are furthermore subject, increasingly, to social sanc- 
tions, primarily of the type that have been aimed at Lattimore and 
Schuman and Shapley. 

These sanctions are not the same all over the country. In some 
localities, in sections of the Midwest for example, the sanctions hit 
people who might escape them elsewhere. In the rare instance, a 
single Communist-front affiliation may engender public hostility 
and bring down severe social sanctions on a man’s head. In the 
academic arena of the East, by contrast, the level of enforced con- 
formity is decidedly lower, and sometimes descends nearly to zero. 
Southern Baptist College X fires Jones when there are apparently 
no reasonable grounds for believing him to be a pro-Communist. 
But Harvard, Williams and Johns Hopkins retain Shapley, Schu- 
man and Lattimore on their faculties when reasonable grounds 
abound for believing them to be pro-Communist. 

The claim is often made that McCarthyism has as its ultimate ob- 
jective the exclusion of Liberals from positions of power, prestige, 

0 We stress the discomfort that the three professors have suffered without 
attempting to balance it against the comfort they have presumably drawn 
from their apotheosis by the Liberals. It has for several years been a popular 
— and adroit — witticism among young academicians that "if only I were a 
Communist, then I could be sure I wouldn't be fired. They wouldn't dare!” 
The insecure professor who embraces Communism in order to frustrate the 
college president's attempt to get rid of him is the central figure in a recent 
novel about university life. 



and influence in the American community; and that the present 
campaign against Communists and fellow-travelers is merely the 
thin edge of the wedge. It is therefore curious that the one instance 
which lent a modicum of factual support to this fear received little 
or no attention from Liberal publicists. 

In October of 1952, Senator McCarthy delivered his widely her- 
alded attack on Adlai Stevenson, which people generally expected 
would turn into an attempt to connect the Democratic candidate 
with Commun ism. With millions of listeners glued to radio and TV, 
McCarthy reached, not for a red paint brush, but for a list of some 
of Stevensons top advisors: Archibald MacLeish, Bernard De Voto, 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Was his point that these men were Commu- 
nists? No, that was not McCarthy’s point. His objection to these 
men was not that they were Communists, or even pro-Communists, 
but that they were Liberals— atheistic, soft-headed, anti-anti-Com- 
munist, ADA Liberals. And his major point turned out to be that 
this was sufficient reason for rejecting the candidate for whom 
they were serving as Edgar Bergens. 

Whether the speech was a conscious effort to narrow the limits 
of tolerable opinion so as to exclude left-wing Liberals, only Mc- 
Carthy can say. The fact that he has not reiterated the point sug- 
gests that, if this was his intent, he was not very serious about it. 
It is far more likely that he intended to deliver a traditional polit- 
ical campaign speech highlighting the disqualifications of his Par- 
ty’s opponents. But it may well be we have not heard the last of 
this idea. Some day, the patience of America may at last be ex- 
hausted, and we will strike out against Liberals. Not because they 
are treacherous like Communists, but because, with James Burn- 
ham, we will conclude “that they are mistaken in their predictions, 
false in their analyses, wrong in their advice, and through the re- 
sults of their actions injurious to the interests of the nation. That 
is reason enough to strive to free the conduct of the country’s 
affairs from the influence of them and their works.”* But the real 
point, for our purposes, is that the mainstream of McCarthyism 
flows past the Liberals as gently as the Afton; and that the Mac- 
Leishs, De Votos and Schlesingers have no grounds for arguing 
that any sustained effort is being made to read them out of the 

0 Burnham was referring to “Wechsler and his political associates” ( The 
Freeman , June 15, 1953). He was most clearly advocating social sanctions 
against them. 



It is still only Communist ideas that are beyond the pale. And the 
evidence is convincing that the function of Senator McCarthy and 
his colleagues is not that of defining or creating a new orthodoxy 
with which individuals are being called upon to conform. The 
American community affirmed anti-Communism long before Mc- 
Carthy started in. McCarthy’s function has been to harden the 
existing conformity. 

We are left with the final question: whether the conformity 
urged by McCarthyism is doing a service to America and, therefore, 
whether we should view it with approval. Certainly the vast ma- 
jority of the American people have already given their answer to 
the question; for, after all, the approaching conformity is of their 
own making, and they must be presumed to approve what they 
are doing. Most Americans, the available evidence seems to say, 
favor anti-Communism, and tight security in the civil service. But 
we are asking, of course, whether the majority is right ; and there- 
fore we must take account of the misgivings of the intelligentsia. 
What should be said of their resolute and impassioned opposition 
to McCarthyism? 

Simply this. They are confused, they have misread history, and 
they fail to understand social processes. What is more, they do not 
feel the faith they so often and so ardently express in democracy. 
There is only one alternative to this explanation: that they are op- 
posed to the decline of Communist influence at home. The deter- 
mination of the American people to curb Communism cannot be 
dismissed as a capricious, ignorant, or impetuous decision. There 
is, we contend, a great deal of difference between a society’s har- 
assing the exponents of an idea that has been thoroughly exam- 
ined and found objectionable, and its harassing the exponents of 
an idea simply because it hurls a novel challenge at traditional no- 
tions. Our Schumans, Shapleys, and Lattimores have become unac- 
ceptable not because they are known to hold ideas and values at 
variance with those of the majority of Americans, but because they 
expound a particular set of ideas and values which Americans have 
explored and emphatically rejected, and because the propagation 
of these ideas fortifies an implacable foreign power bent on the 
destruction of American independence. 

The ideas of the Schumans, Shapleys and Lattimores are not, as 
we say, new ideas; they are exploded ideas. America has had access 
to the literature of Communism for more than a generation. Every- 



thing from Das Kapital and The Problems of Leninism to month- 
lies, weeklies and dailies reflecting the least adjustment in the Party 
Line, has for years circulated freely in American classrooms, librar- 
ies, and living rooms. Communist missionaries have roamed the 
land to urge their ideas through the spoken word. In short, Amer- 
ica could hardly have given Communism a fairer or more exhaus- 
tive hearing without inviting over a dozen commissars to conduct 
an American Five Year Plan. 

Having heard the case, America has rejected it. And because the 
case is championed by a mobilized, aggressive, titanic enemy state, 
America has gone further: she has turned to the offensive against 
Communism. We are at war, and there are many strategies, many 
tactics, many weapons, many courses of action open to us. Our 
lines could be advanced by innumerable enterprises, some foolish, 
some proper— by assassinating Malenkov, by atom-bombing Soviet 
industrial plants, by subsidizing a Russian underground, by pro- 
viding leadership and funds for prominent European and Asiatic 
anti-Communists, by imprisoning violators of the Smith Act, by 
purging the Civil Service, and by exposing and persecuting Com- 
munist apologists in whatever occupation they are engaged. One 
thing is certain : Communism will not be defeated— any more than 
freedom was won— by postulating the virtues of democracy and of 
Christianity as evident truths and letting it go at that. 

McCarthyism, then, is a weapon in the American arsenal. To 
the extent that McCarthyism, out of ignorance or impetuosity or 
malice, urges the imposition of sanctions upon persons who are not 
pro-Communist or security risks, we should certainly oppose it. 
When persons about whose loyalty or security reliability there is 
no reasonable doubt are flushed from government service for secur- 
ity reasons, those responsible should be criticized and held to an 
accounting both at the polls and before investigating committees. 
Whenever the anti-Communist conformity excludes well-meaning 
Liberals, we should, in other words, go to their rescue. But as long 
as McCarthyism fixes its goal with its present precision, it is a 
movement around which men of good will and stern morality can 
close ranks. 



C urrent reports indicate that American intellectuals travel- 
ing abroad divide their time, more or less equally, between 
sight-seeing and apologizing for McCarthy. For Europeans, 
it seems, have lost faith in America, where McCarthyism is rife; 
they are for this reason, we are told, inclining more and more to- 
wards neutralism, toward a “balanced” view of the “two great 
powers that threaten the peace of the world.” 

The following is a letter to the New York Times (July 1, 1953) 
from a distinguished American scholar in the field of philosophy, 
visiting in Scotland for the purpose of delivering the famed Gifford 
Lectures at Saint Andrews University: 

“I should like to report a strong impression,” writes Professor 
Brand Blanshard, “which is the result of seventeen months abroad. 
It is this, that if there is one American who more than any other 
is injuring his country by un-American activities it is Senator Mc- 
Carthy. We who are abroad have come to expect that his acts and 
ideas will be thrown in our faces wherever we go. We are tired of 
explaining him, listening to derisive laughter about him and apolo- 
gizing for him. 

“European liberals are for the most part disillusioned with Com- 
munism and would be ready to follow American leadership if they 
were persuaded that it was really liberal. But if they ever feel an 
impulse in this direction they open their newspapers next day to 
read that Mr. McCarthy is again scouring government offices and 
universities in search of men who have dared to utter liberal opin- 
ions, even in the remote past, and branding them as Communists 
and public enemies. Is it any wonder that Europeans put down 
their papers with a sigh and say: If that is what America is offer- 
ing, we want none of it. We have rejected Communism precisely 
because we could not bear that sort of thing. You do not make it 
bearable to us by renaming it Americanism. If you ask us to choose 
between Communism and McCarthyism, we can only say: A plague 
on both your houses/ 



“Many thoughtful Europeans would consider that in the work 
of undermining the American position in the world Mr. McCarthy 
has been of more use to the Russians than half a dozen of their 
crack divisions. I should agree.” 

Is this indeed what McCarthy has done to us in Europe? And is 
the best traveling American philosophers can do, in the circum- 
stances, to endure, with Mr. Blanshard, the humiliation of ac- 
knowledging McCarthy as a fellow countryman, to apologize 
humbly for him, and to leave town with Europe’s derisive laughter 
ringing in then - ears? 

Let us turn, for a short but first-hand account of the European 
position, to a Jew passages of what purports to be a fairly repre- 
sentative statement of prevailing European sentiment on the crisis 
of the day. We quote from a statement that appeared in Time maga- 
zine, October 12, 1953, putting forward the views of Mr. Tom Dri- 
berg, MP, introduced by Time as “an influential Christian socialist.” 

“Many Europeans and Asians,” Mr. Driberg says, “mistrust the 
tendency to dragoon the whole world into two big-power blocs, 
each professing the noblest intentions and emitting, alternately, 
high-falutin slogans about democracy and Tarzanlike boasts of in- 
vincible might. We have seen this tendency in American and Sovi- 
et policy alike. We believe that it is wrong in itself, and likelier to 
lead to war than to peace. 

“Many of us also feel impatient when, like kids after a street 
fight, each side: accuses the other of having started it. Did the Rus- 
sians start it in Czechoslovakia in 1948? Or the French in Indo- 
China in 1945? Or the British in Greece in 1944? Any competent 
attorney could make a case either way. 

“. . . After all, we agree on some issues with either side: with the 
Russians, we reject what seems to us the jungle philosophy of big- 
business capitalism; we stress political liberties as strongly as the 
Americans do— or did before the era of McCarthy. . . . 

“Certainly Britain, and other Commonwealth countries, want to 
trade with China. Why not? . . . the Americans are destroying 
British and Commonwealth prosperity. As a socialist, I am an 
anti-imperialist; but the new imperialism of the dollar seems to 
me at least as harmful as the old imperialism. . . . 

“To equate Soviet Russia with Nazi Germany is a dangerous 
oversimplification. They seem to me essentially different, in several 
ways: (1) ideologically, Communism is a Christian heresy, but 
Naziism was anti-Christian paganism; (2) hence, in practice, 


though there has been much cruelty in Russia, there is nothing 
comparable with the calculated horror of the gas chambers and the 
extermination of the Jews; (3) geographically and economically, 
the Soviet Union is far more self-sufficient and therefore not intrin- 
sically expansionist. . . 

Now let us first catch our breath and then, in the light of this 
exposition of the “neutralist” view, suggest a new approach for the 
traveling American philosopher shouldered with McCarthy's cross. 
Let us suggest that the next time an American professor is accosted 
by Europe's Christian Socialists, he say something like this: 

“First, let's get one thing straight: A reign of terror does not 
exist in the United States. What about Mr. Blanshard— Phi Beta 
Kappa, senior professor of philosophy in Yale University, sometime 
co-president of the American Philosophical Association, member 
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences? Why, Mr. Blan- 
shard is, in respect of what he has told you about McCarthyism, a 
charlatan. He has, in fact, according to all academic rules, given his 
university grounds for dismissing him. Not, heaven knows, because 
he disagrees with McCarthy— in American colleges people are 
hired , not fired because they disagree with McCarthy— but because 
to make such a statement as that McCarthy is engaged in searching 
out men who have dared to utter liberal opinions, even in the 
remote past, and branding them as Communists/ is to say a demon- 
strable untruth, and the person who utters it, in the teeth of the 
evidence, is, demonstrably, ignorant or mendacious. Mr. Blanshard 
might just as well make claims to professional competence after 
informing his students that Socrates refused to escape with Crito 
because he was afraid of getting seasick. 

“But Blanshard's fatuousness is in point only to the extent that 
such reign-of-terror talk beclouds the issue and commits European 
intellectuals to rather futile careers of swatting away at a straw 
man. For there are, indeed, aspects of McCarthyism that do horrify 
you, the Europeans, and will probably continue to horrify you. And 
this is because the United States and Europe are substantially dif- 
ferent societies; and it is eternally true that one community will 
think well of another community in proportion as the second com- 
munity resembles the first. And, in several essential respects, 
America does not resemble Europe. 

“We are not accustomed, in most parts of America, to what you 
over here accept as a matter of course. The average American, un- 
like the average Frenchman, does not talk politics with his Commu- 



nist barber in a friendly atmosphere of give-and-take, drink wine 
with his Communist neighbor, or have to inure himself to the antics 
of his Communist alderman. The American does not bum the mid- 
night oil on election night because, like the Italian, he wonders 
whether the dawn will usher in a Communist government. The 
American does not, like the Englishman, have the slightest doubt 
in his mind as to who was responsible for the enslavement of Czech- 
oslovakia, for the ‘revolution’ in Greece, or for the war in Indo- 
china; nor is he inclined to view Stalin as a 20th-Century Luther, 
or Russia as a land where, unlike Hitler Germany, ‘horror’ is not 
‘calculated.’ And America, unlike England, does not barter with 
men who are shooting down her sons. 

“Americans would not have tolerated, as France did until 1950, 
an avowed Communist as head of her atomic energy development 
program; and Americans, increasingly, will not tolerate, as England 
does, Communist domination of certain highly strategic trade 

“America, like England, has had her Fuchs, Pontecorvos, Mays, 
Burgesses and McLeans; but America, unlike England, has been 
deeply shocked by the successes of her traitors, and has resolved to 
frustrate them; for it is quite true that America is not prepared to 
accept the notion than an occasional traitor in this, and one in that 
government agency, is one of those consequences of ‘political 
liberties’ that we must put up with. 

“The American, in short, is different from the European. Adlai 
Stevenson left his countrymen bewildered, if not humiliated, when 
he told them in the fall of 1952 that the wonder is not how many 
Communists there are in the United States but, considering the 
Great Depression, how few there are. For unlike the European, we 
do not live in the dread that the slightest— or even the greatest- 
convulsion in our economy, or in our politics, or in our culture, is 
going to deliver the man in the streets into the arms of a proletarian 

“We believe, in short, that the average American is too balanced, 
too mature, too responsible to undulate in rhythm with the average 
European. America is simple. America understands pro-Commu- 
nism, and she understands anti-Communism; but she is bewildered 
by ‘non-Communism.’ You may call this stolidity on her part, a 
sign of dogmatism, of ignorance, of absolutism. Call it what you 
will. It is there. And McCarthyism reflects it. 

“Yet we in /unerica are by no means united. McCarthyism is the 
source of violent controversy in this country, as you well know. 



This is partly the result of ignorance, partly the result of success- 
ful Communist propaganda. But it is also because a number of peo- 
ple in America look at the order of things in Europe and then, rue- 
fully, at the state of affairs in America. These people are, by and 
large, our intellectuals. Whether it is coincidence or causality, our 
intellectuals are fired by the things that fire Europeans, and they are 
not perturbed by the things that do not perturb Europeans— Com- 
munism, for example. 

“These Americans are engaged in a battle against McCarthyism, 
and in the balance hangs the future of America, the question 
whether the American mind will be set in the European mold or 
whether it will hang on to its characteristics, and indulge its pres- 
ent ‘stolid’ instincts. 

“A considerable number of Americans support McCarthy not 
only in his fight to prevent America from becoming Communized, 
but also in his fight to prevent America from becoming like Europe. 
For us Communism is the worst fate on the horizon; but there are 
other fates that we would avoid, one of them being the fate of 
Europe, whom we see today as a weary and cynical community of 
pettifogging nations whose deterioration is not only measured by 
the strength of her Communist minority but the weakness of her 
non-Communist majority. 

“Senator McCarthy is certainly no more critical of you than you 
have been and are likely to continue to be of him; in point of fact, 
he has on no occasion, not even in his Comrade-Attlee speech, 
spoken so intemperately or so distortedly about Europeans as Euro- 
peans regularly speak about him. So be it, for this is beside the 
point. We do not anticipate or even propose a reconciliation, and 
we do not anticipate, and certainly do not propose a compromise. 
Whatever help Europe chooses to extend in the fight against Com- 
munism is help that she extends in the defense of herself, and that 
help will reflect the extent to which she wishes to resist Commu- 
nism, not the extent to which she consents to go along with a 
country in which McCarthy is a national figure. We do not, there- 
fore, intend to get rid of McCarthy. We believe that on McCarthy- 
ism hang the hopes of America for effective resistance to Commu- 
nist infiltration. And if and when McCarthy broadens out, and there 
have been indications that he will, his spirit may infuse American 
foreign policy with the sinews and purpose to crush the Communist 
conspiracy. Only then can we afford to do without McCarthy.” 


Appendix A 

Communist Front Connections 
of McCarthy’s "Public Cases” 

The following are the fronts with which, McCarthy charged, the 
nine “Public Cases” had been connected— together with descrip- 
tions of the ev idence McCarthy adduced to back up his allegations. 
We list only those fronts mentioned by McCarthy that are backed 
up by an executive or a legislative citation. In by no means every 
case, it should be noted, did McCarthy list all the fronts his public 
cases had been connected with. We refer, specifically, to Miss Ken- 
yon and Drs. Schuman and Shapley. The following symbols will be 
used: For the; Attorney General— “AG”; for the House Committee 
on Un-American Activities— “HUAC”; for the California Commit- 
tee on Un-American Activities— “CU AC”; for Tydings Committee 
Hearings— “TCH” 

Dorothy Kenyon 

1. American Committee for Anti-Nazi Literature. Sponsor, March 
1939, as indicated by organizations letterhead. Miss Kenyon had no 
recollection of sponsorship. TCH, p. 182. 

Cited as a Communist front: CUAC report, 1948, p. 334. 

2. American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom . 
Member, in 1940. Miss Kenyon admitted membership. TCH, p. 181. 

Cited HUAC report, June 25, 1942, p. 13, and March 29, 1944, 
p. 87; C UAC report 1948, p. 12. 

3. American-Russian Institute , N. Y. Sponsor of dinner honoring 
FDR, May 1946. Miss Kenyon admitted sponsorship. TCH, p. 202. 

Cited: AG, April 27, 1949. 

4. Associated Blind, Inc. Sponsor, as indicated by organizations let- 
terhead. (No date.) Miss Kenyon had no recollection of sponsorship. 
TCH, p. 202. 

Never officially cited, but identified as a Communist front by 
HUAC report, Appendix IX, 1944. 

5. Citizens Committee to Aid Striking Seamen. Member Advisory 


3 44 

Committee, January 1937, as indicated by organization’s letterhead. 
Miss Kenyon had no recollection of membership. TCH, p. 182. 

Never officially cited, but identified as a Communist front by 
HUAC report, Appendix IX, 1944. 

6. Conference on Pan-American Democracy. Sponsor, November 
1938, March 1939. Miss Kenyon admitted sponsorship. TCH, p. 180. 

Cited: AG, June 1, 1948; HUAC report, March 29, 1944, pp. 161, 
164; CUAC report, 1947, p. 210. 

7. Consumers National Federation . Member, 1937. Miss Kenyon ad- 
mitted membership, but stated she got out soon afterwards because “I 
did not like the . . . company that I was keeping.” TCH, p. 189. 

Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, p. 155; CUAC report, 
1943, p. 102. 

8. Consumers Union . Miss Kenyon denied Consumer’s Union mem- 
bership, stating she had been a member of Consumer’s Research, par- 
ent of Consumer’s Union. TCH, p. 180. 

Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, p. 153; CUAC report, 
1943, p. 102. 

9. Coordinating Committee To Lift The (Spanish) Embargo , Spon- 
sor, 1939. Miss Kenyon admitted sponsorship. TCH, p. 196. 

Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, pp. 137, 138; CUAC re- 
port, 140, 1947, p. 210. 

10. Descendants of the American Revolution . Member of the Ad- 
visory Board. Miss Kenyon admitted membership "in the middle 30’s,” 
but stated, "I got out ... as fast as I could.” TCH, p. 203. 

Cited: HUAC report, June 25, 1942, pp. 18, 19; CUAC report, 

1948, p. 336. 

11. Film Audiences for Democracy . Member Advisory Board, Octo- 
ber, 1939, as indicated by organization’s letterhead. Miss Kenyon had 
no recollection of membershipi TCH, p. 182. 

Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, p. 150; CUAC report, 
1948, pp. 193, 238. 

12. Films for Democracy. Member Advisory Board, April 1939, as 
indicated by organization’s letterhead. Miss Kenyon had no recollection 
of membership. TCH, p. 182. 

* Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, pp. 149, 150; CUAC report, 
1948, p. 238. 

13. Gerson Supporters. Signed organization’s letter, supporting the 
appointment of Simon W. Gerson, February 1938. Miss Kenyon had no 
recollection of doing so. TCH, p. 182. 

Cited: CUAC report, 1948, p. 34. 

14. Greater New York Emergency Conference on Inalienable Rights. 
Sponsor, February 1940, as indicated by organization’s convention pro- 
gram. Miss Kenyon had no recollection of sponsorship. TCH, p. 182. 

Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, pp. 96, 129; CUAC re- 
port, 1948, p. 61. 

15. Lawyers Committee on American Relations with Spain . Member, 
3.9 3 8, 1939. Miss Kenyon admitted membership. TCH, p. 181. 


Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, pp. 168, 169; CUAC re- 
port, 1948, p. 335. 

16. League of Women Shoppers. Sponsor, 1935, 1936. Miss Kenyon 
admitted sponsorship, and stated she withdrew "a year or so” after its 
founding in 1935. TCH, p. 179. 

Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, pp. 121, 181; CUAC re- 
port, 1943, p. 100. 

17. Milk Consumer s Protective Committee. Member Advisory Board, 
April 1940, as indicated by organization’s letterhead. Miss Kenyon had 
no recollection of membership. TCH, p. 182. 

Cited: New York City Council Committee investigating the Mu- 
nicipal Civil Service Commission. 

18. National Citizens Political Action Committee. Member. (No date 
available.) Miss Kenyon admitted membership: “I was very happy to 
be a member of the PAC.” TCH, p. 193. 

Cited: CUAC report, 1948, p. 38. 

19. National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. Sponsor, No- 
vember 1948, as indicated by organization’s letter of invitation to rally 
honoring "Red Dean” Canterbury. Miss Kenyon admitted sponsorship 
in 1943, but stated that she withdrew “some three years later,” and in 
1949 addressed letter of protest to the organization because her name 
was still carried as a sponsor. TCH, p. 180. 

Cited: AG, December 4, 1947; HUAC report, March 29, 1944, 
p. 156; CUAC report, 1948, pp. 321, 322, 327. 

20. Political Prisoners Bail Fund Committee. Sponsor, January 1935, 
as indicated by organization’s letterhead. Miss Kenyon admitted spon- 
sorship. TCH, p. 180. 

Never officially cited but identified as a Communist Party front 
by HUAC report, Appendix IX, 1944. (HUAC reports in Appen- 
dix IX that the Political Prisoners Bail Fund Committee worked 
closely, in the middle thirties, with the International Labor De- 
fense. This latter organization was called the “legal arm of the 
Communist Party” by Attorney General Biddle /Congressional 
Record , Sept. 24, 1942/; legislative committees identified it as 
such several years before. /HUAC, Jan. 3, 1939, pp. 75-78; Mas- 
sachusetts House Committee on Un-American Activities, Report , 
1938, pp. 198,342./) 

21. Schappes Defense Committee. Signed letter asking for Scliappes’ 
release, October, 1944. Miss Kenyon had no recollection of signing the 
letter and denied she had been a member of the committee. TCH, pp. 
182, 196. 

Cited: AG, April 27, 1949; HUAC report, March 29, 1944, p. 71; 
CUAC report, 1948, p. 55. 

22. Testimonial Dinner for Ferdinand C. Smith . Sponsor, September, 
1944. Miss Kenyon had no recollection of sponsorship. TCH, p. 191. 

Never officially cited, but identified as a Communist front by 
HUAC report, Appendix IX, 1944. 

23. Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Signed open letter to 



F.D.R., protesting attacks on the organization and decrying war hys- 
teria, as indicated by Daily Worker paid advertisement, Feb. 21, 1940. 
Signed press release entitled "For America’s sake: break with Franco 
Spain,” March, 1945. Miss Kenyon denied membership or affiliation. 
TCH, p. 181. 

Cited: AG, December 4, 1947; HUAC report, March 29, 1944, 
p. 82. CUAC report, 1948, pp. 94, 382. 

24. Washington Committee to Lift Spanish Embargo. Name used in 
organizations open letter January 1939. Miss Kenyon had no recollec- 
tion of affiliation. TCH, p. 181. 

Cited: CUAC report, 1948, pp. 335, 336. 

Philip Jessup 

1. American Law Students Association. Member, Faculty Advisory 
Board ( 1940) as indicated by organization’s letterhead. Jessup acknowl- 
edged serving on an Advisory Board which "may have been this one.” 
TCH, p. 263. 

Never officially cited, but identified as a Communist front by 
HUAC report 448, Appendix IX, 1944. 

2. American Russian Institute of New York. Sponsor of two dinners 
given by that organization (1944 and 1946). Jessup acknowledged 
sponsorship of both dinners. TCH, p. 226. 

Cited: AG, April 27, 1949. 

3. National Emergency Conference. Sponsor (May, 1939) as indi- 
cated by organization’s list of sponsors. Jessup stated, "I am willing to 
assume that I consented to have [my name] put on the list.” TCH, 
p. 269. 

Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, p. 49; CUAC report, 1948, 
p. 115. 

4. National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights. Sponsor 
February 1940 as indicated by organization’s letterhead. Jessup had no 
recollection of sponsorship, thought it likely that organization auto- 
matically listed sponsors of its predecessor, the National Emergency 
Conference. TCH, p. 270. 

Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, pp. 48, 102; CUAC re- 
port, 1948, pp. 112, 327. 

NOTE: Senator McCarthy has also asserted that Jessup was affiliated 
with the Coordinating Committee to Lift the Spanish Embargo ( Con- 
gressional Record, June 2, 1950, p. 8109) and the China Aid Council 
(Pamphlet "Let Them Fall,” September 1951) For reasons that appear 
in the text, the allegation with reference to the CCLSE appears to be 
unfounded. Similarly, the evidence later published in "Let Them Fall” 
is insufficient to establish Jessup’s connection with the CAC. 



Esther Brunauer 

1. American Youth Congress . Signer of call to annual meeting 
(1938). Mrs. Brunauer acknowledged affiliation. TCH, p. 296. 

Cited: AG, December 4, 1947; HUAC report, June 25, 1942, 
p. 16; CUAC report, 1948, p. 179. 

2. Friends of the Soviet Union. Presided at meeting (June, 1936). 
Speaker at another meeting (June, 1934). Mrs. Brunauer acknowledged 
her part in both meetings. TCH, p. 296. 

Cited: AG, December 4, 1947. HUAC report, January 3, 1939, 
p. 78; CUAC, report, 1948, pp. 65, 244, and 321. 

NOTE: Senator McCarthy also asserted Mrs. Brunauer supported 
the Consumer’s Union, and that she was a member of the Committee 
for Concerted Peace Efforts. Evidence failed to support the alleged 
connection with Consumers Union. The Committee for Concerted 
Peace Efforts has never been cited as a Communist front. 

Harlow Shapley 

1. American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom. 
Member, as indicated by organization’s letterhead (September 1939). 

Cited: HUAC report, June 25, 1942, p. 13; CUAC report, 1948, 
p. 112. 

2. American Russian Institute , New York. Member, Board of Trus- 
tees, as indicated by New York Times (December 12, 1947). 

Cited: AG, April 27, 1949. 

3. Civil Rights Congress . Sponsor of organization’s Bill of Rights 
conference (June, 1949). 

Cited: AG, December 4, 1947; HUAC report No. 1115, Septem- 
ber 2, :l 947, pp. 2, 19; CUAC report, 1947, p. 187. 

4. Committee for the First Amendment. Signer of organization’s 
statement protesting the HUAC investigation of the motion picture in- 
dustry (October, 1947). 

Cited: CUAC, report, 1948, p. 210. 

5. Committee of One Thousand. Sponsor, as indicated by organiza- 
tion’s press release (March 5, 1948). 

Cited: CUAC report 1948, pp. 34, 35. 

6 . Congress of American Women. Speaker at organization meeting, 
as indicated by Daily Worker , (September 23, 1947). 

Cited: AG, June 1, 1948; HUAC report No. 1953, April 26, 
1950; CUAC report, 1948, pp. 228-31. 

7. Conference on Pan-American Democracy. Signer of organization’s 
open letter defending Luis Carlos Prestes, Brazilian Communist Party 
official, as indicated by the New Masses (December 3, 1940). 

Cited: AG, June 1, 1948; HUAC report, March 29, 1944, pp. 161, 
164; CUAC report, 1947, p. 210. 



8. Eisler Defense Committee. Signer of organization’s statement on 
Gerhart Eisler, as indicated by Daily Worker , (June 28, 1947). 

Cited: HUAC report No. 1115, September 2, 1947, p. 13. 

9. Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Pro- 
fessions. Vice-chairman, as indicated by organizations letterhead ( May 

Cited: HUAC report No. 1954, April 26, 1950; CUAC report, 
1948, p. 262. 

10. International Workers Order. Gave interview to organization’s 
publication. Fraternal Outlook, (March, 1949). 

Cited: AG, September 24, 1942, and December 4, 1947; HUAC, 
report, January 3, 1939, p. 78; CUAC report, 1948, pp. 267, 268, 

11. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee League. Sponsor, as indicated by or- 
ganization’s letterheads (September 8, 1944; April 28, 1949); also 
chairman of organization’s reception committee for Irene Joliot-Curie, 
(March 31, 1948). 

Cited: AG, December 4, 1947; HUAC report, March 29, 1944, 
p. 174; CUAC report, 1948, pp. 270, 271. 

12. League of American Writers. Signer of organizations open let- 
ter, as indicated by Daily Worker (July 31, 1940). 

Cited: AG, June 1, 1948; HUAC report January 3, 1940, p. 9; 
CUAC report, 1945, pp. 121, 122, 126. 

13. National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions . Chair- 
man, when organization sponsored the Waldorf Peace Conference 
( Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace, 1949 ) . 

Cited: HUAC report No. 1954, April 26, 1950. 

14. National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights. Signer 
of organization’s letter, as indicated by Daily Worker, (May 13, 1940). 

Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, pp. 48, 102; CUAC re- 
port, 1948, pp. 112, 327. 

15. National Federation for Constitutional Liberties. Signer of or- 
ganization’s statement urging military commissions to Communists, as 
indicated by Daily Worker (March 18, 1945). 

Cited: AG, December 4, 1947; HUAC report, March 29, 1944, 
p. 50; CUAC, 1948, pp. 201, 327. 

16. New Masses. Signer of open letter appearing in publication’s 
(April 2, 1940) issue attacking Grand Jury for questioning its editors 
and employees. 

Cited: AG, September 24, 1942, p. 7688; HUAC report, March 
29, 1949, pp. 48, 75; CUAC report, 1947, p. 160. 

17. New York Conference for Inalienable Rights. Signer of organiza- 
tion’s open telegram, as indicated by Daily Worker (September 17, 

Cited: HUAC report, March 29, 1944, P* 1 49- 

18. Progressive Citizens of America . Vice chairman (1946-1948). 
Cited: CUAC report, 1947, p. 369. 


19* Spanish Refugee Appeal. Sponsor, as indicated by organizations 
letterhead (February 26, 1946). 

Cited: CUAC report, 1949, p. 359. 

20. Teachers Union. Speaker at organization meeting, as indicated 
by New York Times (April 18, 1949). 

Identified: CUAC report, 1948, p. 379. 

21. United Public Workers of America , CIO. Speaker at Union meet- 
ing, as indicated by Daily Worker (April 16, 1948). 

Cited: CUAC report, 1948, p. 379. 

NOTE: Senator McCarthy asserted that Dr. Shapley was also affili- 
ated with the Conference Against Anti-Communist Legislation, Citi- 
zens to Abolish the Wood-Rankin Committee, and the National Com- 
mittee to Defeat the Mundt Bill. There is no evidence that these organi- 
zations have been either officially identified or cited as Communist 

Frederick Schuman 

1. American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born. Sponsor, 
as indicated by organization's letterheads (March, 1940, June 23, 1948). 

Cited: AG, June 1, 1948; HUAC report, March 29, 1944, p. 195; 
CUAC report, 1947, p. 44. 

2. American Council on Soviet Relations. Signer of one of organiza- 
tion s open letters. 

Cited: AG, June 1, 1948; AG, Congressional Record , Septem- 
ber 24, 1952, p. 7688; HUAC report, March 29, 1944, p. 174; 
CUAC report, 1948, p. 65. 

3. American League for Peace and Democracy. Sponsor of organiza- 
tion subsidiary, The China Aid Council, as indicated by organizations 
letterhead (August 31, 1948). 

Cited: AG, June 1, 1948; HUAC report, January 3, 1939, pp. 
69-71; CUAC report, 1943, p. 91. 

4. American-Russian Institute , New York. Sponsor. 

Cited: AG, April 27, 1949. 

5. American Slav Congress. Sponsor. 

Cited: AG, June 1, 1948; CUAC report, 1948, p. 35; HUAC re- 
port No. 1951, April 26, 1950. 

6. Civil Rights Congress. Sponsor, as indicated by program of or- 
ganizations initial meeting (April 27, 28, 1946). 

Cited: AG, December 4, 1947; CUAC report, 1947, p. 87; HUAC 
report, No. 1115, September 2, 1947, pp. 2, 19. 

7. Committee for a Boycott Against Japanese Aggression. Signer of 
organization’s appeal for Japanese boycott. ( undated. ) 

Cited: CUAC report, 1948, pp. 147, 319, 365. 

8. Friends of the Soviet Union. Speaker for organization as indicated 
by organization’s hand bills (February 25, 1934; January 16, 1936). 

Cited: AG, December 4, 1947; HUAC report, January 3, 1939, 
p. 78; CUAC report, 1948, pp. 65, 244, 321. 



9. League of Professional Croups for Foster and Ford. Signer of or- 
ganization’s open letter urging the election of the Communist Party 
ticket (1932). 

Cited: CUAC report, 1948, pp. 196, 246. 

10. National Citizens ’ Political Action Committee. Member, as indi- 
cated by official organization membership fist (August, 1944). 

Cited: CUAC report, 1948, p. 38. 

11. National Conference on American Policy in China and the Far 
East. Sponsor, as indicated by organization program, January 23, 1948. 

Cited: AG, July 25, 1949. 

12. National Council of the Arts , Sciences and Professions , Member 
(1948, 1949). 

Cited: HUAC report. No. 1954, April 26, 1950. 

NOTE: Senator McCarthy asserted that Professor Schuman was also 
affiliated with the African Aid Committee. There is no evidence that 
this organization has been officially cited or identified as a Communist 

Appendix B 

The Controversy Over the Loyalty Files 

The Tydings Committee dismissed Senator McCarthy’s non-pub- 
lic cases as “old” cases, declaring that they had been reviewed and 
cleared by previous congressional committees. It also endorsed 
their previous “clearance.” For it announced that a review of the 
State Department’s relevant loyalty files ( Senator McCarthy had 
repeatedly cla imed they would substantiate his charges ) had com- 
pletely satisfied it that McCarthy was accusing persons whose reli- 
ability was beyond a “reasonable doubt.” 

But even before the Committee had announced its conclusions 
about the material that lay in the files, McCarthy challenged the 
validity of any finding the Committee might arrive at, on the 
ground that the files had been “raped,” and that the Tydings Com- 
mittee was being shown records from which all damaging data had 
been removed. And the two Republican members of the Committee 
further complicated the matter by insisting that the Committee’s 
examination of the files, such as they were, was superficial; and 
hence its findings inconclusive. Thus a sharp issue was drawn; and 
much that has been said and written about this issue is tendentious 
and uninformed. In an attempt to dispel that confusion, we pre- 
sent here a chronological resume of the relevant events through 
the spring and summer of 1950. 

February 20: Senator McCarthy claims that the State Depart- 
ment’s secret loyalty files will prove his case. 

February 22: The Senate directs the Tydings Committee to 
“procure by subpoena and examine the complete loyalty and em- 
ployment files of the Department of State” concerning persons 
charged with disloyalty. 

March 14: Senator Hickenlooper complains of the Committee’s 
failure to obtain the files (President Truman refused to furnish 
them), maintaining that it is impossible to conduct an adequate 
cross-examination of McCarthy’s targets without access to these 
files. Senator Tydings states he is trying to persuade Truman to 
hand over the files and adds that he has not subpoenaed them be- 



cause he believes that the Secretary of State, as long as the Presi- 
dent backs him up, is legally entitled to ignore a committee sub- 
poena of this kind. “I have in the circumstances asked for the files 
as a gentleman, not as a sheriff. . . .”* 

March 22: Tydings appeals to President Truman to release the 

March 28: Truman refuses to release them, arguing that their 
release would cause “serious prejudice to the effectiveness of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation as an investigative agency,” “em- 
barrassment and danger to confidential informants,” and “injustice 
and unfairness to innocent individuals.”** 

March 29: Tydings subpoenas the files of the State Department, 
the Justice Department, and the Civil Service Commission. 

The relevant subpoenas are duly ignored, and the Committee 
does not attempt to exact compliance through legal process. 

May 4: Truman changes his mind and announces that the loy- 
alty files on McCarthy’s cases will, after all, be made available to 
the Committee. 

May 5: McCarthy charges that the files have been “raped,” 
“skeletonized,” “tampered with.” 

June 16: The Tydings Committee receives the files of 70 of the 
persons mentioned by Senator McCarthy in his February 20th 
speech. In his letter of transmission, Peyton Ford, Deputy Attor- 
ney General, informs Tydings: “The Federal Bureau of Investiga- 
tion furnished me a record of all loyalty material furnished the 
State Department in these cases. The State Department files have 
been checked, and I can assure you that all of the reports and mem- 
oranda furnished the State Department are contained in the 
files”! ( Italics added. ) 

June 16-25: The Tydings Committee examines the files. 

June 21 : Tydings announces to the press he has received a letter 
from Deputy Attorney General Ford assuring him that a special 
FBI inquiry has established the falsity of Senator McCarthy’s 
charge that the files have been stripped. The FBI investigation, 
Tydings asserts, has proved: “That the files are intact, that they 
have not been ‘raped,’ ‘skeletonized,’ or ‘tampered with’ in any 
way, and that the material turned over to the State Department by 
the FBI is still in the files.”! 

• Tydings Hearings, p. 225. 

** Letter from President Truman to Senator Tydings, Mar. 28, 1950. 

t Letter from Peyton Ford to Senator Tydings, June 16, 1950. 

X New York Times, June 22, 1950. 


June 26: Fulton Lewis, Jr., reports that Tydings’ claim is not 
true, that the FBI has not made an examination of the files. 

June 27: McCarthy writes J. Edgar Hoover, “I would . . . greatly 
appreciate knowing whether or not the FBI actually has conducted 
any examination of the files in question and if so, whether your de- 
partment has actually found the files to be complete with nothing 
having been removed therefrom.” 

July 10: Hoover replies to McCarthy, “The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation has made no such examination and therefore is not in 
the position to make any statement concerning the completeness 
or incompleteness of the State Department files.” ( Italics added. ) 

July 12: McCarthy releases the documents on which he bases 
his charge that the files were stripped. These documents are affida- 
vits from four persons who had been employed by the Department 
on a temporary basis in the Fall of 1946 and assigned to a “file 
project,” the purpose of which, they said, was to remove from the 
personnel files of Department employees all derogatory informa- 
tion. According to two of the affiants, some or all of the derogatory 
information was destroyed. A third stated he assumed that some or 
all of it was destroyed. The fourth individual disclaimed any first- 
hand knowledge as to whether the data had been destroyed or not. 

July 12: The State Department answers McCarthy. His charge 
is “absolutely false” and “a characteristic distortion of facts.” “No 
derogatory information concerning personnel of the Department 
has been destroyed The so-called stripping process which Sena- 

tor McCarthy attributes to evil and treacherous motives was actual- 
ly a thorough-going reorganization of the Department’s personnel 
files— not its loyalty and security files, which were and are sepa- 
rately maintained in a security division wholly removed from the 
personnel operation. . “To the Department’s knowledge the data 
culled from the personnel files was not destroyed except in the case 
of material such as duplicate documents, routine inter-office trans- 
mittal sheets, superseded forms, etc ” "... A new filing system . . . 

entailed the removal, for transfer to a more appropriate repository, 
of various other data not necessary to those operations, such as 
duplicate copies of investigation reports already in the security 
files [of the security division] 

July 13-17: The FBI examines the files that had been turned 
over to the Tydings Committee. 

July 17: Attorney General McGrath reports that “the FBI in- 

• State Department press release (Tydings Report, pp. 171-72.) 



vestigation reveals that [as of July 13] the files contain all FBI 
reports and memoranda furnished to the Department in these cases 
prior to the time they were turned over to your committee. . . 

June 20: The Tydings Committee, in its final report, states (a) 
", . . we have carefully and conscientiously reviewed each and ev- 
ery one of the loyalty files relative to the individuals charged by 
Senator McCarthy . . . . In no instance have we found in our con- 
sidered judgments that the decision to grant loyalty and security 
clearance has been erroneously or improperly made in the light of 
existing loyalty standards (b) Senator McCarthy s charge that 
the files have been stripped is “distorted and false”** (Italics 
added. ) 

July 20: Senator Henry Cabot Lodge formally registers his “in- 
dividual views” on the Committee's investigation, with special at- 
tention to the examination of the loyalty files. He says: 

. . . After having read a representative cross section of the 81 loyalty 
files, the conviction was reached that the files alone did not furnish a 
basis for reaching firm conclusions of any kind and that to attempt to 
conclude with respect to an individual case on the basis of the files 
alone would be a most half-baked and superficial procedure unfair 
alike to the government and to the employee in question. The files 
which I read were in such an unfinished state as to indicate that an 
examination of each file would be a waste of time. . . . 

There were, for example, many instances in those files which I read 
where hostile and serious allegations were made about the employee 
concerned but which, insofar as the files were concerned, were left 
unexplained. Where one could expect to find some rebuttal or explana- 
tion, there was nothing. For some reason the files which were prepared 
were inadequate from the standpoint of a senator who was trying to 
come to a conclusion on the basis of the files alone. In some of the most 
important cases the report of the FBI full field investigation was not 
included. It should be noted that the sub-committee was allowed to 
see the files only under such stringent limitations as to preclude our 
getting much essential information and as to make our work extremely 
cumbrous. We were not only bound and specifically forbidden from 
discussing any individual case by name outside of the room in the 
White House where we saw the files, but we were also forbidden from 
taking any notes from the White House. We were categorically denied 
the help of technical career personnel, such as FBI men, to help in the 
files. No assistance from the sub-committee's professional staff was per- 
mitted.! [Italics added.] 

0 Letter from J. Howard McGrath to Senator Tydings, July 17, 1950. 

00 Tydings Report, pp. 10, 170. 

f State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, Senator Lodge’s 
“Individual Views ” pp. 19, 20. 


Sept. 8: J. Edgar Hoover confirms Attorney General McGrath’s 
July 17 report that the files given to the Tydings Committee had 
been checked and found intact.® 

The foregoing clearly leaves a number of questions unanswered. 
It does not answer the question whether the loyalty files were in- 
tact at the time the Committee saw them. For, contrary to Senator 
Tydings’ claim, the FBI had not certified that the files were com- 
plete at the time the Committee examined them. It could not have 
done so, since; it did not check the files until over three weeks after 
the Committee completed its examination. 

Are there grounds then, for supposing that the Tydings Commit- 
tee did not in fact have access to the complete files? Certainly, in 
view of the affidavits on the “stripping” incident, McCarthy was 
justified in expressing skepticism as to the integrity of the files. On 
the other hand, the incident was more or less satisfactorily ex- 
plained by the Department (e.g., by Mr. Carlisle Humelsine’s 
testimony in 1953 ) : 

In answer to McCarthy’s questioning about the 1946 “file proj- 
ect,” Humelsine acknowledged that the Tydings Committee and 
the Department had been wrong in stating that the material the 
four affiants had been instructed to extract from the personnel 
files was not derogatory. But the purpose of the project, he stated, 
had been to segregate security material and place it in separate 
files. The waste baskets and cardboard boxes into which the mate- 
rial had been put were, he added, temporary receptacles in which 
it was to remain only until proper filing cabinets were available. 
If any material was destroyed, said Humelsine, it was merely to get 
rid of a second copy where there was duplication.®® 

This all seems plausible enough. But the fact remains that Mc- 
Carthy’s witnesses were never asked to appear before the Com- 
mittee to back up and expand their affidavits. For example, it 
would be relevant to ask, in the light of the Department’s claim 
that only dup licates were destroyed, whether the affiants had come 
across duplicates while screening out derogatory data from the per- 
sonnel files. Until their affidavits are repudiated, or discredited by 
evidence on the other side, an element of mystery will continue to 
surround the 1946 “stripping” project. 

But even if the files were raped in 1946, it is not likely that the 

Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Senator Tydings, September 8, 1950. 

*® Hearings, Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Appropriations, 1953, 
pp. 526-28. 



Tydings Committee’s review was affected by such interference. For 
in 1947 the FBI was directed by the President’s Executive Order to 
assist in the administration of the loyalty program. Assuming that 
the names of the persons whose files had been stripped were sub- 
mitted to the FBI, the derogatory evidence destroyed in 1946 was 
presumably developed anew in 1947. 

But bearing in mind that the FBI did not itself vouch for the in- 
tegrity of the files until after the Tydings Committee had looked at 
them, the possibility exists that the files were incomplete when the 
Committee saw them. For it may be that they had been tampered 
with by other Department employees at other times. 

That the State Department had at least been negligent in look- 
ing after its files is proved by testimony before the McCarthy Com- 
mittee in 1952. For example, the testimony of Mrs. Helen B. Balog, 
supervisor of the Foreign Service File Room, revealed among other 

(1) That “10 or 11” different files are kept on Department per- 
sonnel, and that “three or four hundred” persons have access even 
to those that are highly confidential. 

(2) That one such person, who had access to the confidential 
personnel files of the Foreign Service, spent “practically the entire 
year of 1949” going back and forth to the file room, and on “quite 
a number” of occasions worked alone in the file room at night. The 
person in question was John Stewart Service; 

(3) That derogatory material is frequently removed from an 
employee’s dossier before the dossier is sent up to a promotion pan- 
el “because they [personnel officials] did not want the panel’s 
mind to be unnecessarily prejudiced against a man;” 

(4) That on one occasion “in 1951 or 1952” an order had come 
down to burn a letter of a derogatory nature that had been a part 
of an employee’s dossier; 

(5) That documents in the file are neither numbered nor other- 
wise recorded; and hence it is never possible to ascertain whether 
material borrowed from the files has been returned, or whether 
documents have been filched. Mrs. Balog gave an example of what 
can happen. She herself, she said, had noticed a letter of recom- 
mendation filed in the dossier of a Foreign Service Officer who was 
later dismissed. Some time later, an FBI agent came around and 
asked to look at the file. Mrs. Balog went through it and noted that 
the letter of recommendation was missing. “And by whom was 


that missing hitter signed?” counsel asked. “Owen Lattimore,” said 
Mrs. Balog.* 

It is, then, not at all surprising that Senator Lodge should have 
said the files were in an “unfinished state,” and “in some of the most 
important cases the report of the FBI full field investigation was 
not included.” 

Let us assume, however, that all the derogatory information 
available on the persons McCarthy had named was laid before the 
Tydings Committee; so that the Committee was correct in insist- 
ing it had consulted the complete files. Even then we must still 
recognize that the Committee had no business claiming that it had 
found in them a refutation of McCarthy’s charges. 

When he presented his report to the Senate, Senator Tydings 
vastly amused himself by teasing Senators Hickenlooper and Lodge 
for having taken, respectively, the time to read only nine and 
twelve of the files.** But Senator Lodge’s account of the “exam- 
ination” makes it clear that any study of the file was little short of 
futile. To expect a United States Senator to arrive at a meaningful 
evaluation of an employee’s security credentials in the circum- 
stances that surrounded the Committee’s work is absurd. Not only 
were the Senators denied the aid of FBI or State Department se- 
curity officials in evaluating the significance of particular data 
(e.g., the significance of an affiliation with a given Communist 
front at a given time); they were forbidden to bring along their 
own assistants. Not even Robert Morris, Assistant Committee 
Counsel and an expert in this business, was allowed to help. Any 
one who has seen a raw security file is aware of the difficulties 
faced by a layman who tries to make any sense out of it. 

This is not to say, of course, that the Committee members 
gained from idle files no insight into the Department’s security 
program. Senator Hickenlooper, after reading some of the files, 
spoke as follows to the Department’s top security official, John 

I am of the opinion . . . [that] the State Department as well as other 
departments . . . have leaned over backward ... to protect individuals, 
and we have done it to the prejudice of the interests of the public. In 
other words our loyalty boards have held too rigidly to the “proof be- 

# Hearing, Senate Investigating Committee, February 4, 1953, pp. 3, 5, 
10, 13, 14. 

00 Congressional Record, July 20, 1950 (bound), p. 10711. 



yond all reasonable doubt” theory which is the [rule] in criminal cases. 
They have demanded a greater degree of proof than is often possible to 
produce, and frankly in some of the departments [that] . . . are very 
sensitive . . . they have kept people on where the evidence seems strong 
that they are a bad security risk. Even in your own Department you 
have kept them on because of the failure to be able to produce unques- 
tioned proof of membership in the Communist Party. ... I have read 
some of these files. I haven't been able to read all of them, and I don't 
hesitate to say on this record that the ones I read I would say almost 
without exception I would not keep in the State Department . I would 
not have them around* [Italics added.] 

In this connection. Senator McCarthy had warned the Commit- 
tee months before it looked over the files that it would be futile to 
examine them without the aid of expert advice. When urging the 
Committee to obtain Esther Brunauer’s file, McCarthy had said, 
"I might say also, I am not trying to advise the Committee but in 
all sincerity, I don’t think the members of the Committee will be 
any more competent than I would be to go over and examine those 
records personally. I think you will have to have on your staff indi- 
viduals who have been in this type of work for some years, who 
have taken some part in those records, so that you will be able to 
get everything out of it.”** 

The Committee cannot itself be blamed for the regulations that 
governed its examination of the files. This was the responsibility 
of the Executive, acting through the Justice Department. But the 
Committee’s majority members must be blamed for having ac- 
cepted the relevant regulations without protest and, most particu- 
larly, for having pretended that the examination of the files had 
yielded “proof” that the State Department’s security division was 
efficient and McCarthy wrong. For example, the Committee was 
not straightforward enough to point out that, for reasons that have 
yet to be explained, it was given files on only 70 of McCarthy’s 110 
cases (all 70 of them, incidentally, Lee-list cases). The Committee 
thus blandly cleared a third of McCarthy’s cases without having 
had even a cursory look at their files. 

Among the State Department files the Tydings Committee did 
obtain, and presumably study, were those of an employee who had 
been engaged in recruiting spies for the Communist underground; 
of another who had been identified by FBI informants as a mem- 
ber of the Communist Party; of another who had been associated 

* Tydings Hearings, p. 1254. 

** Ibid., p. 86. 



with members of a spy ring; and of a number of employees who 
were clearly unqualified, on security grounds, to work in a sensi- 
tive agency. This information was spelled out in the files ( or so, at 
any rate, both the Committee and the State Department, in vouch- 
ing for the integrity of the files, have assured us). And yet, the 
Tydings Committee included all these employees in its blanket 
finding that no one worked in the State Department whose loyalty 
could be questioned. 

Appendix C 

Statistical Breakdown of Lee List 
and McCarthy List 

Background and Disposition of Cases Given by McCarthy 


The lists of names given by Senator McCarthy to the Tydings Com- 
mittee break down into three classifications: (1) Public Cases, (2) Num- 
bered cases, (3) Non-Public and N on-Numbered cases . McCarthy's pub- 
lic cases are treated in detail in the text. Complete information on Mc- 
Carthy's two non-public, non-numbered cases (Theodore Geiger and 
Oliver Edmund Clubb) is not available . There follows, therefore, a 
breakdown of McCarthy's numbered list alone, and also the break- 
down of a comparison between the McCarthy and the Lee lists . 

It will be noted that the figure 110, used in the text as representing 
the total number of names given by McCarthy to the Tydings Com- 
mittee, is arrived at by subtracting from the public cases (9), the num- 
bered cases (107), and the non-public and non-numbered cases (2), those 
cases, indicated below, which were either not identified or else dupli- 
cated (6). A final warning: two of the public cases are also numbered 
cases, thus bringing McCarthy's names to a total of 110. 

List of McCarthy Cases That Were Not Included 
in the Lee List: 

1. Gustavo Duran 5. Frederick Schuman 

*2. Haldore Hanson 6. Harlow Shapley 

3. Dorothy Kenyon *7. John Stewart Service 

4. Owen Lattimore 

Total Public Non-Numbered Cases : 

8. Theodore Geiger * 9. Oliver Edmund Clubb 

Total Non-Public Non-Numbered Cases: 2 

* 10. Case No. 15 * 12. Case No. 21 

11. Case No. 19 * 13. Case No. 22 




Case No. 23 


Case No. 91 

0l 5 - 

Case No. 24 


Case No. 92 


Case No. 25 


Case No. 93 

* 17 - 

Case No. 26 


Case No. 94 


Case No. 27 

* 3 °. 

Case No. 95 

* 19 - 

Case No. 77 

* 3 i- 

Case No. 96 


Case No. 82 


Case No. 97 


Case No. 84 

* 33 - 

Case No. 98 


Case No. 86 

" 34 - 

Case No. 102 


Case No. 87 

35 - 

Case No. 103 


Case No. 88 

3 6 - 

Case No. 106 

* 25 - 

Case No. 90 

* 37 - 

Case No. 107 

Total Numbered Cases: 28 

Total non-Lee Cases: 37 

* Working for the State Department at the time the Tydings Committee met. 
f (Philip Jessup is a numbered non-Lee case; Esther Brunauer is a num- 
bered case and also a Lee case. ) 

McCarthy’s Numbered Cases 

59 Individuals on McCarthy’s List were employed by the State Depart- 
ment as of February 20 , 1950 

6 had been cleared under Executive Order 9835 before Feb- 
ruary 20, 1950, and were not being reprocessed in June, 1951: 
(Cases 38, 89, 93, 95,* 98, 107.) 

19 were cleared under Executive Order 9835 between February, 
1950, and June, 1951: (Cases 21, 22, 25, 26, 31, 36,* 43, 51,* 
58, 60,* 63, 64, 68,° 79, 82,° 86, 91, 100.) 

26 were being investigated under Executive Order 9835 as of 
June, 1951: (Cases 1, 2, 0 6, 7,* 15,* 23, 24,* 32, 34,* 37,* 40,* 
41, 46,* 47,* 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 59,* 70, 84, 85, 102.) 

7 had never been investigated under Executive Order 9835 as 
of June, 1951; (Cases 83, 87, 88, 90, 92, 96,* 97.) 

1 resigned in December, 1950, while investigation under Ex- 
ecutive Order 9835 was pending (Case 77.*) 

Total 59 

0 Not in the State Department as of the 1st of January, 1953. 

3 6 * 


Employment dates of those who were no longer with the 
State Department in January , 1953 

Case 2 — 4/24 

Case 47—3/44 

7 — 9/45 

5 1 — 8/ 43 

15 — 4/47 

59 — 9/45 

24 — 3/49 







82— 45(?) 


95 — 45 (f > ) 


96 — 45 (?) 

48 Individuals on McCarthy s List were not working for State Depart- 
ment as of February 20 , 1950 

35 had previously been employed by the State Department. 

11 resigned or were terminated before December, 1947. 
(Cases 9, 12, 16, 17, 44, 47, 66, 67, 75, 99, 103.) 

24 resigned or were terminated after December, 1947. 
(Cases 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 27, 30, 35, 39, 45, 53, 
57, 61, 62, 69, 71, 73, 74, 81, 94.) 

Of the 24 

14 had never been investigated under Executive 
Order 9835. (Cases 3, 4, 5, 10, xi, 14, 18, 30, 
35 > 5 7 > 7 b 73 > 74 > 94 -) 

5 had been cleared under Executive Order 9835. 
(Cases 8, 13, 27, 45, 61.) 

4 resigned while security investigations were 
pending. (Cases 39, 53, 62, 69.) 

(Data on Case 81 unavailable.) 

6 had applied for work with the State Department. ( Cases 20, 
28,29, 72,* 78, 101.) 

5 secured other government posts. (Cases 78, 101 [Treas- 
ury], 29 [Public Health], 28 [Commerce], 72 [Army].) 

* No. 72 was singled out in McCarthy's speech as an anti-Communist who 
was unfairly discriminated against by the Department when he applied for 



1 worked for the Department of Commerce. (Case 19.) 

Data on Case 106 unavailable. 

2 never fully identified. (Cases 76, 104.)** 

3 were duplications. ( Cases 22 and 105; 80 and 85; 65 and 89. ) 
Total 48 

00 Civil Ser/ice Commission has no record of the two persons involved 
having had federal employment. 

Appendix D 

List of Persons Accused by McCarthy 

(The following — as complete a list as the authors have been able to 
compile — are persons whose loyalty McCarthy has , in however re- 
mote a way , challenged . The period covered is from February 9 , 1950, 
to January 1, 1953. On the left we quote those of McCarthy’s statements 
that have been made on the floor of the Senate , which immunizes him. 
On the right we list the statements made off the floor , which are , of 
course , immunized only when he repeats testimony originally heard 
under the cloak of immunity . We have selected those of McCarthy’s 
characterizations that are the most derogatory , thus those that make 
out the strongest case for the charge that he is a “reckless smearer” 

Robert Warren Barnett 

“The letter of charges against 
the Barnetts — both Robert War- 
ren Barnett and his wife, Mrs. 

Robert Warren Barnett — charges 
them with close association and 
constant contact with known So- 
viet espionage activity” ( Con- 
gressional Record , p. 9707, Aug. 9, 


Esther Brunauer 

“At that time I pointed out that 
one Esther Caukin Brunauer, 
who was holding a top job in the 
State Department, I pointed out 
that the evidence showed that her 
husband had been a member of 
the Communist Party and was ac- 
tive therein, that she belonged to 
a number of Communist-front or- 
ganizations, and that she was one 
of Alger Hiss’ assistants at San 

“Incidentally, her assistance to 
Hiss has since been denied by 

“Another case was Esther Bru- 
nauer, a $10,000 a year State De- 
partment official. She also be- 
longed to a sizeable number of 
organizations named as fronts for 
the Communist Party. For ex- 
ample, she was chairman of a 
meeting of the American Friends 
of the Soviet Union, [at] which 
the principal speaker was a well 
known Communist and a frequent 
writer for the official Communist 
Daily Worker. Brunauer was a 
signer of the call to the annual 



her, but on page 419 of this State meeting of the American Youth 
Department publication we find Congress which was publicly 
that Brunauer was one of the as- known to be completely domi- 
sistants of Hiss. nated by the Communist Party. 

“Incidentally, as a member of She admitted that her husband 
Unesco she has been able to travel had Communist connections and 
rather freely to other capitals of had been a member of the Young 
the world. The evidence shows Communist League.” (Wise. Re- 
contacts in those capitals with tail Ford Dealers Assoc., Milwau- 
members of Communist delega- kee, Aug. 6, 1950. ) 
tions.” ( Congressional Record, 

May 8, 1951 p. 5058.) 

Stephen Brunauer 

‘Tor example, his very good 
friend, Noel Field, a known Com- 
munist and espionage agent, spent 
night after night with Stephen 
Brunauer, who had access to all 
the top secrets in the explosive 
section of our Navy. Field then 
left the country, and has since dis- 
appeared behind the iron curtain, 
taking with him all information 
which his friend Brunauer had 
given him. . . . What forced the 
Navy to take action was that it 
appeared during the atom-spy in- 
vestigations that Stephen Bru- 
nauer was involved.” (Congres- 
sional Record, May 8, 1951, p. 



(Miss Cameron was named by 
McCarthy on the Senate floor, 
August 9, 1951, as having been 
one of the persons whose name he 
had given to the Tydings Com- 
mittee a year earlier. McCarthy 
pointed out that Miss Cameron 
was currently in loyalty-security 
channels in the Department, but 
he gave no particulars against 

“Brunauer, an admitted former 
member of the Young Communist 
League, was suspended from his 
job as head of the Navy's high ex- 
plosives section where he was en- 
gaged in top secret work. He re- 
signed before the Navy’s Loyalty 
Board could complete question- 
ing him and dispose of his case.” 
( McCarthyism , p. 13.) 




Nelson Chipchin 

(Mr. Chipchin was named by 
McCarthy on the Senate floor, 

August 9, 1951, as having been 
one of the persons whose name he 
had given to the Tydings Com- 
mittee a year earlier. McCarthy 
pointed out that Mr. Chipchin was 
currently in loyalty-security chan- 
nels in the Department, but he 
gave no particulars against him.) 

Lauchlin Currie 

“The Stilwell-Davies group took 
over in China in 1942. Soon there- 
after, Lauchlin, at the White 
House, and John Carter Vincent, 
and subsequently Alger Hiss at 
the State Department were exer- 
cising their influence at the Wash- 
ington end of the transmission 
belt conveying poisonous misin- 
formation from Chungking. The 
full outlines of Currie's betrayal 
have yet to be traced. 

... In this connection it should 
be recalled that Currie issued an 
order on White House stationery 
depriving the Republic of China 
of 20,000 German rifles.” ( Con- 
gressional Record, June 14, 1951, 
P- 6574 -) 

“Just turn back a page of his- 
tory to 1945. This Lauchlin Cur- 
rie was administrative assistant to 
the President. This is the same 
Lauchlin Currie who has been 
named under oath by Elizabeth 
Bentley as the man who tipped 
off her Russian espionage agents 
that we were about to break the 
Japanese Code. . . . This is the 
same Lauchlin Currie whose pic- 
ture I hold in my hand, with a 
picture of Harry Dexter White, 
John Abt, and Alger Hiss — all 
named under oath repeatedly as 
Communists. , . .” 

“At that time Lauchlin Currie 
was Administrative Assistant to 
the President. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff approved sending vast 
amounts of German captured arms 
to those fighting Communism in 
China. After the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and Eisenhower had ap- 
proved the shipment — after vast 
quantities had left German ports 
destined for our allies in China — 
Lauchlin Currie, Truman's ad- 
ministrative Assistant, the man 
named by Bentley and Chambers, 
signed an order on White House 
stationery ordering that all this 



military equipment be destroyed.” 
( Columbia County Republican 
Club, Portage, Wise., Sept. 9, 
1950 -) 

John Paton Davies 

“Incidentally, since I wrote the 
State Department, Davies has 
been cleared, despite the vast 
amount of information on his com- 
munistic activities.” (Congression- 
al Record , p. 9708, Aug. 9, 1951.) 

“Davies has been suitably re- 
warded by Dean Acheson for his 
sell-out of an ally. Davies serves 
in Washington as a member of the 
State Department's Policy Plan- 
ning Committee, where he is stra- 
tegically placed to help further the 
betrayal he began in Chungking.” 
( Congressional Record , June 14, 

1951. p- 6574- ) 

“John P. Davies, who was ac- 
cused by General Hurley of oper- 
ating behind his back to support 
the Communists and who, in his 
official reports to the State De- 
partment, adopted the thinking of 
Agnes Smedley, a known Com- 
munist agent, whom he described 
as one of the ‘pure in heart' in 

“In their recommendations to 
Washington both [Davies and 
Service] followed the Communist 
Party line.” ( McCarthyism , pp. 
33 ? 35 *) 

Gustavo Duran 

“Now let us see what happens 
when individuals with Commu- 
nist connections are forced out of 
the Department. Gustavo Duran 
who was labeled (I quote) "a 
notorious international Commu- 
nist' was made assistant to the 
Assistant Secretary of State in 
charge of Latin American affairs. 
He was taken into the State De- 
partment from his job as a lieuten- 
ant colonel in the Communist In- 
ternational Brigade. Finally, after 
intense congressional pressure and 
criticism, he resigned in 1946 from 
the State Department — and ladies 
and gentlemen., where do you 
think he is now? He took over a 
high-salaried job as Chief of Cul- 
tural Activities Section in the of- 
fice of the Assistant Secretary 

“I presented to the Committee 
the complete Army Intelligence 
report showing that he was active 
in secret Communist operations in 
Europe and that he was regional 
head of S. I. M. a counterpart of 
the Russian Secret police.” ( Isaac 
Walton League, Fond du Lac, 
Wise., July 30, 1950.) 



General of the U. N.” (Congres- 
sional Record, Feb. 20, 1950, p. 


Arp ad Erdos 

( Mr. Erdos was named by Mc- 
Carthy on the Senate floor, August 
9, 1951 , as having been one of the 
persons whose name he had given 
to the Tydings Committee a year 
earlier. McCarthy pointed out that 
Mr. Erdos was currently in loy- 
alty-security channels in the De- 
partment but he gave no particu- 
lars against him. ) 

Herbert Fierst 

*A memorandum of August 2, 

1946 by Mr. Bannerman, one of 
the security officers in the De- 
partment of State, is to the effect 
that physical surveillance showed 
that this man Fierst was in con- 
stant contact with members of an 
espionage group and that he rec- 
ommended Communists for State 
Department employment, and was 
engaged in a number of other 
Communist activities.” (Congres- 
sional Record, p. 9707, Aug. 9, 

1951 *) 

John Tipton Fishburn 

(Mr. Fishburn was named by 
McCarthy on the Senate floor, Au- 
gust 9, 1951, as having been one 
of the persons whose name he had 
given to the Tydings Committee a 
year earlier. McCarthy pointed 
out that Mr. Fishburn was current- 
ly in loyalty-security channels in 
the Department but he gave no 
particulars against him. ) 


3 6 9 

Theodore Geiger 

“I may say for the Senators 
benefit, in connection with Mr, 
Geiger, that the day the President 
made the statement that there 
were no Communists in the Gov- 
ernment, we received a telephone 
call from one of the men who 
served in the same Communist cell 
as Mr. Geiger. ... He [Mr. Rob- 
ert Morris] developed, I think, 
either 3 or 4 witnesses who 
were in Mr. Geigers Communist 
cell. They said We will come 
down and testify before the Com- 
mittee as to Geigers Communist 
activities/” ( Congressional Rec- 
ord, p. 1091, July 25, 1950.) 



(Miss Gordon was named by 
McCarthy on the Senate floor, Au- 
gust 9, 1951, as having been one 
of the persons whose name he had 
given to the Tydings Committee 
a year earlier. McCarthy pointed 
out that Miss Gordon was current- 
ly in loyalty-security channels in 
the Department but he gave no 
particulars against her. ) 

“ There is a case of a man named 
Theodore Geiger. He has been an 
employee of the State Depart- 
ment. He is now one of Paul Hoff- 
mans top assistants. He is doing 
work that is quasi-State Depart- 
ment in character. I [Mr. Robert 
Morris] have gone and gotten 
some witnesses together who will 
testify that he was a member of 
the same Communist Party unit 
as they were, and I think we 
would be delinquent if in the face 
of this evidence that is now on 
record . . / ” (Quoted from Tyd- 
ings Committee Hearings in Me - 
Carthyism, p. 74.) 


“Another of the men whom 
Acheson refused to turn his back 
upon was Harold Glasser. Glasser 
also was named under oath by a 
government witness as a Commu- 
nist.” ( McCarthyism , p. 31; cita- 
tion: Congressional Record [un- 
bound], Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16336.) 




Haldore Hanson 

“Is the Senator also aware of the 
fact that Haldore Hanson, who as 
I say was running a Communist 
paper in Peiping, China, some 15 
years ago, and today is the head 
of the technical staff on planning 
for Point 4, and that Budenz testi- 
fied that Hanson is one of the men 
who is considered to be among the 
top Communists in the country — 
so much so that Budenz said he 
carried Hansons name around 
with him. Is the Senator aware of 
that fact?” ( Congressional Record , 
May 24, 1950, p. 7599.) 

“Here is a man who worked on 
the Communist edition of a maga- 
zine; who praised Communists; 
who was co-editor of a Commu- 
nist paper in China; who was 
named by a Government witness 
under oath as a member of the 
Communist Party.” ( Izaak Walton 
League, Fond du Lac, Wise., July 


Ruth Marcia Harrison 

“I will not read all the charges. 

One is that she belonged to a vast 
number of Communist fronts, plus 
a Communist organization; that 
she belonged to the Young Com- 
munist League, was a paid-up 
member of it.” ( Congressional 
Record, Aug. 9, 1951, p. 9707.) 

Myron Victor Hunt 

(Mr. Hunt was named by Mc- 
Carthy on the Senate floor, Au- 
gust 9, 1951, as having been one 
of the persons whose name he 
had given to the Tydings Commit- 
tee a year earlier. McCarthy point- 
ed out that Mr. Hunt was current- 
ly in loyalty-security channels in 
the Department but he gave no 
particulars against him.) 

Philip C. Jessup 

“Prof. Jessup must therefore be “I would like to discuss with you 
credited by the American people the case of one of the individuals 



with having pioneered the smear 
campaign against China and Chi- 
ang Kai-Shek, and with being the 
originator of the myth of the 
(democratic) Chinese Commu- 

“From that time onward we wit- 
nessed the spectacle of this three- 
horse team of smears and untruths 
thundering down the stretch — 
Jessup’s publications, Far Eastern 
Survey , the Daily Worker , and 
Isvestia . What an effective job 
they did can best be demonstrated 
by the fact that this was the line 
which the State Department fol- 
lowed in formulating its far-east- 
ern policy, right down to the last 
comma. . . . 

“In this connection it should be 
noted that Dr. Jessup was also 
quite a joiner. Perhaps he was also 
a dupe in this respect, but it is 
rather significant that the only or- 
ganizations that he so prolifically 
joined were Communist-front or- 
ganizations — 

“I personally have stated that I 
thought that Jessup was a well- 
meaning dupe of the Lattimore 
crowd. However, I do not think 
the decision on that point is up to 
me; but rather, it is up to the Con- 
gress and the American people. . . . 

“One can understand a person 
standing by his friend on a private 
basis; but Dr. Jessup, as Ambas- 
sador-at-large, represents the 
American people. He is supposed 
to be aware of the dangerous tac- 
tic of infiltration as practiced by 
Stalin s police state. To put it mild- 
ly, Jessup’s reaction to gross dis- 
loyalty seems obtuse. He can say 
without qualification and as a most 
important public official, that he 
can see no reason whatever to 
change his opinion about Hiss’ 

whom I consider most dangerous 
to this country. As I said before, 
when I gave this on the Senate 
floor, they shouted, McCarthy you 
gave this under Senatorial immun- 
ity. I am talking about Philip C. 
Jessup, the Ambassador-at-large. 
... He has not only a great affin- 
ity for Communist causes, he has 
a great affinity for Communist em- 
ployees, Communist friends, Com- 
munist-money supported publica- 
tions, and a great affinity for Com- 
munist public supported organiza- 
tions.” (New York City, Veterans 
of Foreign Wars, Aug. 30, 1951.) 

“Whether or not Mr. Jessup was 
a dupe, don’t think for a moment 
that the Communists did not know 
what they were buying when they 
paid thousands of dollars to enable 
his publication to act as the lead 
horse in that 3-horse team which 
so effectively convinced a sizeable 
number of individuals in the State 
Department and a great mass of 
honest, sincere, loyal Americans 
that the Communists in China 
were not Communists at all and 
that Chiang Kai-shek represented 
everything that was evil.” (Wash- 
ington, D. C., American Newspa- 
per Editors Society, April 20, 
1950 .) 


37 * 

veracity, loyalty, and integrity, 
even though an American jury has 
convicted him of perjury and what 
amounts to far-reaching espionage 
on damaging evidence which sat- 
isfied the jury and a Federal judge 
that Hiss beyond reasonable 
doubt, has proved to be an under- 
ground Communist agent. 

‘This is in the very best Acheson 
tradition of ‘not turning one’s back* 
on treason.” ( Congressional Rec- 
ord, March 30, 1950, pp. 4402-4.) 

Maby Jane Keeney 


T took a typical case in order to 
show just what it meant to be 
cleared by the Loyalty Board. It 
was a case in which the Board had 
documentation with respect to 28 
organizations which had been de- 
clared to be Communist-front or- 
ganizations. They had not been 
declared Communist-front organi- 
zations by McCarthy, but they had 
been declared Communist-front 
organizations by the Attorney 
General, the House Un-American 

“Then there was a Mrs. Mary 
Jane Keeney from the Board of 
Economic Warfare in the State 
Department, who was named in a 
F.B.I. report and a House Com- 
mittee report as a courier for the 
Communist Party while working 
for the Government. And where 
do you think Mrs. Keeney is — she 
is now an editor in the U.N. Docu- 
ments Bureau.” (Speech to Ohio 
County Women’s Republican 
Club, Wheeling, West Virginia; 
read into the Congressional Rec- 
ord , February 20, 1950, p. 1956.) 


"As you know, the first case pre- 
sented to the Committee was of 
one Judge Dorothy Kenyon. The 
case consisted of photostatic docu- 
ments showing membership in and 
sponsorship of 28 Communist- 
front organizations, named as such 
not by me, but by the Attorney 
General, or Congressional Com- 
mittees. I erred. Judge Kenyons 
files show membership in exactly 
52 organizations of this type — not 
28 — but at the time I had obtained 


Activities Committee, the Cali- 
fornia Committee, the Coudert 
Committee. I presented her case 
to the Committee to show that 28, 
according to our exhibits, showed 
her name, and showed that she 
was a sponsor of the organizations. 
The Committee did not even go 
through the motions of calling her 
and asking her ‘Judge, why did 
you join? Were; you a dupe, or did 
you join purposely?’ That was the 
importance of the Kenyon case. 
( Congressional Record , p. 4380- 
81^ Mar. 30, 1950.) 

“Here again we have this promi- 
nent State Department official. 
Judge Kenyon, crying aloud in 
anguish for a fellow red.” (Tt/- 
dings Hearings , p. 68.) 

photostatic proof of only 28 in- 
stances. . . . 

“The State Department’s Loy- 
alty Board, however, never once 
questioned Judge Kenyon person- 
ally or by mail, regarding her pen- 
chant for fronts. Nor have her 
views regarding the conviction of 
Alger Hiss been entertained [in- 
vestigated?] by the State Depart- 
ment as an obvious indication of 
how she thinks.” (American News- 
paper Editors Society, Washing- 
ton, D. C., April 20, 1950. ) 

Leon Keyserling 

“The evidence before the Mc- 
Carran committee is to the effect — 
that evidence has not yet been 
made public, and I hesitate to 
make it public except that I think 
the Senate should have the infor- 
mation at this time — the sworn 
evidence before the McCarran 
Committee is to the effect that 
Leon Keyserling had been ap- 
proached and asked to join the 
Communist Party. At the time he 
said he agreed with all the prin- 
ciples of the party except that he 
would not agree on the necessity 
for a so-called “black belt” or Ne- 
gro republic in the South. He 
would not agree with the Commu- 
nist Party on that point. I am re- 
ferring now to the sworn testimony 
before the Board. He also dis- 
agreed with tiie Communist Par- 
ty’s theory that the United States 
could be communized only through 



a bloody revolution.” (Congres- 
sional Record , April 21, 1952, p. 


Mrs. Leon Keyserling 

"The evidence presented to the 
Board [Commerce Department’s 
Loyalty Board] shows that Mrs. 

Mary Dublin Keyserling had been 
a member of the Communist Party 
and that she belonged to an un- 
limited number of Communist 
fronts.” ( C ongressional Record, 

April 21, 1952, p. 4153.) 

Owen Lattimore 

"Subsequently, in executive ses- 
sion, I told the subcommittee, that 
I thought this man was one of the 
top Communist agents in this 
country. Today, I intend to give 
the Senate some documentation to 
show that he is a Soviet agent and 
also that he either is, or at least has 
been a member of the Communist 
Party. . . . 

"He is undoubtedly the most 
brilliant and scholarly of all the 
Communist propagandists, and 
also the most subtle of the evangel- 
ists who have deceived the Ameri- 
can people about the Chinese 
Communists. . . . 

'Thus we have the picture of 
Lattimore using his high office in 
the O.W.I. to spread the Commu- 
nist line for China thru a Chinese 
Communist whose son now awaits 
being seated as a representative of 
the Chinese Communists in the 
U.N.; and it is important to point 
out that Lattimore’s maneuver was 
based upon fraud and misrepre- 
sentation in his intended decep- 

"Budenz testified he attended 
Communist Politburo meetings of 
the Communist Party and that at 
one of those meetings a Party line 
change was transmitted from Mos- 
cow to the Politburo from Owen 
Lattimore via Frederick Vander- 
bilt Field. 

"Budenz testified unequivocally 
that his official information was 
that Lattimore was a member of 
the Party and that one of the tasks 
assigned to Lattimore was to re- 
cruit Communist and fellow-trav- 
eler writers to sell to the American 
people and to the State Depart- 
ment the Communist Party line on 

"Budenz further testified that 
Lattimore was a member of a Red 
cell in the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions — the job of which was to sell 
the Communist line on China. 

"Budenz testified that top secret 
instructions which went out to 
Communist leaders throughout the 
country were seen by him and that 
they bore Lattimore’s Party identi- 


tion of his superior” ( Congression - fication symbol ‘XL* ” ( Republi- 
al Record, March 30, 1950, pp. can Rally, Wauwatosa, Wise., Sept. 
4374 " 75 > 4385-96. ) 14, 1950. ) 

Paul Lefantieff-Lee 

“His file in the Navy Depart- 
ment, which was transmitted to the 
State Department, shows that he 
took secret State Department doc- 
uments, which were found in his 
room and picked up by naval intel- 
ligence. That is shown by the naval 
intelligence report.” ( Congression- 
al Record, Aug. 9, 1951, p. 9708. ) 

Esther Less 

( also known as Esther Less Kopelewich) 

(Miss Less was named by Mc- 
Carthy on the Senate floor, August 
9, 1951, as having been one of the 
persons whose name he had given 
to the Tydings Committee a year 
earlier. McCarthy pointed out that 
Miss Less was currently in loyalty- 
security channels in die Depart- 
ment but he gave no particulars 
against her. ) 

David Demarest Lloyd 

"... another individual whom I 
discussed last year because of his 
communistic activities — a man 
who was then on the payroll of the 
Defense Establishment, but loaned 
to the President and working in the 
White House. Since then this indi- 
vidual has been promoted to a 
$i7,5oo-a-yeai job. I believe that 
his correct title is Administrative 
Assistant to the President. In view 
of his promotion to a job of consid- 
erable power in the White House, I 
felt in duty-bound called upon to 



give the Senate some further pic- 
ture of this man, David Demarest 
Lloyd.” ( C ongressional Record , 
Jan. 15, 1952, p. 193.) 

Val Lorwin 

“I understand that two of the in- 
dividuals [from a list McCarthy 
had read to the Senate] were sus- 
pended [pending adjudication of 
loyalty and security charges] .They 
are . . . and Val Lorwin. ( Congres- 
sional Record , August 9, 1951, p. 

Daniel F. 

“Originally the appointment of 
this man was disapproved on the 
ground that he was a bad loyalty 
and security risk. He was hired 
anyway.” ( Congressional Record , 
August 9, 1951, p. 9707. ) 

“Lorwin was suspended under 
the State Departments Loyalty 
Program ( according to a letter re- 
ceived from the Chairman of the 
Civil Service Loyalty Review 
Board in June, 1951).” ( McCarthy - 
ism, p. 13.) 


Peveril Meigs 

“The next case is that of Peveril 
Meigs. Meigs was No. 3 on my list. 
He was not No. 3 in order of im- 
portance but merely accidentally 
No. 3 on the list. He was allowed 
to resign from his job with the 
State Department with a clear rec- 
ord. The State Department made 
no notation on his record to the ef- 
fect that he was under investiga- 
tion. He got a job in the Military 
Establishment. The Army loyalty 
board called hearings on Meigs 
and he was ordered discharged 
from the Army.” ( Congressional 
Record, May 26 , 1952, p. 5963.) 

“On February 20, I believe, I 
laid before the Senate the case of 
Peveril Meigs. The State Depart- 
ment held a hearing. They knew 

“Meigs was allowed to resign 
from the State Department with a 
clear record. He then obtained a 
job with the Military Establish- 
ment. He was discharged from that 
job under the Loyalty Program.” 
( McCarthyism , p. 13. ) 


that they could not conceivably 
clear Peveril Meigs, even with the 
type of Board which they have. 
What did they do? They notified 
him that he would not be cleared, 
so he then resigned, went over to 
the Army and got a job in the 
Army, with no notification to the 
Army that this man was an ex- 
tremely bad security risk because 
of close association with espionage 
agents. It was only after we called 
the Army’s attention to the case 
that the Army Loyalty Board took 
the case up, and of course, they 
promptly ordered him discharged.” 
(Congressional Record , January 
15 > 1952 , p. 192 0 

Ella M. Montague 

“She worked for the Amtorg 
Trading Corp. The testimony be- 
fore three different committees is 
that only top members of the Com- 
munist Party could work for Am- 
torg.” ( Congressional Record , Au- 
gust 9, 1951, p, 9707.) 

Phtlleo Nash 

“As to the matter developed by 
the FBI there are nine principal 

“1. That Philleo Nash, the Presi- 
dent’s adviser, had been in close 
contact with lie Communist un- 
derground in Washington. 

“2. That he had been a close 
friend and a close associate of one 
of the convicted Canadian Com- 

“3. We shall skip that one; some 
of these Mr. President, I think 
should not go into the Record . 

“4. Also omitted. 



"5. That he has financially con- 
tributed to the support of the Cana- 
dian Tribune , the official organ of 
the Communist Party in Canada. 

"6. That during the early forties 
parts of the Communist spy ring in 
Canada were using his home in 
Toronto as a point of rendezvous, 
and some of them were living there. 

“7 & 8. I believe we had better 

“9. That Philleo Nash in the 
early forties was attending Com- 
munist meetings and had officially 
joined the Communist Party.” 
( Congressional Record , Jan. 29, 
1952 , p. 581.) 

Franz Leopold Neumann 

(Mr. Neumann was named by 
McCarthy on the Senate floor, Au- 
gust 9, 1951, as having been one of 
the persons whose name he had 
given to the Tydings Committee a 
year earlier. McCarthy pointed out 
that Mr. Neumann was currently 
in loyalty-security channels in the 
Department but he gave no partic- 
ulars against him. ) 

Olga V. Osnatch 

“She worked for the Russian Em- 
bassy in Turkey for 3 years. Then 
with the Russian Welfare Society 
and so forth. One of the significant 
things here, of course, is that the 
Russians do not hire people in their 
embassies unless they are Commu- 
nists.” ( Congressional Record , 

Aug. 9, 1951, p. 9707.) 

Edward G. Posniak 

“An FBI agent who joined the “In 1948 Letters of Charges were 

Communist Party at the request of filed against Posniak after the re- 
the Bureau in 1937 and was ex- ports of 9 FBI investigators were 


pelled from the Communist Party 
in 1948 and whose record as an in- 
formant was one of complete relia- 
bility, stated that [Posniak] . . . 
was a member of the Communist 
Party and personally known to him 
as such. . . . ” ( Congressional Rec- 
ord, July 25, 1950, p. 10928. ) 

( McCarthy did not reveal Pos- 
niak’s name when he synthesized 
the FBI report; Senator Wayne 
Morse, however, who had knowl- 
edge of the matter, immediately 
identified the man McCarthy was 
speaking of as Edward Posniak.) 


presented to the State Depart- 
ment. . . . 

“At the time of the hearing he 
was cleared by a 2 to 1 vote of the 
State Department loyalty panel. 
After I gave the Senate a resume of 
the 9 FBI reports on Posniak, his 
loyalty-security case reopened and 
he was allowed to resign while his 
case was pending. He has since 
been before a federal grand jury, 
but as far as is known at the time 
this is written, no action has been 
taken on his case.” ( McCarthyism, 
p. 29.) 

Philip Raine 

“He is tied up, in the letter of 
charges, very closely with Robert 
T. Miller, who has been identified 
under oath several times as a Rus- 
sian espionage agent.” (Congres- 
sional Record, August 9, 1951, p. 


William Remington 

“I stated to them [the Tydings 
Committee] that they would find 
in his file the statements of men 
who were in the Communist move- 
ment with him, showing that he 
also was a member of the Commu- 
nist Party.” ( Congressional Rec- 
ord, July 25, 1950, p. 10913.) 

“Remington was convicted in 
connection with his membership in 
the Communist Party and sen- 
tenced to 5 yrs. Evidence present- 
ed at his trial showed that he had 
supplied secret government docu- 
ments to a Soviet courier.” ( Mc- 
Carthyism, p. 13. ) 

Robert Ross 

(Mr. Ross was named by Mc- 
Carthy on the Senate floor, August 
9, 1951, as having been one of the 
persons whose name he had given 
to the Tydings Committee a year 
earlier. McCarthy pointed out that 
Mr. Ross was currently in loyalty- 



security channels in the Depart- 
ment but he gave no particulars 
against him. ) 

Sylvia Schimmel 

( Miss Schimmel was named by 
McCarthy on the Senate floor, Au- 
gust 9, 1951, as having been one of 
the persons whose name he had 
given to the Tydings Committee a 
year earlier. McCarthy pointed out 
that Miss Schimmel was currently 
in loyalty-security channels in the 
Department but he gave no partic- 
ulars against her. ) 

Frederick Schuman 

"Was the Senator aware at the 
time he cleared Frederick Schu- 
man that Frederick Schuman had 
belonged to 35 organizations 
which had been officially labeled 
either by the Attorney General or 
by a Congressional Committee as 
front-supported organizations do- 
ing the work of the Communist 
Party?” ( Congressional Record , 
Dec. 19, 1950, p. 16747.) 

“Another is Dr. Frederick Schu- 
man whose job was to lecture and 
train State Department employees 
who were to be placed in Commu- 
nist trouble spots. 

“He was associated with a vast 
number of organizations officially 
listed as fronts for and doing the 
foul work for the Communist Par- 
ty. For example he was a member 
of the American Council on Soviet 
Relations, the American Russian 
Institute, Civil Rights Congress, 
the Friends of the Soviet Union, 
and on and on. He also headed up 
a campaign for Wallace for Presi- 
dent.” (Izaak Walton League, 
Fond du Lac, Wise., July 30, 1950. ) 

John Stewart Service 

"... the same John Service who 
in 1944, according to General Pat- 
rick Hurley’s papers, advocated 
that we torpedo Chiang Kai-shek, 
and who officially as a representa- 
tive of the State Department said 
that the only hope of Asia was 
Communism. The same John Serv- 

“Service was named by our Am- 
bassador to China as one of the 
men who was serving the cause of 
Communism in China. He asked 
the President to remove Service. 
He said that this mans actions are 
not good for the United States, 
they are good for Russia. While in 



ice was later picked up by the FBI 
on charges of espionage.” ( Con- 
gressional Record , Jan. 5, 1950, p. 
1973- ) 


"I pointed out to the Senate that 
Shapley had headed up this out- 
fit that the State Department 
called a tool of Russia and a sound- 
ing board for Communist propa- 
ganda.” ( Congressional Record , 
Feb. 20, 1950, p. 1973.) 


"Stone’s Communist activities 
are legion, and I will not attempt 
to describe all of them. It is of 
some interest to note that he was 
one of the co-editors of Amerasia. 
Amerasia has been described by 
the FBI as a ‘tool of Soviet espion- 
age/ ” ( Congressional Record , 

Aug. 9, 1951, p. 9706.) 

China, Service, in secret recom- 
mendations to the State Depart- 
ment, urged that the Communists 
were the only hope of China. Later 
Service, and five others were 
picked up by the FBI. . . . Among 
other things, the FBI produced 
microphone recordings from a ho- 
tel room which showed that Serv- 
ice had turned over to a known 
Communist, not only State Depart- 
ment documents, but also secret 
military information.” (Speech in 
Baltimore, Md., Sept. 15, 1950.) 


"Shapley was Chairman of a 
conference held in New York in 
March, 1949, which President Tru- 
man denounced as a tool of Russia 
and a sounding board for Commu- 
nist propaganda. But what does 
Acheson do? He rewards Shapley, 
the Chairman of the Conference 
which Truman called a tool of Rus- 
sia, by giving him an appointment 
to represent the State Department 
on a U.N. Commission — paid for, 
of course, largely out of your pock- 
ets. The list of Communist-front 
organizations to which he be- 
longed is legion.” (Isaac Walton 
League, Fond du Lac, Wise., July 
3°> W-) 

T. Stone 

"Another typical case of State 
Department ‘clearance’ is that of 
William T. Stone. On March 22, 
1946, the State Department Secur- 
ity Office made the following rec- 
ommendation on Stone: 

‘“In behalf of the above-men- 
tioned, it is recommended that ac- 
tion be instituted to terminate his 
services with the State Depart- 
ment immediately. It is suggested. 



to achieve this purpose, that an ap- 
propriate officer of the Department 
should inform Mr. Stone that his 
continued employment in the De- 
partment is embarrassing to the 
Department and he should be 
given an opportunity to resign. If 
he should not resign voluntarily, 
action should be immediately in- 
stituted under Civil Service Rule 
No. 3 to terminate his service with 
the Department/ ” ( McCarthyism, 
p. 30, quoting Third Supplemen- 
tal Appropriation Bill 1951, Senate 
Appropriations Committee, April 
*95i> P- 4 0 &) 

Frances M. Tuchser 

(Miss Tuchser was named by 
McCarthy on the Senate floor, Au- 
gust 9, 1951, as having been one of 
the persons whose name he had 
given to the Tydings Committee a 
year earlier. McCarthy pointed out 
that Miss Tuchser was currently 
in loyalty-security channels in the 
Department but he gave no par- 
ticulars against her. ) 

John Carter Vincent 

“Vincent is charged with being a 
member of the Communist Party, 
and to the best of my knowledge 
he is also charged with espionage 
activities while in Switzerland.” 
( Congressional Record, Aug. 9, 
195 1 . P- 97 06 -) 

“John Carter Vincent, State De- 
partment official repeatedly ac- 
cused in Congress of pro-Commu- 
nist operations. . . . 

“John Carter Vincent, who has 
been named under oath as a mem- 
ber of the Communist Party.” 

“In 1944 Lattimore and John 
Carter Vincent ( named by a gov- 
ernment witness under oath as a 
Communist ) , upon the recommen- 
dation of Lauchlin Currie ( named 
under oath as a member of a Com- 
munist spy ring), accompanied 
Vice President Henry Wallace on 
a tour of China.” ( McCarthyism , 
PP- 30, 33> 62 -) 

Appendix E 

Press Coverage Given to McCarthy’s 
Nine Public Cases 

Dorothy Kenyon 

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 

Mar. 8, p. 1. “McCarthy Names Woman in State Dept. Red Inquiry” 

Mar. 14, p. 1. “McCarthy's Red Charges Denied by Judge Kenyon” 
2 columns (hereafter referred to as cols. ) This story includes Mc- 
Carthy's accusations against Shapley, Duran, and Service on 
p. 6A. 

Mar. 9, p. 4A. quotes from Kenyon telegram to Tydings Committee 
calling McCarthy's charges “outrageous and maliciously false.” 
New York Times 

Mar. 9, p. 1. “McCarthy Says Miss Kenyon Helped 28 Red Front 
Groups,” over 2 cols. 

Mar. 15, p. 1. “Miss Kenyon Cites Patriotic Record to Refute 
Charges” (Reply about equally prominent), approx. 3 cols. 

San Francisco Chronicle 

Mar. 9, pp. 1, 7. “McCarthy's Spy Hunt — Senator Accuses Dorothy 
Kenyon Ex-UN Delegate,” 1 col. Jessup named in same story but 
less conspicuously; much space devoted to Kenyon denial. 

Mar. 15, p. 7. “Outrageous Charges,” Vi col. 

Des Moines Register 

Mar. 9, pp. 1, 6. Kenyon mentioned very inconspicuously under 
headline “Wrangling by Senate Group Delays Probe — Tydings 
Tries to Put McCarthy on Spot,” 2^/2 cols. 

Mar. 15, p. 8. “Dorothy Kenyon is ‘Not Disloyal' says Hickenlooper 
after Hearing,” over 1 col. of Kenyon reply. 

Washington Post 

Mar. g, pp. 1, 5. “Ex-Judge Hurls Lie at McCarthy's Red Charge,” 
3-col. story. 

Mar. 15, pp. 1, 2. “Miss Kenyon Denies Red Link Before Senate 
Unit,” 2 cols.; picture of Kenyon on front page. 

Haldore Hanson 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch 

Mar. 13, pp. 1, 6. Accusation and Hanson press statement. 

Mar. 28, pp. 1, 6A. Hanson denial — not headlined. 

New York Times 

Mar. 14, pp. i, 4. “McCarthy Accuses Point Four Official,” over 
2 cols. 



Mar. 29, p. 3. "McCarthy Is Dared To Drop Immunity — Hanson 
Testifies He Will Sue for Libel if Accuser Makes Charge Outside 
Congress,” 2-col. story and picture. 

San Francisco Chronicle 

Mar. 14, pp. 1, 8. "Disloyalty Hearing — Senator McCarthy Names 
3 More Communists,” over 1 col. 

Mar. 29, p. 5. "McCarthy Challenged — Hanson Calls on Senator to 
Repeat His Charges Without Immunity,” over 1 col. large head- 

Des Moines Register 

Mar. 14. Hanson not mentioned at all; only Brunauer and Lattimore. 

No coverage of his reply either. 

Washington Post 

Mar. 14, pp. 1, 3. Hanson mentioned under headline "McCarthy 
Adds Four, Including Lattimore to Pro-Red Roster,” 3-col. story. 

Mar. 29, p. 2. "McCarthy Juggled Facts, Hanson Says,” 1 col.; large 
headline; picture of Hanson. 

Esther Brunauer 

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 

Mar. 13, p. 1. Same story as Kenyon reply. 

Mar. 28, p. 6A. "angrily denied McCarthy’s accusations,” same story 
as Hanson denial. 

New York Times 

Mar. 14, p. 4. Same story as Hanson; less prominent. 

Mar. 28, p. 3. "Red Leaning Denied by Mrs. Brunauer,” over 2 cols. 

San Francisco Chronicle 

Mar. 14, p. 8. not named until tag-end of Lattimore-Hanson story. 
Separate headline, p. 8., short story "Woman Denies Charge by 
McCarthy.” No coverage of Brunauer’s reply of the 27th. 

Des Moines Register 

Mar. 14, p. 7. no story; only picture and caption. 

Mar. 28, p. 9. Brief reporting of Brunauer’s testimony. 

Washington Post 

Mar. 14, pp. 1, 3. "McCarthy Adds Four, Including Lattimore to 
Pro-Red Roster,” 3-col. story. 

Mar. 28, pp. 1, 2. "Mrs. Brunauer Hits Charges; Reveals Threats to 
Family”; bottom of page; over 1 col. 

Philip Jessup 

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 

Mar. 8, p. 9 A. Jessup named inconspicuously in continuation of 
Kenyon story. 

Mar. 20, pp. 1, 6. Large headline: "Jessup Accuses McCarthy of 
Shocking Disregard for Interests of Our Country.” Very promi- 
nent 3-col. story with lengthy quotes from Jessup’s statement. 



New York Times 

Mar. 9, p. 1. Less prominently named in same story as Kenyon: over 
2 cols. 

Mar. 16, p. 20. Short item: “Jessup Calls Charges Baseless.” 

Mar. 21, p. 1. “Jessup Denounces McCarthy Charges as Danger to 
U.S” 3J4 col. story but mostly in continuation on p. 25. Support- 
ing letters from Marshall and Eisenhower quoted in full. 

San Francisco Chronicle 

Mar. 9, pp. 1, 7. named less conspicuously in same story as Kenyon 

Mar. 21, p. 1. “Criticism of State Dept. — Marshall ‘Shocked" by At- 
tack on Envoy Jessup; Truman Backs up Acheson/" 1 col. 

Mar. 21, p. 7. “Charges ‘In Effect" Aid Communism — Jessup Coun- 
terattacks, Accuses McCarthy,” over 1 col. 

Des Moines Register 

Jessup accusation not mentioned. 

Mar. 21, pp. 1, 6. Large page-width headline “Marshall, Ike Back 
Jessup,” 2-col. story. 

Washington Post 

Mar. 9, p. 5. inconspicuously reported accusation in Kenyon story. 

Mar. 21, pp. 1, 5. “Jessup Lashes Sharply at McCarthy,” 2 cols.; 
picture; texts of letters backing Jessup quoted separately on 
front page. 

Owen Lattimore 

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 

Mar. 13, p 1. about 1 col. including Brunauer and Hanson accusa- 

Mar. 27, pp. 1, 2A. “Moonshine, Is Lattimore Reply to McCarthy 
Charge He Is Red Spy in State Dept. ” over 2 cols. 

April 6, pp. 1, 4. “Lattimore Calls McCarthy Chinese Nationalist 
Dupe, over 2 cols.; prominent. 

May 3, pp. 1, 5. Lattimore denial of all charges against him and wife. 

New York Times 

Mar. 14, p. 4. less prominently mentioned in same story as Hanson. 

Mar. 28, p. 1. dismissed McCarthy charges as “Pure Moonshine,” 
small sub-headline. 

April 7, p. 1. “Lattimore Denies He was Ever a Red; Tydings Clears 
Him,” 3 cols. 

April 21, p. 1. “Lattimore Accused by Budenz as a Red,” Over 4-cols, 
mostly on p. 2. 

May 3, pp 1, 2. “Lattimore Calls Budenz ‘Informer," Lying for a 
Profit/" 2 Y* cols. 

San Francisco Chronicle 

Mar. 14, pp. 1, 8. not very conspicuously mentioned in same story as 

Mar. 28, p. 1. “McCarthy’s Charges Called ‘Moonshine/ ” 1 col. 



Mar. 29, p. 1. Short item: “Lattimore Calls Charges ‘Hallucina- 
tion/ ” 

April 7, p. 1. “Spy Investigation — FBI Files Cleared Lattimore, Tyd- 
ings Says; but McCarthy Doesn’t Believe It”; prominent story. 

April 21, pp. 1, 7. “McCarthy Charges — Lattimore Called a Spy by 
Budenz, but General Asserts He’s Loyal Citizen” (refers to ex- 
MacArthur aide), over 2 cols.; very prominent continuation of 
story with large pictures of hearings. 

May 3, pp. 1, 6 “McCarthy Disgraceful, Budenz Lies for Profit, 
Says Owen Lattimore,” over 2 cols. 

Des Moines Register 

Mar. 14, No story; only picture and caption, p. 7. 

April 7, p. 5. “Lattimore’s FBI Record Called Clear”; over 2 cols.; 

April 20, pp. 1, 8. page-width headline: “Retired General Backs 
Lattimore.” Budenz accusation not headlined but reported at 
length, 3-cols. 

May 3, p. 6. “Senate Urged by Lattimore: End ‘Nonsense/” 2 cols. 

Washington Post 

Mar. 14, p. 1. “McCarthy Adds Four, Including Lattimore to Pro- 
Red Roster,” 3 cols.; picture on front page. 

April 7, pp. 1, 21. “Files Clear Lattimore, Tydings Says.” Subtitle: 
“Far Eastern Expert Declares McCarthy Charges Are ‘Lies’; Calls 
Senator Dupe,” nearly 4 cols. 

April 21, pp. 1, 2. “Reds Called Lattimore Communist, Budenz 
Says,” over 4 cols.; picture of both on front page. 

Gustavo Duran 

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 

Mar. 14, p. 6A. Duran mentioned under headline of Kenyon denial. 
His reply to charges mentioned in same story. 

New York Times 

Mar. 15, p. 1. Mentioned in same story as Kenyon reply. 

San Francisco Chronicle 

Mar. 15, p. 1. Name not headlined in reporting of accusations. 

Mar. 15, p. 7. “ ‘Full of Errors’ — ExSpaniard and Former State Dept. 
Official Says McCarthy is Wrong.” Short story. 

Des Moines Register 
no mention. 

Washington Post 

Mar. 15, p. 2. Accusation and denial in same story as Service, Schu- 
man, Shapley. Over 2 cols. 

Harlow Shapley 

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 

Mar. 14, p. 6A. Accusation and reply to press. Same story as Schu- 
man, etc. 

New York Times 

Mar. 15, p. 1. same story as Kenyon reply. 


3 8 7 

San Francisco Chronicle 

Mar. 15, p. 1. “Disloyalty Charges — McCarthy Names Four More, 
Including Shapley; State Dept. Issues Denials,” less than 1 col. — 
partly devoted to Kenyon Denial. 

Mar. 15, p. 7. “Shapley Calls Story Untrue — and Boring.” Pictures 
of Kenyon, Shapley and Schuman on this page and 3 separate 
short stories on replies of Shapley, Schuman and Duran. 

Washington Post 

Mar. 15, p. 2. Accusation and reply reported along with Duran and 
Schuman. Over 2 cols. 

Frederick Schuman 

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 

Mar. 14, p. 6A. Accusation reported in same story as Service, Shap- 

New York Times 

Mar. 15, p. 1. Accusation in same story as Kenyon reply. 

Des Moines Register 

No mention. 

San Francisco Chronicle 

Mar. 15, p. 7. Short story on Schuman denial of charge. 

Mar. 15, p. 1. Accusation — name not headlined. 

Washington Post 

Mar. 15, p. 2. Accusation and reply reported with those of Duran 
and Shapley. 

John S. Service 

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 

Mar. 14, p. 6A. Service mentioned under headline of Kenyon reply. 

June 22, p. 7A. Long story on Service answer with voluminous 
quotes from his statement; picture. 

New York Times 

Mar. 15, ]). 1. Same story as Kenyon reply. 

June 23, pp. 1, 4. “Service Concedes He Briefed Jaffe” sub-heading: 
“But State Dept. Officer Denies He Turned Over Data on Secret 
Military Plans.” 4 cols. 

San Francisco Chronicle 

Mar. 15, p. 1. Accusation not headlined. 

June 22, pp. 1, 5. “Amerasia Inquiry — Service Denies Passing Any 
Secret Data,” over 1 col. 

Des Moines Register 

Accusation not reported. 

June 23, pp. 1, 7. “Briefed Jaffe on China War, Service Says”; Sub- 
head: “But Denied Revealing Vital Secrets,” over 3 cols. 

Washington Post 

Mar. 15, p. 2. Same story as Kenyon denial; accusation of Service not 

June 23, pp. 1, 14. “Service Says China Charges Are Unfounded,” 
approx. 3 cols. 

Appendix F 

The George Marshall Episode 

Senator McCarthy delivered a 60,000 word speech on the floor 
of the Senate, on June 14, 1951, examining the career of General 
George Marshall and concluding, on the basis of the evidence he 
presented, that Marshall is “steeped in falsehood,” and that he has 
“recourse to the lie whenever it suits his convenience.” McCarthy 
concluded his survey of Marshall's career by asking, 

How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that 
men high in this Government are concerting to deliver us to disaster? 
This must be the product of a great conspiracy, a conspiracy on a scale 
so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. 
A conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its prin- 
cipals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men 

What can be made of this unbroken series of decisions and acts con- 
tributing to the strategy of defeat? They cannot be attributed to incom- 
petence. If Marshall were merely stupid, the laws of probability would 
dictate that part of his decisions would serve his country's interest. 

McCarthy has said that he did not call Marshall a traitor. Strictly 
speaking, he is correct. And, in fact, a year after making his speech, 
McCarthy wrote “If [Marshall] . . . made mistakes, that is no dis- 
grace. Only those who do nothing make no mistakes. To prove that 
Marshall made mistakes does not indict Marshall of being either 
incompetent or of following the Communist cause”; and to the di- 
rect question, “Did you accuse Marshall of being a traitor,” McCar- 
thy answered, “No.”* 

It is, however, unreasonable to conclude, on the basis of the para- 
graphs quoted above, that McCarthy was charging Marshall with 
anything less than pro-Communism. In doing so, McCarthy aroused 
more resentment than with any other single act in his stormy ca- 
reer— save, possibly, his attack on Philip Jessup. 

Marshall was not a typical “McCarthy case.” McCarthy did not 

0 McCarthyism , op.cit pp. 68-69. 



impugn Marshall’s loyalty on the ground that he had belonged to 
a number of Communist fronts; or that he had been seen at clan- 
destine meetings of the Party; or that he had filched secret docu- 
ments and turned them over to members of a Soviet spy ring. 
Rather, McCarthy impugned Marshall’s loyalty on the grounds 
that, over a pe riod of years, his policy decisions advanced the Com- 
munist cause and retarded our own. He reconstructed Marshall’s 
public record after delving laboriously into the memoirs of Leahy, 
Churchill, Mark Clark, Sherwood, Stimson, Byrnes, Stettinius, 
Welles, Hull, Arnold, Deane, Chennault, and Daniels— almost all of 
them highly vocal admirers of General Marshall. McCarthy moved 
from their reconstruction of wartime strategy and wartime and 
postwar diplomacy to an analysis of Marshall’s role in shaping 
allied policy. He concluded that, on those issues in which the inter- 
ests of the western powers and those of Russia conflicted, Marshall 
consistently sided with the policy urged by Russia. McCarthy there- 
fore inferred that Marshall was pro-Communist. 

On McCarthy’s showing, the crucial matters in Marshall’s record 

( 1 ) his inordinate anxiety to launch a second front at a time 
when we were manifestly unprepared to do so; 

(2) his insistence that the Russians be allowed to reach eastern 
Europe ahead of the Allies; 

(3) his insistence that we appease Russia at Teheran and Yalta 
in order to woo her help in the Far East; 

(4) his siding with Stalin at Teheran on the strategy of the war; 

(5) his directives to his subordinates that the Russians be in- 
dulged in their refusal to make available to us statistics on their 
“forces, their weapons, and their plans”; 

(6) his allowing the Communists first access to Berlin and 
Prague, and his failure to provide for a western corridor to Berlin; 

(7) his insistence at Yalta that we make territorial and other 
concessions to Stalin; 

(8) his role in formulating our anti-Chiang Far Eastern policy; 

(9) his personal impact on that policy while in China; 

(10) his pressure on Truman to extend further lend-lease aid to 

(11) his suppression of the Wedemeyer report which warned 
against our China policy; 

(12) his proposal that we withhold military aid from Nation- 
alist China; 



( 13 ) his “sabotage” of the military-aid program with which we 
finally went to China’s assistance; 

(14) his fixing of the thirty-eighth parallel as a dividing line 
between free and Communist K